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RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0342
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0355
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 000492 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR RICHARD NEPHEW AND MATT GOLDSTEIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018 
TAGS: KNNP PARM IAEA MNUC TRGY IR SYR UK
SUBJECT: HMG SHARES U.S. STRATEGY AND CONCERNS REGARDING 
IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA 
 
REF: SECSTATE 16285 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Rick Mills 
for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1.  (S)  Summary.  The UK shares U.S. concerns and has a 
similar strategy regarding the IAEA reports on Iran and 
Syria's nuclear programs (ref):  HMG is urging IAEA Board 
Member countries to advocate strong national statements "at 
the upcoming Board of Governors meeting (that) will reflect 
the continuing concerns of the IAEA on Iran and support its 
continuing work on nuclear issues" and to "agree to support 
the continuing IAEA investigation in Syria until Syria has 
restored confidence in its intentions."  HMG has received 
preliminary indications that Russia and China have been "a 
bit difficult" regarding a proposed P5   1 statement 
demanding Iran's immediate and full cooperation with the IAEA 
and would appreciate more information about where Russia and 
China stand.  One FCO officer opined that he was pessimistic 
about prospects for getting Russia to agree to anything more 
than an extremely anodyne statement, that China would follow 
Russia, and E3 1 should therefore set the bar low on a P5 1 
result.  End Summary. 
 
UK Demarches IAEA Board 
----------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S)  The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) sent a 
telegram to British Embassies in all IAEA Board Member 
countries, except Russia and China, on February 20 with 
instructions to urge host countries to advocate strong 
national statements "at the upcoming Board of Governors 
meeting (that) will reflect the continuing concerns of the 
IAEA on Iran and support its continuing work on nuclear 
issues," Duncan Johnson, an officer with the FCO 
Counterproliferation Department's Regional Issues Section, 
told Poloff February 23 (ref).  Johnson elaborated by telling 
Poloff that the U.S. and UK share virtually identical 
concerns and strategies regarding the progress of Iran's and 
Syria's nuclear programs.  He shared with Poloff a copy of 
the points he said had been included in the telegram to 
British Embassies. These points are reproduced at paragraph 6. 
 
¶3.  (S) In regard to a possible P5   1 statement demanding 
Iran's immediate and full cooperation with the IAEA (ref), 
Johnson said that HMG received a telegram February 20 from 
Vienna indicating that "the initial feedback is that...the 
Russians and Chinese are being a bit difficult."  Johnson 
said that HMG would appreciate information from the U.S. on 
the Russian and Chinese positions.  He underscored UK support 
for an E3   3 (or a P5  1) statement and said HMG would seek 
to coordinate with the U.S. in this regard, noting again that 
HMG "wants to see what the Russian and Chinese response will 
be." 
 
Syrian Concerns 
--------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) In regard to Syria's nuclear program, Johnson 
stressed that HMG continues to discuss "how best to handle 
Syria," adding that "our goal is to get Syria away from the 
Iranians."  He opined that "some EU countries," singling out 
France, are "very keen on reengaging Syria...and are nervous 
about pushing the Syrians too hard on the nuclear issue." 
The UK has insisted that Syria's EU Association Agreement 
move forward only if there is meaningful progress in regard 
to Syria's nuclear programs, "but we're the only ones (in the 
EU) saying it," Johnson said.  He added that HMG was 
disappointed by the "non-responsive" reaction of Non-Aligned 
Member states when the UK lobbied them last year in regard to 
Syria.  He noted that HMG's points for delivery in IAEA Board 
Member countries (see below at para 6) urges those countries 
to "agree to support the continuing IAEA investigation in 
Syria until Syria has restored confidence in its intentions." 
 
Only USG Can Influence Russia 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) FCO Iran Coordination Group Multilateral Team Leader 
Will Gelling  told  London Iran Watcher February 24 that HMG 
is in full accord with USG views on the need for strong 
statements from the IAEA Board of Governors and in the P5 1. 
HMG believes it &is worth it8 to press for a useful and 
specific statement in the P5 1, and the elements of such a 
statement should include the UNSCR,s and the IAEA report. 
Gelling argued suspension did not need to be specifically 
cited as it is already contained in the UNSCRs.   He was 
pessimistic, however, about prospects for getting Russia to 
agree to anything more than an extremely anodyne statement, 
that China would follow Russia, and E3 1 should therefore set 
the bar low on a P5 1 result.  Gelling pointedly said that 
HMG sees moving Russia as being entirely beyond the ability 
of E3 governments and &in effect completely up to the United 
States at this point,8 as HMG has, in Gelling,s view, no 
leverage with Russia in the P5 1 context.  Gelling also 
mentioned that the volumes of LEU cited in our demarche were 
"puzzling;" the FCO,s Johnson in his February 23 meeting 
with Poloff also flagged this topic and underscored that the 
FCO wanted to be &in synch8 with the U.S. in regard to what 
we state publicly about LEU volumes. 
 
¶6.  (S)  The text of the points sent by FCO to British 
Embassies, as referred to in paragraph 2, follows: 
 
Iran 
We continue to have serious concerns about Iran,s nuclear 
programme. The latest IAEA report makes clear that Iran has 
refused to suspend it proliferation sensitive activities, 
including its uranium enrichment at Natanz and construction 
of the heavy water reactor (suitable for plutonium 
production) at Arak in defiance of five UN Security Council 
Resolutions calling for them to stop. 
 
Despite five UNSCRs calling on Iran to suspend enrichment, 
the IAEA report says Iran now has more than 5500 centrifuges 
either fed with Uranium gas or running in a vacuum. It also 
states Iran has produced 1010 kg of Low Enriched Uranium. 
 
We are extremely concerned that Iran has refused IAEA 
inspectors access to the Heavy Water Reactor at Arak for a 
second time. The IAEA say this could hamper their ability to 
carry out safeguards at the facility, as requested by the 
UNSC. 
 
In the IAEA Director General,s last four reports he 
expressed concern at Iran,s failure to answer IAEA questions 
relating to studies with a possible military dimension. His 
last report in November 2008 highlighted the lack of any 
substantive progress on the issue. We call upon Iran to 
answer the IAEA,s questions and implement the transparency 
measures in the IAEA Director General,s reports. 
 
UNSCR 1835 was adopted unanimously on 27 September, 
demonstrating E3 3 unity and international determination to 
resolve the Iranian impasse diplomatically. 
 
We have made clear many times that we do not deny right,s to 
civil nuclear power under the Non Proliferation Treaty. In 
2008, the E3 3 governments refreshed their broad ranging 
offer of June 2006 to Iran. This offer included help to 
develop civil nuclear power if it suspends enrichment, as 
well as co-operation in a range of other areas. But Iran has 
failed to respond substantively to this offer and has so far 
not seriously engaged on the suggestion of a 
freeze-for-freeze agreement. 
 
We and our E3 3 will continue our dual track strategy: 
sanctions to persuade Iran to change course and dialogue to 
lead to full negotiations if the Iranians suspend their 
enrichment-related activities. 
 
Iran needs to adhere to UNSCRs and suspend its 
enrichment-related activities and comply fully with IAEA 
requests. Once that has been achieved we will be able to 
forge a more productive and positive relationship between 
Iran and the international community. 
 
Hope that your national statement at the upcoming Board of 
Governors meeting will reflect the continuing concerns of the 
IAEA on Iran and support its continuing work on nuclear 
issues. 
 
Syria 
Evidence produced in April 2008 relating to the Al Kibar site 
raised a number of serious concerns and questions about the 
likelihood that Syria was building a nuclear site with North 
Korean co-operation. 
 
We were disappointed that Syria did not provide access to all 
the sites the IAEA requested during its visit in June 2008. 
The latest IAEA report makes clear that Syria still needs to 
provide additional information about the site and about other 
locations alleged to be related to the site. 
 
Syria previously claimed that uranium traces found at the 
site were the result of the Israeli bombing. The latest IAEA 
report states that the particles were inconsistent with what 
would be expected from the use uranium based munitions. 
 
Critical therefore that Syria answers all the Agency,s 
questions and co-operates with them in a timely and 
comprehensive way. 
 
This reflects the importance of adopting and implementing the 
Additional Protocol as resulted by the IAEA (Syria has a 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement but not the Additional 
Protocol which is universally recognized as the model 
safeguards agreement). 
 
Hope that you will agree to support the continuing IAEA 
investigation in Syria until Syria has restored confidence in 
its intentions. 
 
End text. 
 
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LEBARON