VZCZCXRO6903
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #0101/01 0410601
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 100601Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9109
INFO RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH PRIORITY 5556
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0259
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000101 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EAP/MLS, IO/UNP, USUN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV USUN ECON VM
SUBJECT: VIETNAM ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL: MORE CONFIDENT, 
BUT NOT MORE AMBITIOUS 
 
REF: A. 08 HANOI 1163 
     ¶B. HANOI 60 
     ¶C. 08 HANOI 1311 
     ¶D. 08 HANOI 1094 
     ¶E. 08 HANOI 338 
     ¶F. 08 HANOI 1359 
 
HANOI 00000101  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael Michalak.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  As Vietnam enters its second year on the 
UN Security Council, few here anticipate significant 
changes in policy or approach.  Contacts in the MFA, Party, 
and think tank community express satisfaction that Vietnam 
was able to acquit itself professionally in its first year 
and had weathered what they describe as difficult votes on 
Iran, Kosovo, Georgia, and Somalia without alienating any 
of Hanoi's major international partners.  For 2009, Vietnam 
will be increasingly confident, though hardly more 
ambitious.  In a recent conversation, one of Vietnam's 
senior diplomats pledged to "do better" to work with 
Hanoi's partners.  But other than playing a more 
conspicuous role as the Council's "ASEAN representative" 
and chairing the UNSC during UNGA, Vietnam appears content, 
still, simply to have a seat at the table. 
 
¶2.  (C) COMMENT:  Vietnam can be justifiably criticized for 
an exceedingly modest agenda, and we should continue to 
emphasize that being a responsible member of the 
international community frequently entails hard choices. 
Still, charges that Vietnam has simply toed China's line 
miss the mark.  Vietnam has on important occasions voted 
with China (and Russia), but for reasons that serve 
Vietnam's perceived interests and are consistent with its 
Non-Aligned Movement principles: non-interference and an 
aversion to sanctions, an almost reverential commitment to 
consensus, and -- above all -- a desire to pursue a 
balanced, independent foreign policy.  Vietnam is not 
impervious to persuasion; however, as votes on Iran and 
Somali piracy suggest, high-level engagement is sometimes 
required, the earlier in the process the better.  END 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
¶3.  (C) A note on sources:  This cable draws on 
conversations January 21-February 9 with a range of Embassy 
contacts including Nguyen Ba Hung, MFA Americas Division 
Director General; To Anh Tuan, MFA International 
Organizations Deputy Director; Pham Tien Nhien, Director of 
the CPV External Relations Commission's Department for 
Northwest Europe and North American Affairs; Tran Nguyen 
Tuyen, Director of the Ho Chi Minh National Political 
Academy; Luan Thuy Duong, Deputy Director General of the 
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV); Nguyen Hong Son, 
Director of the DAV Institute for Foreign Policy and 
Strategic Studies; and Nguyen Quoc Chinh, Chief Foreign 
Affairs Editor for Hanoi Moi Newspaper. 
 
MODEST GOALS AND A FOCUS ON PROCESS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Vietnam actively lobbied for its UNSC seat and 
viewed its first year on the Council as a signature 
achievement, according to contacts within the MFA and CPV 
External Relations Commission.  Nevertheless, Vietnam came 
to the Council with modest goals.  As To Anh Tuan, the MFA 
official directly responsible for UNSC matters, described 
it, Vietnam sought to demonstrate that it could be a 
"reliable and constructive partner" able to "participate 
actively in discussions."  People in the MFA, Party, and 
think tank community familiar with the UN readily concede 
that Vietnam had few policy initiatives of its own and 
simply wanted to acquit itself professionally.  Pressed to 
name concrete achievements on the Council last year, our 
contacts pointed to Vietnam's turn chairing the UNSC in 
July and their Mission's decision to consult with the 
General Assembly in the drafting of UNSC mid-year reports. 
 
¶5.  (C) Vietnam's focus was largely on process, both within 
the UNSC and internally.  And at least initially, the 
process caused a great deal of "heartburn," according to 
the Chief Foreign Affairs Editor for the Party-affiliated 
Hanoi Moi newspaper, Nguyen Quoc Chinh.  As Chinh and 
others described it, the rapid pace of work, coupled with a 
12-hour time difference, presented difficulties for 
Vietnam's diplomats.  The MFA's Tuan was less direct, but 
acknowledged that he frequently had to wake his bosses in 
 
HANOI 00000101  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
the middle of the night with calls from New York. 
Eventually, many of the kinks were worked out, and the MFA 
and its UN mission developed a three-tiered system to 
determine which matters could be handled in New York, which 
required consultations with the MFA, and which could only 
be acted on with explicit instruction from Hanoi. 
According to Pham Tien Nhien, a high-ranking official in 
the CPV External Relations Commission, DPM/FM Pham Gia 
Khiem was empowered to speak for the Politburo on all but 
the most sensitive of issues. 
 
SOME TOUGH VOTES, BUT SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶6.  (C) Nhien declined to specify which decisions were 
problematic enough to need approval by the wider Politburo; 
however, contacts in the MFA and at the MFA-sponsored 
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV) identified votes on 
Iran, Kosovo, Georgia, and Somalia as particularly 
challenging.  The issues of Kosovo independence and Abhkaz 
and South Ossetian separatism -- linked, in Vietnam's mind 
-- were, if anything, more irksome than voters on Iran 
sanctions, according to the Director of the DAV Institute 
for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Nguyen Hong Son. 
This was particularly the case since the votes came in the 
run-up to important visits to Moscow (ref. A).  The 
substance of particular resolutions aside, our contacts 
expressed satisfaction that Vietnam's votes had not 
alienated any of its major international partners. 
 
PERMREP GETS A PROMOTION 
------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Several of our contacts pointed to the promotion of 
Vietnam's UN Ambassador Le Luong Minh to Vice Foreign 
Minister as evidence that the country's leadership was 
pleased with Vietnam's performance on the Council.  The 
DAV's Son said that the impetus for Minh's promotion came 
not from the MFA, but from elsewhere in the CPV hierarchy; 
in a separate conversation, Son's colleague, DAV Deputy 
Director General Luan Thuy Duong, said that many consider 
Minh to be cinch for a future spot on the Central 
Committee.  (Comment: This would be a significant 
development as VFM Pham Binh Minh, recently given full CC 
membership, is currently the only professional diplomat on 
the Central Committee.  See ref. B.  End comment.) 
 
2009:  NO SHARP TURNS 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Duong and others in the MFA cited Ambassador Minh's 
elevation to VFM status as a sign that he might be given 
more scope to make decisions on his own authority.  Others 
disagreed.  None of our contacts, however, saw the 
promotion as evidence that Vietnam would pursue a more 
ambitious agenda on the Council.  On the contrary, the 
individuals with whom we spoke were unanimous that, if 
anything, the promotion served as a senior-level 
endorsement of Vietnam's cautious approach.  While 
increasingly assured of its ability to manage the workflow, 
there would be "no sharp turns" in policy or approach, Son 
confidently asserted. 
 
¶9.  (C) Asked about Vietnam's priorities on the council in 
2009, our MFA, Party, and think tank sources could not 
identify any particular initiatives that Vietnam would seek 
to promote.  With Indonesia no longer on the Council, 
Vietnam would seek to provide an "ASEAN perspective," DDG 
Duong and the MFA's Tuan noted.  Our contacts declined to 
be more specific, save to indicate that Vietnam would be 
more mindful, broadly, of Southeast Asia's interests as a 
region; one practical consequence is that Vietnam will 
likely continue to insist that the Security Council is not 
an appropriate venue to discuss Burma (see ref. C for a 
discussion of ASEAN as a central factor in Vietnam's Burma 
policy).  Our contacts also said that Vietnam would have 
its hands full in October when it chairs the Council during 
UNGA.  Beyond these rather modest goals, Vietnam would be 
content simply to manage decisions as they come. 
 
MODEST BUT SERIOUS-MINDED 
------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) This is not to say, however, that Vietnam is 
rudderless on the Council or that it does not take policy 
 
HANOI 00000101  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
issues seriously.  In nearly every matter of substance, we 
have found our MFA International Organizations 
interlocutors to be well briefed and responsive.  Nor is it 
to say that Vietnam simply follows China's lead.  Vietnam 
has on several important occasions voted with China (and 
Russia), but for reasons that serve Vietnam's overall 
foreign policy interests and are consistent with its 
principles. 
 
¶11.  (C) Vietnam shares with China a commitment to 
non-intervention and a reflexive aversion to sanctions. 
This has caused it to align with China (and Russia) on 
issues such as Georgia and Darfur.  Like China, Vietnam 
will almost always prefer to build consensus -- such as on 
Iran sanctions -- rather than push for a position-forcing 
vote.  But Vietnam, above all, is committed to an 
independent foreign policy.  Vietnam's "friends with all" 
foreign policy is based on a clear-eyed acknowledgment of 
the country's status as a small power locked into an 
asymmetrical relationship with China.  Vietnam can 
ill-afford to ignore its northern neighbor, on the UNSC or 
elsewhere, but this does not mean that Vietnam is somehow 
in China's pocket.  (See ref. D for a wider assessment of 
Vietnam's China policy.)  If anything, Vietnam's positions 
tend to follow most closely those of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. 
 
WORKING WITH VIETNAM 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) If last year is any guide, we should not expect 
leadership from Vietnam on the Council in 2009.  But even 
with an exceedingly modest agenda, Vietnam takes its 
responsibilities seriously and is, at times, open to 
persuasion.  "Vietnam is focused on self interest, not 
ideology," the DG for the MFA's Americas Division Nguyen Ba 
Hung put it frankly.  In a recent conversation with the 
DCM, DG Hung pledged that Vietnam would "do better" in its 
second year on the Council and work more closely with the 
United States, but cautioned that the two countries would 
retain their differences.  "Of course we are not quite 
like-minded," he noted, adding that the two countries 
should at the very least consult more often to gain a 
better understanding of each others' positions. 
 
¶13.  (C) What this requires from us is a demonstration of 
respect and a commitment to consultation, as early in the 
process as possible.  Our MFA and Party contacts repeatedly 
emphasized how much Vietnam values its "partnership" with 
the United States on the Council.  Many still point to the 
February 2008 call from Secretary Rice to DPM/FM Khiem as a 
pivotal moment in Vietnam's UNSC diplomacy (ref. E)  DG 
Hung, who was with Khiem when he received the Secretary's 
call, called the conversation "historic."  More recently, 
intense discussion in Hanoi, Washington, and New York was 
successful in assuaging Vietnam's concerns about December's 
Chapter VII resolution authorizing measures against Somali 
piracy (ref. F).  Despite its perceived "success" on the 
Council, Vietnam has no pretentions that it should be 
deferred to as a great power.  Our experience is that a 
selective measure of high-level engagement, artfully 
applied, can go some way in swaying Vietnam's positions. 
MICHALAK