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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000037 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP DAS MARCIEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/11/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP RAMOS HORTA JOSE
SUBJECT: JOSE RAMOS-HORTA VISITS WASHINGTON 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Hans Klemm, Ambassador, EXEC, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  On February 24-26, 2009, Jose Ramos-Horta 
will make his first visit to Washington as President of 
Timor-Leste.  The Nobel Peace Prize laureate hopes to acquaint 
himself with leaders of the new Obama Administration and renew 
old friendships among members of the U.S. Congress.  He will 
make one or two public addresses to strengthen the profile of 
Timor-Leste in America.  President Ramos-Horta broadly will seek 
to reaffirm the U.S.-Timor-Leste partnership, express gratitude 
for past assistance including that granted in the immediate 
aftermath of the attempt on his life one year ago, and explore 
new avenues of cooperation.  Always outspoken, Ramos-Horta can 
also be expected to fault the recent decision not to make 
Timor-Leste eligible for a Millennium Challenge Cooperation 
compact.  As the leader of a young, vulnerable and fragile 
Southeast Asian democracy, we should affirm American's 
commitment and encourage Ramos-Horta to continue his efforts to 
stabilize and pull his country out of poverty on the basis of 
sound economic policy, the rule of law and national 
reconciliation.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  Elected to a five year term in May 2007 as 
Timor-Leste's second president, Jose Ramos-Horta knows the U.S. 
well, having resided in American for fifteen years during the 
Indonesian occupation of Timor (during which time he doggedly 
lobbied at the UN for Timor-Leste's recognition and 
independence, eventually earning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996) 
and as a regular participant in UN gatherings or other events. 
This will be his first visit to Washington as his country's 
President, however, and he will be seeking to meet with leaders 
of the Obama Administration as the head of state of a fragile, 
hopefully stabilizing, but still impoverished Southeast Asian 
democracy.  Within Timor-Leste, Ramos-Horta is one of the 
strongest advocates of a robust partnership with the U.S., and 
has publicly advocated for more U.S. engagement in the 
development of his country's national security capabilities.  He 
personally has directed his government to closely align itself 
with the U.S., for example, on UN votes supporting human rights 
and democracy in countries such as North Korea and Iran. 
 
¶3. (U) Ramos-Horta campaigned for president in 2007 on the 
themes of national reconciliation and fighting poverty.  Once in 
office, however, the self-styled "President of the Poor" quickly 
became frustrated by the lack of executive authority granted his 
office by Timor's constitution. Although bereft of financial 
resources or policy tools to direct antipoverty programs of his 
own, Ramos-Horta uses his bully pulpit, traveling the back roads 
of Timor-Leste more often than any other senior politician and 
scolding government ministers in public consultations for their 
ineffectiveness.  He's imaginative in finding leverage in 
unexpected ways, encouraging both the U.S. and Australian 
militaries to station engineering units in Timor-Leste to repair 
schools and clinics to improve service delivery to the 
underprivileged, in addition to training with Timor-Leste's 
military. 
 
¶4. (C) Ramos-Horta has a distinctly mixed record on his second 
major objective, fostering national reconciliation.  Coming into 
the presidency a year after the 2006 crisis, he concluded that 
the best way to achieve reconciliation was to issue a blanket 
amnesty for the perpetrators of violence, and forego the 
establishment of truth and accountability, or the provision of 
compensation for victims.  He managed to get an amnesty bill 
passed by Parliament in 2007, but it was later thrown out on 
constitutional grounds. In May 2008 Ramos-Horta pardoned the 
sole significant member of the former government to be tried and 
found guilty for actions in the 2006 crisis, again dismissing 
concerns that he might be contributing to a culture of impunity. 
 In October 2009, Ramos-Horta used the occasion of the release 
of the Indonesia-Timorese Truth and Friendship Commission report 
on the events of 1999 to again promote a general amnesty, but 
was firmly rebuked by key members of the National Parliament. 
 
¶5. (C) Also in the spirit of reconciliation, Ramos-Horta has 
tried repeatedly to serve as a bridge between the governing 
coalition and the main opposition party, Fretilin.  Symbolic of 
the contentiousness and oft inflammatory nature of Timorese 
politics, Fretilin, although participating fully (and largely 
 
DILI 00000037  002 OF 003 
 
 
constructively) as opposition in the National Parliament, still 
maintains that the current government is illegal, 
unconstitutional and illegitimate.  Ramos-Horta has sought to 
find ways to engage Fretilin on issues of national importance, 
arguing that in a post-conflict environment major parties cannot 
be excluded from key decisions and instead must be engaged in 
dialogue and consensus building.  One mediation effort in early 
2008 seemed  about to yield fruit, but then stuttered to a stop 
with the president's shooting.  Ramos-Horta on February 9, 2009, 
launched another attempt, this time with the help of the 
Swiss-based Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, to create a 
mechanism to encourage cross-party and inter-generational 
dialogue.  He asked for donor financing for this effort, 
including from the U.S., although the strength of commitment 
from either the opposition or the governing coalition to this 
project remains uncertain. 
 
¶6. (C) Once he recovered from his wounds, Ramos-Horta fairly 
quickly resumed an active international travel schedule to 
advocate for his country -- and himself.  Already in 2009, he 
will have visited Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore 
and New Zealand before arriving in New York on February 17, 
¶2009.  Never shy regarding his ambitions for the world stage, he 
touted himself as a candidate for UN Secretary General several 
years ago and he was tempted by the open position of UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in 2008.  His eagerness to be seen 
and taken seriously as an international player has led him to 
make strong and occasionally rash pronouncements on far-flung 
issues, sometimes counter to Timorese interests.  His outspoken 
views on Burma, condemning the regime's behavior while promoting 
the removal of economic sanctions and increased engagement, led 
Rangoon to place a veto on any consideration within ASEAN of 
Timor-Leste becoming its next member (Timor's highest foreign 
policy priority).  A year ago, he seriously irritated Timor's 
two neighbors, Australia and Indonesia, with ill-founded and 
reckless remarks regarding events surrounding his shooting.  He 
regularly chastises the U.S. for its embargo of Cuba. 
 
¶7. (C) Issues that President Ramos-Horta will likely raise 
during his conversations with USG principals include the 
following. 
 
-- Peace Corps:  A very successful and locally renowned Peace 
Corps Volunteer program was suspended in 2006 at the height of 
Timor's crisis.  President Ramos-Horta will invite its 
resumption.  Embassy Dili strongly supports a return to 
Timor-Leste by the Peace Corps and will submit a security 
assessment concluding that local conditions well exceed those 
necessary to ensure the safety of volunteers. 
 
-- U.S.-Timor partnership:  Both sides should be ready to 
reaffirm the health and vibrancy of U.S.-Timor-Leste bilateral 
relations.  We should be ready to thank Ramos-Horta for the 
strong bilateral alignment that exists in international fora in 
support of democracy and human rights, and applaud his personal 
experience and long standing commitment to these principles. 
Upon the election of President Obama, he issued a warm public 
note of congratulation and was grateful for President Bush's 
sharp condemnation of the attack on his life in February 2008. 
 
-- Security sector reform:  As supreme commandar of 
Timor-Leste's defense force, Ramos-Horta has long been a 
proponent of increased U.S. contributions to Timor-Leste's 
security, including professionalization of its military and 
police.  There is no stronger advocate within Timor-Leste of 
U.S. ship visits, light joint military exercises or community 
relations activities by U.S. forces.  In a November 2008 speech 
in Darwin, he welcomed greater involvement by the U.S. and 
Australia in Timor's security, especially in the area of 
maritime security.  He has even gone so far as to invite the 
U.S. military to make full use of Timorese facilities, including 
the large airfield outside of  Baucau.  Ramos-Horta is grateful 
for the recent expansion of the U.S. Pacific Command's 
engagement in Timor-Leste and will welcome indications that it 
will continue. 
 
-- Recent developments in Timor-Leste:  President Ramos-Horta 
will want to share his positive assessment of the performance of 
PM Gusmao's government.  Its achievements include resolving 
several major consequences of the 2006 crisis (resettling 
internally displaced refugees and resolving the grievances of 
the "petitioners," those that mutinied against the military and 
precipitated the collapse of the government) and extending a 
 
DILI 00000037  003 OF 003 
 
 
basic social safety net.  Timor-Leste's government is now 
focusing on infrastructure, rural development and education. 
Timor-Leste has enjoyed a rare, year-long period of stability 
and Ramos-Horta is committed to extending it, encourging for 
example a more serious commitment from PM Gusmao's government to 
the reform of Timor-Leste's security sector. 
 
-- U.S. contribution to Timor-Leste's social and economic 
development:  Timor-Leste is Asia's poorest country and its 
social development indicators resemble those of the most 
impoverished countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.  President 
Ramos-Horta has been an occasional skeptic of U.S. and other 
donor aid programs, asserting they overly benefit international 
consultants and deliver relatively little to Timor-Leste's poor. 
 He sharply criticized both the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation's recent decision to find Timor-Leste ineligible for 
a compact and its organizing concept, stating the U.S. should be 
generous with poor countries in need, not when they reach a 
state of policy perfection.  In response to recent Embssy Dili 
efforts to better inform him of the size and composition of our 
local aid programs (70 percent of which goes to agriculture and 
rural development), Ramos-Horta has become a stronger proponent 
of our projects. 
 
-- Justice and Reconciliation:  As discussed above, Ramos-Horta 
consistently has promoted amnesty to heal the nation's wounds 
rather than accountability.  He asserts that Timor's 
institutions of justice are inadequate and the country's 
political culture insufficiently mature to accommodate a full 
application of the law for serious crimes in either 1999 or 
¶2006.  His stance arguably has encouraged a sense of impunity 
and undermined the full commitment of the Timorese to the rule 
of law.  We should remind Ramos-Horta of the importance of 
justice and the rule of law to Timor-Leste's stability and 
democratic development -- and of the importance of his personal 
commitment to these principles. 
 
-- Intelligence Services Support:  Timor-Leste has little 
effective intelligence gathering or analytical capability.   Not 
only did the events of February 11, 2008, come as a complete 
surprise to Timor-Leste's leadership, but the government's lack 
of intelligence capabilities and dependence on an archaic, 
clandestine network of informants seriously eroded its ability 
to capture the perpetrators.  The threat from international 
traffickers and crime syndicates to Timor-Leste's stability is 
compounded by weak law enforcement and intelligence 
capabilities.  The Gusmao government hopes soon to establish an 
International Crisis Management Center to coordinate 
Timor-Leste's intelligence functions and has asked for USG 
support.  Ramos-Horta may explore the extension of such 
assistance. 
 
¶8. (C)  Comment.  Ramos-Horta repeatedly sought to meet 
Secretary Rice during his attendance at recent UN General 
Assemblies, but failed to do so.  He is conscious of the absence 
of civilian ministerial-level visitors to Timor-Leste in recent 
years, and recently shared with the Ambassador his 
disappointment and sense of being overlooked by the U.S. 
Ramos-Horta, despite his blemishes, has been a positive, 
constructive force in the democratic development of Timor-Leste. 
 By nature and conviction he is a very strong friend of the U.S. 
 A warm opening by Administration principals to Timor-Leste's 
President will go a very long way to assuage his bruised 
feelings and ensure the viability of our mutual committment to 
the success of democracy in Timor-Leste. 
KLEMM