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OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #0205/01 0431904
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O 121904Z FEB 09
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000205 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR P, ISN, EUR/ERA, EEB, AND NEA/IRAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 
TAGS: PREL KNNC ETTC ETRD EFIN IR EUN
SUBJECT: IRAN: FEBRUARY 6 EU DEBATE ON SANCTIONS AND U.S. 
POLICY 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 174 
 
Classified By: Chris Davis, USEU Polmincouns for reasons 1.5(d) and (e) 
 
¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: On February 6, EU Political 
and Security Council Ambassadors debated next steps on Iran 
policy.   Council Secretariat DirGen Robert Cooper briefed 
the EU-27 on the P5 1 meeting earlier in the week.  Given 
U.S. reaffirmation of the dual-track policy and the fact of 
the P5 1 consultation, Cooper believed new U.S. policy would 
not be completely reinvented from scratch. He encouraged 
member states to prepare to act to further reinforce the 
dual-track approach.  While the PSC viewed positively the 
U.S. willingness to engage directly with Iran, some believed 
US engagement could lead to an Iranian perception of the U.S. 
"good cop" to the EU's "bad cop." Smaller EU member states 
opposed moving forward on new EU autonomous designations of 
Iranian entities and individuals until the U.S. completed its 
policy review and made its sanctions policy known to the 
EU-27.  Neither Cooper nor EU-3 members (UK, GR, FR) pushed 
back on this point. 
 
2.(C/NF) Privately, several member state contacts have 
relayed concerns to Poloff about the difficulty of gaining 
EU-wide consensus for EU action on existing sanctions (such 
as new designations under relevant UNSCRs) in the absence of 
a clear signal of interest from the USG to the EU-27 to do 
so.  Based on our informal soundings in EU corridors, there 
remains strong support for information-sharing on sanctions 
(including recent U.S. designations). The Czechs have also 
told us that they would be interested in placing Iran on the 
agenda of the March 16 GAERC or, more likely, March 27-28 
Gymnich should the U.S. policy review be completed by late 
March.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
P5 1 Debrief 
------------ 
¶3. (C) On February 9 and 10, three friendly EU member states 
provided detailed read-outs of the February 6 EU-27 Political 
and Security Council (PSC) Ambassadors debate on Iran policy. 
 Topics included the P5 1 consultation, the U.S. policy 
review process, and Iranian proliferation-related and 
political developments.  Robert Cooper, Council Secretariat 
Director General (and Deputy to High Rep Solana on Iran 
nuclear negotiations) briefed the PSC on P5 1 consultations 
held in Wiesbaden, Germany February 3-4.   Cooper indicated 
that the participation of U/S Bill Burns in the meeting 
signaled U.S. interest in continuing the P5 1 process and the 
double track policy.  Consequently, Cooper said he believed 
the U.S. Administration's policy review on Iran would not 
lead to an entirely new USG policy.  U.S. thinking seemed to 
be heading toward a "bigger carrot, bigger stick" approach, 
which would mean a real dialogue with Iran with the 
possibility of real pressure.  Cooper thought the U.S. would 
be using the existing framework and that they would want to 
see others invest more in this framework, including 
especially Russia and China. 
 
4.(C) In response to questions from Italy and the 
Netherlands, Cooper noted that for China and Russia, the 
question of how far and fast we go on each track was still 
problematic.  Russia seemed not to have changed its attitude, 
whereas China seemed to be taking into account a change in 
the U.S. approach.  Cooper also stressed the importance of 
the fact that Iran's neighbors in the Gulf were uncomfortable 
about Iran's evolution. 
 
An "Important" Year 
-------------------- 
¶5. (C) Cooper also updated member states on developments in 
Iran's nuclear program.  The next IAEA report was due on 
February 20 and it should state that Iran's production of low 
enriched uranium had currently reached 700 kg (500 kg before 
the end of December 2008).  Iran seemed, therefore, to be 
enriching at a very quick pace.  Cooper pointed out that 
Russia and China expressed diverging views from other members 
of the P5 1 on the military aspects of the Iranian program. 
In any case, the level of cooperation between Iran and the 
IAEA had reached a new low; e.g., Iran had stopped answering 
inquires and was refusing access to certain cites.  These 
developments, taken together with the new U.S. administration 
and upcoming Iranian elections made it an "important year" 
for Iran.  Cooper pointed out that while Iranian elections 
were important, they should not be a reason for the EU to do 
nothing.  While the EU's preference for sanctions within the 
UN framework was well-understood, Cooper stressed that the EU 
should prepare itself to look at other options, such as 
strengthening its own (autonomous) sanctions.  He encouraged 
 
BRUSSELS 00000205  002 OF 002 
 
 
the Council to be in a "state of readiness to act." 
 
U.S. Policy Review: The Impact of Timing 
---------------------------------------- 
¶6. (C/NF) Cooper told EU-27 member states that the U.S. 
policy review would take "a couple of months" and he did not 
expect the EU to move much until the U.S. review was 
completed. Several smaller EU member states opposed moving 
forward on new EU autonomous designations of Iranian entities 
and individuals until the U.S. completed its policy review 
and made its sanctions policy known to the EU-27.  None of 
the EU-3 states (UK, GR, FR) pushed back on this point.  On 
February 11, the UK PSC delegation maintained to us privately 
that the FCO was taking the position that there would be no 
further EU moves on sanctions during the U.S. policy review. 
On February 10, a French contact told us he was surprised by 
Cooper's comment on the U.S. review timeline.  France had 
understood that the review process would take four to six 
weeks -- shorter than Cooper's indication to the EU.  A Dutch 
and French colleagues agreed that the difference of even a 
few weeks could be significant as it would affect the Czech 
Presidency decision (and EU member states' support for) a 
Ministerial debate in March. 
 
EU Members' Concerns 
-------------------- 
7.(C) Many member states, including Germany, the UK, and 
France, stressed what they agree is te positive fact of U.S. 
willingness to engge directly with Iran.  On the other hand, 
soe member states, including Germany, France, the K and 
Portugal, recognized that the EU could be perceived as the 
bad cop and the USG as the good cop.  In this sense, France 
noted the risk that the new positive U.S. approach could be 
used by Iran against the EU.  It was incumbent upon the EU, 
therefore, to stress the dual character of its approach.  The 
UK also spoke of the need for a "symmetric" dual track. 
Germany underscored the importance of showing EU willingness 
to envisage further sanctions. Cooper disputed the 
over-simplified "good cop" portrayal of the United States, 
pointing out that the USG had no relations with Iran at all. 
Furthermore, it was possible for the USG to engage Iran 
without necessarily playing "the good cop" role.  Sweden and 
the Netherlands highlighted the need to discuss Iran in a 
wider context, including Afghanistan (Sweden) and MEPP 
(Netherlands).  Denmark wondered aloud about the state of 
play concerning the "freeze for freeze" initiative.  The 
EU-3, Italy, and Hungary underlined the urgency of the 
Iranian issue throughout the discussion. 
MURRAY 
.