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RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1024

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGUI 000022 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/C FOR SSARDAR, MASHRAF, SLOPEZ, KWYCOFF; PARIS FOR RKANEDA; 
LONDON FOR PLORD; YAOUNDE FOR POL/ECON 
STATE FOR OPS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR ECON EAID CT
SUBJECT: LEADER OF A FAILED STATE: HOW BOZIZE MAINTAINS POWER 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Francois Bozize took power in the Central 
African Republic on March 15, 2003 overthrowing Felix-Ange 
Patasse.  It was his second attempt at that coup, but may have 
been only the last in a long series of extra-legal attempts to 
gain power.  This message describes how Bozize, often the man in 
the background, has none the less consolidated and maintained 
his hold on power.  END SUMMARY 
 
------------------------ 
The Man and the Military 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) Bozize is always referred to in formal introductions as 
General of the armies as well as head of state.  This is not a 
mere formality; his father was a military officer and he has 
been a military man for almost all of his adult life.  Moreover, 
he appears to see the military as both a guarantor of his power 
and a threat.  He had been appointed to ever higher military 
posts in every Central African government, starting with that of 
Bokassa and continuing through that of Patasse.  (It is rumored 
that his favor with Bokassa was enhanced by his physical attack 
on a French non-commissioned officer who his alleged to have 
insulted Bokassa.)  He has been, at various times, for various 
governments, Minister of Defense, Minister of Information, and 
Chief of Staff of the Army.  It was during his tenure as 
Minister of Information for President Kolingba that he was 
accused of coup plotting, arrested, returned to Bangui and, 
according to reports (BBC and others), physically tortured. 
There are also numerous reports of his being the enforcer for 
various presidents and taking the lead in the violent 
suppression of various coup attempts and mutinies.  The key 
point being that Bozize does not appear to be any stranger to 
violence, both political and personal.  He is also no stranger 
to palace conspiracies and the danger of the military turning on 
the president as has happened so many times in the cAR's past. 
His presidential guard has included Chadian and, more recently, 
South African elements as well as Central Africans such as the 
notorious Eugene Ngaikosse, responsible for reprisals against 
civilian populations for attacks on the regime by rebel forces. 
Bozize has, until recently, maintained for himself the title of 
Minister of Defense, though he has now appointed his son Francis 
as Deputy Defense Minister. 
 
-------------------------- 
The Man and the Government 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) While Bozize is clearly a military man, he has long 
harbored political ambition, dating from at least 1993 when he 
lost the presidential elections to Patasse.  Now in power at 
last, he is not an impressive president.  Most elements of the 
government are barely functioning, staffed by often unpaid civil 
servants with no resources, while Bozize fills key ministries 
with members of his family and clan.  Foremost among these is 
Minister of Mines Sylvain Ndoutingai, a former Colonel in the 
armed forces, who is usually described as Bozize's nephew.  With 
access to the nation's diamond resources, Ndoutingai is the 
Bozize clan's money man, often working with individuals such as 
Saifee Durbar, an Anglo-Pakistani businessman wanted for fraud 
in France and recently given the position of Vice-Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in a brazenly transparent attempt to establish 
immunity from prosecution for Durbar. 
 
----------------- 
The Opposition(s) 
 
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----------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Sadly, perhaps, the Opposition is unimpressive; the 
best lack all conviction, while the worst are simply full of 
passionate intensity against Bozize, the man - none is evidently 
 more competent or less corrupt.  Former Patasse Prime Minister 
Martin Ziguele, head of the MLPC is an urbane, sophisticated man 
who ran strongly against Bozize in 2005, but the Inclusive 
Political Dialogue of 2008 seems to have sidelined him and he 
has told us that he is content to make his living doing 
consulting work in Paris and that he no longer seeks any 
government position.  The rest of the unarmed opposition to 
Bozize is arrogant, disorganized and lacking in any coherent 
program beyond the questioning of Bozize's legitimacy.  Much of 
their disdain for Bozize results from his membership of the 
Gbaya ethnic group, described by some Central Africans 
(including one Minister in the government) as `the stupidest 
tribe in the nation.'  Bozize's time spent driving a bush taxi 
is much mocked by better educated opposition figures, some of 
whom, in their impassioned rhetoric, border on advocacy for 
violent overthrow.  Yet in July and August of 2009, when Bangui 
was deprived of electricity and water following failure of power 
turbines at the Boali dam, the opposition was unable to organize 
planned demonstrations to protest the government's incompetent 
handling of the crisis.  The members of the former armed 
opposition have yet to step forward and take any political 
action.  Interestingly, but again, not surprisingly, the unarmed 
opposition say that they have not yet made any effort to reach 
out to the former armed opposition to form common fronts, or 
plan joint actions.  The CAR's population was deeply traumatized 
by the looting, rape, and killing by forces loyal to former DRC 
rebel turned DRC Vice-President turned ICC defendant, 
Jean-Pierre Bemba, that came to Patasse's aid.  Bozize's coup 
was eagerly accepted by Bangui and he may be still be seen as 
the best alternative, being `the devil you know.' 
 
------------- 
The neighbors 
------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Chadian President Deby assisted Bozize in his seizure 
of power.  Although Deby is preoccupied elsewhere, Bozize 
probably counts on Deby to protect his northern flank.  To the 
south, former DRC Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba, currently on 
trial by the ICC, no longer holds sway in Equateur, neutralizing 
any threat from across the Oubangui River.  The north east of 
CAR, bordering with Chad and Sudan is so remote from Bangui as 
to be of little concern to Bozize.  Accordingly, he has been 
content to let French troops, now wearing EUFOR badges, maintain 
a presence in Birao until such time as a UN force is deployed as 
part of MINURCAT.  Similarly, while the arrival of the Lord's 
Resistance Army in south-eastern CAR in February of 2008 
attracted international attention, it was virtually ignored by 
the CARG; Obo is closer, and has better road links, to Kampala 
than Bangui.  Relations with Cameroon appear to be almost 
moribund.  Bozize has not met Biya in years and the Cameroonian 
Embassy in Bangui was led by a Charge for over a year until the 
recent appointment of a new Ambassador; this despite the CAR's 
almost total dependence on Douala as its only real port. 
Congolese President Sassou is a friend of Bozize's: he was the 
only foreign leader to attend CAR Independence Day celebrations 
in 2007.  The friendship may be based in part on forestry 
concessions made by Bozize's government to companies controlled 
by members of Sassou's family as well as on common membership of 
the same Masonic lodge.  At the same time, the CAR forest 
 
BANGUI 00000022  003 OF 004 
 
 
industry complains that the poor state of the Pointe 
Noire/Brazzaville railroad, coupled with `processing' delays of 
up to six months, means that they cannot export logs down the 
Oubangui River and are forced to use the much more expensive 
overland route to Douala.  They also note that the Cameroonians 
are subsidizing fuel costs for their timber industry to keep it 
competitive during the world market downturn.  Bozize clearly 
has important work to do with his neighbors, but there is no 
sign that he is even aware of these issues.  Which brings us to 
Gabonese President Bongo.  Bozize was born in Gabon, a fact 
which may or may not have significance, and President Bongo 
speaks the Central African national language Sango fluently, 
according to some reports.  What is undoubtedly significant is 
that Bongo agreed to act as godfather to the peace accords 
reached between the government and the rebels and to open and 
close the Inclusive political dialogue.  According to at least 
one observer, Bongo provided the cash necessary to buy off the 
rebel leadership.  COMMENT: Given the political, rather than 
tribal nature of the CAR's civil war, AmEmbassy Bangui is 
inclined to believe these reports. END COMMENT 
 
----------------- 
Outside interests 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Although Bozize reportedly received a tongue-lashing 
from French President Sarkozy during their brief one-on-one 
meeting at the Elysee in November 2007, tensions appear to be 
somewhat eased with the settlement of a dispute between the 
government and French petroleum company TOTAL and the signing of 
a deal with AREVA for exploitation of CAR's uranium resources. 
The French Embassy in Bangui, previously tough with the CARG on 
governance issues, appears to have moderated its position with 
these developments and the arrival in August 2008 of a new 
Ambassador who appears more favorable to Bozize.  The 
appointment of Saifee Durbar as deputy minister of foreign 
affairs may have ended that honeymoon.  The French have 
demarched the Department in Washington about Durbar and the 
French ambassador (PROTECT) has had several very quiet 
conversations with the Ambassador in Bangui.  These 
conversations express his deep frustration with the actions of 
the Bozize government and his search for ways to make it clear 
that the Durbar appointment is an unacceptable insult and that 
the Bozize government will have to suffer a penalty.  While 
AmEmbassy Bangui had previously thought that the French Embassy 
in Bangui was ahead of the Quai, it now appears that they may 
have Paris on board and that we may expect some action by the 
French.  Although China was unwilling to finance the repair of 
the Boali turbines, Bozize knows that he can count on the 
Chinese, and the Russians (who have no visible interests in 
CAR), for at least tacit support.  The Chinese have built a 
large stadium and continue to build schools and similar projects 
while running an aggressive public diplomacy program with 
outreach directly into the poorer neighborhoods of Bangui.  The 
Chinese are also reported to have bought 49 per cent of the 
French uranium concession at Bakouma.  Libya's presence is much 
diminished since the beginning of the decade, but Bozize has no 
issues with Gadhafi in particular or with the African Union in 
general.  Bozize does, however, appear to be concerned about the 
possibility of an ICC investigation into the activities of his 
forces when he took power, writing a formal letter to UNSYG Ban 
to suspend the prosecution of Bemba. 
 
-------------- 
The population 
 
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-------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) There is a streak of fatalism and resignation among the 
population.  Most Central Africans are poor, many are 
traumatized by the events of their history and all appear to be 
tired of the struggle for power among Bokassa's heirs.  Bozize, 
who is an uncharismatic leader, even when he is somewhat more 
animatedly addressing crowds in Sango, is thus able to portray 
himself as a force for stability.  He also makes just enough 
movement in his accommodations with the opposition and in his 
cabinet appointments (most of which, including that of Prime 
Minister, come with no real authority) to hold out to optimists 
the hope for a better future.  Pessimists believe that Bozize 
will allow a certain amount of democracy as long as it will not 
lead to his being voted out of power. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The conventional wisdom in Bangui today is that the 
opposition is incapable of mounting any real action against that 
Bozize government and the general population is too resigned to 
take action.  The Ambassador was thus very attentive when the 
French let him know, very privately, that they are dusting off 
their Emergency and Evacuation plans and are concerned by what 
they see.  At least some in the French embassy believe that 
popular patience does have limits and they note that 
confrontations in Bangui have always been violent.  There is no 
way of knowing if the French have information that causes them 
to be worried or if this is merely a result of the arrival of a 
new Defense Attache, a special forces officer with a previous 
tour in Bangui during one of the spasms of fighting.  In any 
case, we continue to work on our emergency preparedness. 
 
---------- 
The Future 
---------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) What does this mean for U.S. policy and activity in the 
CAR?  A full discussion can be found in our Mission Strategic 
Plan, but in simplest terms: The peace accords provide an 
opening in 2009, but the history of problems in CAR is long and 
the challenges of engaging with this government start at the 
very top.  We must thus keep our expectations low.  We must do 
all we can to protect the fragile peace and prevent the failure 
of the upcoming elections.  Any other programs that we may 
attempt will be rendered irrelevant if the CAR slides back into 
civil war. 
COOK ##