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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 000263 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR MOPS PINS PHUM TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SENIOR MILITARY VISITORS TO 
THAILAND DURING COBRA GOLD 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Coming visits by component commanders, and 
other senior leaders of various U.S. military commands will 
afford a chance to affirm the United States Government's 
commitment to working with a democratically elected Thai 
government, to promoting a continued strong bilateral 
relationship, and to affirming our support for important 
areas of our mil-mil relationship such as the Defense Reform 
Management Study (DRMS), Cobra Gold, and Thailand's 
deployment of peacekeepers to Darfur.  End Summary. 
 
ENDURING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Thai public closely watched our recent 
Presidential election, and the results received much scrutiny 
regarding the potential impact on U.S.-Thai relations.  Thai 
government officials have expressed strong interest in 
hearing assessments of the transition to a new administration 
and U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia.  We have stressed to 
the Thai we do not anticipate significant changes in our 
bilateral relationship due to the history and strength of our 
alliance and the nature of long-standing U.S.-Thai security, 
economic, and cultural bonds.  However, the changing 
generations in both Thailand and the U.S. require both sides 
work hard to maintain the vibrancy in the relationship. 
 
THAI POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT - YELLOW AND RED 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) The December dissolution of the People's Power Party 
(PPP), which led to the fall of the government of former PM 
Somchai and installation of the Democrat-led coalition 
government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejajjiva, has appeared 
to quiet, at least temporarily, the political situation. 
Gone are the street protests by the anti-government People's 
Alliance for Democracy (PAD) which shut down Bangkok's 
airports for a week and occupied the formal seat of 
government for over three months.  But the basic deep split 
in society and the body politic remains, with the traditional 
royalist elite, urban middle class, Bangkok, and the south on 
one side ("yellow" in shorthand) and the political allies of 
ex-PM Thaksin, currently a fugitive abroad, along with 
largely rural supporters in the North and Northeast ("red") 
on the other. 
 
¶4. (C) Prime Minister Abhisit is off to a reasonably good 
start in his first month in office, but his government faces 
significant policy challenges given the current economic 
situation in Thailand and globally.  Abhisit and the 
Democrats also have to contend with former Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra's continued attempts to influence the 
political environment from abroad and to recover assets of 
his that were seized by the government.  Moreover, 
demonstrations by United Front of Democracy for Dictatorship 
"redshirts" loyal to the former PM will test the new 
government. 
 
¶5. (C) Calling for new elections would not appear to be a 
viable solution to political divide, and political turmoil 
could very well persist for years.  The steadiest figure on 
the political stage over the past months has been Army 
Commander Anupong Paochinda, who steadfastly rejected 
pressure from both sides for the army to intervene in the 
political stalemate, either to conduct a coup d'etat or to 
clear the streets of protesters.  We continue to stress to 
Thai interlocutors the negative ramifications of a coup and 
the need for all parties to avoid violence and respect 
democratic norms within the framework of the constitution and 
rule of law. 
 
¶6. (C) King Bhumibol turned 81 on December 5.  Many had 
anticipated his commentary for his annual address to the 
nation on the eve of his birthday; his address was canceled, 
 
BANGKOK 00000263  002 OF 005 
 
 
however, after he fell ill with bronchitis.  (Note: The King 
was hospitalized for a period of weeks in late 2007 for 
appeared to be a minor stroke. End note.)   The Palace has 
since announced the King's recovery; as of late, he has been 
shown on television more frequently in meetings with both 
foreigners and Thais.  The King's passing, whenever that may 
be, will shock Thailand.  Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn is the 
King's designated heir.  However, the current King's enormous 
personal prestige, the lack of a precedent for royal 
succession during the modern era (King Bhumibol has been on 
the throne since 1946), and changing sentiment about the 
proper role of the institution in the 21st century suggest 
that the transition will be difficult. 
 
THAI ECONOMY STRUGGLES TO OVERCOME CHALLENGES 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Over the past few years, Thailand's economy has been 
growing at a moderate pace, though the long-running political 
uncertainty has stifled domestic investment, hamstrung 
government stimulus programs, and kept Thailand from keeping 
up with other ASEAN nations.  The worldwide economic slowdown 
of recent months has hit Thailand particularly hard as 
exports, the one bright spot in GDP growth, have fallen, 
causing growth forecasts for 2009 to be ratcheted down from 
4% to less than 2%.  This dreary scenario was made much worse 
by the November airport closures, which devastated Thailand's 
large tourism and convention industries just at the beginning 
of the high season. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Historically, Thailand's economy has hummed along 
unaffected by frequent political squabbling, but the recent 
willingness of political actors to take actions that clearly 
damage the economy and the nation's international image is 
changing that tenet.  Thailand's largest foreign investors, 
Japanese in particular, have expressed dismay at the new turn 
in events.  The full effect of the airport closures has not 
yet shown up in the data, but FDI (especially from the U.S.) 
was already trending down for 2008.  The new government is 
well aware of these challenges, has made an extraordinary 
effort to put together an economically reasonable and 
politically savvy economic stimulus package, and is reaching 
out to the foreign business community to re-built Thailand's 
image as a good place to do business. 
 
IMPORTANT MILITARY ENGAGEMENT PROGRAM, ACCESS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The long-standing U.S.-Thai military partnership 
provides the U.S. with unique benefits.  These include 
distinctive force projection options, the possibility to 
conduct training exercises that are nearly impossible to 
match elsewhere in Asia, the opportunity to advance U.S. 
strategic goals, access to military leaders in a nation that 
is trying to strengthen democratic institutions, a willing 
participant in international peacekeeping operations, and a 
partner in medical research which has produced widely-used 
vaccines. 
 
¶10. (C) Thailand's willingness to allow the United States to 
use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional 
assistance program was key to making the 2004 tsunami and the 
2008 Cyclone Nargis relief operations successful.  While 
those high-profile relief operations highlighted publicly the 
value of access to Utapao, the air base is used regularly for 
flights in support of critical U.S. military operations to 
strategic areas of the world.  Thailand also provides valued 
port access with U.S. naval vessels making calls, primarily 
at Laem Chabang and Sattahip, over forty times per year for 
exercises and visits. 
 
COBRA GOLD AND THE MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) By means of access to good military base 
 
BANGKOK 00000263  003 OF 005 
 
 
infrastructure and large areas to conduct unrestricted 
operations, Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for 
exercises unique in Asia.  Thai leaders are far more willing 
to host multinational exercises than are other countries in 
Asia.  Unlike Japan, which only hosts annual bilateral 
exercises due to legal prohibitions over collective security, 
or the Philippines, where planning for multinational 
exercises has been difficult, or Australia, which refuses to 
multilateralize Tandem Thrust, the Thai government encourages 
multinational exercises as a way to show regional leadership. 
 This has allowed us to use exercises in Thailand to further 
key U.S. objectives, such as supporting Japan's growing 
military role in Asia and engaging the Indonesian and 
Singaporean militaries. 
 
¶12. (C) Cobra Gold, the capstone event of our exercise 
program, is PACOM's largest annual multi-lateral exercise and 
for 28 years has served to strengthen our relations with 
Thailand, highlight our commitment to Southeast Asia, and 
provide exceptional training opportunities for our troops. 
The event has evolved over the years and now facilitates 
important objectives such as promoting a greater role in the 
Asian Pacific region for Japan and Singapore and 
re-establishing a partner role with Indonesia.  Cobra Gold is 
key to building partner nation capacity in humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief, especially at a time when 
U.S. forces face other global commitments.  We have also been 
able to incorporate into Cobra Gold a robust Global 
Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) event with active 
participation of Indonesia and Singapore.  Our other primary 
exercises with the Thai military are CARAT and COPE TIGER. 
 
DEFENSE REFORM 
-------------- 
 
¶13. (C)  We have been working closely with the Royal Thai 
Armed Forces Headquarters (RTARF) on the U.S.-funded Defense 
Resource Management System (DRMS) project which will help 
rationalize the Thai military's procurement and other 
resource needs.  We use every appropriate opportunity to 
emphasize our desire to work closely with the Thai military 
leadership to accelerate DRMS process.  Phase II of this 
process will begin the first week of March following the 
ASEAN summit scheduled for Thailand. 
 
PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS 
-------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Thailand has been an active contributor in 
peacekeeping missions, best known for leading forces in the 
UNTAET mission in East Timor. The RTARF has been a close 
partner for us as the Thai government continues preparations 
to deploy a battalion of peacekeeping troops to Darfur as 
UNAMID.  With deployment currently scheduled for mid-2009, we 
have continued to underscore to the leadership of the Thai 
military that we stand ready to assist the Thai again where 
possible. 
 
SOUTHERN THAILAND: SECURITY AND JUSTICE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) The Thai military, since General Anupong became Army 
Commander, has taken a more assertive role in trying to quell 
the ethnic Malay Muslim ethno-nationalist insurgency in 
southern Thailand, a region that has witnessed episodic 
violence since its incorporation into Siam/Thailand in 1902. 
Regional violence has claimed more than 3000 lives since 
January 2004, when the violence began to escalate.  The root 
causes of the insurgency -- government neglect, human rights 
abuses, and a lack of social justice, combined with a desire 
for some form of self-determination, have not been addressed 
by any Thai government to this point. 
 
¶16. (C) While the Thai military has so far focused mostly on 
trying to resolve the difficult security situation in the 
 
BANGKOK 00000263  004 OF 005 
 
 
South, with increased tactical success in security sweeps, 
occasional abuses by security forces have added to the sense 
of grievance and lack of justice by the local populace. 
Efforts by civilian government ministries to solve the root 
causes of injustice and the feeling of disenfranchisement by 
the Thai-Malay majority in the three southern provinces have 
so far lagged.  While the Abhisit government appears set to 
adopt an integrated government approach to solving the 
insurgency with budgetary and policy decision making 
responsibility possibly transferred to the Office of the 
Prime Minister, it remains unclear how the civil-military 
dynamic will change. 
 
¶17. (C) The RTG has made clear its hesitancy in accepting any 
direct USG role in the South.  The Embassy maintains a 
three-pronged focus to improve our military cooperation in 
order to address the violence in the South: 
1) Using our exercise and training program to improve the 
professional and operational skills of the Royal Thai Armed 
Forces, especially the Thai Army; 
2) Helping the Thai break down stovepipes between the Thai 
military, police forces, and civilian agencies; 
3) Doing everything we can to ensure the Thai respect 
international human rights norms as they counter the violence. 
 
BORDER CONFLICT WITH CAMBODIA 
----------------------------- 
 
¶18. (C) Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya's January 26 
visit to Phnom Penh produced encouraging statements by all 
sides regarding the border dispute that is centered on 
overlapping claims to territory adjacent to Preah Vihear 
temple.  The next round of talks under the auspices of the 
Foreign Ministry-led Joint Border Commission (JBC) are 
scheduled for February 2, and the two nations' defense 
ministers are scheduled to meet February 6 to discuss the 
redeployment of soldiers stationed at the temple.  Despite 
continued talks between Thailand and Cambodia, we are not 
optimistic for quick resolution to the dispute.  Difficult 
issues lay at the heart of the matter, and political conflict 
in Bangkok may make tough decisions more difficult for the 
Thai government.  We continue to stress to the Thai 
interlocutors that the dispute should be resolved peacefully 
and bilaterally. 
 
REFUGEE/MIGRANT CONCERNS: LAO HMONG AND ROHINGYA 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶19. (C) Thailand has hosted millions of refugees since the 
IndoChina wars and currently has more than 150,000 refugees 
from Burma in camps along the Thai-Burma border.  The RTARF 
has the lead on resolving the difficult problem of the 
thousands of Hmong from Laos who arrived in 2006-2007 seeking 
resettlement in the U.S.; many of them likely would not 
qualify for refugee status and will be returned to Laos. 
However, the Thai government has so far failed to set up a 
transparent screening process for the Hmong currently in a 
camp in Petchaboon province; we believe that a portion of the 
group may have a legitimate claim to refugee status and could 
face harsh treatment by the Lao government if returned.  Some 
are former fighters (or their descendants) allied with the 
U.S. against the communist Pathet Lao during the IndoChina 
wars.  We want to take every opportunity to underscore to the 
RTARF the importance of transparently handling the Lao Hmong 
cases. 
 
¶20. (C) Media reports in recent weeks over Thai actions 
regarding Rohingya "boat people" have resulted in strong 
criticism of the RTG and its policy toward groups that 
attempt to enter Thailand, primarily from Burma.  Rohingya 
typically cross from Burma's Northern Rakhine state into 
Bangladesh to board vessels bound for Malaysia.  This year 
many have instead found their way to the Ranong area in 
Thailand, the Andaman Islands of India, and Aceh Province, 
Indonesia.  According to various reports, several hundred 
 
BANGKOK 00000263  005 OF 005 
 
 
Rohingya went missing from at least one vessel encountered by 
the Indian coast guard off Port Blair in the Andaman Islands 
in early January.  Survivors have alleged being towed out to 
sea and being abandoned by Thai military or marine police 
vessels. 
 
¶21. (C) A recent visit to the Ranong area by Embassy RefCoord 
suggests to us that two loosely defined groupings of unpaid 
civilian defense volunteers drawn from fishing villages were 
involved in the alleged mistreatment of the Rohingya, but 
that they received general policy direction and some 
financial support from the Thai Army-led local Internal 
Security Operations Center.  It remains unclear what boats 
may have been involved in towing the Rohingya back out to 
sea.  We continue to stress to our contacts in the Thai 
government that Thailand should provide access for UNHCR to 
Rohingya boat people who reach Thai shores, and that 
push-outs to sea are not consistent with basic humanitarian 
principles. 
 
THE INCREASING ROLE OF CHINA 
---------------------------- 
 
¶22. (C) Thai leaders continue to develop closer relations 
with China while simultaneously emphasizing the vital role of 
the U.S. in the region.  While Thai military links with the 
United States are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai 
links, China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast 
Asia is evident in business, the arts, the media, and the 
military.  The Thai military has a range of Chinese weapons 
systems in its arsenal; the PLA Navy is interested in closer 
links with the Thai navy, and China has worked with Thailand 
to improve air defense equipment provided to Thailand in the 
late 1980's.  In 2007 and 2008, Thai and Chinese special 
forces conducted joint exercises, and other  mil-to-mil 
exchanges have expanded in recent years, as has the number of 
bilateral military VIP visits.  A yet to be disclosed marine 
corps exercise between China and Thailand near the eastern 
seaboard port of Sattahip in the April-May timeframe 
highlights the continuing push by China to expand their 
mil-to-mil relations with Thailand's military. 
JOHN