VZCZCXRO0273
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHAS #0115/01 0321900
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011900Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6981
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0850
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 6642
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1831
RUEHMRE/AMCONSUL MARSEILLE PRIORITY 1713
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000115 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/NEA, NEA/EX AND NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2019 
TAGS: PREL PINR KPAO MARR ASEC AMGT KMSG AG
SUBJECT: ALGIERS SCANDAL UPDATE: REACTIONS CALM AS EAC MEETS 
 
REF: A. ALGIERS 113 
     ¶B. ALGIERS 107 
     ¶C. ALGIERS 106 
 
ALGIERS 00000115  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce, for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) and 
 (g). 
 
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY:  Ambassador Pearce chaired an EAC meeting 
on January 31 to review the fallout from the ABC news story 
related to a former Embassy officer who allegedly drugged and 
raped two Algerian nationals (reftels).  Because of the 
Algerian weekend, the story did not break in the local press 
until January 31, at which point it was the leading 
front-page story in most daily papers (ref A).  GOA reactions 
have been restrained, with most contacts telling us this 
would not have a significant impact on the bilateral 
relationship.  The Ambassador provided the EAC with cleared 
guidance and instructed it be disseminated to all staff.  The 
RSO reported no threat information, but the EAC agreed 
American staff should limit their movements to essential life 
and work needs for 48 hours to allow time to assess any 
public backlash.  Ambassador also met with the FSN Committee 
to provide guidance and to solicit employees' views regarding 
public reaction.  One female FSN expressed personal 
discomfort dealing with questions expected from family 
regarding propriety in the Embassy workplace.  By Sunday, 
February 1, the story had all but disappeared from the press, 
and although comments continued on Algerian web sites, we 
continued to detect no immediate public or government 
backlash.  The almost complete absence of the story in 
government press outlets indicates the government prefers to 
see the story die down.  END SUMMARY. 
 
GOA DOWNPLAYS IT 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (S/NF) Because the Algerian weekend fell on Thursday and 
Friday and Algerian newspapers do not publish on Fridays, 
most of the Algerian public first learned of the alleged 
assaults (reftels) in the press of Saturday morning, January 
¶31.  The Ambassador called an EAC to review the situation and 
threat levels.  Nearly all newspapers, except government 
journals, carried the story on their front pages (ref A). 
The EAC agreed, however, that the information found in these 
news reports was largely factual, essentially retelling 
details from the ABC news report and court affidavit released 
on January 28.  Surprisingly, press coverage died down 
dramatically on February 1, and has been almost completely 
absent from government-controlled media outlets.  Most of the 
second-day coverage focused on comments made by Interior 
Minister Nourreddine Yazid Zerhouni, who essentially admitted 
publicly that the CIA had worked with Algerian intelligence 
on counter-terrorism issues.  Zerhouni said the case would be 
handled completely in the United States because neither woman 
had filed a complaint in Algeria and both reside in Europe. 
Zerhouni added that the accused officer had been covered by 
diplomatic immunity at the time of the alleged acts. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) The EAC noted that the initial GOA response, in 
Washington and Algiers (refs B and C), had been restrained. 
The Ambassador was able to inform the GOA of the ABC News 
piece during a previously scheduled meeting on the morning of 
January 29 with Minister-Delegate of National Defense 
Abdelmalek Guenaizia and one of his top generals, Major 
General Ahmed Senhadji.  The Ambassador had also called MFA 
Director General for the Americas Fatiha Selmane later that 
morning.  These officials said they appreciated being 
informed personally and in advance of the Algerian press. 
Algerian Ambassador to Washington Abdellah Baali made 
positive public statements to the U.S. press indicating that 
while the alleged incidents were unfortunate, he trusted that 
the American justice system would handle the matter 
appropriately and according to the rule of law, and that the 
situation would not damage bilateral relations.  Baali's 
comments were widely reported in the January 31 Algerian 
press, which helped frame the official Algerian message of 
playing down the scandal in favor of the positive larger 
bilateral relationship.  MFA's protocol office called us on 
January 31, seeking the identities of the two alleged 
victims, but our Management Officer used Department guidance 
to politely deflect the query. 
 
EAC RESPONSE 
------------ 
 
ALGIERS 00000115  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶4. (S/NF) RSO reported no threat information and no expected 
public reaction from meetings with local police on January 31 
and February 1.  No other threats were reported in relation 
to the story.  We received no press or public inquiries on 
January 31 and only two on February 1, and no staff reported 
any particularly negative reaction from contacts, family or 
the public, only curiosity about some details of the reports. 
 The EAC recommended nonetheless that American employees 
should maintain a low profile and refrain from non-essential 
movements in the city for an initial period of 48 hours.  RSO 
advised that SMS alerts and the cascade notification system 
would be used to share news with the Embassy community as 
appropriate and needed.  Both systems were employed on 
January 29 to inform staff to keep a low profile in the 
initial hours after the story broke in the United States. 
RSO also reminded EAC that personal security is the 
responsibility of the employee.  RSO will continue monitoring 
threat information and public reaction in conjunction with 
other Embassy sections.  The EAC agreed, under advice from 
the Embassy Consul, that a warden message would not be 
appropriate because no new threat information had been 
received, and that the existing travel warning remained 
sufficient.  Intra-country travel scheduled for the coming 
week would be reviewed by the RSO and Front Office.  No 
immediate TDY or other visits had been scheduled within five 
days, so action was deferred on inbound travel 
recommendations. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador provided cleared guidance to EAC 
members, for use with the press and Algerian government 
officials.  He requested that all personnel closely adhere to 
the guidance and that employees take care not to allow 
themselves to be drawn into any discussions or speculation 
about the CIA.  He also noted that, while we were restricted 
in terms of what we could say about this specific case,  we 
should make no apologies for the fact that we have a strong, 
ongoing bilateral security relationship with Algeria.  This 
security cooperation made both countries safer.  The 
Ambassador also met with the FSN Committee on January 31, to 
provide the same cleared guidance and listen to employee 
reactions and concerns.  Most of our local staff thought the 
story would pass relatively quickly but the focus would shift 
from the reported incidents to questions of the CIA presence 
in Algeria.  One female local employee confided to the 
Ambassador her concern that female FSNs might face difficult 
questions from family members and friends about the Embassy 
work environment. 
 
¶6.  (U)  POC for this EAC Report is DRSO Miguel A. Eversley. 
PEARCE