VZCZCXRO3920
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #0317 0361522
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051522Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3666
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0490
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3243
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0898
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 6608
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7704

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 000317 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AND AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019 
TAGS: PREL SU GN AU
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: AF ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS WITH 
SANT'EGIDIO REPRESENTATIVES 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  AF Acting Assistant Secretary Phillip 
Carter met Vittorio Scelzo, head of the International 
Department of the Community of Sant'Egidio (CSE), and Kpakile 
Felemou, head of the CSE in Guinea, on the margins of the 
African Union (AU) Summit on 1 February.  Discussions focused 
on Sudan and Guinea.  On Sudan, Scelzo commented that Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Army leader Abdul Wahid Al-Nur had 
recently told CSE that he was waiting for new policies from 
Washington before moving forward on any political process. 
Scelzo also said that Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
leader Khalil Ibrahim had proposed confidential meetings 
between JEM and the Government of Sudan, a prospect accepted 
by AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur Djibril Bassole, 
as well as Sudanese Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie. 
On Guinea, Carter stressed the United States, commitment to 
legislative elections before any potential constitutional 
changes.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Scelzo commented that CSE had been in touch with all 
of the Darfur rebel groups from the beginning of the Darfur 
conflict.  He recently met Sudan Liberation Movement/Army 
(SLA) leader Abdul Wahid Al Nur in Paris.  Abdul Wahid told 
CSE that he was waiting for a new policy from the USG. 
Scelzo assessed that Abdul Wahid was waiting for Washington 
or The Hague to do his work for him.  In response to 
Carter,s question on what the SLA was waiting for, Scelzo 
said a no-fly zone.  Scelzo assessed that the SLA believed a 
no-fly zone would help it gain territory.  Carter asked about 
the SLA,s commitment to the political process, to which 
Scelzo said that the SLA appeared to be too weak.  Scelzo 
continued that Abdul Wahid only appears to want to say no to 
all agreements, commenting that the SLA leader had told him 
that he would only talk when there is security on the ground. 
 
 
¶3.  (C)  Scelzo said he also met with rebel leader Sherif 
Harir, who disparaged Qatari efforts to advance Darfur peace 
talks.  In Scelzo's view, the unity movement was divided and 
called Ahmad Abd Al-Shafi a weak puppet.  He noted, however, 
that everyone agreed on the need to remove Sudanese President 
Bashir.  Carter asked why Bashir,s removal would be good for 
the political process, to which he replied that no one had 
ever said how Bashir,s removal would help.  Carter noted 
that it sounded like the rebels did not see any utility in 
political talks.  Scelzo said it did not appear so until now. 
 Carter asked if the fact that Qatar was new to the mediation 
process was a hurdle.  Scelzo said it was, but when Carter 
asked if that was a sincere concern, he commented that the 
rebel groups appear to want to buy time in order to preserve 
maximum flexibility. 
 
¶4.  (C)  In his meeting with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, 
Scelzo determined that Ibrahim wanted to be "Mr. Yes" to 
Abdul Wahid's "Mr. No."  JEM is seeking a confidential 
meeting with the Government of Sudan, a move that Sudanese 
Presidential Assistant Nafie endorsed in a discussion with 
SCE.  JEM wants to be the sole interlocutor on Darfur issues. 
 Carter saw that option as unrealistic and said it was 
important to be careful not to reinforce an enlarged 
self-image in regards to other groups in Darfur.  Scelzo said 
that he was not sure if the confidential meeting would take 
place, but that SCE would inform the USG if it did. 
 
¶5.  (C)  On Guinea, Carter said the country should move 
forward on legislative elections.  The formula for moving 
forward is to have the president of the legislature as 
interim president until an election can be organized.  It is 
not acceptable for the military to implement constitutional 
change prior to legislative elections, which should be 
carried out prior to the summer rainy season.  The USG will 
work to strongly increase pressure on the military in the 
coming months. 
 
¶6. (U) Acting A/S Carter approved this message. 
YAMAMOTO