P 101407Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2118
INFO NSC WASHDC
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 
AMEMBASSY RIYADH 
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 
AMCONSUL DUBAI

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000148 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/IPA 
PLEASE PASS TO AMBASSADOR GEORGE MITCHELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2034 
TAGS: PREL EAID KPAL KWGB IS AE
SUBJECT: UAE ACTIVITY IN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF: A) ABU DHABI 146 AND PREVIOUS, B) ABU DHABI 56, C) 08 ABU DHABI 
1443, D) 06 ABU DHABI 2971 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  As the UAEG hosted the "moderate camp" of Arab 
ministers February 3, its role in moderating peace in the Middle East 
came somewhat more into focus.  The UAE is a determined player, and 
consistent coordinator, in Arab efforts to secure stability; its 
contributions to GCC and Arab League efforts across the board are 
notable and often in concert with USG priorities.  (Iraq-related 
actions in 2008 offer a case in point, with senior level visits in 
both directions, debt forgiveness, and dispatch of a UAE Ambassador 
blazing a path of deepened Arab engagement with Baghdad.)  The UAE 
role in the Israeli-Palestinian equation has been limited, but 
notable.  UAEG budget support for the Palestinian Authority (PA) and 
cumulative humanitarian aid have reached significant sums (estimated 
over $4 billion).  UAE participation in Annapolis and related 
meetings has been consistently supportive of moderate solutions.  UAE 
Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed's (AbZ) Christmas Eve foray into 
Bethlehem with President Abbas seemed to suggest a desire to be even 
more proactive -- an effort immediately smothered by turmoil in Gaza. 
 AbZ's coordination of Arab moderates highlights his potential role. 
That said, the UAEG is risk-averse in setting policy precedents and 
needs to be engaged quietly and consistently to deepen its role in 
Palestine.  End summary. 
 
A maturing presence 
------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) As oil-enabled prosperity brings ever-increasing ambition 
and confidence to the UAE, the 37-year-old nation of only 900,000 
citizens has gained experience in punching above its weight.  Hiding 
behind the need for "GCC consensus" less often than before (that 
excuse deflected discussion of Iraqi debt forgiveness through 
mid-2008), the UAE has expended more effort to forge moderate 
alliances within the GCC and Arab League on issues of particular 
import.  While it coordinates closely with the traditional 
powerhouses of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, it considers itself empowered 
to press its larger brothers into action; indeed, the UAEG is of a 
younger generation and relatively flexible in blazing new alliances 
(Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed [MbZ] often comments 
pejoratively on the age of his less agile Saudi and Egyptian 
partners).  The UAEG is skeptical -- even disdainful -- of more 
radical approaches it sees in Syria and Qatar, although it engages 
all Arabs on a brotherly basis and has developed some expertise in 
"playing both sides."  The UAEG is particularly animated when it 
perceives Iran's influence encroaching on its regional (and in the 
long term existential) equities. 
 
Ties to all -- but wary 
----------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) With the UAEG's emerging self-confidence, it has the 
potential to play a larger role in forging a durable peace for 
Israel-Palestine.  It views the conflict as an impediment to the 
UAE's own ambitions of a stable region in which to pursue its 
economic goals, and is a natural proponent of an enduring solution. 
The UAEG sees regional dynamics as too often playing into the hands 
of Iran and it seeks a larger role in stunting that expansion.  It 
has ties to virtually all parties to the Israel-Palestinian dispute, 
although some are less publicized than others.  The UAEG clearly 
supports a strong PA and consistently seeks to bolster President 
Abbas, but also maintains some contact with Hamas.  It has 
facilitated Israeli business activity in the Gulf in a low key 
manner, but with sufficient vigor to evidence its desire for 
productive engagement.  (The UAEG and Tel Aviv have some direct 
dialogue on regional and security issues.)  UAE leaders display no 
innate anti-Jewish sentiment and are not of the generation that 
remembers the emotions of partition; Israel is a fact for them.  The 
UAEG is stubbornly secular in its approach to governance. 
 
¶4.  (C/NF) That said, the UAEG has seen both Palestinian and Israeli 
leaders come and go, with little progress or creative bargaining for 
peace on either side, and maintains a healthy skepticism of the 
various players.  Israel is seen as prone to self-serving decisions, 
deference to internal politics, and quick resort to military 
solutions, while the Palestinian leadership of often seen as inept or 
corrupt (or simply unable to manage an unwieldy and divided 
population).  For some UAE citizens, Hamas offers an active 
alternative to the inertia of both sides, making any Hamas appeal for 
support potentially attractive; there may be private flows of funding 
in that direction and the UAEG is well aware of public sympathy 
(locally and regionally) for "the resistance."  While Hamas is 
anathema to the leadership (representing both the Muslim Brotherhood 
and Iranian influence -- a double threat), the UAEG has learned to 
carefully navigate these choppy waters and can offer a realist's 
perspective on possibilities for peace. 
 
A dedicated donor 
----------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The UAE's primary contribution to Palestinians may be its 
estimated $4.2 billion in support for Palestinian causes from 1994 to 
mid-2008 (this Emirates News Agency estimate generally matches our 
assessment), with more funds now committed for Gaza 
aid/reconstruction.  From housing to hospitals, food aid to education 
support, and medical equipment to budget support to help the PA meet 
salary commitments, the UAE's contribution is significant.  Much aid 
has been channeled through official organizations such as the Red 
Crescent and mirrors a UAE penchant for large projects on which it 
can put its name (the $100 million "Khalifa City" and $62 million 
"Zayed City" in the Palestinian territories, for example).  The UAEG 
has given vehicles and materiel as security assistance to PA forces, 
paid 8 million dirham ($2.2M) towards the construction of a new 
Palestinian Embassy in Abu Dhabi (and likely pays some of the 
mission's operating expenses), and hosts an estimated 200,000 
Palestinian residents -- many long-term. 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) These contributions have been made partially to appease a 
UAE population demanding action to support ailing Palestinian 
neighbors, but also with a genuine desire to assist the less 
fortunate and an obvious interest in stabilizing the neighborhood. 
The UAEG has nonetheless been burned more than once with a feeling 
that its contributions were undermined, sometimes by Israeli military 
action and sometimes by Palestinian capacity failings.  (January 22 
press reports of "Sheikh Zayed City damaged by Israeli airstrikes" 
were a poignant reminder of donations negated; an air strike on a 
convoy of UAE-donated ambulances in southern Lebanon in 2006 was 
another sad commentary on undermined humanitarian gestures [ref D].) 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) In spite of a penchant for largesse, apparent Israeli 
designations of key UAE charities as having potentially assisted 
Hamas (Red Crescent and Mohammed bin Rashid charities) also inhibits 
both the flow of funds and the depth of UAE engagement.  Frustrations 
aside, donations continue, increasingly through UN channels, and in 
the aftermath of Gaza the UAEG hosted Arab moderates for a February 
2-3 review of how best to support Palestinian ambitions.  It seeks to 
remain in the game. 
 
Active coordinator among moderates 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C/NF) Often working in concert with USG priorities (whether 
these are directly coordinated with us or simply match our moderate 
motives), the UAEG actively seeks moderate solutions while working to 
sideline immoderate voices (Qatar is a frequent target of disparaging 
remarks).  USG demarches on the eve of Arab League or GCC meetings 
often meet with a UAEG comment that we are working towards the same 
ends; it may be to our advantage to have a closer "inside track" into 
UAEG thinking at the senior levels.  UAE participation in Annapolis 
and related meetings is consistently supportive of a moderate 
approach.  The UAE openly supports the 2002 Arab peace initiative and 
refers generally to "fair" or "peaceful" solutions without specific 
reference to clear policy positions (such as "two-state solution" or 
other constructs that might limit its flexibility).  The UAEG prefers 
to avoid risks associated with getting out in front with potentially 
controversial policies, yet thrives in a behind-the-scenes 
coordination role generally supportive of U.S. aims. 
 
¶9.  (S) The UAEG is also motivated to pursue results to fend off 
public cries of "inaction" in the face of tragedies like Gaza.  (The 
UAE is not necessarily in danger of being radicalized, yet the UAEG 
needs the moderate track to bear sustainable fruit to keep it 
actively in the game.)  Given the preeminence of Palestine in the 
Arab psyche, progress on that front would bear fruit in other areas 
of UAE concern in the region as well. 
 
¶10.  (S/NF) UAE Foreign Minister AbZ's Christmas Eve foray into 
Bethlehem with President Abbas seemed to suggest a desire to be even 
more proactive -- an effort immediately smothered by turmoil in Gaza. 
 AbZ has a history of working with Levant and Palestinian issues, has 
personal ties with key players, and is empowered to coordinate 
foreign affairs for the UAE (in close consultation with his elder 
brother Abu Dhabi Crown Prince MbZ).  UAE coordination of the 
moderate camp of Arab foreign ministers is yet another indication 
that it is a core player ready for a more defined place in regional 
peace making. 
 
OLSON