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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 006469 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019 
TAGS: EG IR IS KPAL MARR MOPS PHSAQ PREL XG NATO
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN GAZA ARMS 
INTERDICTION EFFORT 
 
REF: STATE 4900 
 
Classified By: EUR PDAS Marcie Ries for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1.(C) This is an action request.  Department requests USNATO 
and USEU reach out to NATO and EU Secretariat Officials on 
the points that follow.  Additionally, Embassy Prague is 
requested to brief senior Government officials representing 
the EU Presidency to: 
 
-- Brief them on ongoing efforts for a new multinational 
mechanism to interdict weapons supplies to Hamas at points of 
origin and transit routes; a mechanism that will complement 
ongoing efforts with Egypt and Israel to disrupt transfer of 
weapons at terminal delivery points; 
 
-- Note that, as briefed in an informal discussion January 15 
in Washington with key interlocutors, the new mechanism would 
likely feature enhanced intelligence sharing, 
diplomatic coordination and military operations; and 
 
-- Request NATO and the EU to support plans to organize an 
expert workshop in the near future that will develop 
practical modalities for the effort. 
 
General Background ) 
 
¶2.  (U) The United States and Israel committed to cooperative 
efforts in a Memorandum of Understanding signed in Washington 
on January 16.  We expect that the MOU has already had a 
positive impact on international efforts to achieve a 
ceasefire in the Gaza conflict and will help to support 
post-conflict security in the region. 
 
¶3.  (C) In implementing our commitments under the MOU, the 
U.S. plans action in two separate but related spheres:  (1) 
Work with Israel, Egypt and Palestinian Authority security 
forces to improve security along Gaza,s border with Egypt; 
and (2) Work with other international partners to develop a 
new interdiction regime to help prevent the flow of weapons 
and explosives from the point of origin and along transit 
routes before they reach Egyptian or Gazan territory. 
 
¶4.  (C) This message focuses exclusively on support for the 
second element of this strategy. 
 
General Concept of Joint Interdiction Mechanism ) 
 
¶5.  (C) The U.S. is exploring the establishment of a new 
multilateral mechanism aimed at interdicting the flow of arms 
to Hamas at points of origin and in transit routes. 
 
¶6.  (C) On January 15, the Under Secretary of Political 
Affairs' Senior Advisor Stephen Mull and other Department 
officials held an informal discussion with a group of 
Washington-based Ambassadors and DCMs from the embassies of 
the UK, 
France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway 
and Egypt. 
 
¶7.  (C) The purpose of the meeting was to discuss a 
prospective new effort to interdict illicit weapons smuggling 
to Gaza.  Ambassador Mull laid out a vision for an 
interdiction regime that would likely include the following 
elements: 
 
--  Increased intelligence sharing and coordination on Gaza 
arms supply origin and transit routes, through the 
establishment of an intelligence fusion cell or similar 
mechanism; 
 
-- Coordinated diplomacy, including both bilateral and 
multilateral persuasion and the denial of 
overflights/territorial sea passage to stop trafficking; 
 
-- A military interdiction regime. 
 
¶8.  (C) The military interdiction regime we envision would be 
similar to commitments undertaken under the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), in which participating states 
act on reliable intelligence to prevent the transit of 
illicit materials through ship inspections " both at sea and 
in port" and denial of overflight privileges to airplanes 
suspected of carrying illicit cargo.  All such actions are 
taken in accordance with national legal 
authorities and relevant international laws and frameworks. 
We do not envision military operations on land at points of 
origin, or anywhere along transit routes.  Rather, the 
focus will be on maritime operations -- both on the high 
seas, and in ports of cooperating 
littoral states. 
 
¶9. (C) We have not yet determined the primary theater(s) of 
operation for this mechanism.  Intelligence on these weapon 
flows is sparse, probably because of their 
piecemeal nature.  There are claims that such supplies 
transit both the Mediterranean and Red Sea.  For interdiction 
operations in the Red Sea, one option might be expanding the 
mission of Coalition Task Force 150 to include specifically 
targeting suspected Hamas arms supplies.  We could consider 
standing up a similar mechanism in the Mediterranean, for 
example, NATO naval assets possibly could deploy rapidly, but 
Rules of Engagement may be difficult to agree at 26. 
Building a new Coalition Task Force may be easier to sustain 
over the long run. 
 
¶10.  (C) Clearly, such a joint mechanism would have to be 
based on developing actionable intelligence, and obtaining 
the cooperation of littoral states in offering their ports 
for cargo inspections. 
 
¶11.  (C) In addition, the question of disposition of illicit 
cargo seized and detained as a result of interdiction actions 
will have to be addressed, along with an evaluation of 
existing authorities and the possible need for increased 
authorities. 
 
¶12.  (C ) Undertaking the mission represents an important 
confidence building measure for the Israeli government to 
encourage its constructive participation in efforts to secure 
Gaza, and thus to extend and solidify the ceasefire in Gaza. 
 
The February Workshop ) 
 
¶13.  (C ) The U.S. has already received sufficiently positive 
expressions of interest that we are moving ahead. 
 
-- If asked:  We have gotten positive expressions of interest 
from UK, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and the 
Netherlands; no response yet from Norway.  Egypt 
has publicly announced that they will not be participating in 
this joint effort, though we have reason to believe that they 
also will not try to block our efforts.  We are awaiting an 
official reply from the Egyptian government. 
 
¶14.  (C ) Denmark has offered to host a workshop for 
contributing states to the new mechanism in the timeframe of 
February 4-5. 
 
¶15.  (C ) Notionally, day one of the workshop might consist 
of expert level consultations that would break into 
sub-groups; day two would be at a more senior level, and 
would feature reports from the sub-groups, and hopefully 
result in agreement for the way forward. 
 
Deadline/Points of Contact 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (U) Department requests missions/post report on interest 
in cooperation in both the broader effort and the proposed 
workshop by January 28.  Please report results to 
P Special Assistant Constantinos Nicolaidis, with copies to 
NEA/RA Michael Adler and Constance Arvis, and EUR/RPM Peter 
Chisholm. 
 
 
CLINTON