R 231942Z JAN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

UNCLAS STATE 006306 
 
 
FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION, ADCMS, PRINCIPAL OFFICERS, AND 
MANAGEMENT OFFICERS FROM UNDER SECRETARY FOR MANAGEMENT 
PATRICK KENNEDY 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT AMED CASC TBIO ASEC KFLU KSAF KSEO KPAO
SUBJECT: Pandemic Influenza Tripwires 
 
Ref:  (A) 08 STATE 67922 (B) 08 STATE 67936 
 
 
¶1.  This is an ACTION REQUEST: please see paragraphs three, 
four and five. 
 
¶2.  The threat of a potentially devastating global influenza 
pandemic persists.  The National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza calls pandemic influenza "a unique circumstance," 
requiring planning beyond more customary emergency readiness. 
 
¶3.  Posts are to be commended for their thorough and 
insightful pandemic planning, and particularly for the 
tripwires they developed.  Medical knowledge about a 
potential pandemic has increased in the time since the 
tripwires were developed, and so have some of the recommended 
responses.  The Department has created the following general 
tripwires for pandemic influenza.  Posts should include these 
new tripwires as part of their current planning as a basic 
minimum, but posts are also encouraged to incorporate 
additional, country-specific information in the final version 
of their pandemic influenza tripwires.  This will ensure that 
posts' tripwires are consistent and reflect current medical 
knowledge and State Department policy - and also that they 
give due consideration to specific public health, resource, 
infrastructure and other factors at play in each country. 
The guidance and instructions concerning tripwires apply to 
all USG personnel in country under Chief of Mission 
authority. 
 
¶4.  Posts should provide an introductory paragraph generally 
describing the host country public health system's current 
ability to respond to an outbreak of pandemic influenza, the 
current local availability of antiviral medications to 
private Americans, whether private Americans are able to 
receive prescription medications via mail, as well as the 
host country stance on access by uninsured foreigners to its 
medical system.  Posts are requested to publish their updated 
tripwires on the Tripwire Reporting and Integrated Planning 
System (TRIPS) located on the classified network, by February 
23, 2009. 
 
¶5.  Preface to Tripwires:  For easy reference, the 
following information should be included in the 
introductory materials to posts' tripwires, or otherwise be 
easily accessible: 
 
¶A. Unpredictable Nature of Pandemic 
 
How a pandemic would develop (where the first outbreak 
would occur, how it would spread, etc.) is not predictable 
at this point.  One should not assume that the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Phases, the Federal Government Response 
Stages or the tripwires that appear below will occur in a 
sequential progression during the Pandemic Alert Period or 
during the Pandemic Period.  (For instance, given the ease 
of international transportation, significant human-to-human 
transmission may begin in some places without reports of 
individual clusters of illness.)  Therefore, EACs should 
review all of the tripwires when they initially meet 
regarding a potentially triggering event.  EACs should also 
be aware that implementation of the actions listed under 
each tripwire may vary depending on the severity of the 
pandemic and the assessment of its risks by medical 
authorities.  In this regard, the Pandemic Severity Index 
developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
will serve as a global planning tool for this purpose. 
 
¶B.  Both Planning and Flexibility are Essential 
 
i.  Planning is crucial.  As noted in ref B, evacuation 
should not be expected, and other methods of departure may 
not be available, making it essential that posts and 
individuals make prior preparations for remaining overseas 
during a pandemic.  Much of what can be prepared in advance 
is discussed in reftels and in the first tripwire below. 
 
ii.  The most effective response to any emergency, however, 
requires both good planning and the flexibility to depart 
from the plan when necessary.  Many of the actions 
discussed in these tripwires will have to be initiated or 
authorized in the State Department (e.g., "authorized 
departure" and "ordered departure," as well as other 
actions, can only be authorized in Washington, D.C.).  It 
is likely that a State Department Task Force would be 
formed upon USG confirmation that a pandemic had begun. 
This Task Force would communicate State Department 
instructions, many of which could differ from what appears 
in the tripwires below. 
 
iii.  In this same vein, tripwires developed in the context 
of planning for the initial outbreak of a pandemic may need 
modification for subsequent waves of the outbreak, in order 
to reflect possible changes in attack rate, changes in the 
case fatality ratio, the possibility of an effective 
pandemic-specific vaccine 6 to 12 months after an initial 
outbreak, as well as other social and economic factors. 
 
¶C.  WHO Phases and USG Stages 
 
Each tripwire includes the relevant WHO Phase and U.S. 
Federal Government Response Stage.  These pandemic status 
markers are applied globally; if one country experiences 
increased and sustained transmission in the general 
population, which is WHO Phase 6 and Federal Government 
Response Stage 3, the pandemic is considered to have 
reached those levels globally.  Since tripwires are written 
from the perspective of the individual post, the WHO Phase 
or Federal Government Response Stage listed for each 
tripwire may not seem to correspond to what is happening in 
the host country.  The WHO Phases and Federal Government 
Response Stages are nevertheless included to put events at 
post into a global perspective. 
 
¶D.  Individuals with Special Needs and Those with 
Disabilities 
 
Posts should include a cross section of individuals at 
post, including persons with special needs and persons with 
disabilities (e.g., visual, hearing, speech, mobility) in 
all aspects of emergency planning, including, but not 
limited, to overcoming barriers to information exchange and 
obtaining transportation.  Posts should take practicable 
steps to ensure that all plans, communications, information 
dissemination, and services, whether via the Internet/Web 
or through other electronic means (or non-electronically) 
are accessible to and usable by all stakeholders, including 
persons with special needs and individuals with 
disabilities.  Here are a few resources on this topic: 
http://www.disabilitypreparedness.gov/ (Internet), 
http://impact.state.gov (Intranet), and 
http://www.section508.gov (Intranet). 
 
¶E.  Accounting for Employee Absenteeism and Limited Access 
to Facilities 
 
Posts should keep likely employee absenteeism in mind when 
making plans to maintain essential services, considering 
probable absenteeism of those who must care for school age 
children if schools are closed, as well as those who must 
stay home due to their own illness or illness of a family 
member.  Possible scenarios include workforce reductions of 
forty percent for two weeks at the peak of a pandemic, and 
lower levels for a few weeks on either side of the peak. 
Posts should also plan for maintaining essential services 
during periods when access to Embassy facilities and other 
locations may be limited due to social distancing to limit 
contagion or due to security concerns.  Post should 
coordinate planning with contractors, suppliers, and 
shippers, etc., and should also consider the availability 
of fall-back services, should contracted services not be 
available as planned. 
 
¶F.  Water Storage by Individuals 
 
i.  The Department continues to recommend that families store 
their own supplies of water even though posts are also 
required to maintain water for their use.  At many posts, 
employee housing may not afford sufficient storage space to 
permit safe storage of recommended quantities of water (i.e., 
storing the water without stacking or shelving it in an 
unsafe manner).  As noted under Tripwire One below, families 
should nevertheless consider storing as much water as is 
safely allowed by their individual circumstances.  Posts are 
reminded to develop lists of alternate sources of potable 
water (and equipment, such as distillers), as well as 
procedures for rendering water safe for drinking, and to 
develop contingency plans in case expected sources of water 
are not available. 
 
ii.  Store-bought water, from a reliable source and stored in 
its original, sealed container in a cool, dark place, may be 
stored until its "use by" date.  (Bottled water brands that 
have been certified by the National Sanitation Foundation 
(http://www.nsf.org/) or by the International Bottled Water 
Association (http://www.bottledwater.org), or approved for 
U.S. military purchase, meet EPA Drinking Water Standards 
(http://www.epa.gov/safewater/standards.html) .  The NSF and 
IBWA logos appear on the bottles of approved brands.) 
 
iii.  Water prepared for drinking by individuals according to 
CDC instructions (see 
http://emergency.cdc.gov/preparedness/kit/wat er/) may be 
stored up to six months. 
 
iv.  For more information about drinking water safety, see 
the OBO/OM/SHEM website at http://obo.state.gov/opssaf- 
shem/PARENT%20PAGES/Policies%20and%20Directiv es/ALDACs/U.S.De 
partment_of_State_Drinking_Water_Program.pdf. 
 
 
¶G.  The No-Double-Standard Policy 
 
In conformance with the No Double Standard policy, 
information about any action taken by post that makes 
employees and their family members safer, must be provided 
at the same time to the general American community as well, 
to permit its members to take similar precautions.  It is 
not necessary to disseminate publicly information about an 
EAC meeting or other decision-making group that deliberates 
about steps that may be taken, but it is necessary to 
disseminate publicly information about resulting actions 
that make employees, in general, safer.  These actions 
could include provision of safety and security information 
to official Americans, limitations on employee travel, or 
reduction of personnel at post, etc.  Many of the actions 
listed below fall into this category.  The consular section 
administers the No Double Standard policy under the 
oversight of the Chief of Mission.  Any questions about 
application of the policy should immediately be referred to 
the Bureau of Consular Affairs' Office of American Citizens 
Services (CA/OCS/ACS). 
 
¶H.  Health and Human Services Teams 
 
Although mention of a possible visit by a HHS/CDC team for 
the assessment and/or containment of cluster cases first 
appears in Tripwire Three, posts should be ready to house, 
provide transportation for, and otherwise assist such a team 
at any point. 
 
¶I.  The Status Quo and Tripwire One 
 
Tripwire One reflects the status quo at the time this cable 
was drafted.  Posts should review reftels, which provide 
information that is still current regarding pandemic 
policy, to ensure that action items described in those 
cables have been completed.  Note that many of the "Actions 
to Consider" listed under Tripwire One below are basic 
steps that should be taken regularly even without a 
pandemic threat. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6.  Tripwire One: 
 
There are domestic animal outbreaks in various countries, 
but animal-to-human transmission is rare (Federal 
Government Response Stage 0, WHO Phase 3).  A pandemic 
outbreak is considered likely at some point in the coming 
years, and possibly this year or next. 
 
¶7.  Actions to Consider 
 
--  Review USG pandemic policy, as communicated in reftels, 
at meetings for staff and their families, as well as with the 
American community via warden messages, newsletters, OSAC 
discussions and town hall meetings.  Points covered should 
include the following: 
 
a.  At the outset of a pandemic, while commercial 
transportation options are still available, the Department 
will consider implementing authorized departure for non- 
emergency employees and any family members at the 
initially affected post, and will suggest that non- 
emergency employees and any family members at other posts 
who do not wish to remain overseas during a pandemic avail 
themselves of appropriate departure options (SMA, R&R, 
etc.) in order to return to the U.S.  When this 
announcement is made to employees, the private American 
community will also be advised, so that its members can 
make informed decisions about their own actions. 
 
b.  Embassy employees, their family members, and private 
American citizens who do not leave while commercial 
transportation options are still available (and while 
borders are still open) should expect to remain in country 
for the duration of the pandemic.  They will therefore 
need to have prepared in advance for such a situation, 
having on hand personal supplies of food, water and 
medications that will last up to twelve weeks.  The U.S. 
Government website, Pandemicflu.gov, contains a checklist 
of suggested preparations for individuals and families at 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/individual/ch ecklist.html. 
(Note that this website advises families in the United 
States to keep two weeks of emergency supplies in the 
event of an influenza pandemic.  Given differences in 
local conditions and preparedness overseas and possible 
transportation difficulties in a pandemic, the USG 
recommends that Americans overseas maintain sufficient 
supplies to maintain themselves in country for up to 
twelve weeks.) 
 
c.  Also see 2008 STATE 67936, which suggests: 
 
Stored food should primarily consist of non-perishable 
items that do not require refrigeration, or water for 
preparation, and should include adequate amounts of 
food for family members on special diets, such as the 
elderly or infants on formula . . . 
 
Store one gallon of water per person per day (two 
quarts for drinking and two quarts for food preparation 
and sanitation) in clean plastic containers (avoiding 
containers that will decompose or break, such as milk 
cartons or glass bottles).  Also have on hand items 
that may be needed for water purification, such as camp 
stoves and pots . . . 
 
d.  It is recommended that families store their own 
supplies of water.  It may be impractical at many posts, 
however, for individual families to store these amounts of 
water (see paragraph 5(F) above).  All posts should 
develop a list of potential sources of potable water, 
procedures (and, if necessary, equipment, such as 
distillers) for rendering the water safe for drinking, and 
contingency plans in case these sources of water are not 
available.  An example of a potential source of water is a 
swimming pool. 
 
e.  The Department will consider requesting DOD support 
for non-combatant evacuation operations only in the event 
of a breakdown in civil order. 
 
--  Review Embassy supplies of food, water, antivirals, other 
medications and equipment to ensure that they meet Department 
pandemic guidelines (see 2008 STATE 67936). 
 
--  Encourage employees and their families to maintain first 
aid kits at home that include hygiene and medical supplies 
(see 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/individual/ch ecklist.html for 
a checklist of suggested items).  Ensure that this 
information is shared with the private American community. 
 
--  Review security conditions for employees and their 
families at their residences and in public venues. 
 
--  Consult with schools attended by American children about 
safety procedures. 
 
--  Review operations of USG agencies with offices or 
personnel off-chancery to take into account special security 
considerations. 
 
--  Review the availability of alternate operating 
facilities, such as homes or other adequate worksites. 
 
--  Review/test emergency preparations, to include 
internal/external communication procedures, to ensure these 
procedures are adequate, that they can be followed to 
completion by all, including individuals with special needs 
and persons with disabilities, and that all will have ready 
access to information during an emergency. 
 
--  Review back-up procedures for advising staff and the 
private American community during a pandemic about where to 
obtain up-to-date information about the situation and about 
Embassy operations. 
 
--  Review/update information regarding exit visas and other 
formalities for departure. 
 
--  Review/update warden system and F-77 Report. 
 
--  Review volume of controlled/classified documents, and 
destruction procedures; the Bureau of Diplomatic Security 
recommends that posts maintain only a "minimum footprint" of 
controlled and classified holdings, keeping these down to 
amounts requiring less than one hour destruction time. 
 
--  Ensure personnel lists have been updated on WebPASS Post 
Personnel System (PS), so that accurate information can be 
accessed instantly in the Department. 
 
--  Review/update emergency and minimal staffing lists, as 
well as the status of cross-training for individuals who 
might have to fill in behind absent colleagues, keeping in 
mind that absenteeism is projected at up to forty percent at 
the height of a pandemic wave. 
 
--  Review the adequacy of existing contracts for goods and 
services as they relate to performance during an emergency 
such as a pandemic, with an emphasis on whether vital 
supplies, such as water, and essential services, such as 
guard services, are covered. 
 
--  Review local healthcare resources, health risk under the 
current (non-pandemic) conditions, and public health and 
sanitation situation. 
 
--  Perform liaison with host government medical authorities 
to learn plans for alternate care sites if hospitals are 
full; confirm that Americans, whether official or private, 
would be accepted at these sites. 
 
--  Perform liaison with host government medical authorities 
to learn mortuary plans in case of mass fatalities, to 
include: 
 
-assessments of current capacity for refrigeration of 
 deceased persons. 
-discussions of mass fatality plans with local health 
 officials and medical examiners. 
-coordination with local health officials to identify 
 temporary morgue sites. 
-determination of the scope and volume of supplies 
 (e.g., body bags) needed to handle an increased number 
 of deceased persons. 
 
--  Review departure transportation options, and verify 
commercial air schedules. 
 
--  Review post's Internet website to ensure that it is up- 
to-date and provides detailed information. 
 
--  Review whether post's website is part of Department's 
Content Management System (CMS), which enables 24/7 remote 
posting of content by the CMS support team at the request 
of the mission.  (Send test messages or requests to 
embassy-help@getusinfo.com.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶8.  Tripwire Two: 
 
There is a confirmed outbreak (clusters of human-to-human 
transmission) in another country (Federal Government 
Response Stage 2), and human-to-human transmission is 
increasing there (WHO Phase 4 or 5, depending upon the 
degree of human-to-human transmission). 
 
¶9.  Actions to Consider 
 
-- EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's Crisis 
Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and, if applicable, the State 
Department Task Force, confirms that tripwire has been 
crossed. 
 
--  EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwire One. 
 
--  Provide Mission briefings for employees and dependents 
emphasizing procedures in the event that the Under 
Secretary for Management encourages employees to exercise 
liberal departure options (SMA, R&R, etc.).  Also review 
health and safety precautions, and social distancing. 
 
--  Hold Town Hall and OSAC meetings with the American 
community to cover information provided to employees during 
the briefing, and take steps to ensure the information is 
also sent to the American community via warden message and 
placed on post's Internet website.  Information provided 
should emphasize that private Americans should strongly 
consider departing at the earliest stages of a pandemic, 
while commercial options remain available (and those who do 
not depart should be prepared to remain in country). 
 
--  If the Department issues a revised Travel Alert or Travel 
Warning, posts should promptly disseminate it to the local 
American community. 
 
--  Update information regarding exit visas and other 
formalities for departure. 
 
--  Ensure personnel lists have been updated (including 
information about TDYers) on WebPASS Post Personnel System 
(PS), so that accurate information can be accessed instantly 
in the Department. 
 
--  Review the next tripwire to be ready to react quickly 
once it is crossed. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶10.  Tripwire Three: 
 
A pandemic influenza outbreak with human-to-human 
transmission in the host country has been confirmed 
(Federal Government Response Stage 2 or 3, and WHO Phase 5 
or 6, depending upon the degree of human-to-human 
transmission: "significant" or "efficient and sustained"). 
 
¶11.  Actions to Consider 
 
-- EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's Crisis 
Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and, if applicable, the State 
Department Task Force, confirms that tripwire has been 
crossed. 
 
--  EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwires One and Two. 
 
--  Be ready to house, provide transportation for and 
otherwise assist a USG rapid response team led by HHS/CDC, 
which may be deployed to the host country for the assessment 
and/or containment of cluster cases in the event of an 
incipient pandemic. 
 
--  Consider instituting social distancing policy for 
employees and their family members, advising them to avoid 
crowded venues, including representational events.  Since 
large meetings of Embassy personnel are inadvisable at this 
point, notify personnel of preferred methods of 
disseminating information (e-mail, Intranet postings, 
telephone, etc.). Take steps to ensure that information 
about this action is provided to the American community via 
warden message and placed on post's Internet website.  Urge 
private Americans to practice social distancing. 
 
--  Disseminate information to personnel about the 
possibility of host country quarantine and how to cooperate 
with local authorities.  Disseminate information about this 
action via post's warden system and Internet website, noting 
that although the Embassy would like to know whenever an 
American citizen is taken into quarantine facilities, 
consular employees will generally not be permitted to visit 
that person or remove them from the facility. 
 
--  Complying within reason with the requirement for "social 
distancing," set up and staff a control room with a stable 
electrical supply as well as phone and Internet access. 
 
--  Consider setting up, in compliance with the requirement 
for "social distancing," a rumor-control hotline staffed by 
volunteers and at least one representative of post's press 
office.  The volunteers would refer callers to appropriate 
USG websites, including post's website and PandemicFlu.gov. 
The press office representative would prepare and obtain 
clearance for press guidance and coordinate messaging with 
other USG agencies and local government ministries. 
 
--  Consider advising employees to withdraw children from 
local schools, and inform the American community of any 
decision to do so via the warden system and post's Internet 
website. 
 
--  Consider strongly encouraging use of sick leave for 
employees who exhibit flu-like symptoms or have family 
member exhibiting flu-like symptoms.  Take steps to ensure 
that information about this action is provided to the 
American community via warden message and placed on post's 
Internet website.  Urge private Americans to take the same 
precautions. 
 
--  Consider limiting the number of TDY personnel at post. 
If action adopted, advise American community via post's 
warden system and Internet website. 
 
--  Consider restricting official and unofficial travel to 
suspect areas.  If action adopted, advise American 
community via post's warden system and Internet website. 
 
--  Consider restricting in-country travel by all 
employees, as well as TDY travel by post personnel, and 
consider recalling employees already located in remote 
areas.  Disseminate information about this action via 
post's warden system and Internet website. 
 
--  Review host government's emergency mortuary set-up, and 
ensure that post will be able to assist both official and 
private Americans coordinate with host government medical 
authorities when a body must be placed in a mortuary 
facility. 
 
--  Evaluate and report on capacity of local government to 
deal with epidemic, restore services and ensure domestic 
order. 
 
--  Consult with CA about ceasing to provide non-emergency 
consular services (including visa services and non- 
emergency ACS services), and, if action adopted, 
disseminate information about it via post's warden system 
and Internet website. 
 
--  Consult with CA about limiting face-to-face contact 
with ACS cases. If action adopted, advise American 
community via post's warden system and Internet website. 
 
--  Reduce embassy operating hours and services, and 
disseminate information about this action via post's warden 
system and Internet website. 
 
--  Update information regarding exit visas and other 
formalities for departure. 
 
--  Request authorized departure for non-essential employees 
and any family members.  If it is granted, the Department 
will issue a Travel Warning, and post should disseminate it 
to the American community via post's warden system and 
Internet website.  The Travel Warning will emphasize that 
Americans should strongly consider departing while commercial 
options remain available, and that those who do not depart 
should be prepared to remain in country.  Evacuation should 
not be expected.  (Note:  at the point that seats on 
commercial flights become difficult to obtain, the Embassy 
may need to assist private Americans in obtaining seats just 
as it does employees.)  Inform host government and other 
foreign missions of drawdown status. 
 
--  If authorized departure is not granted, provide Mission 
briefings for employees and dependents emphasizing 
procedures in the event that the Under Secretary for 
Management encourages employees to exercise liberal 
departure options (SMA, R&R, etc.). 
 
--  Update personnel lists on WebPASS Post Personnel System 
(PS), to include TDY personnel, and keep the Emergency 
Management System (EMS) module current with departures and 
destinations. 
 
--  Request an update to the Travel Alert or a Travel Warning 
to reflect post actions.  If the Department issues a revised 
Travel Alert or Travel Warning, posts should promptly 
disseminate it to the local American community. 
 
--  Review the next tripwire to be ready to react quickly 
once it is crossed. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶12.  Tripwire Four: 
 
The pandemic situation is such that it is difficult to get 
seats on the few commercial flights still operating 
(Federal Government Response Stage 3, and WHO Phase 6). 
 
¶13.  Actions to Consider 
 
-- EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's Crisis 
Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and the State Department Task 
Force, confirms that tripwire has been crossed. 
 
--  EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwires One, Two and 
Three. 
 
--  Under post's social distancing policy, meetings are no 
longer routinely held, so reminders to employees about health 
precautions, as well as procedures to report an emergency, 
are disseminated via e-mail, Intranet or telephone.   Take 
steps to ensure the same information is provided to the 
private American community via warden messages and post's 
Internet website.  Americans should be further advised how to 
obtain food and medications if they run out. 
 
--  Ensure that controlled/classified documents have been 
reduced to less than one-hour destruction time. 
 
--  Provide information about host-country alternate care 
sites (e.g., school gymnasiums, armories, convention centers) 
to employees and family members.  Ensure that this 
information is provided to the local American community via 
warden messages and post's Internet website. 
 
--  If the Embassy needs to assist employees in booking seats 
on commercial flights because bookings are difficult to 
obtain, the Embassy should assist private Americans in 
booking seats as well. 
 
--  Update personnel lists on WebPASS Post Personnel System 
(PS), to include TDY personnel, and keep the Emergency 
Management System (EMS) module current with departures and 
destinations. 
 
--  Request an update to the Travel Alert or a Travel Warning 
to reflect current circumstances and post actions.  If the 
Department issues a revised Travel Alert or Travel Warning, 
posts should promptly disseminate it to the local American 
community. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶14.  Tripwire Five: 
 
The pandemic situation is such that random acts of violence 
or an increase in threats are occurring (Federal Government 
Response Stage 3, and WHO Phase 6).  (As noted earlier, 
non-combatant evacuation operations will be considered only 
in the event of a breakdown in civil order; this tripwire 
does not describe that situation). 
 
¶15.  Actions to Consider 
 
-- EAC, in consultation with the Operations Center's Crisis 
Management Staff (S/ES-O/CMS) and the State Department Task 
Force, confirms that tripwire has been crossed. 
 
--  EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwires One, Two, Three 
and Four. 
 
--  At front office level, meet with government officials and 
contacts to express concerns and discuss enhancement of 
security around U.S. facilities. 
 
--  Implement security escort of personnel to and from work. 
 
--  Consolidate housing closer to embassy or alternate 
command post. 
 
--  Ensure that social distancing and other health 
precautions are being observed by mission personnel and 
family members. 
 
--  Update information regarding exit visas and other 
formalities for departure. 
 
--  Update American community via the warden system and 
post's Internet website about general safety precautions 
taken vis--vis local travel and housing (see above). 
 
--  Update functional designations, as needed, and create a 
shadow roster to make it clear who is on alert, on call, or 
on duty, and include back-up personnel.  Examples include: 
 
- Senior officers, EAC members, other designees 
- Security personnel, including Marine Security Guards 
(MSGs) 
- Telephone operators, communications personnel 
- General Services Office personnel such as electricians, 
  plumbers, warehouse personnel, etc. 
- Others: i.e., secretaries, drivers, key Locally Engaged 
  Staff, etc. 
 
--  Perform liaison with State Department and appropriate 
U.S. military command in event civil order breaks down and 
military-assisted Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) 
becomes necessary.  Brief Department on all other 
conversations with the military command.  Bear in mind that a 
NEO may not be possible, and post's preparations should take 
this into account. 
 
--  If not already done, and complying within reason with 
"social distancing" requirements, set up and staff a 24-hour 
control room with a stable electrical supply as well as phone 
and Internet access. 
 
--  Review Tripwire Six to be ready to react quickly to a 
potentially volatile situation. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶16.  Tripwire Six: 
 
The pandemic situation is such that the local government 
cannot contain civil unrest, much of which is directed 
against the U.S. Embassy and Americans, who may be 
perceived as having food, water and medications, and 
refusing to share same.  American homes may be broken into 
by mobs seeking medications and food, and numbers of 
Americans may be seeking refuge at the Embassy. (Federal 
Government Response Stage 3, and WHO Phase 6) 
 
¶17.  Actions to Consider 
 
--  At front office level, call the State Department 
Operations Center to report on the developing situation. 
This call should be made as soon as it is determined that 
Tripwire Six may have been crossed.  EAC, in consultation 
with the Operations Center's Crisis Management Staff (S/ES- 
O/CMS) and the State Department Task Force, confirms that 
tripwire has been crossed. 
 
--  EAC reviews actions listed for Tripwires One, Two, Three, 
Four and Five. 
 
--  Request conference call via State Operations Center with 
CMS (Crisis Management Support), CA/OCS, and the regional 
bureau's EX office to discuss requesting ordered departure. 
 
--  Request Ordered Departure status from the Department, and 
provide post's assessment of the current situation.  Include 
information about potential numbers of private Americans 
departing, and about transportation availability. 
 
--  If Ordered Departure status is granted, the following 
actions will become necessary: 
 
a. If more transportation is needed than is available, 
request Department assistance. A/LM is responsible for 
arranging increases in regularly scheduled flights to 
post, charters, etc. 
 
b. If departure will not be possible via regularly- 
scheduled commercial flights or chartered commercial 
aircraft, CMS and the regional Bureau will discuss request 
for DOD assistance. Ambassador should brief the relevant 
combatant command on the situation at hand. 
 
c. Depending on departure option(s) selected, identify 
preferred options for internal movement, staging points, 
routes, assembly areas, embarkation points, etc.  Also, 
consider transportation, timing, and size of group 
movements. 
 
d. If potential transportation includes stopovers at a 
location where there is a U.S. diplomatic post, include 
transit post(s) as info addressee on all related cable 
traffic.  Provide guidance to transit post on services 
required for those departing, such as special medical 
needs, diapers, etc. 
 
e. Inform other foreign missions of drawdown status. 
 
f. Disseminate the Travel Warning (issued by the 
Department when Ordered Departure is granted) to the 
American community via post's warden system and Internet 
website.  The communication to the private American 
community should strongly urge private Americans to review 
their individual circumstances and consider whether they 
should relocate to the United States at this point.  It 
should note that those who do not depart should be 
prepared to remain in country, and that embassy services 
may soon become unavailable to those who stay.  Note that 
warden system and website updates may also become 
unavailable, and that Americans who stay should monitor 
the State Department website, and, specifically, 
http://travel.state.gov. 
 
g. Consult with M/FLO for services to personnel who depart 
post. 
 
h. Request that the Department impose Minimize status. 
 
i. Ensure the guidelines in 4 FAH-3 H-830 "Emergency 
Evacuation Fiscal Policy" are followed by all agencies at 
post. 
 
j. Contact the regional bureau to replenish post operating 
funds to sustain post operations, and also contact K Fund 
Manager, RM/CFO, for special K funds for evacuation 
related operations and evacuee travel.  Charter aircraft 
will be funded at the Department level. 
 
k. Confirm travel orders are prepared for departing post 
personnel. (It is best for post to get all information 
when employees check in at post.) 
 
l. Consider actions that must be accomplished in the event 
all employees depart post and operations are suspended. 
Be ready to initiate document destruction plan. 
 
m. Arrange administrative control of residences and 
personal property of departing U.S. Government personnel. 
 
n. Designate liaison officers, arranging at high level to 
ensure acceptance by host government and ensuring 
communication capability. 
 
o. Consider disposition of pets. (State Department policy 
precludes evacuating pets via chartered or military 
aircraft or ships, and they therefore require alternate 
accommodations. Working animals, such as guide dogs, are 
not considered pets and will be accommodated if possible.) 
 
p. Consider assigning officers at the main ports of 
departure to offer routine consular services, assist in 
liaison with local authorities, and track private 
Americans leaving the country via the Consular Task Force 
application.  Assign personnel only after consultation 
with post's Regional Medical Officer or Foreign Service 
Health Practitioner in case additional protective measures 
are advised. 
 
q. Update personnel lists on WebPASS Post Personnel System 
(PS), making sure that TDY personnel have been included, 
and that the Emergency Management System module is current 
in its tracking of travels and destinations.  If computers 
are not functioning, transmit up-to-date staffing pattern 
to S/ES-O/CMS, CA and post's regional bureau, including 
breakdown of employees and family members by agency and 
names of TDY personnel, and indicating who is out of 
country and their status (TDY, annual leave, home leave, 
R&R). 
 
--  At the discretion of the Chief of Mission, in 
coordination with the Department, assistance may be extended 
to other foreign nationals when humanitarian or U.S. national 
security interests dictate. Post must obtain prior approval 
from the Department before offering departure assistance. 
Points to cover in such local discussions may include: 
 
(1) The U.S. Government will consider assisting third- 
country nationals (TCNs) and host-country nationals in 
departure on a case-by-case, space available, and 
reimbursable basis when doing so serves U.S. interests and 
the passenger(s) has appropriate travel documents, 
including a valid visa for entry to the United States. 
 
(2) Priorities of movement and how they will be integrated 
into departure plans. 
 
(3) Reimbursement for departure assistance to third- 
country nationals is billed directly from the U.S. 
Government to the government of the individual (except 
where the national is a family member of a U.S. citizen in 
which case the national becomes part of the U.S. citizen's 
individual promissory note). 
 
(4) Advance travel documentation. 
 
(5) Sharing of personnel assignments, communications and 
other management considerations for the departure process. 
 
(6) Screening procedures at assembly and embarkation 
areas. 
 
(7) Responsibilities at safe haven, transit points or 
final destination. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶18.  Please direct questions to Robin Morritz in M/PRI at 
MorritzRX@State.gov or Elias Parra in Crisis Management Staff 
at SES-O_CMS@State.gov. 
 
¶19.  Minimize considered. 
 
 
CLINTON