VZCZCXYZ0027
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2556 0100005
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 092348Z JAN 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 002556 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2018 
TAGS: ETTC EFIN KNNP MNUC PARM PINS PREL UNVIE
SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF SANCTIONS: A.Q. KHAN AND 
ASSOCIATES 
 
Classified By: IO PDAS James B. Warlick for reasons 1.4 (b)(c)(d) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph three. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶2. (S) Sanctions have been imposed under the Nuclear 
Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA), the Export Import Bank 
Act (EXIM), and Executive Orders (E.O.) 12938 and 13382 on 13 
individuals and three companies for involvement in the A.Q. 
Khan nuclear proliferation network. 
 
------------------------- 
OBJECTIVES/ACTION REQUEST 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Post is requested to achieve the following objectives: 
 
-- Notify IAEA officials sometime after 9am EST January 12 
that on January 12 the U.S. imposed sanctions on 13 people 
and three companies for engaging in activities related to the 
A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. 
 
-- Emphasize that no sanctions were imposed on governments 
and that the overall sanctions decision reflects the diverse 
and global nature of the network. 
 
-- Post can draw from information from the legal paper in 
para 5, points in the media note in para six, and press 
guidance in para seven. 
 
------------------------ 
SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SECRET/rel IAEA) 
 
-- I wanted to inform you of a legal process that has 
concluded in the U.S. 
 
-- U.S. nonproliferation law requires that sanctions be 
imposed in certain circumstances; the activities of Dr. Khan 
and some of his associates fall under the requirements of 
this law. 
 
-- The U.S. has decided to impose sanctions on individuals 
and companies listed in a media note that was released on 
January 12. 
 
-- This is a very complex case that involved a large volume 
of information and many people and companies across the 
globe. 
 
-- The U.S. sanctions laws and executive orders involved 
include the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA), the 
Export Import Bank Act (EXIM), and Executive Orders (E.O.) 
12938 and 13382. 
 
-- This legal non-paper describes in more detail the specific 
sanctions and penalties involved. 
 
-- The U.S. decision was announced on January 12 and will 
soon be printed in the Federal Register. 
 
-- This U.S. decision is not directed at any country.  In 
fact, as we highlight in our public statement, many countries 
contributed to international efforts to shut down and 
investigate the network. 
 
-- The sanctions decision reflects the diverse and global 
nature of the network. 
 
-- No sanctions were imposed on governments. 
 
-- As IAEA knows, the actions of the A.Q. Khan network have 
irrevocably changed the proliferation landscape and will have 
lasting implications for international security. 
 
-- These sanctions will help prevent and deter future 
proliferation-related activities and provide a warning to 
other would-be proliferators. 
 
-- It is imperative that all countries remain vigilant in 
order to ensure that Khan network associates or others 
seeking to pursue similar proliferation activities will not 
become a future source for sensitive nuclear information or 
equipment. 
 
-- If Asked:  Will there be any additional sanctions on these 
individuals? 
 
We don,t foresee, at this time, the imposition of additional 
sanctions related to these activities. 
 
-- If Asked:  Will you share your findings with us? 
 
We can not share details of the sanction decision but don,t 
believe the information we have would contribute to a 
different understanding of the activities than you already 
have. 
 
End suggested talking points. 
 
-------------- 
LEGAL NONPAPER 
-------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Begin non-paper: 
 
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA) 
 
The NPPA provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on 
U.S. procurement from any person who, on or after June 30, 
1994, knowingly and materially contributes, through the 
export of nuclear-related goods or technology, to the efforts 
of any individual, group, or non-nuclear weapon state to 
acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special 
nuclear material. 
 
Once imposed, the sanction shall apply for a period of at 
least 12 months, but can thereafter be terminated if reliable 
information indicates that (1) the sanctioned person has 
ceased to aid or abet any individual, group, or 
non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire 
unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear 
explosive device, and (2) the United States has received 
reliable assurances from the sanctioned person that such 
person will not, in the future, aid or abet any individual, 
group, or non-nuclear-weapon state in its efforts to acquire 
unsafeguarded special nuclear material or any nuclear 
explosive device. 
 
Export Import Bank Act (EXIM) 
 
The EXIM provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on 
the Export-Import Bank,s guaranteeing, insuring, or 
extending credit, or participating in the extension of credit 
in support of United States exports to any person who, after 
 
September 23, 1996, knowingly aids or abets a non-nuclear 
weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or 
unsafeguarded material. 
 
This sanction can be terminated if the U.S. determines and 
certifies in writing to the Congress that reliable 
information indicates that the sanctioned person has ceased 
to aid or abet any non-nuclear weapon state to acquire any 
nuclear explosive device or acquire un-safeguarded special 
nuclear material; and steps have been taken to ensure that 
the sanctionable activities will not resume. The sanction may 
also be terminated if the appropriate government has taken 
certain corrective actions. 
 
Executive Orders 12938 and 13382 
 
These Executive Orders (E.O.) provide the authority to impose 
measures against a foreign person that has engaged or 
attempted to engage in activities or transactions that have 
materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially 
contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) or their means of delivery. 
 
The sanctions under E.O. 12938 include: a ban on USG 
departments, and agencies, procurement from, or entering 
into contracts for procurement with, the sanctioned person or 
entity; a ban on providing any USG assistance to, and any 
participation in USG assistance programs by, the sanctioned 
person or entity; and a ban on the importation into the U.S. 
of goods, technology or services procured or provided by the 
sanctioned person or entity. 
 
The E.O. 12938 sanctions may be terminated if there is 
reliable evidence that the foreign person has ceased the 
activities that led to the imposition of sanctions. 
 
The sanction under E.O. 13382 is that all property and 
interests in property of the designated entity, that are in 
the U.S. or subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. (i.e., 
U.S. persons anywhere) are blocked and may not be 
transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt 
in. 
 
Sanctions under E.O. 13382 may be lifted when circumstances 
no longer warrant their imposition. 
 
End non-paper. 
 
---------- 
MEDIA NOTE 
------------ 
 
¶6.  (U) Post can draw from the following Media Note after 
0900 EST January 12. 
 
Begin Media Note: 
 
For Immediate Release 
                        January 12, 2009 
 
Designation of A.Q. Khan and Associates for Nuclear 
Proliferation Activities 
 
Today, the Department of State announced that sanctions will 
be imposed on 13 individuals and three private companies for 
their involvement in the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation 
network.  This announcement comes after a multi-year U.S. 
government review of the available information pertaining to 
the activities of this network. 
 
We believe these sanctions will help prevent future 
proliferation-related activities by these private entities, 
provide a warning to other would-be proliferators, and 
demonstrate our ongoing commitment to using all available 
tools to address proliferation-related activities. 
 
Dr. A.Q. Khan led an extensive international network for the 
proliferation of nuclear equipment and know-how that provided 
&one stop shopping8 for countries seeking to develop 
nuclear weapons.  He and his associates provided Iran and 
Libya with centrifuge components, designs, and, in some 
cases, complete centrifuges.  The United States also believes 
that Khan and his associates provided centrifuge designs, 
equipment, and technology to North Korea.  Dr. Khan also 
provided Libya with nuclear weapon designs.  With the 
assistance of Khan,s network, countries could leapfrog the 
slow, incremental stages of other nuclear weapons development 
programs.  In 2004, following Libya,s welcome decision to 
renounce its nuclear program, the United States removed from 
Libya items it had received from the network. 
 
The network,s actions have irrevocably changed the 
proliferation landscape and have had lasting implications for 
international security.  Governments around the world, 
including Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, and Malaysia, 
worked closely with the United States to investigate and shut 
down the network.  Governments have also joined together to 
put in place United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 
to criminalize proliferation and have worked cooperatively to 
establish the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to 
enhance international tools to interdict and prevent trade in 
sensitive technologies. 
 
Many of Dr. Khan,s associates are either in custody, being 
prosecuted, or have been convicted of crimes.  Dr. Khan 
publicly acknowledged his involvement in the network in 2004, 
although he later retracted those statements.  While we 
believe the A.Q. Khan network is no longer operating, 
countries should remain vigilant to ensure that Khan network 
associates, or others seeking to pursue similar proliferation 
activities, will not become a future source for sensitive 
nuclear information or equipment. 
 
Sanctions have been imposed under the following statutes as 
follows: 
 
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA):  Selim Alguadis, 
Kursad Zafer Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik 
Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik 
Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Paul Griffin, Peter 
Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Shamsul Bahrin bin Rukiban, 
Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain 
 
Export-Import Bank Act (EXIM):  Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer 
Cire, Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri 
Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret 
A.S., Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter 
Griffin, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Shamsul Bahrin 
bin Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, Gerhard Wisser, and Shah 
Hakim Shahnazim Zain 
 
Executive Order 12938:  Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, 
Muhammad Nasim ud Din, EKA Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri Sanayi 
ve Ticaret A.S., ETI Elektroteknik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S., 
Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, 
Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Shamsul Bahrin bin 
Rukiban, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, Tradefin Engineering, 
Gerhard Wisser, and Shah Hakim Shahnazim Zain 
 
Executive Order 13382:  Selim Alguadis, Kursad Zafer Cire, 
Muhammad Farooq, Daniel Geiges, Paul Griffin, Peter Griffin, 
Abdul Qadeer Khan, Gotthard Lerch, Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir, 
and Gerhard Wisser 
 
End media note. 
 
-------------- 
Press Guidance 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (U) Post can draw from the ISN Press Guidance after 0900 
EST January 12. 
 
Begin Press Guidance: 
 
ISN Contingency Press Guidance 
January 12, 2009 
 
A.Q. Khan Network: Sanctions 
 
General Questions 
 
Q: What specifically did A.Q. Khan and his network transfer? 
What did these people do to trigger sanctions? 
 
These entities were sanctioned for engaging in 
nuclear-related proliferation activities as part of the 
international A.Q. Khan network. 
 
In particular, Dr. Khan and his associates in a number of 
countries provided Iran and Libya with centrifuge components, 
designs, and, in some cases, complete centrifuges.  The 
United States also believes that Khan and his associates 
provided centrifuge designs, equipment, and technology to 
North Korea.  Dr. Khan also provided Libya with nuclear 
weapon designs. 
 
These illicit transfers by the Khan network have been 
reported in the press for a number of years. I cannot comment 
on additional specific intelligence-related information. 
 
Today,s imposition of sanctions on private companies and 
individuals does not reflect recent proliferation activity by 
the network. 
 
Q: Why haven,t you sanctioned any countries? 
 
The authorities under which sanctions are being imposed do 
not target countries.  Governments around the world, 
including Pakistan, South Africa, Turkey, the UK, Germany, 
Switzerland, the UAE, and Malaysia worked closely with the 
U.S. to investigate and shut down this international network. 
 
Q: Why has it taken four years to impose sanctions? 
 
This is a very complex case that involved a large volume of 
information and many people and companies across the globe. 
 
We have been working diligently for the past four years to 
assemble and properly evaluate the available information. 
Given the consequences of a sanctions decision, it is 
important that the information be thoroughly vetted and 
evaluated before a sanctions determination is made. 
 
Q: Why couldn,t you have sanctioned some entities earlier 
instead of waiting four years? 
 
Information continued to become available as other countries 
concluded their investigations or prosecutions and we 
believed in this case that it was important to sanction the 
group at one time. 
 
Q: Did you tell the affected governments prior to public 
announcement? 
 
Yes, governments were notified in advance that the United 
States intends to impose proliferation sanctions on these 
private companies and individuals.  We applaud the actions 
that each of these countries took to shut down and 
investigate the network, and work cooperatively to implement 
new measures to prevent proliferation. 
 
Q: What sanctions authorities were used to impose penalties? 
 
There are two sanctions laws and two Executive Orders that 
provide the basis for the imposition of sanctions in this 
case.  The sanctions laws are the Nuclear Proliferation 
Prevention Act (the &NPPA8) and the Export Import Bank Act 
(&EXIM8). The two Executive Orders are 12938 and 13382. 
 
Q: What do these authorities require? 
 
The NPPA provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on 
U.S. procurement from any person who, on or after June 30, 
1994, knowingly and materially contributes, through the 
export of nuclear-related goods or technology, to the efforts 
of any individual, group, or non-nuclear weapon state to 
acquire a nuclear explosive device or unsafeguarded special 
nuclear material. 
 
The EXIM provides for the mandatory imposition of a ban on 
the Export-Import Bank,s guaranteeing, insuring, or 
extending credit, or participating in the extension of credit 
in support of United States exports to any person who, after 
September 23, 1996, knowingly aids or abets a non-nuclear 
weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or 
unsafeguarded material. 
 
The Executive Orders provide the authority to impose measures 
against a foreign person that has engaged or attempted to 
engage in activities or transactions that have materially 
contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or 
their means of delivery, including any efforts to 
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer, 
or use such items, by any person or foreign country of 
proliferation concern. 
 
Q: What penalties can be imposed pursuant to these sanctions 
authorities? 
 
These sanctions are not being applied to any governments, but 
to private companies and individuals.  In brief, the NPPA 
provides for a ban on USG procurement from the sanctioned 
person.  EXIM provides for a ban on Export Import Bank 
credit, guarantees, or insurance in support of U.S. exports 
to the sanctioned person.  Executive Order 12938 provides for 
a ban on USG procurement or imports from the sanctioned 
entity as well as a ban on U.S. assistance to the sanctioned 
entity.  Executive Order 13382 freezes the assets of a 
sanctioned entity that are under U.S. jurisdiction. 
 
Q: What impact, if any, will these sanctions have? 
 
These sanctions will help prevent and deter future 
proliferation-related activities and provide a warning to 
other would-be proliferators. 
 
Q: What can companies and individuals do to have sanctions 
rescinded? 
 
Each law treats this issue differently.  I refer you to the 
statutes. 
 
Q: Is the A.Q. Khan network still active?  If so, what are we 
doing about it? 
 
We do not believe that the network run by A.Q. Khan is still 
functioning. 
 
Most of the key people involved with the network have been 
put out of business, are in jail and/or facing prosecution. 
 
We remain concerned that individuals associated with the 
network, once they are released from jail or are no longer 
being closely monitored, could re-engage in proliferation on 
their own in the future.  It is important that countries 
continue to monitor their behavior closely and put in place 
laws and enforcement mechanisms to prevent proliferation 
activities. 
 
Q: Do remnants of the network still exist?  What are we doing 
about them? 
 
Saying the Khan network is no longer functioning does not 
mean that other proliferation-related networks and activity 
around the world has stopped. 
 
We know, for example, that Iran has utilized several 
different front and Iranian companies to purchase particular 
items of proliferation concern. 
 
Several of these entities and companies were identified in UN 
Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 in 
connection with their involvement in the Iranian nuclear or 
missile programs. 
 
The U.S. has taken action against many of these entities, 
including designations under E.O.  13382.  More information 
on E.O. 13382 designations can be found on the State 
Department,s website under nonproliferation sanctions as 
well as the Treasury,s Office of Foreign Asset Control,s 
website. 
 
Country Specific Questions 
 
Pakistan 
 
Q: Wasn,t the Government of Pakistan involved or at least 
knew what was going on? 
 
The government of Pakistan assured us it had nothing to do 
with the network and we have no information to refute this. 
 
We applaud the actions Pakistan took to shut down and 
investigate the network. 
 
In the years since the public revelation of the Khan network, 
the government of Pakistan also has taken a number of 
positive steps to improve its export controls and promote 
international nonproliferation. 
 
Q: Why haven,t we had direct access to Khan? 
 
We appreciate the cooperation the government of Pakistan has 
provided the IAEA and the United States.  We believe that 
Pakistan took seriously its commitment to dismantle the 
network. 
 
Pakistan has assured us that it will not be a source of 
proliferation in the future. 
 
The United States does not need direct access to A.Q. Khan in 
order to obtain information about his dealings. 
 
Q: Reports indicate that Pakistan is easing restrictions on 
Khan ) What is your reaction to this? 
 
We appreciate Pakistan,s efforts in shutting down the 
proliferation network led by A.Q. Khan as well as the 
cooperation Pakistan has provided the United States and the 
IAEA to investigate the Khan network. 
 
We believe Dr. Khan is still a proliferation threat to the 
world and the proliferation support that he and his 
associates provided to several states of proliferation 
concern has had a harmful impact on international security 
and will for years to come. 
 
Q: Khan recently said he was forced to confess.  If we 
haven,t had access to Khan then how do we know he was 
complicit? 
 
We have information from other sources indicating that Khan 
was complicit in nuclear-related transfers to several 
countries. 
 
Q: Any response to statements by Pakistan that it wants to 
put the A.Q. Khan issue to rest or that the U.S. has not 
passed questions on Khan,s activities for some time. 
 
The U.S. appreciates the cooperation Pakistan has provided 
the U.S. and IAEA. 
 
Such cooperation will continue to be important as we work 
toward a greater understanding of what the network provided 
to various countries. 
 
Q: Will there be any additional sanctions on these 
individuals? 
 
We don,t foresee, at this time, the imposition of additional 
sanctions related to these activities. 
 
Q: Why didn,t you sanction Khan Research Labs? 
 
I can,t comment on individual decisions. 
 
Q: What effect will these sanctions have on our relationship 
with Pakistan ) specifically, our counter-terrorism 
relationship? 
 
These sanctions are based on activities by individuals that 
occurred well in the past and have been public for many years. 
 
We appreciate Pakistan,s efforts in shutting down the Khan 
proliferation network as well as the cooperation Pakistan has 
provided the United States and the IAEA to investigate the 
activities of the Khan network. 
 
The United States has a close partnership with Pakistan on 
counter-terrorism, nonproliferation, and other issues. 
 
Q: Do you think these sanctions will have an effect on the 
India-Pakistan relationship? 
 
These sanctions are based on activities by individuals that 
occurred well in the past and have been public for many years. 
 
Questions about India and Pakistan,s relationship are best 
answered by those countries. 
 
Switzerland 
 
Q: Is it true that the U.S. asked Switzerland to destroy 
nuclear documents? 
 
We have no comment. 
 
Q: Why aren,t you sanctioning any of the Tinners? Is it 
because they were spies for the U.S.? 
 
We have no comment. 
 
Sanctions Decisions: 
 
Q: Didn,t the Khan network include many more people and 
companies than you sanctioned, including the Tinner family, 
Henk Slebos, and companies in the UAE.  Why aren,t you 
sanctioning them? 
 
The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough 
review of all available information. 
 
While I cannot comment on individual decisions, I can note 
that we did not impose sanctions on companies that are no 
longer operating. 
 
Q: Why did you designate some people under E.O. 13382 but not 
others? 
 
The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough 
review of all available information. 
 
I can,t comment on individual sanction decisions. 
 
Q: Why did you sanction Lerch, Geiges, and Wisser under EXIM, 
but not under the NPPA? 
 
The decision to impose sanctions is based on a thorough 
review of all available information. 
 
I can,t comment on individual sanction decisions. 
 
Q: What about Libya, Iran and North Korea?  They bought these 
items ) why haven,t we sanctioned them? 
 
These sanctions focus on individuals and companies associated 
with the Khan network.  As such, the governments that 
acquired these items are not subject to sanction under the 
NPPA or the EXIM Bank Act. 
 
Iran and the DPRK are subject to a wide array of sanctions, 
including UNSCRs 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1718 respectively.  In 
addition, sanctions were imposed on the DPRK under the Glenn 
Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act following its October 2006 
nuclear test. 
 
In the case of Libya, once it made the strategic 2003 
decision to dismantle its WMD program, it then cooperated 
with the USG to facilitate that process.  Libya also provided 
information about the A.Q. Khan network's activities in Libya. 
 
Q: Aren,t these kinds of sanctions really toothless with 
little impact? 
 
Sanctions help signal strong U.S. opposition to the 
activities of the A.Q. Khan network, expose publicly those 
involved, and serve as a deterrent to others that might 
consider pursuing similar activities. 
 
Sanctions imposed under Executive Order 13382 will allow the 
U.S. to seize assets held under U.S. jurisdiction and thereby 
help prevent future proliferation. 
 
Q: What about North Korea ) are sanctions in the works for 
their nuclear transfers to Syria? 
 
The DPRK is subject to a wide array of sanctions, including 
UNSCR 1718 and a number of other U.S. sanctions related to 
its transfers of items proliferation concern.  Furthermore, 
in the Six-Party Talks, the DPRK has reaffirmed its 
commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or 
know-how. 
 
Q: What have we learned about Khan,s efforts to assist 
Iran,s nuclear program? 
 
The IAEA has detailed in various reports that Iran has 
admitted to a relationship with the Khan network ) the same 
network that provided nuclear weapons designs to Libya ) 
from 1987 to 1999.  This network provided Iran with P1 
centrifuge designs, centrifuges, and components; P2 
centrifuge designs; other very sensitive information; and 
technical advice including a &hemispheres document8. 
 
The &hemispheres document8 contains instructions for 
casting enriched uranium metal into hemispheres, which the 
IAEA,s January 2006 report noted are &related to the 
fabrication of nuclear weapons.8 
 
Beginning with the November 2003 report, the IAEA Director 
General confirmed that for almost 20 years, Iran had been 
pursuing undeclared work in some of the most sensitive 
aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, and had systematically 
hidden that work from the IAEA.  Iran,s failure to cooperate 
sharply limits the IAEA,s ability to know more about the 
possible military dimensions of its nuclear program, and 
increases the international community,s concerns about 
Iran,s true intentions. 
 
Q: What have we learned about Khan,s efforts to assist North 
Korea,s nuclear program? 
 
Former Pakistani President Musharraf has previously 
acknowledged that Dr. A.Q. Khan and his international network 
provided sensitive centrifuge technology, including about two 
dozen centrifuges, to North Korea. 
 
Q: Were there other customer of Khan,s network? 
 
Questions remain as to whether there were other customers. 
 
End Press Guidance. 
 
------------------ 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (U) Please report within ten working days of receipt of 
this cable. Please use SIPDIS caption on all responses. 
 
---------------- 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up information 
is Caroline Russell and Chris Herrington, ISN/CPI, 647-5035. 
RICE