VZCZCXRO2834
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHGP #0025/01 0090115
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 090115Z JAN 09 ***ZFR****
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6219
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4258
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6438
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 000025 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KSLG ETRD ECON SN
SUBJECT:  GAO REVIEWS CANCELLATION OF SFI TRIAL IN SINGAPORE 
 
SINGAPORE 00000025  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
////ZFR///ZFR///ZFR/// 
 
DISREGARD SINGAPORE 25.  IT WAS RESENT AS SINGAPORE 28. 
 
///////////////////// 
 
 
 
SINGAPORE 00000025  002 OF 002 
 
 
moving among berths to a scanning station, potentially adding 
several kilometers to any container movement within the port.  The 
longer distance would increase fuel and driver costs.  Current dwell 
times at the port are about 24 hours for ships and two to four hours 
for individual containers, but that could change under SFI.  The 
scanning station would become a chokepoint that could significantly 
affect port efficiency and the competiveness of Singapore's port, 
PSA added.  (Note:  In 2007 approximately 28 million TEUs 
(twenty-foot equivalent units) moved through the port of Singapore, 
and 80 percent of the cargo was transshipped.  Approximately 680,000 
of the TEUs passed through Singapore en route to the United States. 
End Note.)  PSA also wrestled with how to handle liabilities and 
claims filed by shippers or shipping lines if cargo was delayed by 
the scanning process and missed its transfer to an outbound ship, or 
damages that might occur if a container triggered an alarm and had 
to be opened at the port. 
 
GOS:  No Substantial Benefit to 100-Percent Scanning 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Cargo scanning is a useful tool that has a role in a 
risk-based approach to supply chain security, but implementation of 
100-percent scanning is not worth the incremental benefits it 
provides, DepSec Lim told GAO.  CBP promised benefits to SFI such as 
fewer inspections of cargo once it reaches the United States. 
However, as of now, MOT estimated that only a very small percentage 
of cargo from Singapore is re-inspected on arrival at a U.S. port, 
and that is little incentive.  Singapore also has yet to see 
benefits promised from other container-security programs such as the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI).  Ambassador Mary Seet-Cheng, 
MFA Senior Specialist Advisor, claimed that CBP has yet to fulfill 
promised "green lanes" at U.S. ports for cargo screened through CSI. 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Singapore remains supportive of supply-chain security but 
views 100-percent scanning as a departure from the USG's previously 
stated risk-based approach to security, Seet-Cheng said. 
100-percent scanning does not equal 100-percent security, she added. 
 The USG began with risk-based programs such as CSI and the 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and the world 
adopted those programs.  Now the USG appears to be layering on even 
more programs, including the Megaports radiation detection program 
and SFI, and consistency has been lost.  Seet-Cheng asserted that 
the United States must show it can address security issues in a 
"rational" and "logical" way because "its reputation is on the 
line." 
 
SFI Versus Other Trade Security Programs 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) GAO and the GOS discussed SFI and 100-percent scanning in 
relation to other U.S. or international trade-security programs, 
such as CSI or the EU Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) program. 
The GOS favors a total supply chain approach to cargo security and 
initiatives such as the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) Trade 
Recovery Program.  MOT and Customs did not think companies would 
reject participating in CSI or the AEO program if they also had to 
comply with 100-percent scanning, but Customs indicated companies 
are concerned about meeting many obligations under disparate cargo 
security programs.  There could be less incentive to participate in 
C-TPAT and CSI if all containers are scanned at the port.  MOT 
indicated that the GOS might be more supportive of USG cargo 
security programs if they were more based on mutual recognition and 
reciprocity, so implementation led to lower risk scoring and 
facilitation of shipments bound for the United States.  However, the 
GOS does not intend to ask for reciprocity for SFI because it does 
not support 100-percent scanning and does not want to see it 
implemented, DepSec Lim told GAO. 
 
¶10.  (U) GAO cleared this message. 
HERBOLD