VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0004/01 0020138
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020138Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2803

UNCLAS SEOUL 000004 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/K AND INL (JOHN LYLE) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KN KS
SUBJECT: 2008-2009 ROK AND DPRK INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS 
CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR) 
 
REF: STATE 100989 
 
¶1. (U) Per reftel, Embassy Seoul's submission for the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) portion of the 2008-2009 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) is 
provided in para 2.  Input for the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) portion of the INCSR is provided at 
para 3 with the understanding that information on the DPRK's 
narcotics-related activities is very limited. 
 
¶2. (U) 2008-2009 INCSR input for the ROK: 
 
¶I. Summary 
 
Narcotics production or abuse is not a major problem in the 
Republic of Korea (ROK).  However, reports continue to 
indicate that an undetermined quantity of narcotics is 
smuggled through South Korea en route to the United States 
and other countries.  South Korea has become a transshipment 
location for drug traffickers due to the country's reputation 
for not having a drug abuse problem.  This combined with the 
fact that the South Korean port of Pusan is one of the 
region's largest ports, makes South Korea an attractive 
location for illegal shipments coming from countries which 
are more likely to attract a contraband inspection upon 
arrival.  The ROK is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
Drugs available in the ROK include methamphetamine, heroin, 
cocaine, marijuana, and club drugs such as LSD and Ecstasy. 
Methamphetamine continues to be the most widely abused drug, 
while marijuana remains popular as well.  Heroin and cocaine 
are only sporadically seen in the ROK.  Club drugs such as 
Ecstasy and LSD continue to be popular among college 
students.  To discourage individuals from producing 
methamphetamine, the South Korean government controls the 
purchase of over-the-counter medicines containing ephedrine 
and psuedoephedrine, requiring customer registration for 
quantities greater than 720 mg (a three-day standard dose). 
 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs 2008 
 
Policy Initiatives.  In 2008, the Korean Food and Drug 
Administration (KFDA) continued to implement stronger 
precursor chemical controls under amended legislation 
approved in 2005.  The KFDA continued its efforts to educate 
companies and train its regulatory investigators on the 
enhanced regulations and procedures for monitoring the 
precursor chemical program.  In addition to existing 
regulatory oversight procedures to track and address 
diversion of narcotics and psychotropic substances from 
medical facilities, the ROK in 2008 strengthened the Ministry 
of Health, Welfare, and Family Affairs' role in the 
treatment, protection, and study of drug-addicts.  In 2008, 
the ROK added benzylpiperazine to the list of narcotics and 
gamma butyrolactone (GBL) to the list of narcotic raw 
materials. 
 
Law Enforcement Efforts.  In the first ten months of 2008, 
South Korean authorities arrested 8,283 individuals for 
narcotic violations of which 6,120 individuals were arrested 
for psychotropic substance use and 814 persons for marijuana 
use.  ROK authorities seized 17.2 kg of methamphetamine. 
Ecstasy seizures decreased from 18,151 tablets (for the first 
nine months of 2007) to 273.  South Korean authorities seized 
65.4 kg of marijuana, which is an increase from the 19.6 kg 
seized during the first nine months of 2007. (NOTE:  Total 
figures for 2008 are not available.)  South Koreans generally 
do not use heroin; and cocaine is used only sporadically, 
with no indication of its use increasing. 
 
Corruption.  There were no reports of corruption involving 
narcotics law enforcement in the ROK in 2008.  As a matter of 
government policy, the ROK does not encourage or facilitate 
illicit production or distribution of narcotic or 
psychotropic or other controlled substances, or the 
laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. 
 
Agreements and Treaties.  South Korea has extradition 
treaties with 23 countries and mutual legal assistance 
treaties in force with 18 countries, including the United 
States. South Korea is a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention, as amended by 
its 1972 Protocol.  South Korea has signed, but has not yet 
ratified, the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime 
and the UN Convention against Corruption.  Korean authorities 
exchange information with international counter narcotics 
agencies such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) and the International Criminal Police Organization 
 
(INTERPOL), and have placed Korean National Police and/or 
Korea Customs Service attachs in Thailand, Japan, Hong Kong, 
China, and the United States. 
 
Cultivation/Production.  Legal marijuana and hemp growth is 
licensed by local Health Departments.  The hemp is used to 
produce fiber for traditional hand-made ceremonial funeral 
clothing.  Every year, each District Prosecutor's Office, in 
conjunction with local governments, conducts surveillance 
into suspected illicit marijuana growing areas during 
planting or harvesting time periods to limit possible illicit 
diversion.  Opium poppy production is illegal in South Korea, 
although poppy continues to be grown in Kyonggi Province 
where farmers have traditionally used the harvested plants as 
a folk medicine to treat sick pigs and cows.  Opium is not 
normally processed from these plants for human consumption. 
Korean authorities continue surveillance of opium 
poppy-growing areas.  Statistics for marijuana and poppy 
plant seizures during 2008 were unavailable for the report. 
 
Drug Flow/Transit.  Few narcotic drugs originate in South 
Korea.  The exportation of narcotic substances is illegal 
under South Korean law, and none are known to be exported. 
However, the ROK does produce and export the precursor 
chemicals acetone, toluene, and sulfuric acid.  Transshipment 
through South Korea's ports remains a serious problem.  ROK 
authorities recognize South Korea's vulnerability as a 
transshipment nexus and have undertaken greater efforts to 
educate shipping companies of the risk.  ROK authorities, 
ability to directly intercept the suspected transshipment of 
narcotics and precursor chemicals has been limited by the 
fact that the vast majority of the shipping containers never 
enter ROK territory.  Nonetheless, the ROK continued its 
international cooperation efforts to monitor and investigate 
transshipment cases.  Redoubled efforts by the Korean Customs 
Service (KCS) have resulted in increased seizures of 
methamphetamine and marijuana (12.8 kg and 13.9 kg 
respectively in the first ten months of 2008) transported by 
arriving passengers and through postal services at South 
Korea's ports of entry.  Most methamphetamine smuggled into 
South Korea comes from China.  A majority of the LSD and 
Ecstasy used in South Korea has been identified as coming 
from North America or Europe.  People living in metropolitan 
areas are known to use marijuana originating in South Africa 
and Nigeria, whereas those living in rural areas appear to 
obtain their marijuana from locally produced crops.  ROK 
authorities also report increased instances of marijuana use 
among the foreign population in South Korea in recent years, 
a trend that is most likely the result of increased law 
enforcement efforts targeting this segment of the population. 
 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
 
Policy Initiatives and Programs.  The U.S. Embassy's Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) Seoul Country Office and 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials work 
closely with ROK narcotics law enforcement authorities.  Both 
the DEA and ICE consider their working relationships to be 
excellent. 
 
Bilateral Cooperation. The DEA Seoul Country Office has 
focused its efforts on international drug interdiction, 
seizures of funds and assets related to illicit narcotics 
trafficking (in collaboration with ICE), and the diversion of 
precursor chemicals in South Korea and in the Far East 
region.  In 2008, the DEA Seoul Country Office organized, 
coordinated, and hosted a one-week training seminar on 
Airport Interdiction.  This training was co-hosted by the 
Korean Customs Service (KCS).  The DEA Seoul Country Office 
continues to share intelligence regarding the importation of 
precursor chemicals into South Korea from the United States 
and other Asian countries with the KFDA, KCS, the Korean 
Supreme Prosecutors Office (KSPO), and the Korean National 
Intelligence Service (KNIS).  DEA also works closely with the 
KSPO and KCS in their activities to monitor airport and drug 
transshipment methods and trends, including the use of 
international mail by drug traffickers. 
 
The Road Ahead.  ROK authorities have expressed concern that 
the popularity of South Korea as a transshipment nexus may 
lead to greater volume of drugs entering Korean markets. 
Korean authorities fear increased accessibility and lower 
prices could stimulate domestic drug use in the future. 
South Korean authorities also indicate a growing concern 
about the importation of narcotics, psychotropic drugs, and 
illegal medicines purchased via the internet, predominately 
from web sites maintained in the United States.  In response, 
Korean authorities established Memorandum of Understanding 
with a number of Korean internet portal sites to allow the 
KNPA to track and intercept such purchases.  Statistics for 
intercepted internet-based drug purchases during 2008 is 
 
unavailable.  The South Korean government is currently 
seeking further international cooperation to better navigate 
the legal complexities surrounding the prosecution of 
transnational cyber crimes.  The DEA Seoul Country Office 
will continue its extensive training, mentoring, and 
operational cooperation with ROK authorities. 
 
¶3. (U) 2008-2009 INCSR input for the DPRK: 
 
¶I. Summary 
 
There have been no instances of drug trafficking in the 
Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea (DPRK) 
suggestive of state-directed trafficking for six years.  It 
seems possible that the DPRK has curtailed trafficking in 
narcotic drugs involving its personnel and state assets. 
However, there is insufficient evidence to say for certain 
that state-sponsored trafficking has stopped at this time. 
Still, small-scale trafficking along the DPRK-China border 
continues.  The DPRK is a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention. 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
There were no confirmed instances of large-scale drug 
trafficking involving the DPRK or its nationals during 2008. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the small-scale trafficking 
and drug abuse in the DPRK itself and along its border with 
China continue.  The China-DPRK border region is the only 
area in the world where there are continuing reports of drug 
trafficking involving DPRK nationals.  Most reports indicate 
small-scale trafficking by individual North Koreans who cross 
the border into China.  In some cases there are reports of 
slightly larger-scale trafficking by locally prominent 
individuals living along the border who misuse their modest 
positions of local influence in the ruling party to traffic 
in methamphetamine.  Also, there are indications that some 
foreign nationals from Japan and South Korea might travel to 
this area to purchase the stimulant drugs available there. 
 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2008 
 
Law Enforcement Efforts.  Most of the reports about drug 
trafficking along the China-DPRK border emerge only after the 
individuals involved are apprehended.  There is no evidence 
of a central role for the DPRK state institutions in 
organizing the trafficking, as had emerged regularly in the 
past, especially in Japan during the mid- to late nineties, 
and continuing until the 2003 incident in Australia involving 
the "Pong Su," a DPRK cargo vessel involved with the delivery 
and seizure of a large quanity of heroin.  It appears that 
both China and the DPRK try to discourage such trafficking 
through law enforcement efforts and information campaigns on 
both sides of the border.  However an atmosphere of 
lawlessness remains along this border because individuals who 
wish to leave the DPRK can apparently do so through payments 
to guides. 
 
Despite the absence of any large-scale narcotics trafficking 
incidents involving the state, examples of 
non-narcotics-related acts of criminality suggests that 
DPRK-tolerance for criminal behavior may exist on a larger, 
organized scale.  Press, industry and law enforcement 
reporting of DPRK links to large-scale counterfeit cigarette 
trafficking in the North Korean Export Processing Zone at 
Rajiin (or Najin) does not specify the extent to which DPRK 
authorities are complicit in this illegal activity, although 
it is all but certain that they are aware of it. 
 
Agreements and Treaties.  The DPRK is a party to the 1988 UN 
Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention and the 1971 
UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. 
 
Cultivation/Production.  The Department has no evidence to 
support a finding that state trafficking has stopped, and no 
clear evidence it is continuing.  Consequently, there is no 
clear answer as to whether the DPRK as abandoned its 
involvement in drug trafficking.  But the absence of any 
seizures linked to DPRK state institutions in almost six 
years, after a period in which such seizures involving very 
large quantities of drugs occurred regularly, does suggest, 
at least, considerably less state trafficking, and perhaps a 
complete end to it.  On the other hand, the continuing 
large-scale traffic in counterfeit cigarettes from DPRK 
territory suggests, at the least, that enforcement against 
organized criminality is lax, or that a lucrative counterfeit 
cigarette trade has replaced a riskier drug trafficking 
business as a generator of revenu for the DPRK state. 
 
IV. U.S. Initiatives and Programs 
 
The Department is of the view that it is likely, but not 
certain, that the North Korean government has sponsored 
criminal activities in the past, including narcotics 
production and trafficking, but notes that there has been no 
evidence for almost six years that it continues to traffic in 
narcotics. 
STEPHENS