Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09SEOUL4, 2008-2009 ROK AND DPRK INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SEOUL4.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL4 2009-01-02 01:38 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0004/01 0020138
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020138Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2803
UNCLAS SEOUL 000004 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/K AND INL (JOHN LYLE) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KN KS
SUBJECT: 2008-2009 ROK AND DPRK INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS 
CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR) 
 
REF: STATE 100989 
 
1. (U) Per reftel, Embassy Seoul's submission for the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) portion of the 2008-2009 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) is 
provided in para 2.  Input for the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) portion of the INCSR is provided at 
para 3 with the understanding that information on the DPRK's 
narcotics-related activities is very limited. 
 
2. (U) 2008-2009 INCSR input for the ROK: 
 
I. Summary 
 
Narcotics production or abuse is not a major problem in the 
Republic of Korea (ROK).  However, reports continue to 
indicate that an undetermined quantity of narcotics is 
smuggled through South Korea en route to the United States 
and other countries.  South Korea has become a transshipment 
location for drug traffickers due to the country's reputation 
for not having a drug abuse problem.  This combined with the 
fact that the South Korean port of Pusan is one of the 
region's largest ports, makes South Korea an attractive 
location for illegal shipments coming from countries which 
are more likely to attract a contraband inspection upon 
arrival.  The ROK is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
Drugs available in the ROK include methamphetamine, heroin, 
cocaine, marijuana, and club drugs such as LSD and Ecstasy. 
Methamphetamine continues to be the most widely abused drug, 
while marijuana remains popular as well.  Heroin and cocaine 
are only sporadically seen in the ROK.  Club drugs such as 
Ecstasy and LSD continue to be popular among college 
students.  To discourage individuals from producing 
methamphetamine, the South Korean government controls the 
purchase of over-the-counter medicines containing ephedrine 
and psuedoephedrine, requiring customer registration for 
quantities greater than 720 mg (a three-day standard dose). 
 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs 2008 
 
Policy Initiatives.  In 2008, the Korean Food and Drug 
Administration (KFDA) continued to implement stronger 
precursor chemical controls under amended legislation 
approved in 2005.  The KFDA continued its efforts to educate 
companies and train its regulatory investigators on the 
enhanced regulations and procedures for monitoring the 
precursor chemical program.  In addition to existing 
regulatory oversight procedures to track and address 
diversion of narcotics and psychotropic substances from 
medical facilities, the ROK in 2008 strengthened the Ministry 
of Health, Welfare, and Family Affairs' role in the 
treatment, protection, and study of drug-addicts.  In 2008, 
the ROK added benzylpiperazine to the list of narcotics and 
gamma butyrolactone (GBL) to the list of narcotic raw 
materials. 
 
Law Enforcement Efforts.  In the first ten months of 2008, 
South Korean authorities arrested 8,283 individuals for 
narcotic violations of which 6,120 individuals were arrested 
for psychotropic substance use and 814 persons for marijuana 
use.  ROK authorities seized 17.2 kg of methamphetamine. 
Ecstasy seizures decreased from 18,151 tablets (for the first 
nine months of 2007) to 273.  South Korean authorities seized 
65.4 kg of marijuana, which is an increase from the 19.6 kg 
seized during the first nine months of 2007. (NOTE:  Total 
figures for 2008 are not available.)  South Koreans generally 
do not use heroin; and cocaine is used only sporadically, 
with no indication of its use increasing. 
 
Corruption.  There were no reports of corruption involving 
narcotics law enforcement in the ROK in 2008.  As a matter of 
government policy, the ROK does not encourage or facilitate 
illicit production or distribution of narcotic or 
psychotropic or other controlled substances, or the 
laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. 
 
Agreements and Treaties.  South Korea has extradition 
treaties with 23 countries and mutual legal assistance 
treaties in force with 18 countries, including the United 
States. South Korea is a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention, as amended by 
its 1972 Protocol.  South Korea has signed, but has not yet 
ratified, the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime 
and the UN Convention against Corruption.  Korean authorities 
exchange information with international counter narcotics 
agencies such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) and the International Criminal Police Organization 
 
(INTERPOL), and have placed Korean National Police and/or 
Korea Customs Service attachs in Thailand, Japan, Hong Kong, 
China, and the United States. 
 
Cultivation/Production.  Legal marijuana and hemp growth is 
licensed by local Health Departments.  The hemp is used to 
produce fiber for traditional hand-made ceremonial funeral 
clothing.  Every year, each District Prosecutor's Office, in 
conjunction with local governments, conducts surveillance 
into suspected illicit marijuana growing areas during 
planting or harvesting time periods to limit possible illicit 
diversion.  Opium poppy production is illegal in South Korea, 
although poppy continues to be grown in Kyonggi Province 
where farmers have traditionally used the harvested plants as 
a folk medicine to treat sick pigs and cows.  Opium is not 
normally processed from these plants for human consumption. 
Korean authorities continue surveillance of opium 
poppy-growing areas.  Statistics for marijuana and poppy 
plant seizures during 2008 were unavailable for the report. 
 
Drug Flow/Transit.  Few narcotic drugs originate in South 
Korea.  The exportation of narcotic substances is illegal 
under South Korean law, and none are known to be exported. 
However, the ROK does produce and export the precursor 
chemicals acetone, toluene, and sulfuric acid.  Transshipment 
through South Korea's ports remains a serious problem.  ROK 
authorities recognize South Korea's vulnerability as a 
transshipment nexus and have undertaken greater efforts to 
educate shipping companies of the risk.  ROK authorities, 
ability to directly intercept the suspected transshipment of 
narcotics and precursor chemicals has been limited by the 
fact that the vast majority of the shipping containers never 
enter ROK territory.  Nonetheless, the ROK continued its 
international cooperation efforts to monitor and investigate 
transshipment cases.  Redoubled efforts by the Korean Customs 
Service (KCS) have resulted in increased seizures of 
methamphetamine and marijuana (12.8 kg and 13.9 kg 
respectively in the first ten months of 2008) transported by 
arriving passengers and through postal services at South 
Korea's ports of entry.  Most methamphetamine smuggled into 
South Korea comes from China.  A majority of the LSD and 
Ecstasy used in South Korea has been identified as coming 
from North America or Europe.  People living in metropolitan 
areas are known to use marijuana originating in South Africa 
and Nigeria, whereas those living in rural areas appear to 
obtain their marijuana from locally produced crops.  ROK 
authorities also report increased instances of marijuana use 
among the foreign population in South Korea in recent years, 
a trend that is most likely the result of increased law 
enforcement efforts targeting this segment of the population. 
 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
 
Policy Initiatives and Programs.  The U.S. Embassy's Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) Seoul Country Office and 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials work 
closely with ROK narcotics law enforcement authorities.  Both 
the DEA and ICE consider their working relationships to be 
excellent. 
 
Bilateral Cooperation. The DEA Seoul Country Office has 
focused its efforts on international drug interdiction, 
seizures of funds and assets related to illicit narcotics 
trafficking (in collaboration with ICE), and the diversion of 
precursor chemicals in South Korea and in the Far East 
region.  In 2008, the DEA Seoul Country Office organized, 
coordinated, and hosted a one-week training seminar on 
Airport Interdiction.  This training was co-hosted by the 
Korean Customs Service (KCS).  The DEA Seoul Country Office 
continues to share intelligence regarding the importation of 
precursor chemicals into South Korea from the United States 
and other Asian countries with the KFDA, KCS, the Korean 
Supreme Prosecutors Office (KSPO), and the Korean National 
Intelligence Service (KNIS).  DEA also works closely with the 
KSPO and KCS in their activities to monitor airport and drug 
transshipment methods and trends, including the use of 
international mail by drug traffickers. 
 
The Road Ahead.  ROK authorities have expressed concern that 
the popularity of South Korea as a transshipment nexus may 
lead to greater volume of drugs entering Korean markets. 
Korean authorities fear increased accessibility and lower 
prices could stimulate domestic drug use in the future. 
South Korean authorities also indicate a growing concern 
about the importation of narcotics, psychotropic drugs, and 
illegal medicines purchased via the internet, predominately 
from web sites maintained in the United States.  In response, 
Korean authorities established Memorandum of Understanding 
with a number of Korean internet portal sites to allow the 
KNPA to track and intercept such purchases.  Statistics for 
intercepted internet-based drug purchases during 2008 is 
 
unavailable.  The South Korean government is currently 
seeking further international cooperation to better navigate 
the legal complexities surrounding the prosecution of 
transnational cyber crimes.  The DEA Seoul Country Office 
will continue its extensive training, mentoring, and 
operational cooperation with ROK authorities. 
 
3. (U) 2008-2009 INCSR input for the DPRK: 
 
I. Summary 
 
There have been no instances of drug trafficking in the 
Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea (DPRK) 
suggestive of state-directed trafficking for six years.  It 
seems possible that the DPRK has curtailed trafficking in 
narcotic drugs involving its personnel and state assets. 
However, there is insufficient evidence to say for certain 
that state-sponsored trafficking has stopped at this time. 
Still, small-scale trafficking along the DPRK-China border 
continues.  The DPRK is a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention. 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
There were no confirmed instances of large-scale drug 
trafficking involving the DPRK or its nationals during 2008. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the small-scale trafficking 
and drug abuse in the DPRK itself and along its border with 
China continue.  The China-DPRK border region is the only 
area in the world where there are continuing reports of drug 
trafficking involving DPRK nationals.  Most reports indicate 
small-scale trafficking by individual North Koreans who cross 
the border into China.  In some cases there are reports of 
slightly larger-scale trafficking by locally prominent 
individuals living along the border who misuse their modest 
positions of local influence in the ruling party to traffic 
in methamphetamine.  Also, there are indications that some 
foreign nationals from Japan and South Korea might travel to 
this area to purchase the stimulant drugs available there. 
 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2008 
 
Law Enforcement Efforts.  Most of the reports about drug 
trafficking along the China-DPRK border emerge only after the 
individuals involved are apprehended.  There is no evidence 
of a central role for the DPRK state institutions in 
organizing the trafficking, as had emerged regularly in the 
past, especially in Japan during the mid- to late nineties, 
and continuing until the 2003 incident in Australia involving 
the "Pong Su," a DPRK cargo vessel involved with the delivery 
and seizure of a large quanity of heroin.  It appears that 
both China and the DPRK try to discourage such trafficking 
through law enforcement efforts and information campaigns on 
both sides of the border.  However an atmosphere of 
lawlessness remains along this border because individuals who 
wish to leave the DPRK can apparently do so through payments 
to guides. 
 
Despite the absence of any large-scale narcotics trafficking 
incidents involving the state, examples of 
non-narcotics-related acts of criminality suggests that 
DPRK-tolerance for criminal behavior may exist on a larger, 
organized scale.  Press, industry and law enforcement 
reporting of DPRK links to large-scale counterfeit cigarette 
trafficking in the North Korean Export Processing Zone at 
Rajiin (or Najin) does not specify the extent to which DPRK 
authorities are complicit in this illegal activity, although 
it is all but certain that they are aware of it. 
 
Agreements and Treaties.  The DPRK is a party to the 1988 UN 
Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention and the 1971 
UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. 
 
Cultivation/Production.  The Department has no evidence to 
support a finding that state trafficking has stopped, and no 
clear evidence it is continuing.  Consequently, there is no 
clear answer as to whether the DPRK as abandoned its 
involvement in drug trafficking.  But the absence of any 
seizures linked to DPRK state institutions in almost six 
years, after a period in which such seizures involving very 
large quantities of drugs occurred regularly, does suggest, 
at least, considerably less state trafficking, and perhaps a 
complete end to it.  On the other hand, the continuing 
large-scale traffic in counterfeit cigarettes from DPRK 
territory suggests, at the least, that enforcement against 
organized criminality is lax, or that a lucrative counterfeit 
cigarette trade has replaced a riskier drug trafficking 
business as a generator of revenu for the DPRK state. 
 
IV. U.S. Initiatives and Programs 
 
The Department is of the view that it is likely, but not 
certain, that the North Korean government has sponsored 
criminal activities in the past, including narcotics 
production and trafficking, but notes that there has been no 
evidence for almost six years that it continues to traffic in 
narcotics. 
STEPHENS