VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0002/01 0012219
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 012219Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2795
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5123
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 6165
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5229
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3761
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 2910
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC 1862
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SEOUL 000002 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD PGOV KS
SUBJECT: KOREAN ECONOMY SLOWING -- OUTLOOK WEAK FOR FIRST 
HALF OF 2009 
 
¶1. (U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified and not/not 
intended for internet distribution. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary: Korean economic growth slowed in 2008 from 
the 5 percent pace of 2007 to below 4 percent.  Growth was 
already slowing before the impact of the global financial 
turmoil, but has been further impeded by it.  The benchmark 
KOSPI index fell by more than 40 percent and the won fell by 
more than 30 percent for the year.  GDP growth is expected to 
reach a maximum of 1.4 percent in the fourth quarter.  Export 
growth is waning rapidly, recording an 18 percent decline in 
November from a year ago.  Industrial output fell by 14 
percent in November from the November before.  The silver 
lining is that falling oil and commodity prices have lead to 
reduced inflationary pressure and improvement in the current 
account.  Looking ahead into 2009, the Korean economy, which 
depends heavily on the export sector, will be buffeted by the 
global slowdown and continuing credit crunch until global 
recovery begins and demand starts to increase.  Investment 
houses, think tanks, and international institutions have 
presented a wide array of forecasts for ROK GDP growth in 
2009 with the majority falling between one and two percent. 
End Summary. 
 
 
Korean Economic Performance and Prospects 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Korean economy had already begun to slow in the 
third quarter of the year, well before financial turmoil in 
New York precipitated the global liquidity squeeze that began 
in late September.  Korea's GDP growth in the third quarter 
was 3.8 percent, more than a percentage point below the 
economy's 2007 performance.  Sluggish domestic demand 
combined late in the quarter with the impact of the global 
financial turmoil and pushed growth below all but the most 
pessimistic forecasts.  Private consumption grew by just 1.1 
percent in the quarter while government expenditure and 
domestic investment growth were higher at 4.5 percent and and 
5.2 percent, respectively.  Export growth was 10.7 percent 
higher than the third quarter of 2007, but low in contrast 
with the 21.8 percent growth of the preceding four quarters. 
 
¶4. (SBU) While final statistics for the year are not yet 
available, it is clear that growth in the fourth quarter will 
be considerably weaker at around 1.4 percent and will drag 
GDP growth, which stands at 4.7 percent through the first 
three quarters, to below 4 percent for 2008 as a whole. 
Increasing government expenditure growth in the fourth 
quarter is attributable to earlier spending lags and USD 3.2 
billion in supplementary budget spending.  Growth in private 
consumption, gross capital formation, and exports are 
expected to show sharp declines in the quarter. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Korea's equity market was hit hard in late September 
through November by the global economic turbulence.  The 
Korean economy's declining performance in the third quarter, 
its thin capital markets, and a large increase in foreign 
short-term debt left it exposed to the external shock posed 
by the global financial turmoil.  The benchmark KOSPI index 
ended the year at 1,124, down 40.7 percent (most acutely in 
October and November).  This was the third worst showing ever 
recorded for the index.  The Korean won ends the year at 1260 
per U.S. dollar, down by about 28 percent over the last five 
months.  The picture could have been far worse, but the won 
recovered by 16.6 percent during December.  Despite the 
December recovery, this was the worst performance by the won 
since the economic collapse in 1997 during the Asian 
Financial Crisis.  Interest rates remain above pre-crisis 
levels, despite intensive efforts by the BOK to reduce them. 
 
 
Contributions to GDP Growth by Major Component 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6. (SBU) Looking more closely at the components of GDP 
growth, the steep decline in net export growth will allow 
exports to yield only a 0.6 percent contribution to GDP 
growth in the fourth quarter.  Weak fourth quarter investment 
(gross capital formation in the table above) will yield only 
a 0.3 percent boost to GDP growth in the fourth quarter. 
Increased government spending is expected to be the biggest 
 
factor in sustaining GDP growth in the fourth quarter, 
providing a boost of 0.7 percent.  The Bank of Korea has 
slashed its key interest rates by 2 percent since early 
October and taken other steps to help ease the liquidity 
crunch.  While it is difficult to measure the impact of the 
monetary loosening in a financial crisis, it should have a 
stimulatory effect on the economy as the credit crunch 
gradually eases in 2009.  The ROKG plans an aggressive fiscal 
stimulus for 2009 to make up for the anticipated low levels 
of private sector economic activity and to complement the 
monetary action.  Since Korea imports almost all of its 
energy needs, the silver lining in the global financial 
turmoil has been the collapse of oil prices.  This has 
dramatically reduced import expenditures in the fourth 
quarter and reversed the current account deficit, thus easing 
one source of pressure on the won. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Private consumption has been weakening throughout 
2008, recording just 1.1 percent growth in the third quarter. 
 Increasing prices, low employment growth, falling asset 
values, and rising household debt have all contributed to 
this weakness.  Despite the easing of oil and gas prices, 
core inflation and the weak won are still limiting demand for 
non-necessities.  The negative wealth effect is a relatively 
new factor in the picture as equity and real estate values 
fell most heavily in the fourth quarter.  The impact on Korea 
of the global credit crunch has also reduced consumer credit 
and furthers limits demand.  These new developments in an 
already weak environment lead to the expectation that private 
consumption growth will reach only 0.1 percent in the fourth 
quarter.  Consumer confidence survey scores in December fell 
to the lowest level in ten years.  Demand is expected to 
remain weak through at least the first and second quarters of 
¶2009. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Investment growth is expected to fall by 1.4 percent 
in the fourth quarter of 2008 in comparison with the third 
quarter.  This will bring the annual investment growth figure 
for 2008 to around 2.4 percent, slightly lower than in 2007. 
The poor overall economic environment is also likely to lower 
investment in new plant and equipment in at least the first 
two quarters of 2009.  The BOK announced in late December 
that facility investment in the fourth quarter was 7.2 
percent lower than in 2007.  The BOK anticipates declining 
facility investment in 2009.  Increasing ROKG construction 
spending will not have a significant impact on the economy 
until the first and second quarters of 2009, although the 
supplementary budget measure in September did boost spending 
modestly in the fourth quarter.  In any case, increasing 
government construction spending is only likely to offset 
partially otherwise declining private sector construction 
activity in the first half of 2009.  While President Lee 
Myung-bak had promised increased infrastructure spending 
during his campaign in 2007, these plans did not get off the 
drawing board in 2008 as the Administration was bogged down 
by other issues. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The real estate and housing market is moribund with 
large stocks of finished but unsold apartments accumulating 
in the fourth quarter.  This problem is particularly 
pronounced in the regions beyond Seoul where the previous Roh 
Administration had promoted development and construction. 
Construction firms and mutual savings banks heavily invested 
in these regional projects are clearly among those most 
likely to be put out of business as the government is 
expected to move forward with restructuring in these and 
other sectors in 2009.  The Lee Myung-bak Administration is 
pushing forward a number of real estate reforms that had been 
stalled in order to stimulate the market.  While these 
measures may yield positive results, the effect is unlikely 
to be substantial at the outset of 2009. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Government expenditure growth was only 4.2 percent 
through the first three quarters of this year.  This in part 
was the result of the budget austerity stance at the start of 
the Lee Myung-bak Administration.  Total government spending 
through the first ten months of 2008 was 197.7 trillion won 
(USD 141.2 billion), only 75.9 percent of the annual budget. 
The supplementary budget of 4.5 trillion won (USD 3.2 
billion) passed in September was insufficient to reverse the 
low spending growth trajectory established through the first 
9 months.  The expected increase in spending in the fourth 
 
quarter will boost the annual rate of government spending 
growth to 4.5 percent.  Government spending is expected to 
grow significantly in 2009 as the budget already contains a 
fiscal stimulus and an additional stimulus package is 
expected. 
 
 
Employment and Wages 
-------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Unemployment rates are not expected to increase 
substantially in the fourth quarter, despite the slowing of 
the economy.  Unemployment is expected to be 3.3 percent in 
the fourth quarter, only slightly higher than the rate 
through 2007.  One reason for this is the increasing rate of 
economic inactivity within the overall population.  Another 
factor is the tendency in Korean firms to reduce output and 
hours rather than lay off workers.  Nonetheless, job losses 
are anticipated in 2009 through the coming economic 
restructuring in construction, shipbuilding and possibly 
other sectors.  Temporary and day laborers, along with the 
self-employed, are expected to face the toughest conditions. 
Many of these are actually foreign migrant workers. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Even as employment growth has slowed in 2008, so 
have real wages slowed and then turned negative.  Real wage 
growth was 2.3 percent in the first quarter, 1.6 percent in 
the second quarter, but minus 2.9 percent in the third 
quarter.  Real wages are expected to continue to decline in 
the fourth quarter as workers are in a weak bargaining 
position and inflation remains substantial.  This trend could 
continue into 2009 unless inflation is brought within the 
target zone.  Declining real wages will further undercut 
consumer demand in the fourth quarter and into at least the 
first quarter of 2009. 
 
 
External Sector 
--------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Net export growth through the first three quarters 
of 2008 was 20.2 percent higher than the same period in 2007. 
 This growth, however, slowed in the third quarter to 10.7 
percent and is expected to deteriorate sharply in the fourth 
quarter.  Exports in November fell by 18 percent from the 
level of November 2007, the sharpest drop in seven years. 
Similarly, the National Statistical Office announced a 14 
percent decline in industrial production in November (from 
the level of Nov 2007) -- the sharpest monthly decline since 
¶1970.  Despite slowing export growth, the trade balance swung 
into positive territory in October with a USD 2.79 billion 
surplus, reflecting the impact of rapidly falling oil and 
commodity prices.  This change helped propel the current 
account into a USD 4.75 billion surplus in October and a USD 
2.06 billion surplus in November.  For the year, we expect a 
surplus of more than USD 5 billion for the goods balance, 
while the services balance is expected to be around minus USD 
14 billion.  The positive movement in the trade and current 
account balances late in 2008 has not improved exporter 
confidence levels.  The Export Business Survey Index, taken 
quarterly by the Korean International Trade Association for 
the coming quarter, peaked at a level of 128.3 in the first 
quarter of 2008.  The index fell to 90.6 in the second 
quarter, 82.8 in the third quarter, and reached a record-low 
of 33.4 in the fourth quarter. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Prospects for the external sector have directly and 
indirectly affected by the financial crisis.  The global 
credit crunch has made trade financing more difficult for 
imports and exports.  The Korean government has attempted 
with mixed results to ensure adequate trade financing. 
Recessionary expectations in the United States and Europe are 
darkening global growth expectations and many of Korea's 
export industries will feel the pain.  The won depreciated 
rapidly in October and November, reaching 1508 per U.S. 
dollar on November 21, losing more than 50 percent of its 
value of just a few months before.  The won, along with most 
other currencies, has regained value against the dollar in 
December with the rate on December 30 closing at 1260 won per 
U.S. dollar.  Market analysts expect the won to recover 
further against the dollar but most expect the rate to 
stabilize above 1100 with the currency then 15-25 percent 
 
weaker than in the first half of 2008.  This should make 
Korean exports more competitive over time, particularly in 
comparison to those of Japan, where the yen has appreciated. 
 
 
Inflation and Monetary Policy 
----------------------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Consumer prices in 2008 were propelled upward by 
rising energy, commodity and food prices in the first half. 
As these prices moderated and then fell in the second half, 
consumer price pressures began to ease.  Consumer prices for 
the year as a whole are expected to rise by 4.7 percent, well 
above the target zone of 2.5-3.5 percent.  Producer prices 
climbed even higher during the year, peaking at 12 percent in 
the third quarter.  These prices are expected to end the year 
with an annual growth rate of 8.6 percent.  Inflationary 
pressures are generally expected to continue to ease in the 
first half of 2009, although upside risks spring from the 
weaker won, possible public utility price hikes, and possible 
increased labor wage demands. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The impact of the global financial turmoil 
(including easing energy and commodity prices) caused the 
Bank of Korea (and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance) to 
abandon anti-inflationary policies of the summer months in 
favor of monetary easing in the fourth quarter.  The BOK cut 
the benchmark seven-day repurchase agreement by 75 basis 
points on October 27, 25 basis points on November 7, and a 
full percentage point on December 11.  Analysts generally 
expect additional monetary easing in the first half of 2009 
and indeed, BOK Governor Lee Seong-tae in New Year remarks 
announced that the bank would "manage the base rate with 
priority on economic recovery and improving financial markets 
because price growth is expected to slow down." 
 
 
Wide Range of 2009 Forecasts 
---------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The most pessimistic forecast for the Korean 
economy in 2009 was released by UBS, which predicted in late 
November a 3 percent GDP decline.  UBS expects the heavy blow 
to export industries coming in early 2009 to burst what it 
considers to be a credit bubble.  Some other western 
investment houses have also predicted negative growth in 
2009, but most western and domestic institutional analyses 
are more positive. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The OECD is among the more optimistic of 
forecasters and, in its &Economic Outlook 20098 anticipates 
GDP growth of 2.7 percent for the coming year.  The OECD 
suggests a quicker rebound for exports than most other 
institutions.  The OECD analysis foresees the weak won as a 
spur to exports (but the won has recovered considerably in 
December).  The IMF and World Bank have both announced 
expectations of 2 percent for Korean GDP growth in 2009. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The BOK, which has a reputation for optimism when 
forecasting Korean GDP growth, surprised most observers in 
December with a forecast of only 2 percent GDP growth for 
¶2009.  The BOK was less optimistic than the OECD about a 
quick turnaround in demand in export markets as well as 
domestically.  With the exception of Samsung Economic 
Research Institute, which is predicting 2009 GDP growth of 
3.2 percent, Korean think tanks are forecasting growth 
between 1 and 2 percent.  President Lee Myung-bak warned in 
late December that growth in the first half of 2009 could be 
negative, but was hopeful regarding positive growth for 2009 
as a whole. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) President Lee Myung-bak has made shoring up the 
economy his highest domestic priority in late 2008 and is 
expected to make it a primary theme in his New Year's 
address.  Lee and the ruling GNP are trying to move forward 
with a wide-ranging set of reforms intended to help the 
economy weather the global slowdown as well as create an 
environment more conducive to business interests.  Lee and 
 
the GNP are, however, at loggerheads with the opposition 
Democratic Party, which seized the floor of the National 
Assembly in late December to prevent the GNP from using its 
majority to pass any legislation.  (The GNP's majority was 
used to pass the budget and tax cuts earlier in December over 
strenuous objections of the DP).  The economic crisis offers 
Lee a rare opportunity to regain the initiative in his 
Presidency and the opposition is using radical tactics to 
prevent this outcome.  Regardless of the outcome of the 
legislative standoff, the government has used the tools 
available to it, along with the budget and tax measures, to 
adopt expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, ease 
regulatory controls, ease the liquidity crisis facing the 
financial sector, shore up bank capital adequacy ratios, and 
prepare for restructuring in industries such as construction 
and shipbuilding. 
 
¶21. (SBU) The financial crisis appears to have generated the 
necessary urgency to spur Korea and its larger neighbors, 
China and Japan, to adopt a new set of bilateral national 
currency swap mechanisms on the margins of the mid-December 
summit in Fukuoka.  Nonetheless, the ROKG remains greatly 
appreciative of the USD 30 billion currency swap between the 
Federal Reserve and the Bank of Korea.  This gesture played a 
key role in stabilizing Korean markets in late October when 
fear and uncertainty were accelerating the decline of the won 
and stock indices.  The ROKG is also appreciative of the U.S. 
role in ensuring a place at the table for Korea at talks on 
the global financial system and we can expect the ROKG to 
continue to be an ally in these talks. 
STEPHENS