VZCZCXRO0684
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHRH #0134/01 0201343
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201343Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9934
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE 9985
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4350
RUMICEA/USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000134 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2019 
TAGS: PREL SAIS IS KPAL
SUBJECT: SAUDIS TO OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: PEACE PROCESS NOW 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ford Fraker, reasons 1.4 b, d. 
 
Key Points: 
 
--(U) FM Saud Al-Faisal strongly urged that the new US 
administration engage early and meaningfully to restart the 
Middle East peace process. 
 
--(C) The Saudis fear that strong popular Arab reaction to 
events in Gaza may destabilize region unless the US acts. 
 
--(C) Saud said leaders gathered in Kuwait might call for 
deployment of an international force to Gaza. 
 
--(U) FM Saud asked to arrange a congratulatory phone call to 
Secretary-designate Clinton as soon as convenient. 
 
(C) COMMENT:  Saud,s gently worded warnings about the 
dangers posed by delays in resuming the peace process were 
bluntly and succinctly echoed by King Abdallah in the opening 
session of the Arab Economic Summit in Kuwait on January 19: 
Israel should realize that the choice between peace and war 
will not be available indefinitely, and that the Arab Peace 
Initiative, currently on the table, will not remain on the 
table forever.  To underscore his determination, he then held 
reconciliation talks with Bashar Al-Asad.  Events in Gaza 
have apparently resulted in renewed Arab unity, at least in 
popular outrage.  The Saudis fear instability and increased 
Iranian influence could result, and believe that there is a 
limited window of opportunity for action.  They say they are 
ready to participate as partners if the US is ready to lead. 
End comment. 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  See paragraph 7. 
 
¶2. (C) SAUDIS PLEASED WITH AMBASSADORIAL EXTENSION:  In a 
January 18 meeting, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal 
warmly welcomed the news that Ambassador Fraker,s tenure had 
been extended to facilitate the transition between US 
administrations.  "This is an excellent sign for the new 
administration," Saud declared, adding that it would ensure a 
smooth handover and continued good bilateral cooperation. 
 
¶3. (C) NEXT STEPS ON GAZA: The January 19-20 Arab Economic 
Summit in Kuwait would focus on the Gaza situation, Saud 
explained, though the ministers would also be considering 
some 42 decisions related to regional economic development. 
With a fragile cease-fire in place, there was a growing 
consensus that the best case scenario would involve the 
deployment of an international force in Gaza, along the 
border with Egypt and possibly in a buffer zone along the 
northern border with Israel.  Some worried that such forces 
would end up in conflict with Hamas, but the Saudis believed 
this was not likely.  Saud did not provide details about the 
make up or sponsorship of such an international force, but 
said it was likely that the final summit communiqu would 
urge its creation. 
 
¶4. (C) URGENT US ACTION NEEDED: Saud said that he hoped 
Ambassador Fraker could convince the new US administration to 
urgently engage in the Middle East peace process by taking 
"meaningful steps" towards establishing a Palestinian state. 
Such action would strengthen those on the Arab side who favor 
peace and help undermine Hamas and build Palestinian unity. 
"Hamas is not an option," but the people of Gaza will only 
support the side able to secure benefits.  "Abu Mazen is the 
only one who can do this, but he needs help." 
 
¶5. (C) THE SAUDI MESSAGE:  Prince Saud strongly urged that 
President Obama and Secretary-designate Clinton start early 
on the peace process and convince Israel that the US 
government has a firm position on establishing a Palestinian 
state.  The Arab peace initiative was based on the concept 
that "the US would bring Israel, and the Arabs would bring 
the Palestinians."  Now, the Saudi and other Arab governments 
looked to the US to act, and for both sides to move in 
tandem.  In Saud,s view, this was most important.  If Israel 
believed that the Arabs remained disillusioned with the US 
(and presumably disinclined to act as partners in a peace 
process), it would continue to act unilaterally, and count on 
unqualified US support for its actions.  This was very 
shortsighted, because Israel should have seen the limits of 
what its military action could achieve.  A chink had appeared 
in Israel's armor, Saud warned.  In the absence of a peace 
process, there will be growing turmoil and instability in the 
region, and pressure to exploit Israel's weaknesses. 
(Comment:  Saud appeared to be alluding to Iranian attempts 
to expand its influence, and the belief among the 
rejectionist Palestinian factions encouraged by Syria and 
 
RIYADH 00000134  002 OF 002 
 
 
Iran, that since Hizballah and now Hamas had both survived 
military confrontations with Israel, armed confrontation was 
a viable option.  End comment.) 
 
¶6. (C) BILATERAL PRIORITIES:  In response to the Ambassador's 
question,  Saud mentioned two key priorities for the new 
administration:  continuing efforts to strengthen Saudi 
Arabia's military, which should help stabilize the region by 
providing some balance to the Iranian threat, and increasing 
"human to human contact." 
 
¶7. (U) PHONE CALL REQUEST. In that connection, the Foreign 
Minister requested the Ambassador's assistance in arranging 
for a phone call with the Secretary-Designate; it was his 
hope to extend his congratulations on her assumption of her 
new duties personally.  The Ambassador assured him that he 
would convey the request as soon as possible. 
 
¶8. (U) Please advise. 
 
FRAKER