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Viewing cable 09PARIS114, POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER FRENCH CONTRIBUTIONS IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09PARIS114 2009-01-27 10:55 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO5801
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #0114/01 0271055
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 271055Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5309
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0717
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000114 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019 
TAGS: NATO MCAP MOPS PREL MGOV MARR FR AF
SUBJECT: POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER FRENCH CONTRIBUTIONS IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A. PARIS POINTS FOR 12/13/2008 
     B. IIR 6 832 0569 09 
     C. STATE 125172 
     D. 08 STATE 131480 
     E. 08 PARIS 64 
     F. 07 PARIS 4615 
 
Classified By: Charge Mark A. Pekala for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C)  As Washington prepares for possible requests to 
allies on Afghanistan, this cable lays out French military 
and civilian capabilities and identifies potential areas for 
additional French efforts.  French officials expect 
Afghanistan to be a major focus of the 60th anniversary NATO 
summit to be held in Strasbourg and Baden-Baden in early 
April and are anxious for the summit to be a successful 
showcase of alliance unity.  Coincidentally, a planned French 
restructuring of its defense posture in Cote d'Ivoire, 
Senegal and Gabon, as well as the end of the EUFOR mission in 
Chad and expected adjustment of KFOR in Kosovo provide a 
possible window to reduce forces in these regions and to 
increase French resources in Afghanistan.  To this end, 
French military planners have already quietly begun 
identifying a possible 1000-2000 additional troops who could 
supplement their current deployments in RC-East.  But the 
final decision on increasing troops will ultimately be a 
political one, taken by the French President himself.  The 
French Defense Minister has been publicly denying an 
increased role in Afghanistan in advance of a January 28 
parliamentary vote on foreign deployments, but this has been 
negated by other French officials who view the Minister's 
statements as a political move to keep the Afghanistan 
conflict from affecting the vote.  French political leaders 
have continually stressed that there is no "purely military" 
solution to Afghanistan and said they want to see more 
resources directed to the "Afghanization" of our effort and 
the gradual turn over of responsibility to the relevant 
Afghan authorities.  Despite hosting a high-profile pledging 
conference last June, French financial contributions remain 
modest (USD 165 million over the next three years).   In 
December, the Afghan Interior Minister approached the French 
about a joint police training mission that would make use of 
the structure and expertise of the French gendarmerie.  The 
French are actively studying this proposal.  This is an area 
where we could push for increased French involvement in the 
civilian sector, although the GOF also has relevant expertise 
in other aspects of development.  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
DEFENSE RESTRUCTURING TO OUR BENEFIT 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (S/NF) Several convergent factors currently present 
opportunities for the French to find additional military 
capacity for Afghanistan.  According to Jacques Audibert, 
Director of Strategic Affairs at the MFA, the GOF is 
assessing how to make more troops available for service in 
Afghanistan and said that expected French drawdowns in 
overseas deployments could provide possible additional 
capacity.  This has been confirmed by sources in the French 
Joint Staff (ref B) and by Philippe Errera, Strategic Affairs 
advisor to FM Kouchner.  Specifically, the GOF is planning a 
drawdown of military forces stationed in Cote d'Ivoire, 
Senegal and Gabon as part of a restructuring effort prompted 
by the 2008 White Paper on Defense and Security.  Audibert 
confirmed that France is also eyeing the EUFOR mission in 
Chad, which is expected to end its mission in March, again 
potentially freeing up additional personnel for other 
deployments.  Finally, Audibert expects the KFOR mission in 
Kosovo to diminish by half as it adjusts to a "posture of 
dissuasion."  In Kosovo alone there are currently 1730 
soldiers, so according to Audibert the change could free up 
some 800 French soldiers for reassignment.  In the coming 
months a few additional troops are also expected to be 
released from service in Bosnia as well. 
 
3.  (S/NF) Within existing deployments to Afghanistan, French 
military planners are planning for a possible turnover of 
RC-Capital to Turkish forces and France could then redeploy 
its forces (some 1800 troops) to RC-East.  In this scenario, 
the French would stand up a brigade headquarters within 
CJTF-82.  Such a move would take advantage of the existing 
logistics and force protection that they have already 
 
PARIS 00000114  002 OF 003 
 
 
established for the deployment last year of a maneuver 
battalion to Kapisa province.  The national support base 
would remain Camp Warehouse.  In one possibility, French 
planners have also envisioned carving off part of RC-Capital 
for inclusion into RC-East (the Suwrobi district) and the 
additional maneuver battalion would task force into that 
area.  If additional battalions are deployed, they would like 
to go to Laghman province which borders Kapisa, again giving 
the French military the continuity it seeks. 
 
4.  (S/NF) The deployment of Special Forces troops remains on 
the table, but is considered particularly sensitive for the 
French government due to those forces' more controversial 
operations and the French view of them as a strategic 
national asset needed to protect French interests.  According 
to our sources within the French military, the SOF is ready 
and willing to deploy but is awaiting the political decision 
to allow it to go forward. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
POSITIVE POLITICAL WILL 
-------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C/NF) While military planning seems to be proceeding, 
senior French officials have been sending contradictory 
signals on the possibility of French reinforcements in 
Afghanistan.  Defense Minister Herve Morin has recently 
repeated several times that France does not envision 
supplementary deployments to Afghanistan "at this time." 
However, these public remarks have been widely viewed as 
politically driven due to an upcoming January 28 
parliamentary vote on foreign deployments.  While the 
Afghanistan deployment alone was already debated and approved 
last September by a vote of 343 to 210, the vote on the 28th 
will encompass all foreign deployments including defense 
restructuring plans.  Thus, it risks raising controversy 
about drawing down troops from regions of historic national 
interest (i.e., in Africa) to be sent to fight in Afghanistan 
for what is still regarded by many as "an American war." 
Post has interpreted Morin's remarks downplaying the 
possibility of increased deployments "at this time" as merely 
an effort to keep the issue of Afghanistan from overtaking 
the foreign deployment debate while still leaving open the 
possibility for the French President to announce 
reinforcements at a later date. In a January 22 meeting, 
Audibert confirmed this view, scoffing that Morin was merely 
"doing his job" in the run up to the parliamentary debate. 
In the same meeting, Audibert also stated very firmly that "I 
have no doubt that President Sarkozy will be fully engaged in 
Afghanistan" in the coming months.  Strategic Affairs Advisor 
to FM Kouchner, Philippe Errera, concurred on January 26, 
stating that most of the changes in overseas deployments for 
2009 are reductions in forces, based on right-sizing to 
current needs.  However, an announced increase in Afghanistan 
deployments at this time risks creating the political 
perception that the reductions are taking place solely to 
increase deployments in Afghanistan, a linkage they want to 
avoid. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
PUSHING FOR INCREASED CIVILIAN ENGAGEMENT 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6.  (C/NF) French officials at all levels frequently 
reiterate the mantra that the solution in Afghanistan "cannot 
be purely military" and will require significant investment 
in governance, anti-corruption, development, regional 
cooperation and increased devolution of responsibility to 
Afghan officials.  This comprehensive approach spurred the 
French willingness to host the June 2008 conference on 
Afghanistan and the December 2008 meeting of Afghanistan's 
neighbors, both hosted by FM Kouchner.  However, setting 
aside French willingness to serve as a venue for high-level 
meetings, French financial commitments remain relatively 
modest.  At the June conference, Paris pledged USD 165 
million in reconstruction assistance over the next three 
years, which places it near the middle of the donor 
community, on par with the Aga Khan foundation.  Additional 
requests, such as for USD 100 million in additional funding 
for the Afghan National Army (ref C), remain officially under 
consideration, but have never been answered.  The GOF also 
has not yet responded to requests for increased security 
assistance for the 2009 Afghan elections (ref D).  French 
 
PARIS 00000114  003 OF 003 
 
 
officials, most recently Political Director Gerard Araud, 
have noted that we are "more likely to obtain troops than 
money" in light of the current financial crisis.  That said, 
France remains one of the leading world economies that can, 
and should, do more to promote civilian reconstruction and 
assistance.  It also has a wealth of development experience 
from its historic involvement in Africa, including a long 
history of taking on in their military deployments 
reconstruction elements that could be relevant to 
Afghanistan.  One issue to overcome in this domain is finding 
an appropriate vehicle for deployment of civilian experts 
(Embassy note: The French categorically reject standing up a 
PRT, on legal and ideological grounds that prohibit military 
leadership over civilians.  See refs E and F). 
 
7.  (C/NF) Afghan Ambassador to France Abdullah Omar recently 
confirmed that during a December visit to Paris, Afghan 
Interior Minister Atmar pushed for French assistance in 
restructuring and training Afghan police forces, along the 
lines of the French gendarmerie (which is a separate civilian 
security force that is structured along military lines). 
Philippe Errera informed post that a team of gendarmerie had 
recently traveled to Afghanistan to explore ways to follow up 
on police training.  Their study, exploring if, and how, 
French gendarmes could be involved in Afghanistan police 
training, is due to be completed by January 26.  It will then 
be passed to both the Minister of Defense and the Minister of 
Interior (who recently absorbed the French gendarmerie under 
her authority) for approval.  According to Errera, the study 
should consider the appropriate vehicle for any deployment, 
as well as where there could be increased value added.  For 
example, the French are looking at whether to increase their 
presence in the EUPOL mission (currently France contributes 
eight officers to the mission), to sign a bilateral agreement 
with Afghanistan, or to push for an increased NATO role in 
support of Afghan police.  Errera said that the French lack a 
funding and contractor system like that of the U.S., so he 
doubted that France would become more involved in the basic 
training that the USG does.  Instead, France could consider 
how to provide supplemental training, such as for officers. 
 
8.  (C/NF) Errera made the point that the GOF considers 
current funding for Afghanistan to be adequate, as most 
countries have fulfilled their donor pledges from the June 
conference.  However, the GOF is concerned that significant 
parts of that funding are not reaching their intended 
recipients.  For example, he cited the case of a well-known 
hospital called the Institut Meres-Enfants which is largely 
supported by the Aga Khan Foundation.  France increased its 
contribution to the hospital last year, but was upset to 
learn that the amount dispatched to the Afghan government was 
considerably reduced by the time it arrived at the hospital. 
French officials have raised this directly with President 
Karzai, who reportedly has "promised to look into it."  Such 
experiences have done little to encourage France to increase 
its financial contributions. 
 
9.  (C/NF) Comment.  The French government is clearly 
preparing for some significant requests from the new Obama 
administration and appears ready to view such requests 
positively.  Expected defense restructuring in the coming 
months will free up some additional military capacity that 
could be deployed to Afghanistan.  Given the upcoming NATO 
summit in Strasbourg and Baden-Baden, there is also political 
will for an Afghanistan success story, although ultimately it 
will be President Sarkozy himself who makes the final 
decision on any troop increases.  France has a long history 
of development work in Africa that we believe could be 
brought to bear in Afghanistan as well.  While the French 
continue to shun the possibility of standing up a PRT, we 
should be able to push for increased training and development 
expertise to shore up French promises to find a 
"comprehensive" -- rather than purely military -- solution to 
Afghanistan.  End comment. 
PEKALA