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id: 185546
date: 1/2/2009 13:20
refid: 09OTTAWA1
origin: Embassy Ottawa
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08OTTAWA1495|08OTTAWA1574|08OTTAWA1577|08OTTAWA1586
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000001
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR CA
SUBJECT: "NEVER APOLOGIZE": PM HARPER'S GOVERNING STYLE
 
REF: A. 08 OTTAWA 1495
     ¶B. 08 OTTAWA 1574
     ¶C. 08 OTTAWA 1586
     ¶D. 08 OTTAWA 1577
 
Classified By: DCM Terry Breese, reason 1.4 (d)
 
¶1. (C)  Summary: Prime Minister Stephen Harper's reputation
as a master political strategist is somewhat tattered in the
wake of November's stunning near-fatal mis-step to abolish
public financing for all political parties.  However, at
least on the surface, he remains unbowed and unapologetic.
Relying on an extremely small circle of advisors and his own
instincts, he has played the game of high-stakes, partisan
politics well, but his reputation for decisiveness and
shrewdness has been tarnished by a sometimes vindictive
pettiness.  With only a few exceptions, he has not built the
bridges to the opposition typical of a minority PM.  Moving
from surpluses to deficits, he will face new imperatives in
the changed economic and political landscape of 2009 to adopt
a more conciliatory and inclusive approach.  However, this
will go against the grain for such an instinctively combative
Prime Minister.  End summary.
 
Blow to reputation
------------------
 
¶2. (C)  Canadians have had fifteen years to get to know
Stephen Harper as Reform Party MP (1993-1997), head of the
free enterprise National Citizens Coalition (1997-2001),
leader of the Canadian Alliance (2002- 2003), Conservative
opposition leader (2004-6), and Prime Minister
(2006-present), but he remains an enigma to most Canadians
(including many Conservatives).  Supporters and detractors
alike have labeled him a master strategist and cunning
tactician, as well as an extremely partisan but paradoxically
pragmatic ideologue.  He calls himself a realist.  However,
his reputation as a peerless political chess-master is now
somewhat in tatters, following what most perceive as an
atypical near-fatal miscalculation over a Fall Economic and
Fiscal Statement (ref a) that lacked economic credibility and
proposed the elimination of per vote public subsidies for
political parties.  Faced with an opposition revolt, Harper
first unusually retreated on the latter proposal, and then
bought time by proroguing Parliament on December 4 to avoid a
loss of a confidence vote on December 8.
 
Party first
-----------
 
¶3.  (C)  As Conservative leader, Harper has pursued two key
objectives: welding the fractured Canadian conservative
movement into one cohesive Conservative Party of Canada
(CPC); and, positioning the CPC to replace the Liberals as
Canada's "natural governing party."  He succeeded in the
first goal by imposing discipline and coherence, dangling the
prospect of a majority government, and centralizing power to
an unprecedented degree in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO).
 He has made no secret of his desire to win a majority
government, or of his determination to occupy and redefine
the political center.  As he recently told reporters, "if
you're really serious about making transformation, you have
to pull the center of the political spectrum toward
conservatism . . . we're building the country towards a
definition of itself that is more in line with conservatism."
 In a separate year-end interview, he underscored that his
goal since becoming leader has been to create a strong party
"that can not just win the odd election but can govern on an
ongoing basis."  Until now, that strategy has rested on
winning additional seats in Quebec, but the setbacks in the
province during the October election and Harper's
denunciations of Quebec separatists during the early December
mini-crisis may necessitate a change in direction.
 
¶4. (SBU)  In 2007, former Harper strategist Tom Flanagan set
Q4. (SBU)  In 2007, former Harper strategist Tom Flanagan set
out his "Ten Commandments of Conservative Campaigning" that
read like a prescription for Harper's governing style: party
unity; discipline; inclusion (reach out to ethnic
minorities); toughness; grassroots politics; persistence;
and, technology (fundraising and grassroots motivation).  On
the policy side, moderation, "incrementalism," and
communication.  Conservatives, Flanagan noted, "must be
willing to make progress in small, practical steps . . .
sweeping visions . . . are toxic in practical politics."
Moreover, with five parties on the field, he warned there was
little room for niceties; elections would "not be just street
fights, but all-out brawls."
 
Governing the country, closely
------------------------------
 
¶5. (C)  In office, Harper has rarely made the compromises
typical of a minority PM, nor built the bridges and informal
 
OTTAWA 00000001  002 OF 003
 
 
channels that usually get things done in a minority
Parliament.  In his first term, he practiced confrontation
over cooperation, governing in a kind of faux
majority-minority style that humiliated the already weakened
official opposition Liberals (a task made easier by the often
hapless performance of then-Opposition leader Stephane Dion).
 He reached across the floor only twice: in March 2008 to
achieve bipartisan consensus on the extension of Canada's
military mission in Afghanistan through 2011; and, in June
2008 to resolve the Indian Residential Schools issue.  More
typical was his free use of confidence votes on a series of
legislation to force passage of his agenda under threat of an
election, and his fait accompli in 2006 recognizing the
Quebecois (i.e. not Quebec province) as a nation within a
united Canada, a step that took both his own party as well as
the opposition by surprise.
 
¶6. (C)  Tight focus on the leader and close-hold of
information have been the hallmarks of Harper's governing
style.  Initially, strict discipline and scripting made sense
for a new government on probation, whose members had almost
no experience in power.  However, Harper has centralized
communications and decision-making within the PMO (an ongoing
trend since the 1970s) to an unprecedented degree, according
to commentators familiar with the public service and
Conservative insiders.  "The Center" (PMO and Privy Council
Office) is clearly the arbiter of even the most routine
decisions.
 
¶7.  (C)  For their part, cabinet ministers have mostly kept
on message and in the prime minister's shadow.  Since July,
under new Chief of Staff Guy Giorno and communications
director Kory Teneycke, media access to ministers has been
loosened, but ministers are still on a short leash.  At a
December conference, one Minister of State confessed
privately that he did not "dare" to deviate from his
pre-approved text, even though fast-moving events had already
overtaken his speech.  Discussions with Conservative caucus
members over the past year have also made it clear that they
are often out of the loop on the Prime Minister's plans,
including key committee chairmen in the House of Commons.
Many senior Conservatives admitted that they were stunned to
hear about the ban on public financing of political parties
in the Fall Economic Statement; neither the Cabinet nor the
caucus apparently had any clue this was even part of the
long-range agenda, much less subject to an immediate
confidence vote.
 
Inner, inner circle
-------------------
 
¶8. (C)  Harper's inner circle appears extremely small.
Notoriously hard on staff (Harper burned through a series of
communications directors as opposition leader, and once
reportedly told an aide that he liked to see the "fear" in
the eyes of prospective employees), Harper seems to operate
largely as his own strategist, tactician, and advisor.  Often
described by observers as self-consciously the "smartest guy
in the room," he has tended to surround himself with
like-minded people.  As a result, some insiders say he lacks
staff willing or able to act as an effective sounding-board
or check his partisan instincts.  Following the departure in
July of long-term advisor and chief of staff Ian Brodie and
communications director Sandra Buckler, their replacements
Giorno and Teneycke are known as highly partisan veterans of
two controversial majority Ontario provincial governments
that polarized public opinion.
 
¶9.  (C)  In cabinet, pundits consider Environment Minister
Jim Prentice, Transport Minister John Baird, and Foreign
QJim Prentice, Transport Minister John Baird, and Foreign
Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon to have Harper's confidence.
 However, few, if any, ministers appear to be genuine
confidantes.  Unlike former Conservative PM Brian Mulroney,
who famously called his MPs when their kids were sick and
kept their loyalty even when his personal popularity plunged
to historic lows, Harper lacks the personal touch.  He
appears to keep his caucus in line more through respect for
what he has accomplished and with the power and authority
that comes with the position of Prime Minister -- and as the
party's best hope for a future majority -- than through
affection or loyalty.  He has worked to quiet the party's
socially conservative rank and file, and to marginalize
contentious issues, such as same-sex marriage and abortion,
notably at the party's November policy conference in
Winnipeg.  He will next have to win their acquiescence to
upcoming deficit spending -- anathema for western Canadian
conservatives -- for a new stimulus package.  Realistically,
however, they have no credible alternative to Harper or the
CPC at this point, which will help to keep the party base
loyal.
 
Expect surprises
----------------
 
OTTAWA 00000001  003 OF 003
 
 
 
¶10.  (C)  After almost three years in power and facing a
changing economic and political landscape for 2009 (ref b),
Harper's new agenda is probably also still evolving.  The
2008 Conservative election platform, the November policy
convention, and the 2008 Speech from the Throne provided few
insights, obliging Harper-watchers to parse his comments and
actions for clues about his future direction.  Harper has
typically concentrated almost exclusively on short-term
election planning horizons, giving his government a sometimes
improvisational air.  Some commitments (such as revisions to
the Anti-terrorism Act and new copyright legislation) have
languished, while others (notably his about-face on his
election pledge not to run a deficit, and his current
proposal to inject up to C$30 billion in fiscal stimulus in
FY 2009-2010) have been surprise reverses.  Harper has also
not been bound by party orthodoxy.  On December 22, he filled
the Senate with 18 unelected Conservatives and directly named
a Supreme Court justice, contradicting long-standing
commitments to an elected Senate and parliamentary review of
Supreme Court appointments (refs c and d).
 
¶11.  (C)  According to one insider, Harper "likes surprises,"
not least to keep the opposition off balance.  For the
opposition, Harper's unpredictability has been more dangerous
due to his fierce partisanship and his willingness to take
risks.  Harper and senior Conservatives prefaced the 40th
Parliament with calls for greater conciliation, a new "tone,"
and a common resolve to work together to tackle the economic
crisis.  However, the government's provocative Economic and
Fiscal Statement immediately revived the bitterness and
threat of an election that had hung over the parliament until
the prorogation.  Opposition leaders claimed that the PM had
"poisoned the well" and broken their trust.  As one national
columnist noted, the Statement "amounted to a declaration of
war."
 
¶12.  (C)  The opposition's ability to turn the tables with a
proposed coalition in turn apparently caught the PM by
surprise, as was perhaps the rumored unwillingness of the
Governor General to rule out this option against his advice.
His ensuing passionate attacks on the "separatist" coalition
undid much of the progress the Conservative party had made in
Quebec.  Harper was able to retake the initiative by seeking,
and gaining, a prorogation until January 26, but in year-end
media interviews he remained unapologetic.  He denied that he
had acted like a "bully" in provoking the crisis, adding
"it's our job . . . to put forward things we think are in the
public interest."
 
¶13.  (C)  In anticipation of the 2009 budget, PM Harper has
somewhat uncharacteristically reached out to the opposition
for input, opened channels to new Liberal leader Michael
Ignatieff, and appointed an eminent persons Economic Advisory
Group with some Liberal representation.  He told CTV that his
plan is to focus on the economy and "find some consensus" in
Parliament, but he also made it clear that, if his political
rivals defeat him in January, he will have "no choice" but to
ask for an election: "if the decision of Parliament is that
they don't support the government people elected, then I
think, the only -- in my view -- constitutionally,
politically, morally, the only reasonable thing to do at that
point is for some other government to get a mandate from the
Canadian people."
 
¶14.  (C)  In the changed economic and political landscape of
2009, PM Harper will face new imperatives to adopt a more
conciliatory and inclusive approach.  However, this will go
Qconciliatory and inclusive approach.  However, this will go
against the grain for such an instinctively combative Prime
Minister.
 
Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada
 
WILKINS

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