VZCZCXRO8324
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0003/01 0010733
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 010733Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1412
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000003 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.  12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KNNP OREP RS
SUBJECT:  DEPUTY SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY NAZAROV MEETING WITH 
CODEL TAUSCHER 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  In a December 15 meeting with CODEL Tauscher, 
Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir Nazarov called 
the lack of trust the main obstacle for U.S. and Russian 
cooperation, followed by ineffective mechanisms to guarantee 
security.  Nazarov claimed that U.S. assistance to Georgia made the 
U.S. guilty of participating in "genocide," and criticized the 
NATO-Russia Council.  In order to rebuild trust, Nazarov called for 
an arms control verification mechanism, welcomed U.S. congressional 
efforts to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and advocated 
for an agreement on the non-offensive military use of space, as well 
as an additional Nonproliferation Treaty protocol for non-signatory 
countries such as Iran to participate.  Nazarov agreed that Iran 
must not acquire nuclear weapons, but disagreed over the means to 
achieve that end.  Rejecting sanctions as "groundless," he urged a 
dialogue with Tehran.  Nazarov stated Russia did not think Iran had 
made the political decision yet to acquire nuclear arms, and claimed 
there was no proof to date of a hidden enrichment project.  Nazarov 
welcomed the delegation's proposal that missile defense would only 
be activated if there was a confirmed missile threat from Iran, but 
cautioned that Russia would only cooperate on regional missile 
defense if there was also cooperation on global missile defense. 
Nazarov said the CFE was not a cornerstone of European security, and 
needed to be "brought into agreement with modern reality."  End 
summary. 
 
------------- 
Lack of trust 
------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In a December 15 meeting, Russian Security Council Deputy 
Secretary Vladimir Nazarov agreed with Representative Ellen Tauscher 
(D-CA), Representative Loretta Sanchez (D-CA), Representative Rick 
Larsen (D-WA), and Representative Doug Lamborn (R-CO) that joint 
U.S.-Russian cooperation was essential in order to reach agreement 
on extending the START Treaty, the Nonproliferation Treaty due for 
review in 2010, and dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons. 
 He noted that former Secretary of Defense William Perry during a 
visit to Moscow last week in a similar vein had listed economic 
cooperation, climate change, arms control, terrorism, and 
nonproliferation as other areas of potential cooperation. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) However, Nazarov stressed that the GOR's main concern was 
about two different issues: first, the lack of trust between the 
U.S. and Russia, and second, the ineffectiveness of mechanisms to 
guarantee security.  To illustrate the lack of trust, which he 
called Russia's "number one priority," Nazarov raised alleged USG 
promises that the U.S. would work with Georgian president 
Saakashvili to reduce the risk of aggression, and assurances that 
the presence of U.S. military advisors in Georgia was nothing to 
worry about.  However, Georgia had invaded South Ossetia 
notwithstanding, Nazarov charged. 
 
------------------------------- 
"U.S. participated in genocide" 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Nazarov further claimed Georgia had terminated advanced 
negotiations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia after Secretary Rice 
had visited Tbilisi, and later begun preparations for the operation 
in South Ossetia.  Given that the U.S. had assisted Georgia in these 
preparations by supplying aid and advisors, Nazarov accused the U.S. 
of "participating in genocide."  He said the U.S. needed to 
understand this Russian view, as a misunderstanding in that point 
would make it more difficult to achieve a common understanding 
elsewhere. 
 
------------------ 
NRC is not working 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Nazarov also criticized the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), 
which he described as an intended crisis management mechanism 
designed to create trust, with all members having "their own 
voices."  Instead it had become a venue where NATO spoke as one bloc 
against Russia. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Nazarov further charged that when the Georgian conflict 
broke out in August, Russian authorities unsuccessfully tried for 
one full day to reach Secretary Rice and the President, only getting 
through after Russian forces had repulsed the Georgians.  He claimed 
that Russian requests for the NRC to convene were rejected, as the 
U.S. had not yet "brought the other NATO partners into line." 
Therefore, Russia had little trust in the NRC, Nazarov stated. 
 
---------------- 
Rebuilding trust 
---------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Responding to Representative Larson's question what "hoops 
 
MOSCOW 00000003  002 OF 003 
 
 
the U.S. needed to jump through" in order to regain Russia's trust, 
Nazarov advocated that the new U.S. administration not take up old 
stereotypes, and cooperate on the issues mentioned earlier (para 1). 
 Nazarov proposed adding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the 
military use of space, and missile defense to the list of issues to 
address in order to rebuild trust. 
 
------------ 
Arms control 
------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Nazarov called for an arms control verification mechanism, 
rejecting any agreement that relied solely on voluntary 
demonstrations of compliance.  Dedicated channels within a framework 
of legal rules were necessary in order to pass confidential 
information about warheads and delivery vehicles. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Representative Tauscher indicated that a bill on the 
ratification of the CTBT had been submitted to the current Congress, 
while U.S. President-elect Barack Obama had pledged to seek Senate 
approval again in the next session of Congress, if necessary.  She 
noted the IAEA needed more funding and more "teeth."  Nazarov 
expressed Russia's strong support for the legislators' efforts to 
secure approval of the CTBT bill, but noted that there were many 
"powerful people" in high positions in Russia who considered nuclear 
tests essential to maintain the functionality of Russia's nuclear 
arsenal. 
 
--------------------- 
Military use of space 
--------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Nazarov again recalled his talks with Bill Perry, who had 
called for an agreement on the non-offensive military use of space. 
This was another area of U.S.-Russian agreement, Nazarov said, as 
the GOR considered the issue to be a big factor for ensuring 
strategic stability. 
 
---------------- 
Nonproliferation 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) On nonproliferation, Nazarov asserted that Russia was 
"showing everybody" that it complied with Article VI of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which calls on all signatories "to 
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures" to end the 
arms race, and to negotiate a treaty on total disarmament.  While 
Russia was decreasing its nuclear arsenal, Nazarov suggested that an 
additional protocol was necessary for non-signatory countries to 
participate.  Representative Tauscher agreed, affirming that the key 
element in Article VI was the dismantlement of weapons, not just 
their storage.  This was why the renewal of the START treaty was 
crucial. 
 
---- 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Nazarov noted that, due to Iran and Russia's shared 
border, Russia's strong desire for a non-nuclear Iran was 
understandable.  However, the question was how to reach that common 
goal.  Nazarov urged for establishing unity in negotiations among 
the "Big 6" (U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China). 
Charging that the sanctions imposed by President Bush against Iran 
were groundless and had no basis in international law, he quipped, 
"either we cooperate, or you sanction Rosoberonexport.  Both don't 
work." 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Representative Tauscher replied that the U.S. had a 
violent past with Iran, and no formal relations for 30 years.  For 
that reason, sanctions were the only tool remaining to influence 
Iran.  Allowing that that instrument was not very effective in the 
21st century, especially against a country which had lived so well 
despite sanctions, she questioned what other possibilities of 
influencing Iran remained.  Nazarov noted that the U.S. position 
with regard to other nuclear threshold countries had changed in the 
past, for example with regard to India and Pakistan.  After 
sanctioning Russia for cooperating with India on its nuclear 
program, the U.S. now hoped to replace Russia as India's key partner 
in atomic energy projects, he charged.  Nazarov suggested that the 
next U.S. administration might consider the Bushehr power station 
project to be one that supported stability in Iran, and helped 
impede Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Representative Tauscher pushed for unity in opposing 
 
MOSCOW 00000003  003 OF 003 
 
 
Iran's clandestine enrichment programs, especially given the lack of 
the rule of law in the country, and Iran's close ties to Hamas and 
other terrorist groups.  She asserted that the U.S. and Russia 
needed to stop Iran's enrichment program, and put similar pressure 
on the sixty other countries without mature governments or stable 
borders, which were trying to acquire nuclear power plants without 
closed fuel cycles.  Inspections were a key element. 
President-elect Obama would likely continue the low-level engagement 
with Iran started by the Bush administration, in order to prevent 
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Nazarov repeated that Russia disagreed with the U.S. on 
the tactics, not on the goal, and suggested it would be a great 
achievement if the U.S. and Russia were to both speak with Iran.  He 
described that he had been working on Iran issues for 20 years, and 
every year heard that Iran was about two-five years away from 
acquiring nuclear weapons.  Therefore it was necessary to share 
information actively in unprejudiced conversation, in order to 
clarify points on Iran's past nuclear activities.  Russia did not 
think Iran had made the political decision yet to acquire nuclear 
arms, and claimed there was no proof to date of a hidden project, 
nor did Russian monitors currently see an aggravation of the 
situation. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Responding to a question by Representative Lamborn, 
Nazarov confirmed Russia had seen Iran's centrifuges, but asserted 
they were ineffective and had "no future."  While the Type 2 
centrifuges were more dangerous, Iran did not have many of those, 
and was experiencing problems with them.  For this reason, Iran 
should be encouraged to join the proposed additional NPT protocol, 
in order to guarantee monitoring, which he agreed was most 
important. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Nazarov then lamented that Secretary Rice during her 
tenure as National Security Advisor had maintained close contact 
with the Russian Security Council, but once at the State Department 
had let those contacts expire, concentrating only on the Russian MFA 
instead.  He affirmed the Security Council's willingness to 
cooperate on mutual evaluations and on balancing the "carrots and 
sticks" for use with Iran. 
 
------------------- 
Missile Defense (MD) 
------------------- 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Representative Tauscher informed Nazarov that the U.S. 
Congress had said there would be no deployment of missiles in Poland 
until the systems had been tested and certified effective, and 
offered not to activate the system until there was a confirmed 
missile threat from Iran.  Nazarov welcomed the last element on 
non-activation as very important to Russia, but called for even more 
-- the demonstration that the MD system did not pose a threat to 
Russia.  He suggested the U.S. and Russia could jointly analyze 
threats, and analyze together the possibilities for cooperation to 
eliminate threats. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) Representative Tauscher suggested building mutual trust 
by cooperating on the short-to-medium range missile systems, 
currently not expected off the drawing board for lack of funds. 
Together with START, this could be an area for confidence building 
that would also attract other countries' cooperation.  Nazarov 
cautioned that Russia would cooperate on regional missile defense if 
there was also cooperation on global missile defense, but so far had 
only made bad experiences.  He illustrated this with the joke about 
the Mongolian astronaut who returned from a joint U.S.-Mongolian 
space flight with aching hands, complaining that every time he tried 
to touch something, he got his hands slapped down. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) Representative Sanchez repeated the offer to cooperate on 
regional MD, noting the technology existed, despite financial 
constraints, while long-range MD still required a lot of testing. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (SBU) Nazarov said the CFE was not a cornerstone of European 
security, and needed to be "brought into agreement with modern 
reality."  This was not a problem of the 1999 Istanbul Agreements, 
however.  Nazarov voiced his hope that the new U.S. administration 
would widen contacts and cooperation with Russia on this and other 
issues. 
 
¶22.  (U) Codel Tauscher did not clear this cable. 
 
BEYRLE