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PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHMC #0031/01 0290153
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290153Z JAN 09
FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3436
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 4482
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USNORTHCOM
RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 8983

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MONTERREY 000031 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCRM SNAR ASEC CASC PHUM PGOV MX
SUBJECT: MONTERREY CIVIL SOCIETY SEEKS TO RESPOND TO NARCO-VIOLENCE 
 
REF: 2008 MONTERREY 438 
 
MONTERREY 00000031  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.       (SBU)  Summary.  Unnerved by the upsurge in kidnappings 
and overall violence, Monterrey civil society institutions - 
government officials, citizens groups, and the press - have set 
to work in attempt to find solutions.  Some analysts worry, 
however, that the situation will get worse before it gets better 
as given the upcoming gubernatorial, state, and local elections 
they think that narco-money will inevitably find its way into 
the campaigns.  For its part, Monterrey's private sector is 
working with local government to use technology to increase 
security.   Despite the improvements, the constant refrain among 
citizens across the economic spectrum is that  they remain 
fearful of reporting crimes because of their continued lack of 
confidence in the police.   End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2.      (SBU)   As the wave of kidnappings, extortion, and 
narco-violence continues in the Monterrey region, the public - 
across all socioeconomic levels and classes - remains fearful. 
Attention shifts from one incident to another, whether it be the 
January 6 grenade attack on the Monterrey Televisa broadcast 
offices, the January 18 murder of a wealthy adolescent departing 
a nightclub, or the January 25 dumping of a tortured corpse 
outside the state government's anonymous tipster office.  Many 
local analysts do not expect the situation to improve any time 
soon.  (See septel which reports on the results of an AmCham 
Monterrey survey on business perceptions of the security 
environment.)  Former Nuevo Leon Governor Socrates Rizzo told CG 
that little could be done in the short-term as the federal, 
state, and municipal police were all compromised.  If citizens 
are afraid to turn to the authorities when faced with threats, 
then truly crime victims are on their own. 
 
 
 
Organized Crime and the Elections 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3.      (SBU)  Particularly worrisome, Rizzo observed, was the 
prospect of the upcoming gubernatorial, state, and municipal 
elections, scheduled to take place in Nuevo Leon on July 5. 
While the two principal parties - PRI and PAN - had both taken 
steps to guard against the infiltration of narco-money in the 
campaigns, in practice it would be practically impossible to 
prevent organized crime from bankrolling candidates.   One way 
the cartels could impact the race would be to just bribe 
television anchorpersons and the commentators, thereby ensuring 
that their particular candidate received favorable coverage. 
Alternatively, he said, organized crime could provide a 
candidate's staff with walking around money to distribute to 
voters.   Meanwhile, another contact pointed out that the 
applicable campaign finance regulations only cover the 
candidate, so that it would be easy to simply funnel the narco 
money to a family member. 
 
 
 
¶4.      (SBU)   Media representatives conoffs spoke with were 
similarly pessimistic about the possibility of walling off the 
elections from organized crime influence.  They did not see the 
January 6 grenade attack on Televisa as a response to any 
reporting done by that broadcast outlet on the cartels. 
Instead, they saw it as an attempt by organized crime to inflict 
political damage on the current Nuevo Leon State Secretary for 
Governance - who happens to be the current governor's preferred 
candidate to win the PRI nomination in the gubernatorial race. 
Under this line of argument, political mafias contracted 
organized crime gunmen to carry out the attack - if true, an 
even more chilling scenario that the alternative theory that the 
cartels themselves were behind the assault. 
 
 
 
¶5.      (SBU)  Our media contacts had grown sour on the idea 
that mass public marches, such as those that took place in 
August 2008 in both Monterrey and Mexico City, to protest the 
growing insecurity would have much of an effect.    One 
interlocutor told us that given the lack of progress during the 
intervening months, he doubted that any effort now to organize a 
similar event in Monterrey would attract much participation. 
Note.  During the August 30 citizen march, the leaders demanded 
an accounting of results after 60 days (see reftel).  No such 
accounting has occurred, march organizers have not exerted any 
follow-up pressure on the government to produce it, and local 
 
MONTERREY 00000031  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
leaders do not see any progress being made on police reform. 
End Note. 
 
 
 
Citizen's Advisory Committees 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6.      (SBU)   At both the state level and in San Pedro - the 
upper-class suburb bordering Monterrey - government officials 
are using citizen advisory committees to channel some of the 
rising discontent and harvest ideas as to structural fixes.  For 
instance, the well-heeled, resource-rich San Pedro committee has 
worked with the municipal government to:  publish crime 
statistics and trends on the city's web site, stand up an 
emergency response telephone number which rings directly to 
dedicated San Pedro operators, establish a mobile unit at which 
citizens can file complaints (instead of waiting for hours 
in-line at city hall), and post a Most Wanted list of persons 
who have been the subject of multiple complaints.   Best 
intentions have sometimes met rudely with reality however.  When 
the city posted its Most Wanted list on the web, it received 
complaints from some on the list who complained they were 
falsely accused.  In addition, the state's human rights 
ombudsman weighed in, telling the city the criminal justice 
sector was a state function and that municipalities should butt 
out.   According to the San Pedro Secretary for Public Security, 
a revised, lawyer-approved, version of the list should soon be 
reissued. 
 
 
 
¶7.      (SBU)   Other problems have proven to be more 
intractable.  Despite the improvements, the constant refrain 
among citizens across the economic spectrum is that they remain 
fearful of reporting crimes because of their continued lack of 
confidence in the police.   Both state and city officials 
complain about the inadequate legal tools to get at the growing 
number of quasi-legitimate casinos and nightclubs, seen by many 
as havens for money laundering, drug-dealing, and extortion. 
The casinos are a harder nut to crack as some have licenses 
issued by the federal government.  But the even in the case of 
nightclubs, government officials state that when they seek to 
enforce space and noise regulations in civil court, judicial 
corruption makes it difficult for them to prevail.  And if they 
were to win at the trial level, the Mexican judicial system 
would allow the nightclubs to continue operating without the 
required local permits until all appeals were exhausted. 
 
 
 
Leveraging Technology 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8.      (SBU)   One positive development has been the emergence 
of C-4 and C-5 Centers (Command, Control, Communications, 
Coordination) at both the state and the municipal level.  These 
units centralize dispatch elements in one place and are equipped 
with cameras to monitor street traffic and technology to 
identify license plates, thereby allowing the authorities to 
respond more quickly should an incident develop.  According to 
Nuevo Leon Attorney General Luis Carlos Trevino, the state's 
long-delayed C-5 unit, which will rely upon Northrop Grumann 
engineering, is set to open in March 2009.   The San Pedro 
Center employs different technology and currently planners are 
considering to what degree the two will be able to exchange 
data.  (It's possible that all they may be able to share are 
common camera feeds.)  Since San Pedro opened its center in 
mid-2008, levels of minor crimes such as burglary, vandalism, 
and auto theft have declined.   So far, however, it remains to 
be seen how effective the centers will be in deterring 
narcotics-related violence, as opposed to everyday street crime. 
 Often the police simply do not have the necessary resolve to 
respond to incidents involving organized crime.  Ultimately, the 
degree to which the C-4/C-5 centers make a difference in that 
regard may depend upon the human factor - i.e., the reliability 
of those entrusted with monitoring the cameras.  If organized 
crime can corrupt the monitors and/or their supervisors to gain 
access to the data, then it too will be a beneficiary of the 
centers' technology. 
WILLIAMSON