VZCZCXRO9447
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #0108/01 0301623
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301623Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0148
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE
RUCNWSN/THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0647
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2433
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 3781
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 2740
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0632
RUEHMZ/AMCONSUL MUNICH 0798
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000108 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/MTR 
ALSO FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PRA, EEB/TFS, EEB/TFS, INR (JBELL), 
NEA, ISN/RA (RNEPHEW) 
TREASURY FOR DFERNANDEZ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2034 
TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL ETTC MNUC TSPA SP IR AINR
SUBJECT: SPAIN: MFA REQUESTS USG REVIEW OF TWO IRAN-RELATED 
ISSUES 
 
REF: A. (A) MADRID 88 
     ¶B. (B) MADRID 87 
     ¶C. (C) 08 MADRID 1227 
     ¶D. (D) 08 MADRID 836 
 
MADRID 00000108  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM William Duncan for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST 
-------------------------- 
 
¶1. (S) This is an Action Request.  See paragraph 8. 
 
¶2. (S) On January 26, POLOFF and Deputy ECON Counselor met 
Carlos Torres, Counselor for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament in the MFA,s Directorate General for Strategic 
Affairs & Terrorism (See REFS A and B), who unexpectedly 
raised two Iran-related issues that the GOS would like the 
USG to investigate.  He said the GOS wanted to flag these 
items for the USG's attention and said that the GOS would 
appreciate any information the USG could provide on either 
topic, which Torres termed "very sensitive matters." END 
SUMMARY. 
 
SCHMIDT-CLEMENS SPAIN 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Torres broached the first issue by explaining that the 
German Minister of Commerce had called in the Spanish 
Ambassador to Berlin to discuss the issue of a Spanish 
affiliate of a German steel company that is manufacturing and 
exporting tubes to Iran.  The company in question is 
Schmidt-Clemens Spain (hereafter S-CS), based in Spain's 
Navarra region. (COMMENT:  S-CS's English language website is 
http://www.centracero.com. It is not clear to Embassy 
officials how Berlin learned of this issue or in what context 
or toward what end the German minister raised the issue with 
the Spanish Ambassador.  END COMMENT.)  Torres indicated that 
although these types of tubes are not on the GOS Chapter 1 
list for restricted dual-use items, the GOS is very worried 
about this export to Iran.  Specifically, the GOS has no 
objection to the beginning and the end of the tubes, but the 
GOS believes that the mid-section of the tube makes it a 
potential dual-use item. 
 
¶4. (S) Torres said that, although there is a legal precedent 
in Spain for exporting the types of tubes that S-CS is 
selling, the GOS convened its inter-ministerial board that 
reviews export license requests for possible dual-use 
technology items.  According to Torres, in that meeting the 
Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce did not object to 
the export of these particular tubes to Iran, but both the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Intelligence 
Center (CNI) did protest.  The exports are at this point 
considered legal, however, the GOS is "blocking" further 
exports of these tubes to Iran by S-CS by conducting a 
lengthy bureaucratic review which essentially is freezing the 
process. 
 
¶5. (S) Although he would not provide the Embassy officers a 
photocopy of documentation on the subject, Torres briefly 
showed them what they understood to be a copy of S-CS's 
application for an export license from the GOS.  The 
documentation listed the export product (in English) as 
"catalyst tube assemblies" and included the specifications 
that the tubes were constructed of "material G4879," and 
included the following compositional breakdown: 
"Cr28%Ni48%W5%." (COMMENT:  Embassy Madrid understands this 
to mean 28 percent chrome, 48 percent nickel and 5 percent 
tungsten, and acknowledges that the sum of these percentages 
does not equal 100 percent. END COMMENT.)  The recipient and 
end user of S-CS's exported goods to Iran were listed as: 
 
Chaharmahal VA Bakhitiati Steel Complex Project 
KM 35 of Shahr E Kord - Broojen Road 
 
MADRID 00000108  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Bakhtiari, Iran 
 
¶6. (S)  Torres noted that Spanish exports to Iran are on the 
increase while German exports to Iran are decreasing. He also 
conveyed the impression to Embassy officers that the GOS was 
upset with German companies over this issue and felt used. 
Torres wondered if cases such as S-CS - in which the Spanish 
subsidiary of a German company skirts German regulatory 
oversight by manufacturing and exporting its products from 
Spain - might help to explain that export trend. 
POSSIBLY PROBLEMATIC FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) Turning to a separate but also Iran-related subject, 
Torres raised a second item.  He said the Israeli government 
had called in the Spanish Ambassador to Tel Aviv to discuss 
the possibility that some Spanish banks may be involved in 
transactions that ultimately have an Iranian connection. 
Torres said he did not know the source of Israel's 
information but intimated that it was possible that Spanish 
banks may be unknowingly involved in these indirect 
transactions with Iran.  He emphasized that this too is a 
sensitive matter for the GOS and pointed out that the GOS did 
not have authority from Spanish banks to share this 
information with the USG.  Nevertheless, without offering any 
details, Torres cited a case in which Banco Santander of 
Spain may be involved in indirect transactions with Bank 
Melli of Iran.  (NOTE:  Banco Santander is Spain's biggest 
bank.  On October 25, 2007, the USG designated Bank Melli, 
Iran's third-largest bank, as a vehicle controlled by the 
Iranian Government which provides banking services to Iran's 
nuclear and ballistic missile programs and to terrorist 
organizations.  Citing proliferation concerns, UNSCR 1803 
specifically calls on states to exercise vigilance over their 
banks, activities with Bank Melli.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶8. (S) Action Request: Recognizing that the GOS has provided 
little concrete information to work with in the second case, 
Post would appreciate any information and insights Washington 
agencies may have on either matter raised by Torres, that we 
can share with the GOS.  End Action Request. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (S) Last July, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain 
told visiting Treasury U/S Levey (REF D) that Banco Santander 
had ceased Iran-related activities.  Spanish officials have 
told us subsequently (REF C) that Spanish banks, concerned 
about designations and sanctions, have sharply reduced 
interactions with Iranian financial institutions.  We tend to 
share Torres,s opinion that if Santander or other Spanish 
banks recently participated in transactions with an indirect 
connection to Iran, they likely did so unknowingly.  At the 
same time, the reported action in the inter-ministerial board 
on the S-CS application and the MFA,s willingness to share 
with us the information on S-CS and the financial 
transactions are signs that the GOS takes its 
responsibilities seriously and wants to work with us on 
Iran-related matters.  END COMMENT. 
CHACON