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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000003 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, S/CT, INL FOR 
BARCLAY/ROESS/BUHLER, S/CT FOR SHORE/MAHANTY 
DOJ FOR CRIM AAG SWARTZ, DOJ/OPDAT FOR 
LEHMANN/ALEXANDRE/BERMAN 
DOJ/CTS FOR MULLANEY, ST HILAIRE 
FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH 
NCTC WASHDC 
NSC FOR E.PHU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA -- 2008 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
(REVISED) 
 
REF: 08JAKARTA2313 
     08STATE120019 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified -- 
Please handle accordingly. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The following is a revised draft text of the 2008 
Country Report on Terrorism for Indonesia. The amended text 
contains additional information on DS/ATA's success in 
working with the Indonesian National Police. The original 
text was submitted through Diplopedia on December 22. 
Mission has updated the Diplopedia entry to include this new 
information. Please treat as Sensitive until the report is 
finalized for submission to Congress. 
 
Begin text: 
- 
Indonesia experienced its third consecutive year without a 
major terrorist incident. The Indonesian government's 
counterterrorism efforts drastically reduced the ability of 
militant groups in Indonesia to carry out attacks. 
Indonesian National Police (INP) successes from previous 
years in breaking up terrorist cells linked to Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) and other violent Islamic extremist 
organizations continued to pay dividends. Arrests in South 
Sumatra and Jakarta demonstrated that JI and other radical 
groups, such as KOMPAK, remained a security threat, but with 
reduced ability to carry out attacks. The Attorney General's 
Office's counterterrorism prosecutions continued, and 
numerous terrorists were convicted of crimes. The Government 
of Indonesia continued to build a legal and law enforcement 
environment conducive to fighting terrorism within its 
borders. International funding for terrorism nearly dried 
up. The U.S. government lifted its Travel Warning for 
Indonesia in recognition of Indonesia's success in curbing 
terrorism and the improved security situation in the country. 
 
Last year's INP raids paid dividends as the INP used 
information gained from suspects to maintain tight 
surveillance over suspected militant strongholds. In July, 
the INP raided a home in Palembang, South Sumatra, capturing 
ten suspects and a small cache of explosives. In October, a 
raid on a house in Kelapa Gading, North Jakarta, led to the 
capture of five suspects and another small cache of 
explosives. The suspects were related to KOMPAK, which in 
the past fanned militancy in Poso, Sulawesi and to Darul 
Islam, a long-standing Islamist extremist group with some 
militant strains. Both raids demonstrated the success of 
DS/ATA training and the improved ability of the INP and 
Security Detachment-88 in monitoring and capturing militants. 
The Embassy also worked to build the investigative support 
for and forensic capabilities of the INP through numerous 
developmental programs administered by DOJ/ICITAP/LEGATT. 
 
The USG-funded Attorney General's Task Force on Terrorism and 
Transnational Crime successfully prosecuted terrorists, and 
DOJ/OPDAT enhanced the prosecutorial capacity of the task 
force. In April, JI Emir Ustad Syaroni (aka Zarkasih) and 
senior JI operative Abu Dujana (aka Ainul Bahri) were 
sentenced to 15 years in prison each for violating the 2003 
counterterrorism law. Zarkasih, as Emir, held a JI 
leadership position. Dujana, also an Afghanistan-veteran and 
JI military leader, had been involved in several JI attacks. 
In addition to handing down the sentences, the judges 
declared JI a terrorist organization, laying the legal basis 
for the GOI to ban JI. In November, Abu Dujana testified on 
behalf of the prosecution in the terrorist trials of Dr. 
Argus Purwantoro and Abu Husna. Additionally, the Task Force 
successfully prosecuted 12 other JI members in 2008. The 
court sentenced five JI members for aiding and abetting Abu 
Dujana and Zarkasih to between seven and eight years of 
prison each. The court sentenced six other members of JI's 
military wing to eight to ten years each in prison. 
 
Other Indonesian legal institutions took a hard line against 
terrorists. In October, the Constitutional Court rejected a 
last-ditch appeal by the Bali bombers of their death 
sentences and upheld that death by firing squad was 
constitutional. Also in October, the Ministry of Law and 
Human Rights did not include sentence remissions for 
convicted terrorists in its annual Eid holiday remissions 
list. 
 
In November, the Government of Indonesia executed three of 
the 2002 Bali bombers, Amrozi bin Nurhasym, Imam Samudra, and 
Ali Gufron alias Mukhlas. The three had been convicted for 
planning and carrying out the October 2002 bombings in Bali, 
which killed over 200 people. There were no serious 
incidents following the executions, and the public reaction 
was calm, despite the public calls by JI co-founder Abu Bakar 
Ba'asyir for retaliatory attacks. 
 
The Indonesian government made genuine efforts to develop an 
effective anti-money laundering system for investigations and 
prosecutions. UNSCR 1267 requires such controls. 
Indonesian police froze terrorist financial assets uncovered 
during investigations. However, the Government of Indonesia 
has yet to demonstrate the political will to implement UNSCR 
¶1267. 
 
USAID promoted capacity-building to the Financial Crimes 
Transaction and Analysis Center (PPATK) and related GOI 
agencies through its Financial Crimes Prevention Project 
(FCPP), a multi-year program, now concluded, which provided 
technical advisors and policy support to Indonesia's effort 
to develop an effective and credible regime against money 
laundering and terrorism finance. FCPP assistance included 
the drafting of a National Anti-Money Laundering Strategy 
adopted by the President in 2007, with DOJ/OPDAT to develop a 
comprehensive asset forfeiture law (which is still under way 
with USDOJ), and certification of GOI officials as 
anti-money-laundering specialists and fraud examiners. Other 
donors are also providing assistance to PPATK. The unit 
receives Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and Cash 
Transaction Reports. The number of STRs PPATK received 
increased from 10 per month in 2002 to over 811 per month in 
2008 (through October 2008), and these reports led to 19 
prosecutions during the period. One of these had a terrorist 
component, and the strengthened financial oversight 
strengthened the tracking of potential terrorist financial 
transactions. 
 
The Indonesian National Police (INP) continued their program 
to "deradicalize" convicted terrorists. The program 
identified individuals who might be open to more moderate 
teachings, with the intent that INP officials work with them 
in prison. The program focused on providing spiritual 
support to the men and on providing modest financial support 
to their families. By providing this support, the police 
gained the trust of the men and received information about 
terrorist networks. The program aimed to reduce terrorist 
recruitment inside prisons. Based upon the success of the 
INP de-radicalization program, the Department of Corrections 
also decided to undertake a prisoner de-radicalization 
program. The Directorate General for prisons proposed the 
creation of a set of guidelines for the handling of terrorist 
prisoners to improve security and surveillance of the 
prisoners and encourage prisoners to not resort to violence 
to carry out their religious beliefs. 
 
While Indonesia's counterterrorism efforts have been 
impressive and its capacity to fight terrorism within its 
borders has improved steadily, continued vigilance is needed. 
The arrests in Palembang and North Jakarta demonstrate that 
militant networks remain partially intact and that groups 
continue to stockpile explosives for potential operations. 
That said, there is no evidence to suggest that there is a 
safe haven in Indonesia. As more gains are made in the 
Philippines' counterterrorism efforts, a small number of 
Indonesian militants in the Philippines may try to return to 
Indonesia. Malaysian JI operative, and recruiter Noordin 
Mohammed Top, who is suspected of involvement in every 
anti-Western terrorist attack in Indonesia since 2002, 
remains at large. 
- 
End text. 
 
¶3. (U) Mission point of contact for this report is Poloff 
Kate Rebholz (RebholzTK@state.gov or 
RebholzTK@state.sgov.gov). 
 
 
HEFFERN