VZCZCXRO4309
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDJ #0042/01 0150618
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161606Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0015
INFO SOMALIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/CJTF HOA
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0002

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 000042 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
SBU DELIBERATIVE PROCESS 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E, ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-01-15 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO MOPS SO DJ XTAG
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ADVOCATES QUICK PRESIDENTIAL 
SUCCESSION IN SOMALIA 
 
REF: a) A. DJIBOUTI 18, b) B. ADDIS ABABA 49 (NOTAL) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Eric M. Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Sharing views he said he had conveyed to 
Djiboutian President Guelleh in a recent "brainstorming 
session," Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf said the 
Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) must be 
pushed to name new parliamentarians in time to elect a new 
President of Somalia before the end of January.  As a 
fall-back, he proposed that the current Transitional 
Federal Parliament elect the President, while the ARS names 
the Prime Minister.  According to Youssouf, however, Sheikh 
Sharif may not be content to replace Nur Adde as Prime 
Minister, but rather seeks to be President of Somalia.  FM 
Youssouf reiterated claims that Yemen, Sudan, and Saudi 
Arabia may provide financial or material assistance to 
support joint TFG-ARS security forces.  Youssouf welcomed 
visiting USAU Amb. Simon's report of progress in mobilizing 
new forces for the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM), and raised the idea of deploying troops from the 
East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) to Somalia, to 
reinforce AU forces there, if given sufficient funding and 
equipment.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador, visiting Ambassador to the African Union 
Amb. Simon, USAU CJTF-HOA Country Coordination Element 
(CCE) Captain Bart Moore, and DCM met with Djiboutian 
Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf on January 11. 
 
NEED FOR ALL-INCLUSIVE PARLIAMENT TO SELECT UNITY PRESIDENT 
 
¶3. (C) Somalia is only now just emerging from an 18-year 
"gestation" period of peace initiatives, Youssouf said, 
with the "4.5" clan representation formula marking what he 
hoped would be the last phase of clan-based solutions. 
Aluding to the Council of Islamic Courts' opposition to 
Ethiopian intervention, Youssouf said the Somali political 
process had been "polluted" by "religious principles," with 
Somalis having spent the last two years calling for holy 
war against foreign occupiers.  However, with the recent 
resignation of TFG President Abdillahi Yusuf, and the 
withdrawal of Ethiopian military forces, Somalia now faced 
a new reality, as it lacked these justifications for 
continued conflict.  Youssouf confirmed that TFG-ARS talks, 
under the auspices of the UN, would resume in Djibouti the 
week of January 15. 
 
¶4. (C) FM Youssouf underscored that it would be preferable 
for a newly formed "all-inclusive" parliament to name the 
next president of Somalia, in the wake of Yusuf's December 
29 resignation.  TFG and moderate ARS representatives 
needed to form a new unity government for Somalia by 
January 29, in accordance with provisions of Somalia's 
transitional charter calling for a new president to be 
named within 30 days of a predecessor's resignation. 
Youssouf called for international pressure on Somali 
parties to name additional MPs--and subsequently a new 
president--"immediately."  Otherwise, Somalia once again 
risked protracted consultations continuing for years. 
 
¶5. (C) Youssouf said that ARS Chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh 
Ahmed had been told to identify 200 additional MPs 
representing the ARS (in accordance with the November 25 
Djibouti Process communique) by January 20; this new 
expanded parliament would then collectively select a new 
president.  If, however, the ARS failed to observe the 
deadline for naming new MPs, Youssouf said he had proposed 
an alternative to Djibouti's President Guelleh:  that the 
current 275-member Transitional Federal Parliament elect a 
new president to replace Yusuf, while the ARS then select 
the head of government (i.e., prime minister).  Youssouf 
urged that international partners press the ARS to name its 
new members quickly, but be ready to endorse a decision by 
the current parliament as a fall-back position. 
 
ARS CHAIRMAN REPORTEDLY SEEKS SOMALI PRESIDENCY 
 
¶6. (C) According to Youssouf, Sheikh Sharif could easily 
 
DJIBOUTI 00000042  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
displace current Somali PM Nur Adde, who lacked political 
vision and charisma.  However, rather than be content to 
serve as prime minister, Sheikh Sharif's ambition drove him 
to seek to be president of Somalia, Youssouf said.  Egypt 
was prepared to organize a meeting with ARS hard-liners in 
Asmara, Youssouf added.  The GODJ had told Sharif that 
having political vision and charisma were more important 
than dispersing money, and had urged Sharif to return from 
Libya, where he had traveled seeking financial assistance. 
 
¶7. (C) Calling Sheikh Sharif "headstrong" and "not easily 
manipulated," Youssouf noted that in early 2007, following 
Ethiopia's entry into Somalia, Djibouti had counseled 
Sheikh Sharif to acknowledge the legitimacy of the TFG and 
to leverage its recognition; Sheikh Sharif had refused. 
Sheikh Sharif now faced a weak prime minister, and a 
sympathetic international community, but was young and 
lacking in experience, Youssouf said. 
 
AMISOM FORCE GENERATION 
 
¶8. (SBU) Noting the importance of maintaining progress on 
security, as well as on the political track, Amb. Simon 
reviewed the current status of force generation for AMISOM 
(ref B), as well as the TFG Defense Minister's claim to be 
able to muster six battalions of troops.  Amb. Simon noted 
that AMISOM had been "holding its own" during the Ethiopian 
withdrawal, and had faced "no onslaught" by newly 
emboldened fighters. 
 
¶9. (C) FM Youssouf welcomed news of progress on force 
generation, explaining that the GODJ had assessed that 
AMISOM would not/not be strengthened, and had therefore 
focused on the importance of empowering Somali forces.  He 
reiterated (reftel) that several countries may support 
joint TFG-ARS security forces:  at the recently concluded 
Sanaa Forum, Yemen had announced $1.5 million in support 
for salaries and light equipment; Sudan may provide food 
and other rations; and Saudi Arabia, while complaining 
about the worldwide economic crisis, had nevertheless been 
"approached" to provide a total of $6-10 million to pay 
salaries (of approximately $100/month) for one year. 
 
¶10. (C) Reiterating observations made earlier in the week 
to Ambassador (septel), by EASBRIG commander Brigadier 
General Osman Nour Soubagale (seconded from Djibouti to 
EASBRIG in Addis Ababa), Youssouf asserted that EASBRIG 
troops could reinforce existing AMISOM forces, in the 
absence of additional battalions from the AU or the UN. 
EASBRIG troops were operationally ready, but would require 
financial assistance to deploy, he said.  The deployment of 
EASBRIG troops would be an alternative only if AMISOM could 
not be strengthened, Youssouf added.  (NOTE.  In a separate 
meeting with Ambassador, the EASBRIG commander asserted 
that some 6,000 EASBRIG troops were ready to deploy to 
Somalia, including troops from Djibouti.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT.  FM Youssouf's frank critique of Somali 
leaders reflects that he is one of the most prominent Afar 
members (and therefore a minority) in Djibouti's 
predominantly ethnic Issa government.  While he shared his 
views as conveyed to Djiboutian President Guelleh, he 
avoided discussion of the Pres. Guelleh's response.  Having 
hosted several rounds of TFG-ARS talks since May 2008, 
Djibouti is eager to build on their momentum, particularly 
as continued instability in neighboring Somalia directly 
affects Djibouti--e.g., through increased refugee flows, 
and higher shipping insurance premiums due to fears of 
Somali piracy.  While the Djiboutians are floating the idea 
of an EASBRIG role in Somalia, it is unclear that there is 
sufficient EASBRIG capability to perform this role without 
major additional support.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶12. (U) USAU Amb. Simon cleared this message. 
SWAN 
 
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