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RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHHM
DE RUEHDT #0018/01 0130345
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130345Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4199
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0924
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1252
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1095
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0094
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3702

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000018 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR VADM BIRD FROM AMBASSADOR KLEMM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PMIL OTRA TT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT TO TIMOR-LESTE BY VADM JOHN M. 
BIRD 
 
DILI 00000018  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Summary 
------------ 
 
¶1. (SBU)  The visit of Vice Admiral Bird to Dili comes at a 
perfect time as we seek to encourage the Government of 
Timor-Leste's active leadership over the reform of its security 
sector.  VADM Bird will be the highest ranking foreign official 
to visit Dili in 2009 from any nation and will underline the 
U.S. commitment to Timor-Leste's stability and to regional 
security.  While still facing enormous challenges of poverty, 
there are hopeful signs of increasing stability with the country 
now in its twelfth consecutive month without a serious incident 
of political violence or instability.  The country's leadership 
appears increasingly aware that it must begin to act to hasten 
reform of the country's police and military to sustain this 
stability, an awareness prompted in significant part due to the 
September 2008 national security policy development workshop 
supported by PACOM.  Admiral Bird's meetings with the Timorese 
leadership will allow us to emphasize our continued commitment 
to support reform, especially the professionalization of 
Timor-Leste's defense force; and to explore possible avenues of 
future engagement, in particular towards the development of 
Timor-Leste's maritime security capabilities.  End summary. 
 
Economic and Social Setting 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U)  Timor-Leste is Asia's poorest country, with half of its 
population living on less than a dollar a day, 85% of its labor 
force engaged in subsistence agriculture, illiteracy running at 
well over 50%, and more than half the population stunted from 
malnutrition.  Timor's poverty is correlated with enormous gaps 
in social infrastructure, distinguished by a poor national road 
network; inadequate telecommunications (less than 1% of 
households has a landline telephone); a single, increasingly 
congested seaport; an electricity grid that supplies power to 
only a third of the country's households and then only for short 
segments of the day; a health services infrastructure barely 
able to cope with one of the world's highest rates of maternal 
and child mortality; an education system in which less than a 
fifth of schoolchildren has a chair or desk, and more than half 
without textbooks; poor water and sanitation facilities 
(two-thirds of adults fetch water at least once a week); and a 
single international airport that can handle planes no larger 
than a 737.  Timor-Leste is not without resources, however.  It 
has more than $3.8 billion in a sovereign wealth fund due to 
accruals from modest oil deposits, and zero international debt. 
It also benefits from the generosity of the international 
community, with the government forecasting receipts of more than 
$220 million from bilateral and multilateral donors in 2009. 
The IMF estimates the economy grew by a real 10% in 2008 due 
almost solely to increased government spending. 
 
Political Context 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Since acquiring independence in 2002, Timor-Leste has 
established a pattern of periodic violence or instability, with 
large-scale disturbances occurring almost yearly.  The most 
serious crisis occurred in 2006, when a mutiny of army regulars 
precipitated open combat between the police and military, the 
collapse of the central government, widespread property damage, 
and the displacement of 150,000 persons from their homes and 
into large and wretched camps around Dili.  To restore order in 
2006, an Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF) 
intervened and a renewed United Nations mandate established a 
large police presence.  Both forces remain in Timor in 
considerable strength.  They were unable to prevent, however, 
the most recent incident of political violence when, on February 
11, 2008, the President was critically wounded and the Prime 
Minister also came under gunfire. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Major causes of Timor's instability include a highly 
contentious political elite; weak, politicized, poorly motivated 
or poorly directed security institutions; poor access to justice 
and a culture of impunity, especially among the elite; and the 
disillusionment and disempowerment that has accompanied Timor's 
failure to raise its people out of grinding poverty.  The 
government of Prime Minister Gusmao, installed in August 2007, 
set out to tackle the primary consequences of the 2006 crisis, 
and to some extent its causes, and recorded significant success 
 
DILI 00000018  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
in 2008.  It largely has closed the many internally displaced 
persons camps that were stubbornly scattered across Dili until 
just months ago.  The government also resolved remaining 
grievances held by the "petitioners," the soldiers that left the 
defense force in early 2006, and introduced a pension system for 
veterans, the elderly and the infirm (a daunting logistical 
challenge in a rugged country without a postal system or banking 
network).  The prime minister designated 2009 as the year of 
infrastructure and rural development as a means of signaling his 
government's intent to speed economic growth and tackle the 
scourges of poverty and unemployment.  In recognition of the 
signs of increasing stability in Timor - the country is now in 
its twelfth consecutive month without a major incident of 
political unrest - the Department of State lifted its travel 
advisory in September 2008. 
 
Security Sector: Reform Needed 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU)  To transform themselves into protectors of the people 
and sources of stability, both Timor-Leste's national police 
(PNTL) and defense force (F-FDTL) require substantial reform. 
The poorly-led, unmotivated, under-resourced and ill-trained 
police force is also tainted by its historical antecedents with 
the Indonesian police force and a recent history of severe 
politicization.  Consequently, UNPOL retains full operational 
command of police responsibilities throughout Timor-Leste, 
although a phased process of resumption of Timorese control is 
to begin in March 2009.  The military largely represents the 
rump of the armed resistance to the Indonesian occupation, one 
that is justly proud of its legacy as a guerrilla force in the 
mountains of Timor, but wholly lacking in command, discipline, 
training and logistics capabilities that feature in a modern, 
professional army.  The roles and responsibilities of the PNTL 
and F-FDTL are ill-defined in law or regulation, and civilian 
command often has been wanting at best, contributing to their 
frequent mutual conflict. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  Reassuringly, the need for reform is recognized across 
the Timorese leadership spectrum and the donor community, 
especially the UN and Timor-Leste's key democratic partners, has 
signaled strong readiness to assist reform.  A significant 
positive development occurred after the February 11, 2008, 
assassination attempts when the army and the police were placed 
together under a joint command to bring the perpetrators to 
justice.  They did so successfully and peacefully, restoring a 
good deal of trust and confidence between the two forces.  Their 
performance was tarnished, however, by many cases of abuse of 
human rights and authority.  Sadly, such incidents continue to 
occur on a regular basis. 
 
U.S. Support of Reform 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU)  Since mid-2007, the U.S. has substantially increased 
its engagement with the Timorese government towards reform of 
its military.  Our core objective has been to enhance the 
ability of the government to provide stability and security for 
its citizens, for without stability there can be no realistic 
hope for sustained, long term economic and social development. 
To do so, we've focused on the goals of reforming and 
strengthening the country's security institutions; enhancing 
civilian command, including through the development of the 
country's legal infrastructure; and supporting the 
professionalization of the F-FDTL and PNTL. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Support from and engagement by the U.S. Pacific 
Command has been essential and generous. In the past eighteen 
months, PACOM Commander Admiral Keating, PACFLT Commander 
Admiral Willard and MARFORPAC Commander Lt. General Goodman have 
all visited Timor-Leste.  The USNS Mercy completed a 15 day 
deployment here in July 2008 and the USS Port Royal received a 
warm welcome in December 2007.  A company from the 31st MEU 
spent a very productive two weeks in April 2008 interoperating 
with the ISF and supporting several community relations 
projects.  A delegation led by the Defense Institute of 
International Legal Studies conducted an analysis of the legal 
infrastructure supporting Timor's security sector in August 
¶2008.  A high-level USN, U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Marines 
assessment team in November 2008 surveyed the prospects for 
future engagement.  And with full PACOM support, the Asia 
 
DILI 00000018  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Pacific Center for Security Studies hosted a historic workshop 
in September 2008 to facilitate the drafting of Timor-Leste's 
first national security policy.  This investment, which brought 
together seventeen Timorese leaders from government, parliament, 
military, police and civil society, has done more than any other 
in recent years to emphasize for those who participated and 
other Timorese leaders the strength and authenticity of the U.S. 
commitment to Timor's reform and development. 
 
Importance to Timor of Maritime Security 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶9. (SBU)  There is a strong and broad consensus among the 
Timorese leadership that the country must strengthen its 
maritime security capabilities.  This came out clearly in the 
Honolulu workshop and in a subsequent September 2009 meeting 
with Admiral Willard.  Accordingly, it is viewed as a priority 
that Timor's security forces raise their ability to defend the 
country's maritime domain to protect its fishery and petroleum 
resources, prevent sea-based incursions by traffickers or other 
criminals, and contribute to regional maritime security.  There 
are disagreements on the means, however, with even members of 
the governing coalition vocally opposed to the decision to 
purchase two patrol boats from China.  Many look to the U.S. for 
assistance, including a prominent member of the opposition who 
flatly states that the U.S. should have the lead in assisting 
the development of Timor's navy.  President Ramos Horta 
repeatedly and publicly urges closer defense cooperation with 
the U.S. and Australia, including on the development of Timor's 
maritime capabilities. 
 
Donor coordination 
----------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU)  The coordination of military or police assistance to 
Timor-Leste is at best ad hoc, with the Timorese government 
unable or reluctant to provide leadership.  Early in 2008 at our 
initiative, ambassadors to Dili from Australia, Japan, Portugal, 
New Zealand and the U.S. began to meet periodically to improve 
information sharing, especially regarding maritime security 
assistance, supplementing regular contact among local defense 
attachis.  In effort in 2008 to include security sector reform 
as part of a government-led national priorities process with 
full donor participation failed largely due to lack of 
engagement by key Timor defense actors.  During Admiral 
Willard's July 2008 visit, Secretary of State for Defense Pinto 
openly shared his concerns of having many generous partners 
ready with assistance to meet Timor's many needs, while knowing 
that the aid is often competitive, conflicting or incoherent. 
He openly confessed his inability to effectively coordinate and 
optimize foreign assistance.  Donors with current maritime 
security programs in Timor, or those that have expressed 
interest in aiding Timor's maritime sector include Portugal, 
Australia, China, Japan, Indonesia, Canada, India, New Zealand, 
Britain, Germany, Korea and the United Nations.  Secretary Pinto 
subsequently asked for U.S. support to convene a conference and 
help him enhance the coordination of assistance to Timor's 
maritime security sector.  Embassy Dili continues to explore 
means of possible facilitation. 
 
Your Visit to Timor 
------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU)  Your visit to Dili comes at a perfect time.  The 
Honolulu APCSS workshop spurred recognition among Timorese 
leaders of the necessity of moving forward on reform of the 
security sector.  Not surprisingly, reform is a highly sensitive 
and political subject in Timor-Leste, and while there has been a 
general awareness that the police and military must be 
overhauled, particularly given their tragic contribution to the 
2006 crisis, there has been scant action.  The UN in particular 
has a long record of failure in initiating reform.  But, 
following the September workshop the Prime Minister told me he 
will turn his attention to security sector reform early in 2009 
- his attention and commitment will be critical to its success. 
Last month, the President hosted a seminar on the topic to 
prompt action, and his advisors subsequently consulted with me 
on options for the sequencing of reform and how the U.S. can 
assist.   Your encouragement will ensure this momentum is 
maintained. 
 
 
DILI 00000018  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶12. (SBU)  We hope to secure meetings for you with the Prime 
Minister, Foreign Minister, Secretary of State for Defense, and 
the relevant commanders of the F-FDTL.  A meeting with the 
President of the Parliament would also be useful.  (Note: the 
Parliament will be in session during your stay to debate the 
government's 2009 budget; these debates are the major event on 
the Timor legislative calendar and may tie down one or more of 
our target ministers.  End note.)  Each of these meetings will 
offer an opportunity to discuss the following themes. 
 
¶A.  The U.S., including PACOM and the Pacific Fleet, is 
committed to assisting the government of Timor-Leste provide 
stability and contribute to regional security. 
 
¶B.  The U.S. is ready to explore how we might best support 
Timor-Leste's  implementation of the results of the Honolulu 
workshop; how can the U.S. further support the development of a 
national security policy or law, and the reform of your security 
institutions? 
 
¶C.  The U.S. Pacific Command is analyzing the findings of the 
November assessment mission and will soon propose avenues of 
future U.S. engagement in Timor-Leste. 
 
¶D.  We are always eager, however, to receive your suggestions on 
how the U.S. might best support the professionalization of 
Timor-Leste's military, especially the development of your naval 
capabilities. 
 
¶E.  The U.S. Navy is grateful for Timor-Leste's warm welcome of 
the USNS Mercy in 2008 and the USS Port Royal in 2007.  We look 
forward to the successful visit of the USS Lassen during the 
week of January 26, 2009. 
 
(If raised by Secretary Pinto) 
 
¶F.  We strongly recognize the importance of effective donor 
coordination.  As we design our future engagement in 
Timor-Leste, the U.S. will follow your leadership and be as 
transparent as possible with your partners.  The U.S. Embassy is 
exploring possible mechanisms to assist your goal of enhancing 
donor coordination. 
KLEMM