P R 230124Z JAN 09
FM AMCONSUL CIUDAD JUAREZ
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5810
AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 
INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL CIUDAD JUAREZ

UNCLAS CIUDAD JUAREZ 000022 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV CASC SNAR MX
SUBJECT: 2008 - THE YEAR IN NUMBERS 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The incidence of violent crime in Ciudad 
Juarez this past year was high by any standard.  There were 
1,633 murders in and around Juarez, a figure that represented 
more than one quarter of all homicides registered in Mexico 
during 2008, and five times the number recorded in the city in 
¶2007.  Police officers died at a rate that would be unacceptable 
most anywhere else; at least 71 peace officers were killed 
during the year.  Simple car theft and carjacking, bank robbery, 
kidnapping and extortion numbers all hit levels that made 
comparison to earlier years all but meaningless.  To the extent 
the Juarez city government attempted to use its own resources to 
stem the tide of violence, its efforts were futile.  The 
Chihuahua state government's police and criminal justice 
structure also had little impact on the incidence of 
criminality, and despite the federal government's promise of 
action as represented by `Joint Operation Chihuahua', the army 
and federal police rarely engaged directly with the cartels and 
street gangs.  Many people who exercise political and economic 
power in the city, including Mayor Jose Reyes Ferriz, have moved 
to El Paso.  Amidst the breakdown in law and order, most Juarez 
residents continue to go about their normal business of work, 
school and homemaking as in the past, albeit while increasingly 
limiting their outdoor activities to daylight hours.  Others, 
however, may be taking the law into their own hands.  End 
Summary. 
 
A STATISTICAL RECAP 
 
¶2.  (U) The following is a summary of the most notorious forms 
of criminality experienced by residents of Ciudad Juarez and its 
outlying towns in 2008. 
 
Homicide 
2008 - 1,633 
2007 (for comparison) - 316 
 
Bank robbery 
2008 - 86 
2007 - 6 
 
Car theft 
2008 - 16,929 
2007 - 9,163 (For 2006, the figure was 5,804) 
 
Carjacking (a subset of the car theft figure provided above) 
2008 - 1,650 
2007 - 327 
 
Extortion 
2008 - 563 (Note: see below) 
 
Kidnapping 
2008 - 41 (Note: see below) 
 
Major arson 
2008 - 22 (Note: see below) 
 
Note:  recorded incidents in these last three categories of 
crime were negligible in past years. 
 
THE KINDS OF THINGS THAT MAKE LAW-ABIDING CITIZENS WORRY 
 
¶3.  (U) Residents of Ciudad Juarez, while deeply discouraged by 
circumstances in their city, recognize that most murder victims 
are either directly involved in the drug trade, or were with 
someone directly involved in the drug trade when that person was 
attacked.  Indeed, one published figure suggests that more than 
1,400 of the murders in and around Juarez this past year 
involved the specific targeting of people involved in narcotics 
trafficking.  Juarez residents have sought to limit their 
potential exposure to this violence by "self-curfewing," 
limiting their outdoor activities at night and their patronage 
of restaurants, bars and nightclubs, but otherwise they continue 
to go about their normal daily activities. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Perhaps more than a fear of being in the wrong place 
at the wrong time when cartel hit squads go after a target, 
Juarez residents are troubled by the increase in the levels of 
kidnapping and carjacking.  Prior to mid-2008, kidnapping was 
rare in Ciudad Juarez.  Around mid-year, reports of kidnappings 
of junkyard owners began to hit the news.  While there was 
commotion in the press over this phenomenon, there was also a 
perception that cash-strapped, cartel-affiliated gangs were 
going after soft target individuals who were operating on the 
fringes of legality anyway.  (Note:  many of the junkyards are 
"chop shops" for cars stolen by the gangs themselves.)  Ransoms 
also tended to be relatively low; families could often retrieve 
a loved one for 30,000 dollars or less.  Over the past few 
months, however, as the twin crimes of extortion and kidnapping 
became more widespread, the level of concern has increased.  The 
kidnapping on January 13 of a Lear Corporation manager, as he 
left a Juarez maquila plant at 7:00 a.m., and the subsequent 
 
reported demand for 1.5 million dollars in ransom, appears to 
have taken this crime to a new level.  (Note:  the Lear manager 
was reported rescued by Mexican army troops on January 19.) 
 
¶5.  (U) The other crime that most concerns law-abiding Juarez 
residents is carjacking.  Figures for non-violent and violent 
(that is, carjacking) car theft over the past twelve months 
paint a troubling picture. 
 
January 
Non-violent car theft - 921 
Violent car theft - 57 
Total - 978 
 
February (figures provided as described for January) 
1,022 / 41 / 1,063 
 
March 
1,111 / 72 / 1,183 
 
April 
1,246 / 54 / 1,300 
 
May 
1,416 / 94 / 1,510 
 
June 
1,339 / 104 / 1,443 
 
July 
1,582 / 126 / 1,708 
 
August 
1,645 / 154 / 1,799 
 
September 
1,418 / 188 / 1,606 
 
October 
1,234 / 218 / 1,452 
 
November 
1,111 / 249 / 1,360 
 
December 
1,234 / 293 / 1,527 
 
¶6.  (U) What these published figures suggest is that while the 
total number of cars stolen in Juarez appears to have reached a 
plateau of 1,500 to 1,800 per month, the chances that a car 
thief will physically threaten the car's owner and demand the 
keys is now much higher than in the past.  What is worse is that 
while being the victim of a carjacking would be traumatic at the 
best of times, Juarez residents' awareness that hundreds of hit 
men are abroad in the city means that when a group of gunmen 
surrounds a target in traffic, the target cannot know whether 
the team simply wants the car, or whether the team has come to 
kill the target. 
 
WHAT ARE GOVERNMENT, BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS DOING ABOUT IT? 
 
¶7.  (SBU) As previously reported by the Consulate, at the close 
of the first 100-plus murder month on record in Ciudad Juarez, 
in late March 2008 the three levels of Mexican government 
announced the start of `Joint Operation Chihuahua'.  To great 
fanfare, 2500 Mexican army soldiers and federal police officers 
flew into Juarez with the promise of ending the bloodshed.  The 
homicide numbers dropped somewhat in April, while the cartels 
fighting for the Juarez "plaza" took measure of the army's 
tactics, and then the violence resumed and accelerated 
throughout the rest of the year.  The view is widely held that 
the army is comfortable letting the Sinaloa and Juarez cartels 
diminish each other's strength as they fight for control of the 
"plaza" (with a corollary theory being that the army would like 
to see the Sinaloa cartel win). 
 
¶8.  (SBU) At the city government level, 400 police officers were 
fired after they failed background checks conducted by federal 
authorities.  (Note:  earlier in 2008, Mayor Reyes Ferriz told 
consulate officers that 100 percent of the municipal police 
force was corrupt to a greater or lesser extent.  When the 400 
were fired, there was some skepticism in the city that these 
were the worst of the lot.)  The city police force of 1600 
officers was further reduced by deaths and resignations.  Mayor 
Reyes Ferriz says that he plans to rebuild the police force to a 
strength of 2200 officers by summer 2009. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The mayor also wants to contract with a private 
security company to establish a 2000 member police auxiliary to 
guard banks, maquilas and other businesses.  During the summer 
of 2008, convenience stores and other small private businesses 
hired off-duty police officers to guard their premises.  The 
 
police/security guards foiled several store robberies, including 
through the use of lethal force, and thereafter the level of 
this kind of crime dropped significantly.  The mayor hopes to 
replicate this result, at a lower cost in salaries and benefits 
than represented by the use of plain-clothes regular police 
officers. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Finally, on January 8 the city announced that its 392 
transit police officers were once again authorized to carry 
weapons on duty.  The transit police had been disarmed in April 
2008 by federal authorities, reportedly due to the agency's 
failure to properly account for the officers' side arms. 
(Comment:  that it took nine months to resolve this issue on 
behalf of the transit officers is indicative of the lack of 
urgency with which city and federal officials have approached 
police officer safety.) 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Other businesses have taken a short-term approach to 
dealing with specific, short-term problems.  For example, when 
extortionists targeted teachers in November and December in 
anticipation of the payment of the teachers' year-end bonuses 
(aguinaldos), many schools simply closed early for the year. 
One school that did so was the Colegio Iberamericano, which is 
attended by eight consulate children (six children of officers, 
two children of Locally Engaged Staff). 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Long before the January 13, 2009 kidnapping of the 
Lear Corporation manager, maquilas and their parent companies 
had taken steps to limit their vulnerability.  Thanks in large 
part to a reduction in travel by trainers and corporate 
executives, Juarez occupancy rates have dropped more than ten 
percent, to less than 40 percent on average. 
 
VIGILANTISM 
 
¶13.  (SBU) In addition to the steps highlighted above, there 
have been indications that local businesses are taking a 
different approach to self-protection, that of vigilantism.  In 
October, the press carried stories of business people forming 
paramilitary groups to protect themselves from extortionists and 
kidnappers.  On November 28, seven men were shot dead outside a 
school a few blocks from the Consulate, and placards were hung 
over their bodies (a fact not reported to the public) claiming 
that the executions were carried out by the `Yonkeros Unidos 
(United Junkyard Owners of Juarez)'.  In another notorious 
incident, a burned body was left outside a Juarez police station 
with its amputated hands each holding a gas fire starter, and 
with a sign saying that this would be the penalty paid by 
arsonists.  During the week of January 11 an email circulated 
through Juarez, claiming that a new locally funded group called 
the `Comando Ciudadano por Juarez (Juarez Citizen Command, or 
CCJ)' was going to "clean (the) city of these criminals" and 
"end the life of a criminal every 24 hours." 
 
¶14.  (SBU) City and state government officials have argued that 
there exists no evidence of a vigilante movement in Ciudad 
Juarez, and that the messages by the CCJ are a hoax.  A 
Consulate contact in the press, however, suggests that the CCJ 
is a real self-defense group comprised of eight former `Zetas' 
hired by four Juarez business owners (including 1998 PRI mayoral 
candidate Eleno Villalba).  According to the contact, the former 
`Zetas' paid a visit on local military commanders when they 
arrived in Juarez in September 2008, and purchased previously 
seized weapons from the army garrison.  According to the 
contact, the former `Zetas' pledged not to target the army, and 
made themselves available to the army for extrajudicial 
operations. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶15.  (SBU) In theory, the Mexican federal police should be 
taking the lead here in going after the cartels, and so create a 
security environment in which the city could work to prevent 
other forms of criminality, and in which the state government 
could investigate and prosecute those crimes committed outside 
the organized crime structure.  The mayor's police hiring plans 
notwithstanding, to date not much has been accomplished along 
these lines.  While Consulate officers have not yet been able to 
determine whether the `Yonkeros Unidos' or the CCJ exist as new 
and independent organizations, it is the absence of effective 
law enforcement that creates an environment in which vigilantism 
could take root, along the lines seen in Colombia with the 
`Pepes' in the early 1990s.  In theory, a vigilante group 
comprised of or in league with Mexican army elements could 
resolve an ongoing frustration of the garrison, which is that 
while they can seize weapons and drugs, their lack of police 
authority and training has generally resulted in alleged 
criminals going free under orders from a court of law. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) With regard to violence between the cartels 
themselves, there was evidence of a temporary truce between the 
Juarez and Sinaloa Cartels that lasted from mid-December 2008 to 
 
mid-January 2009.  That truce has now been broken.  In the 
meantime, apart from bank robberies (which appear to be largely 
the work of small time criminals who settle for what they can 
get out of a counter cash drawer), the other types of crime are 
also often the work of the cartels and their affiliated street 
gangs.  That the cartels are branching out into racketeering, 
kidnapping, arson and car theft appears not only to reflect 
their desire to intimidate their enemies, but also the need to 
meet payroll and other continuing expenses in the face of a more 
difficult smuggling environment.  In this light, it is difficult 
to predict how long the extraordinary levels of violence and 
general criminality will continue, but no one is betting that 
crime will soon return to 2007 levels. 
MCGRATH