Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
Global
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Department of State
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
American Consulate Hyderabad
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Koror
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Consulate Kaduna
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Majuro
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Nogales
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Ponta Delgada
Consulate Peshawar
Consulate Perth
REO Mosul
REO Kirkuk
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Sydney
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US OFFICE FSC CHARLESTON
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
US Delegation FEST TWO
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AEMR
ASEC
AMGT
AE
AS
AMED
AVIAN
AU
AF
AORC
AGENDA
AO
AR
AM
APER
AFIN
ATRN
AJ
ABUD
ARABL
AL
AG
AODE
ALOW
ADANA
AADP
AND
APECO
ACABQ
ASEAN
AA
AFFAIRS
AID
AGR
AY
AGS
AFSI
AGOA
AMB
ARF
ANET
ASCH
ACOA
AFLU
AFSN
AMEX
AFDB
ABLD
AESC
AFGHANISTAN
AINF
AVIATION
ARR
ARSO
ANDREW
ASSEMBLY
AIDS
APRC
ASSK
ADCO
ASIG
AC
AZ
APEC
AFINM
ADB
AP
ACOTA
ASEX
ACKM
ASUP
ANTITERRORISM
ADPM
AINR
ARABLEAGUE
AGAO
AORG
AMTC
AIN
ACCOUNT
ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU
AIDAC
AINT
ARCH
AMGTKSUP
ALAMI
AMCHAMS
ALJAZEERA
AVIANFLU
AORD
AOREC
ALIREZA
AOMS
AMGMT
ABDALLAH
AORCAE
AHMED
ACCELERATED
AUC
ALZUGUREN
ANGEL
AORL
ASECIR
AMG
AMBASSADOR
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
ADM
ASES
ABMC
AER
AMER
ASE
AMGTHA
ARNOLDFREDERICK
AOPC
ACS
AFL
AEGR
ASED
AFPREL
AGRI
AMCHAM
ARNOLD
AN
ANATO
AME
APERTH
ASECSI
AT
ACDA
ASEDC
AIT
AMERICA
AMLB
AMGE
ACTION
AGMT
AFINIZ
ASECVE
ADRC
ABER
AGIT
APCS
AEMED
ARABBL
ARC
ASO
AIAG
ACEC
ASR
ASECM
ARG
AEC
ABT
ADIP
ADCP
ANARCHISTS
AORCUN
AOWC
ASJA
AALC
AX
AROC
ARM
AGENCIES
ALBE
AK
AZE
AOPR
AREP
AMIA
ASCE
ALANAZI
ABDULRAHMEN
ABDULHADI
AINFCY
ARMS
ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS
AGRICULTURE
AFPK
AOCR
ALEXANDER
ATRD
ATFN
ABLG
AORCD
AFGHAN
ARAS
AORCYM
AVERY
ALVAREZ
ACBAQ
ALOWAR
ANTOINE
ABLDG
ALAB
AMERICAS
AFAF
ASECAFIN
ASEK
ASCC
AMCT
AMGTATK
AMT
APDC
AEMRS
ASECE
AFSA
ATRA
ARTICLE
ARENA
AISG
AEMRBC
AFR
AEIR
ASECAF
AFARI
AMPR
ASPA
ASOC
ANTONIO
AORCL
ASECARP
APRM
AUSTRALIAGROUP
ASEG
AFOR
AEAID
AMEDI
ASECTH
ASIC
AFDIN
AGUIRRE
AUNR
ASFC
AOIC
ANTXON
ASA
ASECCASC
ALI
AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN
ASECKHLS
ASSSEMBLY
ASECVZ
AI
ASECPGOV
ASIR
ASCEC
ASAC
ARAB
AIEA
ADMIRAL
AUSGR
AQ
AMTG
ARRMZY
ANC
APR
AMAT
AIHRC
AFU
ADEL
AECL
ACAO
AMEMR
ADEP
AV
AW
AOR
ALL
ALOUNI
AORCUNGA
ALNEA
ASC
AORCO
ARMITAGE
AGENGA
AGRIC
AEM
ACOAAMGT
AGUILAR
AFPHUM
AMEDCASCKFLO
AFZAL
AAA
ATPDEA
ASECPHUM
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
BEXP
BE
BG
BN
BU
BMGT
BR
BH
BM
BA
BO
BRUSSELS
BK
BTIO
BT
BL
BF
BBSR
BB
BILAT
BX
BWC
BY
BGD
BURMA
BP
BTA
BC
BLUE
BURNS
BD
BBG
BESP
BIT
BUD
BECON
BUSH
BAGHDAD
BARACK
BOUCHAIB
BTC
BELLVIEW
BIC
BEXB
BFIF
BZ
BIOTECH
BIDEN
BTIOEAID
BGMT
BUY
BORDER
BRIAN
BNUC
BEN
BMENA
BI
BIO
BFIO
BIOTECHNOLOGY
BHUM
BGOV
BOL
BAPOL
BMEAID
BEPX
BUT
BATA
BEXPC
BTRA
BLUNT
BS
BXEP
BAIO
BPTS
BEMBA
BITO
BRITNY
BEXT
BEAN
BV
BALKANS
BRITNEY
BIOS
BFIN
BASHAR
BMOT
BEXPASECBMGTOTRASFIZKU
BRPA
BEXD
BTIU
BIDOON
BIMSTEC
BOU
BKPREL
BOIKO
BSSR
BUEINV
BNATO
BULGARIA
BIH
BOSNIA
BAKOYANNIS
BPIS
BCXP
BOND
BLR
BOQ
BEXPECONEINVETRDBTIO
BERARDUCCI
BOEHNER
BINR
BEXPPLM
BAYS
BW
BOUTERSE
BBB
BCW
BAECTRD
BGPGOV
BTT
CASC
CJAN
CPAS
CFED
CA
CG
CO
CWC
CY
CH
CU
CVIS
CI
CE
CD
CS
CT
CB
COUNTER
CMGT
COM
CBW
CF
CNARC
CHR
CN
CENTCOM
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CM
CIVS
CITES
CONDOLEEZZA
COE
CLOK
CDC
CVR
CTERR
CDG
CHIEF
CTM
CTR
CIS
CLINTON
CRIMES
CHPREL
CONS
COMMERCE
CDB
CROATIA
CSW
CARICOM
CW
CV
CDI
CIDA
CRIME
CKGR
CIA
CCSR
CR
CAFTA
CARC
COUNTERTERRORISM
CONTROLS
CTRYCLR
CJ
CBD
CACS
CYP
CVPR
CODEL
CHALLENGE
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CPUOS
CITEL
CHILDREN
CNAR
CUSTODIO
CAPC
CIP
CZ
CWG
CBM
CONDITIONS
CP
CBIS
CHRISTOF
CMP
CTER
CASCC
CIO
CHERTOFF
CASA
CBC
CAN
CASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTMXJM
CFG
COLIN
CROS
COL
CHRISTIAN
CENSUS
CMT
CACM
CND
CBTH
CASCR
CMFT
CJUS
CWCM
COPUOS
CHAVEZ
CFIS
CYPGOVPRELPHUM
CONEAZ
CEDAW
CENTRIC
CAS
CEPTER
CLMT
COLOMBO
CAMBODIA
CGEN
CON
CARIB
CDCC
CONTROL
CIAT
CHELIDZE
COSI
CVISPRELPGOV
CSCE
CPC
CTBT
CPPT
CFE
CX
CONGRINT
COMESA
CPA
CARE
CPCTC
CVIA
CVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGKIRF
CUETRD
CONSULAR
CEN
CBSA
CHG
CORRUPTION
CL
CAMERON
CRIM
COETRD
CKOR
CARSON
CITIBANK
CSEP
CYPRUS
CHAD
CIC
CUL
COMMAND
CENTER
CRISTINA
CEA
CDCE
CHENEY
CAIO
CHINA
CBE
CGOPRC
CMGMT
CICTE
CONGO
CCY
CAVO
CHAO
CBG
CVIC
CLO
CVISU
CRUZ
CNC
CMAE
CONG
CIJ
CONAWAY
CHN
CASCSY
CUBA
COLLECTIVE
CSIS
CNO
CRM
CASCSU
CYPRUSARMS
CUCO
CUIS
CASE
CHRISTOPHER
CAC
CFSP
CRS
CIVAIR
CK
CANAHUATI
CEUDA
CYNTHIA
CITT
CASTILLO
CPU
CCC
CASCCH
CQ
CEC
CAJC
CHAMAN
DR
DA
DJ
DEMARCHE
DEA
DPOL
DTRA
DEPT
DISENGAGEMENT
DTRO
DPRK
DEAX
DOMESTIC
DB
DEMOCRATIC
DO
DEMARCHES
DRL
DEFENSE
DHSX
DPKO
DK
DARFUR
DAVID
DEPORTATION
DOMESTICPOLITICS
DCG
DY
DHS
DMIN
DHA
DEMETRIOS
DCRM
DHRF
DPAO
DRC
DANIEL
DS
DSS
DOMC
DOE
DCM
DIPLOMACY
DEOC
DOD
DOC
DAFR
DCHA
DONALD
DEM
DE
DCDG
DAO
DARFR
DUNCAN
DOJ
DC
DHLAKAMA
DPM
DOT
DMINE
DCOM
DVC
DELTAVIOLENCE
DIEZ
DEFENSEREFORM
DKEM
DEFIN
DU
DRIP
DKDEM
DSR
DAN
DTFN
DCI
DHLS
DENNIS
DANFUNG
DAC
DESI
DDD
ETRD
ETTC
EU
ECON
EFIN
EAGR
EAID
ELAB
EINV
ENIV
ENRG
EPET
EZ
ELTN
ELECTIONS
ECPS
ET
ER
EG
EUN
EIND
ECONOMICS
EMIN
ECIN
EINT
EWWT
EAIR
EN
ENGR
ES
EI
ETMIN
EL
EPA
EARG
EFIS
ECONOMY
EC
EK
ELAM
ECONOMIC
EAR
ESDP
ECCP
ELN
EUM
EUMEM
ECA
EAP
ELEC
ECOWAS
EFTA
EXIM
ETTD
EDRC
ECOSOC
ECPSN
ENVIRONMENT
ECO
EMAIL
ECTRD
EREL
EDU
ENERG
ENERGY
ENVR
ETRAD
EAC
EXTERNAL
EFIC
ECIP
ERTD
EUC
ENRGMO
EINZ
ESTH
ECCT
EAGER
ECPN
ELNT
ERD
EGEN
ETRN
EIVN
ETDR
EXEC
EIAD
EIAR
EVN
EPRT
ETTF
ENGY
EAIDCIN
EXPORT
ETRC
ESA
EIB
EAPC
EPIT
ESOCI
ETRB
EINDQTRD
ENRC
EGOV
ECLAC
EUR
ELF
ETEL
ENRGUA
EVIN
EARI
ESCAP
EID
ERIN
ELAN
ENVT
EDEV
EWWY
EXBS
ECOM
EV
ELNTECON
ECE
ETRDGK
EPETEIND
ESCI
ETRDAORC
EAIDETRD
ETTR
EMS
EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN
EBRD
EUREM
ERGR
EAGRBN
EAUD
EFI
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EPEC
ETRO
ENRGY
EGAR
ESSO
EGAD
ENV
ENER
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
ELA
EET
EINVETRD
EETC
EIDN
ERGY
ETRDPGOV
EING
EMINCG
EINVECON
EURM
EEC
EICN
EINO
EPSC
ELAP
ELABPGOVBN
EE
ESPS
ETRA
ECONETRDBESPAR
ERICKSON
EEOC
EVENTS
EPIN
EB
ECUN
EPWR
ENG
EX
EH
EAIDAR
EAIS
ELBA
EPETUN
ETRDEIQ
EENV
ECPC
ETRP
ECONENRG
EUEAID
EWT
EEB
EAIDNI
ESENV
EADM
ECN
ENRGKNNP
ETAD
ETR
ECONETRDEAGRJA
ETRG
ETER
EDUC
EITC
EBUD
EAIF
EBEXP
EAIDS
EITI
EGOVSY
EFQ
ECOQKPKO
ETRGY
ESF
EUE
EAIC
EPGOV
ENFR
EAGRE
ENRD
EINTECPS
EAVI
ETC
ETCC
EIAID
EAIDAF
EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN
EAOD
ETRDA
EURN
EASS
EINVA
EAIDRW
EON
ECOR
EPREL
EGPHUM
ELTM
ECOS
EINN
ENNP
EUPGOV
EAGRTR
ECONCS
ETIO
ETRDGR
EAIDB
EISNAR
EIFN
ESPINOSA
EAIDASEC
ELIN
EWTR
EMED
ETFN
ETT
EADI
EPTER
ELDIN
EINVEFIN
ESS
ENRGIZ
EQRD
ESOC
ETRDECD
ECINECONCS
EAIT
ECONEAIR
ECONEFIN
EUNJ
ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL
ELAD
EFIM
ETIC
EFND
EFN
ETLN
ENGRD
EWRG
ETA
EIN
EAIRECONRP
EXIMOPIC
ERA
ENRGJM
ECONEGE
ENVI
ECHEVARRIA
EMINETRD
EAD
ECONIZ
EENG
ELBR
EWWC
ELTD
EAIDMG
ETRK
EIPR
EISNLN
ETEX
EPTED
EFINECONCS
EPCS
EAG
ETRDKIPR
ED
EAIO
ETRDEC
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ
ERNG
EFINU
EURFOR
EWWI
ELTNSNAR
ETD
EAIRASECCASCID
EOXC
ESTN
EAIDAORC
EAGRRP
ETRDEMIN
ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EGHG
EAIDPHUMPRELUG
EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN
EDA
EPETPGOV
ELAINE
EUCOM
EMW
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
ELB
EINDETRD
EMI
ETRDECONWTOCS
EINR
ESTRADA
EHUM
EFNI
ELABV
ENR
EMN
EXO
EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN
EATO
END
EP
EINVETC
ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID
ELTRN
EIQ
ETTW
EAI
ENGRG
ETRED
ENDURING
ETTRD
EAIDEGZ
EOCN
EINF
EUPREL
ENRL
ECPO
ENLT
EEFIN
EPPD
ECOIN
EUEAGR
EISL
EIDE
ENRGSD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EAIG
ENTG
EEPET
EUNCH
EPECO
ETZ
EPAT
EPTE
EAIRGM
ETRDPREL
EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO
ETTN
EINVKSCA
ESLCO
EBMGT
ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ
EFLU
ELND
EFINOECD
EAIDHO
EDUARDO
ENEG
ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC
EFINTS
ECONQH
ENRGPREL
EUNPHUM
EINDIR
EPE
EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS
EFINM
ECRM
EQ
EWWTSP
ECONPGOVBN
FLU
FJ
FREEDOM
FR
FI
FAO
FARM
FINANCE
FINREF
FAS
FOR
FERNANDO
FM
FIN
FOREIGN
FAC
FBI
FAA
FAOAORC
FARC
FTA
FORCE
FRB
FCSC
FRELIMO
FETHI
FRANCIS
FDA
FA
FP
FORCES
FSC
FTAA
FREDERICK
FWS
FRA
FSI
FRPREL
FIXED
FREDOM
FGM
FEFIN
FOI
FINV
FT
FK
FEDULOV
FMS
FINR
FRAZER
FCS
FDIC
FINE
FRANCISCO
FO
FNRG
FORWHA
FEMA
FCC
FAGR
FIR
FMGT
FCSCEG
FKLU
FPC
FMC
FKFLO
FOOKS
FATAH
FRU
FRIED
FMLN
FISO
FCUL
FELIPE
FAOEFIS
FIGUEROA
FRN
GTIP
GM
GT
GON
GB
GR
GG
GA
GJ
GY
GV
GH
GZ
GAERC
GUTIERREZ
GAZA
GATES
GOI
GCC
GE
GF
GEORGE
GPGOV
GOV
GLOBAL
GUAM
GBSLE
GL
GAO
GPOI
GU
GC
GAZPROM
GESKE
GERARD
GOG
GANGS
GAMES
GEF
GZIS
GUIDANCE
GIWI
GREGG
GKGIC
GTMO
GTREFTEL
GHONDA
GRQ
GI
GN
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
GPI
GS
GIPNC
GATT
GABY
GONZALEZ
GUEVARA
GOMEZ
GOVPOI
GARCIA
GJBB
GPOV
GO
GCCC
GUANTANAMO
GMUS
GGGGG
GGFR
GWI
HA
HO
HK
HR
HUMANR
HUMAN
HUM
HSTC
HU
HL
HURI
HILLARY
HUMANRIGHTS
HUMANITARIAN
HIV
HHS
HRPGOV
HDP
HUMRIT
HLSX
HURRICANE
HOSTAGES
HYDE
HT
HRPREL
HAWZ
HN
HIPC
HRECON
HKSX
HCOPIL
HI
HILLEN
HUNRC
HADLEY
HUD
HEAVEN
HRPARM
HRICTY
HRCS
HIGHLIGHTS
HOURANI
HTSC
HESHAM
HRC
HTCG
HRIGHTS
HIJAZI
HRKAWC
HRKSTC
HECTOR
HARRIET
HRETRD
HUMOR
HOWES
HSWG
HG
HARRY
HIZ
HYLAND
HELGERSON
HRPHUM
HILARY
HRPREF
HERCEGOVINA
HRMARR
HEBRON
HAMID
HE
HRKPAO
HOA
HPKO
HORTA
HSI
HZ
HYMPSK
HNCHR
IS
ILAB
IN
IZ
IR
IT
IMF
IBRD
ID
IAEA
IC
ISLAMISTS
ICTY
IRAQ
ILO
IV
ITRA
IO
IRAN
IMO
IGAD
IPR
ICAO
ICJ
ICRC
INMARSAT
ITALY
IRAQI
ISSUES
ISRAELI
IFAD
IICA
INF
IIP
IQ
ITU
INRD
IWC
ITECON
ISRAEL
ITMOPS
IFRC
INDO
IDB
ITECIP
IRNB
INTERNAL
ISLE
IPROP
ICTR
ILC
ISAF
IOM
ITPREL
INCB
ITALIAN
ISO
IRM
IEA
INRB
IRS
IACO
IZPREL
IAHRC
IAEAK
ITKICC
ISA
INL
INFLUENZA
IASA
IMET
IRL
IVIANNA
INTERPOL
ICCAT
IRC
ICC
IMMIGRATION
INR
INTELSAT
IADB
ICCROM
ITTSPL
ITIA
IL
INTELLECTUAL
IMTS
ITEFIS
IA
IRMO
IEFIN
IDA
ITEUN
ITEAGR
INAUGURATION
ITRD
IE
ISPA
IBPCA
IRPREL
IFO
INSC
ISPL
IHO
IZMARR
ISCON
IRAS
INRPAZ
ITEIND
IRE
ICAC
IDLI
INRA
ISCA
IP
ITA
INV
ITKIPR
ISN
IDLO
ITPHUM
IRDB
ITPREF
IPET
IAES
INT
ICSCA
ITKTIA
ICRS
ITPGOV
IRGG
IZECON
IRPE
IBRB
IZPHUM
IFR
ITKCIP
ITEFIN
ICES
IFC
ICG
IBD
ITMARR
IRCE
IEF
IPGRI
ITTPHY
ITER
IG
IND
IDR
ITNATO
IZAORC
ISAAC
IEINV
IX
ITETTC
IACI
ITELAB
ISTC
IZMOPS
IGF
ITTSPA
IATTC
IK
ITETRD
IZEAID
IAZ
INTEL
IOC
IDP
ITECPS
IACHR
ITAORC
ILEA
ISAJ
IFIN
ISNV
INPFC
ITELTN
IF
IFM
ISKPAL
ITPARM
ISPHUM
ITUNGA
IPK
IRQEGION
IRLE
IEAB
IPINS
IPPC
IACW
IUCN
IWI
INRO
ITF
ITEAIR
IZPGOV
IINS
IAIE
IRA
INVI
IMC
INS
IAII
IBET
IMSO
INNP
IQNV
IBB
IRAJ
JO
JA
JM
JP
JCIC
JOHN
JOSEPH
JE
JI
JUS
JIMENEZ
JN
JABER
JOSE
JAT
JEFFERY
JULIAN
JAMES
JY
JHR
JAPAN
JSRP
JEFFREY
JML
JEAN
JKJUS
JKUS
JENDAYI
JOHNNIE
JAWAD
JK
JS
JUAN
JOHANNS
JAM
JUSLBA
JONATHAN
KFLO
KPKO
KDEM
KFLU
KTEX
KMDR
KPAO
KCRM
KIDE
KN
KNNP
KG
KMCA
KZ
KJUS
KWBG
KU
KDMR
KAWC
KCOR
KPAL
KOMC
KTDB
KTIA
KISL
KHIV
KHUM
KTER
KCFE
KTFN
KS
KIRF
KTIP
KIRC
KSCA
KICA
KIPR
KPWR
KWMN
KE
KGIC
KGIT
KSTC
KACT
KSEP
KFRD
KUNR
KHLS
KCRS
KRVC
KUWAIT
KVPR
KSRE
KMPI
KMRS
KNRV
KNEI
KCIP
KSEO
KITA
KDRG
KV
KSUM
KCUL
KPET
KBCT
KO
KSEC
KOLY
KNAR
KGHG
KSAF
KWNM
KNUC
KMNP
KVIR
KPOL
KOCI
KPIR
KLIG
KSAC
KSTH
KNPT
KINL
KPRP
KRIM
KICC
KIFR
KPRV
KAWK
KFIN
KT
KVRC
KR
KHDP
KGOV
KPOW
KTBT
KPMI
KPOA
KRIF
KEDEM
KFSC
KY
KGCC
KATRINA
KWAC
KSPR
KTBD
KBIO
KSCI
KRCM
KNNB
KBNC
KIMT
KCSY
KINR
KRAD
KMFO
KCORR
KW
KDEMSOCI
KNEP
KFPC
KEMPI
KBTR
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KNPP
KTTB
KTFIN
KBTS
KCOM
KFTN
KMOC
KOR
KDP
KPOP
KGHA
KSLG
KMCR
KJUST
KUM
KMSG
KHPD
KREC
KIPRTRD
KPREL
KEN
KCSA
KCRIM
KGLB
KAKA
KWWT
KUNP
KCRN
KISLPINR
KLFU
KUNC
KEDU
KCMA
KREF
KPAS
KRKO
KNNC
KLHS
KWAK
KOC
KAPO
KTDD
KOGL
KLAP
KECF
KCRCM
KNDP
KSEAO
KCIS
KISM
KREL
KISR
KISC
KKPO
KWCR
KPFO
KUS
KX
KWCI
KRFD
KWPG
KTRD
KH
KLSO
KEVIN
KEANE
KACW
KWRF
KNAO
KETTC
KTAO
KWIR
KVCORR
KDEMGT
KPLS
KICT
KWGB
KIDS
KSCS
KIRP
KSTCPL
KDEN
KLAB
KFLOA
KIND
KMIG
KPPAO
KPRO
KLEG
KGKG
KCUM
KTTP
KWPA
KIIP
KPEO
KICR
KNNA
KMGT
KCROM
KMCC
KLPM
KNNPGM
KSIA
KSI
KWWW
KOMS
KESS
KMCAJO
KWN
KTDM
KDCM
KCM
KVPRKHLS
KENV
KCCP
KGCN
KCEM
KEMR
KWMNKDEM
KNNPPARM
KDRM
KWIM
KJRE
KAID
KWMM
KPAONZ
KUAE
KTFR
KIF
KNAP
KPSC
KSOCI
KCWI
KAUST
KPIN
KCHG
KLBO
KIRCOEXC
KI
KIRCHOFF
KSTT
KNPR
KDRL
KCFC
KLTN
KPAOKMDRKE
KPALAOIS
KESO
KKOR
KSMT
KFTFN
KTFM
KDEMK
KPKP
KOCM
KNN
KISLSCUL
KFRDSOCIRO
KINT
KRG
KWMNSMIG
KSTCC
KPAOY
KFOR
KWPR
KSEPCVIS
KGIV
KSEI
KIL
KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW
KQ
KEMS
KHSL
KTNF
KPDD
KANSOU
KKIV
KFCE
KTTC
KGH
KNNNP
KK
KSCT
KWNN
KAWX
KOMCSG
KEIM
KTSD
KFIU
KDTB
KFGM
KACP
KWWMN
KWAWC
KSPA
KGICKS
KNUP
KNNO
KISLAO
KTPN
KSTS
KPRM
KPALPREL
KPO
KTLA
KCRP
KNMP
KAWCK
KCERS
KDUM
KEDM
KTIALG
KWUN
KPTS
KPEM
KMEPI
KAWL
KHMN
KCRO
KCMR
KPTD
KCROR
KMPT
KTRF
KSKN
KMAC
KUK
KIRL
KEM
KSOC
KBTC
KOM
KINP
KDEMAF
KTNBT
KISK
KRM
KWBW
KBWG
KNNPMNUC
KNOP
KSUP
KCOG
KNET
KWBC
KESP
KMRD
KEBG
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KPWG
KOMCCO
KRGY
KNNF
KPROG
KJAN
KFRED
KPOKO
KM
KWMNCS
KMPF
KJWC
KJU
KSMIG
KALR
KRAL
KDGOV
KPA
KCRMJA
KCRI
KAYLA
KPGOV
KRD
KNNPCH
KFEM
KPRD
KFAM
KALM
KIPRETRDKCRM
KMPP
KADM
KRFR
KMWN
KWRG
KTIAPARM
KTIAEUN
KRDP
KLIP
KDDEM
KTIAIC
KWKN
KPAD
KDM
KRCS
KWBGSY
KEAI
KIVP
KPAOPREL
KUNH
KTSC
KIPT
KNP
KJUSTH
KGOR
KEPREL
KHSA
KGHGHIV
KNNR
KOMH
KRCIM
KWPB
KWIC
KINF
KPER
KILS
KA
KNRG
KCSI
KFRP
KLFLO
KFE
KNPPIS
KQM
KQRDQ
KERG
KPAOPHUM
KSUMPHUM
KVBL
KARIM
KOSOVO
KNSD
KUIR
KWHG
KWBGXF
KWMNU
KPBT
KKNP
KERF
KCRT
KVIS
KWRC
KVIP
KTFS
KMARR
KDGR
KPAI
KDE
KTCRE
KMPIO
KUNRAORC
KHOURY
KAWS
KPAK
KOEM
KCGC
KID
KVRP
KCPS
KIVR
KBDS
KWOMN
KIIC
KTFNJA
KARZAI
KMVP
KHJUS
KPKOUNSC
KMAR
KIBL
KUNA
KSA
KIS
KJUSAF
KDEV
KPMO
KHIB
KIRD
KOUYATE
KIPRZ
KBEM
KPAM
KDET
KPPD
KOSCE
KJUSKUNR
KICCPUR
KRMS
KWMNPREL
KWMJN
KREISLER
KWM
KDHS
KRV
KPOV
KWMNCI
KMPL
KFLD
KWWN
KCVM
KIMMITT
KCASC
KOMO
KNATO
KDDG
KHGH
KRF
KSCAECON
KWMEN
KRIC
LE
LH
LI
LT
LY
LTTE
LO
LG
LA
LU
LABOR
LANTERN
LVPR
LEE
LORAN
LEW
LAB
LS
LOPEZ
LB
LYPHUM
LAOS
LAS
LARS
LMS
LV
LN
LAW
LEBIK
LARREA
LZ
LBY
LGAT
LPREL
LOG
LEVINE
LAURA
LR
LTG
LAVIN
LOVE
LICC
LK
LEB
LINE
LIB
LOTT
LEON
LEGAT
LEIS
LEAGUE
LANSANA
LEGATT
LIMA
LBAR
LKDEM
MARR
MOPS
MU
MA
MASS
MY
MNUC
MX
MI
MZ
MK
MR
MC
MTCRE
MV
MCAP
MNUCPTEREZ
MEDIA
MP
MO
MG
MD
MW
ML
MT
MN
MTS
MLS
MF
MAR
MDC
MPOS
MEPI
MCC
MEPN
MIL
MNLF
MRCRE
MAS
MARRMOPS
MATT
MUNC
MCAPS
MOPPS
MAAR
MCA
MTCR
MOOPS
MOPP
MTAG
MH
MILITARY
MASSIZ
MEPP
MILLENNIUM
MGMT
MILITANTS
MAPP
MS
MDA
MARITIME
MTRCE
MGT
MEX
MFO
MARTIN
MASSMNUC
MILI
MONUC
ME
MORRIS
MCCAIN
MACP
MCAPN
MASC
MICHAEL
MARANTIS
MCAT
MINUSTAH
MARS
MMAR
MCRM
MNUCWA
MONTENEGRO
MAP
MINORITIES
MARRIZ
MGL
MCTRE
MESUR
MOP
MWPREL
MURRAY
MHUC
MCAPMOPS
MUKASEY
MARIE
MNUCH
MED
MTAA
MEETINGS
MORS
MGTA
MAPS
MCCP
MOHAMAD
MUC
MSG
MASSPHUM
MARRIS
MRSEC
MOROCCO
MASSZF
MTRE
MBM
MACEDONIA
MARQUEZ
MANUEL
MITCHELL
MARK
MGOV
MICHEL
MILA
MCGRAW
MOHAMED
MNUK
MSIG
MRRR
MARRGH
MARAD
MNUCECON
MJ
MNNC
MOPSGRPARM
MFA
MCNATO
MENDIETA
MARIA
MEPPIT
MNUR
MMED
MOTO
MILTON
MERCOSUR
MNVC
MIC
MIK
MORALES
MOTT
MNU
MINURSO
MNUCUN
MCCONNELL
MIKE
MPP
MALDONADO
MIGUEL
MASSPGOV
MOPSPBTS
MASSAF
MONY
MTCAE
MOLINA
MZAORC
MARV
MULLEN
MCAPARR
MCAPP
MNNUC
MNUS
MNUN
MB
MDO
MORG
MPOL
MAHURIN
MUCN
MARRSU
MPS
MNUM
MDD
MTCRA
MOS
MOPSMARR
MARRV
MEP
MASSTZ
MTRRE
MPREL
MASSPGOVPRELBN
MRS
MARINO
MIAH
MASSPRELPARM
MOHAMMAD
MEA
MQADHAFI
MURAD
MAYA
NI
NATO
NAR
NP
NU
NO
NL
NZ
NAS
NS
NC
NH
NG
NATIONAL
NSF
NPT
NATOPREL
NR
NSC
NEGROPONTE
NAM
NSSP
NGO
NE
NSFO
NIH
NTSB
NK
NATEU
NDP
NA
NASA
NLD
NAFTA
NRC
NADIA
NOAA
NANCY
NT
NIPP
NEA
NARC
NZUS
NSG
NKNNP
NATOF
NATSIOS
NARCOTICS
NATGAS
NB
NRR
NTTC
NUMBERING
NICOLE
NAC
NGUYEN
NET
NORAD
NCCC
NKWG
NFSO
NOK
NONE
NTDB
NPA
NRRC
NPG
NERG
NEPAD
NACB
NEY
NAT
NAVO
NCD
NOI
NOVO
NEW
NICHOLAS
NEC
NARR
NMNUC
NON
NCTC
NMFS
NELSON
NUIN
NBTS
NRG
NNPT
NEI
NFATC
NFMS
NATOIRAQ
NATOOPS
NATOBALKANS
NAMSA
NATOPOLICY
NCT
NW
NMOPS
NV
NATOAFGHAN
NMUC
NBU
NKKP
NLO
NLIAEA
NUC
NDI
OPRC
OPIC
OPCW
OIIP
OCII
OVIP
OSCE
OTRA
OREP
OPDC
OFDP
OAS
OFDA
OEXC
OECS
OECD
ODPC
OMS
ODIP
OPBAT
OIC
OMIG
OSCI
OPCD
OFFICIALS
OCSE
OSD
OLYMPICS
OAU
OM
OIE
OBAMA
OXEC
OGIV
OXEM
OIL
OECV
ORUE
OPEC
OF
ORA
OFDPQIS
OEXP
OARC
OLYAIR
ORTA
OMAR
OFPD
OPREP
OCS
ORC
OES
OSAC
OSEC
ORP
OVIPIN
OVP
OVID
OSHA
OCHA
OMB
OHCHR
OPID
OBS
OPOC
OHIP
OFDC
OTHER
OCRA
OFSO
OCBD
OSTA
OAO
ONA
OTP
OPC
OIF
OPS
OSCEPREF
OESC
OPPI
OTR
OPAD
OTRC
ORGANIZED
ODC
OPDAT
OTAR
ON
OVIPPREL
OPCR
OPDP
OIG
OTRAZ
OCED
OA
OUALI
ODAG
OPDCPREL
OEXCSCULKPAO
OASS
ORCA
OSTRA
OTRAORP
OBSP
ORED
OGAC
OASC
OTA
OIM
OI
OIPP
OTRAO
OPREC
OSIC
OPSC
OTRABL
OICCO
OPPC
ORECD
OCEA
OHUM
OTHERSASNEEDED
OSCEL
OZ
OPVIP
OTRD
OASCC
OHI
OPICEAGR
OLY
OREG
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OPET
PREL
PINR
PGOV
PHUM
PTER
PE
PREF
PARM
PBTS
PINS
PHSA
PK
PL
PM
PNAT
PHAS
PO
PROP
PGOVE
PA
PU
POLITICAL
PPTER
POL
PALESTINIAN
PHUN
PIN
PAMQ
PPA
PSEC
POLM
PBIO
PSOE
PDEM
PAK
PF
PKAO
PGOVPRELMARRMOPS
PMIL
PV
POLITICS
PRELS
POLICY
PRELHA
PIRN
PINT
PGOG
PERSONS
PRC
PEACE
PROCESS
PRELPGOV
PROV
PFOV
PKK
PRE
PT
PIRF
PSI
PRL
PRELAF
PROG
PARMP
PERL
PUNE
PREFA
PP
PGOB
PUM
PROTECTION
PARTIES
PRIL
PEL
PAGE
PS
PGO
PCUL
PLUM
PIF
PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN
PMUC
PCOR
PAS
PB
PKO
PY
PKST
PTR
PRM
POUS
PRELIZ
PGIC
PHUMS
PAL
PNUC
PLO
PMOPS
PHM
PGOVBL
PBK
PELOSI
PTE
PGOVAU
PNR
PINSO
PRO
PLAB
PREM
PNIR
PSOCI
PBS
PD
PHUML
PERURENA
PKPA
PVOV
PMAR
PHUMCF
PUHM
PHUH
PRELPGOVETTCIRAE
PRT
PROPERTY
PEPFAR
PREI
POLUN
PAR
PINSF
PREFL
PH
PREC
PPD
PING
PQL
PINSCE
PGV
PREO
PRELUN
POV
PGOVPHUM
PINRES
PRES
PGOC
PINO
POTUS
PTERE
PRELKPAO
PRGOV
PETR
PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN
PPKO
PARLIAMENT
PEPR
PMIG
PTBS
PACE
PETER
PMDL
PVIP
PKPO
POLMIL
PTEL
PJUS
PHUMNI
PRELKPAOIZ
PGOVPREL
POGV
PEREZ
POWELL
PMASS
PDOV
PARN
PG
PPOL
PGIV
PAIGH
PBOV
PETROL
PGPV
PGOVL
POSTS
PSO
PRELEU
PRELECON
PHUMPINS
PGOVKCMABN
PQM
PRELSP
PRGO
PATTY
PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO
PGVO
PROTESTS
PRELPLS
PKFK
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PARAGRAPH
PRELGOV
POG
PTRD
PTERM
PBTSAG
PHUMKPAL
PRELPK
PTERPGOV
PAO
PRIVATIZATION
PSCE
PPAO
PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN
PARALYMPIC
PRUM
PKPRP
PETERS
PAHO
PARMS
PGREL
PINV
POINS
PHUMPREL
POREL
PRELNL
PHUMPGOV
PGOVQL
PLAN
PRELL
PARP
PROVE
PSOC
PDD
PRELNP
PRELBR
PKMN
PGKV
PUAS
PRELTBIOBA
PBTSEWWT
PTERIS
PGOVU
PRELGG
PHUMPRELPGOV
PFOR
PEPGOV
PRELUNSC
PRAM
PICES
PTERIZ
PREK
PRELEAGR
PRELEUN
PHUME
PHU
PHUMKCRS
PRESL
PRTER
PGOF
PARK
PGOVSOCI
PTERPREL
PGOVEAID
PGOVPHUMKPAO
PINSKISL
PREZ
PGOVAF
PARMEUN
PECON
PINL
POGOV
PGOVLO
PIERRE
PRELPHUM
PGOVPZ
PGOVKCRM
PBST
PKPAO
PHUMHUPPS
PGOVPOL
PASS
PPGOV
PROGV
PAGR
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PRELID
PGOVID
PHUMR
PHSAQ
PINRAMGT
PSA
PRELM
PRELMU
PIA
PINRPE
PBTSRU
PARMIR
PEDRO
PNUK
PVPR
PINOCHET
PAARM
PRFE
PRELEIN
PINF
PCI
PSEPC
PGOVSU
PRLE
PDIP
PHEM
PRELB
PORG
PGGOC
POLG
POPDC
PGOVPM
PWMN
PDRG
PHUMK
PINB
PRELAL
PRER
PFIN
PNRG
PRED
POLI
PHUMBO
PHYTRP
PROLIFERATION
PHARM
PUOS
PRHUM
PUNR
PENA
PGOVREL
PETRAEUS
PGOVKDEM
PGOVENRG
PHUS
PRESIDENT
PTERKU
PRELKSUMXABN
PGOVSI
PHUMQHA
PKISL
PIR
PGOVZI
PHUMIZNL
PKNP
PRELEVU
PMIN
PHIM
PHUMBA
PUBLIC
PHAM
PRELKPKO
PMR
PARTM
PPREL
PN
PROL
PDA
PGOVECON
PKBL
PKEAID
PERM
PRELEZ
PRELC
PER
PHJM
PGOVPRELPINRBN
PRFL
PLN
PWBG
PNG
PHUMA
PGOR
PHUMPTER
POLINT
PPEF
PKPAL
PNNL
PMARR
PAC
PTIA
PKDEM
PAUL
PREG
PTERR
PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC
PRELJA
POLS
PI
PNS
PAREL
PENV
PTEROREP
PGOVM
PINER
PBGT
PHSAUNSC
PTERDJ
PRELEAID
PARMIN
PKIR
PLEC
PCRM
PNET
PARR
PRELETRD
PRELBN
PINRTH
PREJ
PEACEKEEPINGFORCES
PEMEX
PRELZ
PFLP
PBPTS
PTGOV
PREVAL
PRELSW
PAUM
PRF
PHUMKDEM
PATRICK
PGOVKMCAPHUMBN
PRELA
PNUM
PGGV
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PBT
PIND
PTEP
PTERKS
PGOVJM
PGOT
PRELMARR
PGOVCU
PREV
PREFF
PRWL
PET
PROB
PRELPHUMP
PHUMAF
PVTS
PRELAFDB
PSNR
PGOVECONPRELBU
PGOVZL
PREP
PHUMPRELBN
PHSAPREL
PARCA
PGREV
PGOVDO
PGON
PCON
PODC
PRELOV
PHSAK
PSHA
PGOVGM
PRELP
POSCE
PGOVPTER
PHUMRU
PINRHU
PARMR
PGOVTI
PPEL
PMAT
PAN
PANAM
PGOVBO
PRELHRC
RS
RO
REGION
RU
RP
REACTION
REPORT
RELFREE
RELATIONS
RIGHTS
RW
REL
REGIONAL
RICE
RIGHTSPOLMIL
RSP
REINEMEYER
RFREEDOM
RM
RAID
ROW
ROBERT
REFORM
RGOV
REFUGEES
REALTIONS
RFE
ROBERTG
RSO
RPREL
RHUM
RQ
RPEL
RF
ROME
RIVERA
RECIN
REF
RENAMO
RUS
RAMON
RAY
RODHAM
REFUGEE
RATIFICATION
RGY
RUEHZO
REUBEN
REA
RICHARD
RENE
REO
ROOD
RCMP
RA
RELIGIOUS
RUMSFELD
RREL
ROY
REIN
RUPREL
RELAM
REMON
RR
RVKAWC
RV
RI
RBI
RMA
RE
RAMONTEIJELO
RAED
RPREF
RWANDA
RODRIGUEZ
RUEUN
ROSS
RPTS
RLA
REID
RSOX
RTT
ROK
RCA
RAS
RWPREL
RRB
RAMOS
RL
RIMC
RAFAEL
RODENAS
RUIZ
RFIN
RSZ
REFPAN
SU
SY
SENV
SOCI
SO
SNAR
SF
SA
SCUL
SI
SP
SW
SMIG
SCNV
SN
SZ
SOE
START
SL
SR
SE
SG
SETTLEMENTS
SANC
SILVASANDE
SCIENCE
SOCIETY
SM
SECDEF
SOLIC
SYRIA
SCRS
SOWGC
SADC
ST
SC
SIPDIS
SHUM
SCCC
SAN
SAARC
SENVEFISPRELIWC
SPGOV
SHI
SECRETARY
SMAR
SCPR
SCOM
SECRET
SENC
SOM
SK
SARS
SYR
SENU
SNAP
SENVQGR
SPCE
SCOI
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SENVENV
SPECIALIST
SABAH
SECURITY
SURINAME
STATE
SOCIO
SSH
SOCIA
SUFFRAGE
SCI
SNA
SOCIS
SECTOR
SASEC
SEC
SOCY
SIAORC
SUCCESSION
SOFA
SENVSENV
SYAI
SAIS
SREF
SD
STUDENT
SV
SCVL
SULLIVAN
SECI
SCUIL
SMIGBG
SIPR
SEN
SEP
STEPHEN
SECSTATE
SNRV
SOSI
SANR
SIMS
SNARPGOVBN
SEVN
SAFE
STEINBERG
SASC
SHANNON
SENSITIVE
SPP
SGWI
SWMN
SPTER
SWE
SFNV
SCUD
SPCVIS
SOVIET
SMIL
SACU
SLM
SCULKPAOECONTU
SUMMIT
SPSTATE
SMITH
SOCIKPKO
SCRSERD
SB
SENVSPL
SCA
SARB
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SYSI
SMIT
SUDAN
SIPRNET
SCULUNESCO
SERBIA
SNARIZ
SORT
SENVCASCEAIDID
SPECI
SBA
SNARC
SIPDI
SYMBOL
SPC
SERGIO
STP
SCHUL
SXG
SNUC
SELAB
STET
SCRM
SENS
SUBJECT
SEXP
SKCA
SWHO
SMI
SGNV
SSA
SOPN
SASIAIN
SIUK
SRYI
SAMA
SAAD
SKSAF
SENG
SOCR
STR
SENVKGHG
SPILL
SALOPEK
STC
SRS
SCE
SAIR
SRIT
SOMALIA
SLOVAK
SOLI
SAO
SX
SRPREL
SKEP
SECON
SOC
STAG
SUSAN
SERZH
SARGSIAN
SCOL
SYTH
SOCISZX
SMRT
SKI
SNARR
SUR
SPAS
SOIC
SNARPGOVPRELPHUMSOCIASECKCRMUNDPJMXL
SOI
SIPRS
SOCIPY
SNARKTFN
SPPREL
SNARM
SENVSXE
SCENESETTER
SNIG
TBIO
TU
TRGY
TI
TW
TJ
TH
TS
TC
TPHY
TIP
TURKEY
TSPA
TX
TAGS
TN
TR
TZ
TERRORISM
TSPL
TRSY
TT
TK
TCSENV
TO
TINT
THPY
TD
TERFIN
TP
TECHNOLOGY
TNGD
TL
TV
TRAFFICKING
TAX
TSLP
THIRDTERM
TRADE
TOPEC
TBO
TERR
TRV
TY
TRAD
TPSL
TERROR
TRYS
TIFA
TORRIJOS
TRT
TF
TIO
TFIN
TREATY
TSA
TAUSCHER
TECH
TG
TE
TOURISM
TNDG
TVBIO
TPSA
TRGV
TPP
TTFN
THKSJA
TA
TALAL
TRIO
TSPAM
TBIOEAGR
TPKO
THERESE
TER
TWL
TBIOZK
TWRO
TSRY
TNAR
THE
TDA
TRBY
TZBY
THOMMA
THOMAS
TRY
TRD
TCOR
TGRY
TSPAUV
TREASURY
TIBO
TIUZ
TPHYPA
TREL
TWCH
TRG
TTPGOV
TBI
THANH
TSRL
TM
TITI
TB
TBID
TERAA
TIA
TRYG
TRBIO
TSY
TWI
TREAS
TBKIO
UNGA
US
UNSC
USUN
USTR
UK
UN
UP
UZ
USAID
UNESCO
UV
USEU
UNMIK
UNCTAD
UG
UNEP
UNCHR
UNCRED
UNODC
UY
UNHCR
UNHRC
UNFICYP
UNRWA
UR
USTDA
UNREST
UNAUS
UNIFEM
USAU
USDA
UNDP
UA
UNCSD
UNIDO
UNRCR
UNIDROIT
UKXG
UNFPA
UNICEF
UNOPS
UNMIN
UNAIDS
UNDC
UE
UNCND
UNCRIME
UEU
UNO
UNOMIG
UNSCR
UNDOF
UNCITRAL
UNPUOS
UUNR
UNFIYCP
UAE
USNC
UNIFIL
UNION
UNAF
USTRUWR
USOAS
UNTERR
UNC
UNM
UNVIE
UNMIC
USCC
UNCOPUOS
UNUS
UNSCE
UNTAC
UNAORC
UNAMA
USEUBRUSSELS
UAM
USOSCE
UMIK
UNHR
UNMOVIC
UNCLASSIFIED
UNGAPL
USNATO
UGA
UNRCCA
UKR
USPS
USOP
UNA
UNFC
UNKIK
USSC
UNWRA
USPTO
UGNA
USDELFESTTWO
USTRD
USTA
UNIDCP
USCG
UNAMSIL
UNFCYP
UNSCD
UNPAR
USTRPS
UNECE
URBALEJO
UAID
UPU
UNSE
UNCC
UNBRO
UNMIL
UNEF
UNFF
UDEM
UNDOC
USG
UNG
UNYI
USDAEAID
UNGO
UX
UNCHC
UNDEF
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
UEUN
UB
UNSCS
UM
UNSD
UNCDN
UNMIKV
UNUNSC
UNFA
UNECSO
UKRAINE
UNP
UNSCKZ
USTRIT
UNCDF
UNGAC
UNSCAPU
UPUO
UNTZ
UNSCER
UNMIKI
UNMEE
UNGACG
UNCSW
USMS
USTRRP
UNCHS
UNDESCO
USGS
VM
VE
VC
VZ
VT
VETTING
VN
VTPGOV
VPGOV
VTCH
VTPREL
VISIT
VIP
VEPREL
VTEAID
VTFR
VOA
VIS
VTEG
VA
VISAS
VTOPDC
VTIZ
VTKIRF
VTIT
VEN
VATICA
VY
VTPHUM
VTIS
VTEAGR
VILLA
VXY
VO
VARGAS
VTUNGA
VTWCAR
VAT
VI
VTTBIO
VELS
VANG
VANESSA
VENZ
VINICIO
WTO
WZ
WTRO
WS
WFP
WA
WHO
WI
WE
WILCOX
WEF
WBG
WAR
WHA
WILLIAM
WATKINS
WMD
WOMEN
WRTO
WIPO
WFPO
WMO
WEU
WSIS
WB
WCL
WHTI
WTRD
WETRD
WCAR
WWARD
WEET
WEBZ
WITH
WHOA
WTOEAGR
WFPAORC
WALTER
WWT
WAEMU
WMN
WMDT
WCI
WPO
WHITMER
WAKI
WM
WW
WGC
WFPOAORC
WCO
WWBG
WADE
WJRO
WET
WGG
WTOETRD
WARREN
WEOG
WTRQ
WBEG
WELCH
WFA
WEWWT
WIR
WEBG
WARD
XF
XA
XG
XW
XB
XL
XM
XR
XH
XK
XS
XC
XD
XV
XTAG
XE
XU
XI
XO
XX
XY
XT
XZ
XAAF
XJ
XP
XQ
XFNEA
XKJA
XLUM
XXX
ZI
ZU
ZP
ZO
ZL
ZA
ZR
ZF
ZK
ZANU
ZM
ZIM
ZOELLICK
ZB
ZJ
ZAEAGR
ZCTU
ZS
ZW
ZX
ZFR
ZEALAND
ZC
ZH
ZT
ZXA
ZKGM
ZN
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09BEIJING22, LOOKING AT THE NEXT 30 YEARS OF THE U.S.-CHINA
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BEIJING22.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09BEIJING22 | 2009-01-06 08:41 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing |
Appears in these articles: http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3994486.ece |
VZCZCXRO0309
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #0022/01 0060841
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 060841Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1691
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BEIJING 000022
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY, DEPUTY SECRETARY, EAP A/S
HILL, S/P, EAP/CM
NSC FOR DWILDER
EO 12958 DECL: 01/05/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ECON, EFIN, MARR, MASS, CH
SUBJECT: LOOKING AT THE NEXT 30 YEARS OF THE U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONSHIP
Classified By: Ambassador Clark T. Randt. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
¶1. (C) January 1, 2009, marked the 30th Anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. This anniversary followed the PRC commemoration of roughly 30 years of China’s “reform and opening” policy under Deng Xiaoping, which led to China’s staggering economic growth.
¶2. (C) Thirty years ago, China was just emerging from the nightmare of the Cultural Revolution and 30 years of fratricidal misrule. China’s economy was crippled by years of disastrous policies like the Great Leap Forward. The population was coming to terms with the world’s most draconian population controls enacted in 1976 after decades of Maoist state-subsidies encouraging large families. Chinese foreign relations tended to be more influenced by ideological yardsticks than economic links since China had very few commercial links with the outside world. In 1979, Chinese urbanites on average made the equivalent of five dollars per month.
¶3. (C) Just as no one in 1979 would have predicted that China would become the United States’ most important relationship in thirty years, no one today can predict with certainty where our relations with Beijing will be thirty years hence. However, given the current significance of the bilateral relationship and the risk of missing opportunities to jointly address ongoing and predictable future challenges, below we look at trends currently affecting China with an eye to how those trends might affect relations. Several issues leap out, including China’ insatiable resource needs, our growing economic interdependence, China’s rapid military modernization, a surge in Chinese nationalism, China’s demographic challenges, and the PRC’s increasing influence and confidence on the world stage.
¶4. (C) China has been plagued over the millennia by unforeseen events that devastated formerly prosperous regimes. Mongol invasion, the Black Death, uncountable peasant uprisings, warlords, tax revolts, communist dictatorship, colonialism, famine, earthquakes and other plagues were largely unforeseen by the China watchers of the past. This report focuses generally on more optimistic projections. Given China’s history, however, the United States should also gird itself for the possibility that China will fall short of today’s mostly sanguine forecasts.
Resource Consumption
--------------------
¶5. (C) Popular and scholarly works in recent years highlight China’s growing demand for natural resources and the possible impact that China’s pursuit of resources will have on its foreign policy. Since economic reforms began in the late 1970s, industrial and exchange rate policies have fueled investment in resource-intensive heavy industries in China’s coastal region, which currently account for approximately 55 percent of the country’s total energy consumption today. A construction boom over the past decade has also stimulated growth in heavy industries. China is now a leading steel producer and currently accounts for 50 percent of the world’s annual cement production. Reflecting China’s emphasis on resource-intensive industries, China’s energy utilization rate grew faster than its GDP between 2002 and 2006. In 1990, China consumed 27 quadrillion British Thermal Units (BTUs) of energy, accounting for 7.8 percent of global consumption. In 2006, it consumed 68.6 quadrillion BTUs or 15.6 percent of the global total. According to U.S. Department of Energy statistics, by 2030 China will account for 145.5 quadrillion BTUs or 20.7 percent of global energy consumption.
¶6. (C) China’s oil demand has grown substantially over the last 30 years. In 1980, China consumed 1.7 million barrels of oil per day, almost all of which was produced domestically. In 2006, China consumed 7.4 million barrels per day, second only to the United States. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China’s oil consumption will reach 16.5 million barrels per day in 2030. More than two thirds of the increased demand will come from the
BEIJING 00000022 002 OF 007
transport sector as vehicle ownership rates rise. China became a net importer of oil in 1993, and it now relies on imports to meet a growing portion of its fossil fuel needs. The IEA forecasts that China’s oil import dependence will rise from 50 percent this year to 80 percent by 2030, as domestic oil production peaks early in the next decade. To strengthen the country’s future energy security, the Chinese Government has adopted a “go out” policy that encourages national oil companies (NOCs) to acquire equity stakes in foreign oil and gas production. Today, state-owned Chinese oil giants CNPC/PetroChina, CNOOC, and Sinopec can be found in Sudan, Iran, Kazakhstan,
Venezuela, Angola, and the Caspian Basin.
¶7. (C) China has also increased its reliance on imported minerals, and many analysts have attributed the global commodities boom of recent years in part to China’s growing demand. Between 1980 and 2006, China became the world’s largest consumer of iron, copper and aluminum. Chinese conglomerates are ubiquitous in sub-Saharan Africa exploiting mineral wealth there, and Chinese multinationals have significant investments in Australian mineral and uranium production.
¶8. (C) China’s reliance on coal has come at an appalling environmental cost. This year, China surpassed the United States in carbon emissions, and it will soon become the world’s biggest energy consumer. Between now and 2030, the IEA estimates, China will need to add 1,312 gigawatts of power generating capacity, more than the total current installed capacity in the United States. Coal-fired power generation, a major source of air pollution, accounts for approximately 78 percent of China’s total electricity supply, and it will likely remain the predominant fuel in electricity generation for at least the next 20 years. Analysts predict that domestic coal production will peak in the next 15 to 25 years. China already became a net importer of coal in 2007, and coal imports are expected to grow in the coming decades to meet growing demand in China’s coastal provinces.
¶9. (C) The Chinese Government recognizes the need to reduce dependence on coal, and it is pursuing policies to diversify its energy mix. China is already the largest producer of renewable energy in the world, with major investments in large-scale hydro and wind power projects. Nuclear and natural gas power will also account for a greater proportion of energy production, but under current projections, efforts to diversify China’s energy mix will not have a large enough impact to curb greenhouse gas emissions growth.
¶10. (C) China’s energy intensive growth has also had tragic consequences for public health. By most measurements, at least half of the world’s most polluted major cities are in China. Rural residents, in particular farmers, have been affected by water pollution and dwindling water supplies, which are frequently redirected for industrial use. Respiratory disease, water-borne illness and tainted food scares are facts of modern life in the country. According to a recent WHO study, diseases caused by indoor and outdoor air pollution kill 656,000 Chinese citizens every year. Another 95,600 deaths are attributed annually to polluted drinking water.
¶11. (C) China’s increasing reliance on imported natural resources has foreign policy ramifications and provides opportunities for the United States. A China that is increasingly dependent on Middle Eastern oil might be more likely to support policies that do not destabilize the Middle East. Take Iran, for instance. We have long been frustrated that China has resisted (with Russia) tough sanctions aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear program. In the future, a China increasingly dependent on foreign energy supplies may recalculate the risk a nuclear Iran would pose to the greater Persian Gulf region’s capacity to export oil.
¶12. (C) Another opportunity presented by China’s increasing resource consumption is in the joint development of technological responses to reduce carbon emissions and to diminish the public health impact of industrial growth. Scientific publications around the world conclude that the projected rate of global energy and natural resource
BEIJING 00000022 003 OF 007
consumption is unsustainable. Experts warn that we must find alternative forms of energy in order to avert calamities posed by global climate change. International efforts to develop and significantly utilize renewable energy, clean up our shared global environment, and conserve our remaining raw materials will not be effective without meaningful Chinese participation. As the world’s preeminent technological power and as a leader in multilateral energy and scientific organizations, the United States is in a unique position to work with China to overcome these challenges.
Economic Interdependence and Chinese Demographics
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶13. (C) In the next fifteen years, while China’s overall population is predicted to stabilize, its urban population will likely grow to almost 1 billion, an increase (of 300 million people) equal to the entire current population of the United States. China plans to build 20,000 to 50,000 new skyscrapers over the next two decades -- as many as ten New York cities. More than 170 Chinese cities will need mass transit systems by 2025, more than twice the number now present in all of Europe. China is now surpassing Germany as the world’s third largest economy and is projected to overtake Japan within the next five years. By the end of the next thirty years, China’s economy could rival the United States in overall scale (although its per capita income will likely only be one quarter of the United States’).
¶14. (C) Behind these outward symbols of success will be an increasingly complicated economic picture. Since 1979, by reversing the misguided economic policies of the Mao era, liberalizing labor markets and prices, opening to foreign investment, and taking advantage of the West’s consumer-driven policies, China has maintained fast growth. However, the set of circumstances that allowed such impressive growth rates will no longer exist in the future.
¶15. (C) Many speculate that China has reached the limit to easy productivity gains by rationalizing the state-planned economy. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects China’s annual growth to slow from around 10 percent in the last 30 years to 4.5 percent by 2020. After 2015 when the labor force peaks as a share of the population, labor costs will rise faster. This will increasingly make other countries like India and Vietnam more attractive for labor-intensive investment. In addition, workers will have to support a growing number of retirees. Early retirement ages combined with the urban one-child limits creates the so-called “4-2-1” social dilemma: each worker will have to support four grandparents, two parents and one child. Savings rates will start falling as the elderly draw down their retirement funds.
¶16. (C) China will have to manage an economy increasingly dependent on domestic consumption and service industries for growth. Already, urbanites are buying 1,000 new cars per day, making China the world’s largest Internet and luxury goods market, and traveling abroad in growing numbers. By 2025, China will have the world’s largest middle class, and China will likely have completed the transition from the majority rural population of today to a majority urban population. These consumers of tomorrow will likely flock to products from around the world as their North American, European and Japanese counterparts do today, providing new opportunities for American business. If incomes continue to grow, it is likely that the Chinese middle class will react like educated urbanites in other countries by exerting pressure on the Government to improve its dismal performance on environmental protection, food and product safety. We are already seeing increased public activism over such issues today.
¶17. (C) China will face a challenge in the next thirty years encouraging this urban consumption while dealing with the social equality issues inherent in a rural population where over 200 million people still live on less than a dollar a day. China will also have to find a way to improve the lot of between 150 and 230 million migrant workers who today must leave their children and aging parents behind in their home villages to travel to the industrial centers of the
BEIJING 00000022 004 OF 007
relatively developed coastal regions to work in factories or on construction projects.
¶18. (C) With China’s phenomenal growth has come increased economic interdependence. This will likely increase, although some of the less-balanced elements of China’s economic interactions should be mitigated. Rising consumption rates should work to lower China’s trade surplus as well as its overabundance of foreign exchange reserves. More assets controlled by corporations and individuals, as opposed to the government, will diversify outward investment, reducing political control by Beijing, but also the utility of political suasion for U.S. policymakers interested in effecting the flow of capital to international hotspots.
Chinese Nationalism and Confidence on the International Stage
--------------------------------------------- ----------------
¶19. (C) As one of two main pillars of post-Mao Chinese Communist Party rule (the other being sustained economic growth), Chinese nationalism is growing and should be monitored closely. As witnessed during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Chinese are increasingly proud of the tremendous strides their country has made in recent years. More and more young people see China as having “arrived” and might possess the confidence and willingness to assume the responsibilities of a major power. However, as was evident during protests over the 1999 mistaken bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the 2004 protests over Japanese textbooks, and more recently the anti-France diatribes that followed the roughing-up of a disabled Olympic torch bearer in Paris by Free Tibet supporters, this nationalism can also lead to jingoism. Chinese leaders of a system with few outlets to express political sentiments are faced with trying to give vent to the occasional uprising of nationalistic anger without letting it get out of hand or allowing it to focus on the failings of the central leadership.
¶20. (C) With notable exceptions like Zhou Enlai, Chinese foreign policy practitioners thirty years ago had little practical experience dealing with the West. Since then, Chinese diplomats and subject matter experts are increasingly well-educated, well-traveled and well-respected. Chinese diplomats at international fora such as the UN and the WTO have become adept at using procedural rules to attain diplomatic or commercial ends. This trend will likely continue in the coming decades, increasing the likelihood of American decision makers finding more able adversaries when we disagree on issues, but also more able partners where we can agree to jointly tackle a problem of mutual concern such as nonproliferation, alternative energy or pandemic influenza.
¶21. (C) While still reluctant to claim China is a global leader, Chinese officials are gradually gaining confidence as a regional power. By the end of the next 30 years, China should no longer be able to portray itself as the representative of lesser developed countries. This does not mean that it will necessarily identify with the more developed, mainly Western countries; it well might choose to pursue some uniquely Chinese path. In the coming 30 years, a U.S. President might be involved in negotiations with a Chinese leader seeking to reshape global financial institutions like the IMF or the WTO or establish rival institutions for non-Western countries in order to mitigate domestic Chinese concerns. Even so, China’s growing position as a nation increasingly distinct from the less-developed world may expand our common interests and make it easier for the United States to convince China to act like a responsible global stakeholder.
¶22. (C) Foreign assistance coordination is another area of opportunity. China is rapidly ramping up its global economic presence, not only via resource extraction ventures and cheap exports, but increasingly via direct investment and assistance. This investment and assistance are welcome in most less-developed countries, whether in Africa or Southeast Asia, and particularly in countries where China’s longstanding policy of “no strings attached no political interference” appeals to democratically-challenged dictators
BEIJING 00000022 005 OF 007
and kleptocrats. However, China is already facing blowback as a result of its more cavalier approach to issues that more scrupulous donors have wrestled with for decades. Scant attention paid to worker safety, job opportunities for local people, environmental protection, and political legitimacy has had negative consequences for China on multiple occasions, from a tarnished international image and being used as a political whipping boy by opposition groups in democratic countries to unpaid loans, expropriated investments, and even the deaths of Chinese expatriates. As a result, China is beginning to understand the merits of international assistance standards not for altruistic reasons, but for achieving China’s own bottom-line imperatives of a more secure international position and better-protected economic interests in third countries. This realization, coupled with China’s growing economic clout on the world stage, make it quite possible that, in the next 30 years, China will come to be identified by the average citizen in less developed countries not as “one of us” but as “one of them.”
¶23. (C) In all likelihood, a new-found (if still somewhat grudging) PRC interest in internationally accepted donor principles such as transparency, good governance, environmental and labor protections, and corporate social responsibility will have matured in 30 years’ time, making China a reliable partner for the United States, other donor countries, and international organizations in alleviating poverty, developing infrastructure, improving education and fighting infectious disease. And as one of the world’s premier economic powers, China can be expected to have all but discarded its over-worn and outdated “non-interference” rhetoric in the face of massive Chinese investment assets and other economic interests abroad.
¶24. (C) As evidenced by Chinese policies toward pariah states like Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burma and Iran, China is still willing to put its need for markets and raw materials above the need to promote internationally accepted norms of behavior. However, the possible secession of southern Sudan (where much of the country’s oil is found) from the repressive Khartoum-based Bashir regime, the erratic treatment of foreign economic interests in Zimbabwe by Robert Mugabe, the dangers to regional safety and stability posed by Burma’s dysfunctional military junta, and the threat to China’s energy security that a nuclear-armed Iran would represent have given Beijing cause to re-calibrate its previously uncritical stance toward these international outlaws. If China’s integration into global economic and security structures continues apace, we would expect its tolerance for these sorts of disruptive players to decrease proportionately.
¶25. (C) China’s work in the Six-Party Talks and the Shanghai Cooperative Organization may provide guidance as to how to accelerate this trend. China plays a leading and often responsible and constructive role in both of these multilateral groups. Future U.S. policy-makers might usefully consider additional international mechanisms that include both U.S. and Chinese membership such as the proposed Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism that may grow out of the Six-Party Talks. The Chinese themselves have suggested a Six-Party Talks-like grouping to address the Iran nuclear issue, perhaps a P5-plus-1-plus-Iran. In the future, we may wish to consider the United States joining the East Asia Summit (EAS).
¶26. (C) Likewise, as the Chinese economy takes up a larger portion of the global economy, it inevitably will become increasingly affected by the decisions of international economic and financial institutions. Similarly, China’s economic decisions will have global implications, and its cooperation will become essential to solving global-scale problems. Drawing China constructively into regional and global economic and environmental dialogues and institutions will be essential. More and more experts see the utility of establishing an Asia-Pacific G-8, to include China, Japan, and the United States plus India, Australia, Indonesia, South Korea and Russia; others say the time is ripe to include China as a member of a G-9. Giving China a greater voice is seen as a way to encourage China to assume a larger burden in
BEIJING 00000022 006 OF 007
supporting the international economic and financial system.
Role of the Military
--------------------
¶27. (C) The disparate possibilities exist that in the coming decades the PLA will evolve into a major competitor, maintain only a regional presence or become a partner capable of joining us and others to address peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, humanitarian relief and disaster mitigation roles around the world. China may be content to remain only a regional power, but Deng Xiaoping’s maxim urging China to hide its capabilities while biding its time should caution us against predicting that the PLA’s long-term objectives are modest. In the years to come, our defense experts will need to closely monitor China’s contingency plans and we will need to use every diplomatic and strategic tool we have to prevent intimidating moves toward Taiwan. In the coming years, Chinese defense capabilities will continue to improve. The PLA thirty years from today will likely have sophisticated anti-satellite weapons, state-of-the-art aircraft, aircraft carriers and an ability to project force into strategic sea lanes.
¶28. (C) Thirty years ago the PLA was a bloated political organization with antiquated equipment and tactics. Today, the PLA is leaner and is becoming a modern force. Chinese military and paramilitary units have participated in UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions in East Timor, Kosovo, Haiti and Africa. In December 2008, for the first time, the PLA Navy deployed beyond the immediate waters surrounding the country to participate in anything beyond a goodwill tour to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. It is likely that China will continue to support UN-sponsored PKOs, and if the piracy expedition is successful, China might follow up with expeditions to future piracy hotspots such as the Strait of Malacca or elsewhere.
¶29. (C) Over the past thirty years, Chinese officials have come to begrudgingly acknowledge the benefits to East Asia resulting from the U.S. military presence in the Pacific, especially the extent that a U.S. presence in the Pacific is an alternative to a more robust Japanese military presence. A peaceful resolution of the threat posed by North Korea might cause China to call for an end to the U.S. base presence on the Korean Peninsula. Perceived threats to China’s security posed by Japan’s participation in missile defense or by future high-tech U.S. military technologies might cause tomorrow’s Chinese leaders to change their assessment and to exert economic pressures on U.S. allies like Thailand or the Philippines to choose between Beijing and Washington.
¶30. (C) Whatever the state of our future relations with China, we will need to understand more about the Chinese military. Multilateral training and exercises are constructive ways to promote understanding and develop joint capabilities that could be used in real-life situations. In the coming years, the Chinese may be called upon to participate in regional peacekeeping and humanitarian relief exercises. Some of these could be handled under UN auspices, but others could be bilateral or multilateral. For instance, Cobra Gold, which is held every year in Thailand, is America’s foremost military exercise in Asia. It has a peacekeeping component and since the December 2004 tsunami in Indian Ocean has included a humanitarian relief element. With proper buy-in by the Pentagon and PACOM, we could create a program to engage the PLA more directly both with our military and with friendly militaries in the region. Modest efforts at expanding search and rescue capabilities on the high seas, developing common forensic techniques for use in mass casualty events, conducting exercises with PLA units tasked with responding to civil nuclear emergencies, or table-top exercises for U.S. and Chinese junior officers could be steps that promote trust with little risk. At the same time, more frequent, regularly scheduled high-level reciprocal visits between Chinese and U.S. security officials might eventually lead to a constructive strategic security policy dialogue on nonproliferation, counterterrorism and other issues.
BEIJING 00000022 007 OF 007
Taiwan and Human Rights
------------------------
¶31. (C) Taiwan was the most vexing issue holding up the establishment of relations 30 years ago and remains the toughest issue for U.S.-China relations despite significant improvement in cross-Strait relations since the election of Taiwan President Ma. It will remain a delicate topic for the foreseeable future. We should continue to support Taiwan and Mainland efforts to reduce tension by increasing Taiwan’s “international space” and reducing the Mainland’s military build-up across from Taiwan.
¶32. (C) Thirty years ago, the Chinese state interfered in virtually every aspect of its citizens’ lives. An individual’s work unit provided housing, education, medical care and a burial plot. Reeducation sessions and thought reform were common, churches and temples were closed, and average citizens had little access to the outside world. Today, Chinese have far greater ability to travel, read foreign media and worship. Nonetheless, the overall human rights situation falls well short of international norms. Today, China’s growing cadre of well-educated urbanites generally avoids politics and seems more interested in fashion and consumerism than in ideology; after all, outside-the-box political thinking, much less activism, remains dangerous. However, any number of factors in the future ranging from rising unemployment among recent college graduates, or growing discontent over the income divide separating rich urbanites from poor peasants, to discontent among the mass of migrant workers could lead to unrest and increased political activism. The Chinese Government still responds with brutal force to any social, religious, political or ideological movement it perceives as a potential threat. Chinese political leaders’ occasional nods toward the need for political reform and increased democracy suggest a realization that the current one-party authoritarianism has its weak points, but do not promise sufficient relaxation of party control to create a more dynamically stable polity in the long term.
¶33. (C) While the U.S. model of democracy is not the only example of a tolerant open society, we should continue to push for the expansion of individual freedoms, respect for the rule of law and the establishment of a truly free and independent judiciary and press as being necessities for a thriving, modern society and, as such, in China’s own interests. Someday, China will realize political reform. When that day comes, we will want to be remembered by Chinese for having helped China to advance. Randt