VZCZCXRO0788
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0150/01 0201542
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201542Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1306
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0557
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY 0043
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0089

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000150 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019 
TAGS: MARR PTER PREL PINR PRES TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKISH-IRAQ-U.S. TRILATERAL SECURITY TALKS: SLOW 
PROGRESS, LOWERING EXPECTATIONS 
 
REF: A. 08 BAGHDAD 3710 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 3793 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 3847 
     ¶D. BAGHDAD 4003 
     ¶E. ANKARA 00092 
 
Classified By: Political-Military Minister-Counselor Michael Corbin for 
 reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Little progress was made at the 
Iraqi-Turkish-U.S. trilateral security talks, held at the 
intermediate subcommittee level on January 15.  Turkish MG 
Ozturk made a brief presentation on the PKK in Northern Iraq, 
but most of the time was spent discussing modalities.  All 
parties seem willing to continue the dialogue, with lowered 
expectations.  Embassy and MNF-I will continue to encourage 
the Turks and Iraqis to use this forum for practical 
cooperation.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Following one Ministerial kickoff session (Ref A) 
and three working level meetings (Refs B-D), the 
Turkey-Iraq-U.S. trilateral security talks convened for the 
first time at the intermediate Subcommittee level on January 
¶15.  Iraqi Deputy Minister of State for National Security 
Affairs Tariq Baldawi co-chaired the Iraqi delegation, with 
KRG Major General Dalshad Najeeb continuing to represent 
Erbil.  Turkish General Staff Deputy J3 (Operations) Major 
General Erdal Ozturk flew down with a large interagency 
delegation that included representatives from Interior and 
Foreign Affairs. MNF-I RDML Lothrop "Buzz" Little and Acting 
Pol-Mil Counselor led the U.S. team. 
 
¶3.  (C)  As in previous sessions, little concrete information 
was exchanged.  A formal presentation the Turks had promised 
to provide on the PKK presence in Northern Iraq did not 
materialize, but MG Ozturk did give a short, general overview 
of the PKK's locations, logistics, and political activities, 
of little  operational value.  MG Ozturk passed an 
intelligence template to the Iraqis to assist them in 
developing and sharing information in the future.  Baldawi 
responded to the Turks not with an intel brief, but by 
declaring that the Iraqi Constitution states that it is 
illegal for terrorist groups to operate in or launch attacks 
from Iraq.  Referring  to media reports of Turkey's ongoing 
artillery and air cross-border operations, Baldawi asked the 
Turks to take under consideration their "shelling Iraqi 
border villages" suspected of being PKK hideouts, asserting 
four recent cases of civilian casualties. MG Ozturk calmly 
responded that the Turks take great care not to injure 
civilians and the media has been known to distort events. 
RDML Little suggested the GOI offer details of the alleged 
incidents in writing to facilitate a proper investigation. 
(Comment: We doubt Baldawi will do so; he appeared to be 
making a gallant gesture to the KRG.  End comment.) 
 
¶4.  (C)  The bulk of the session (two hours at the table, not 
counting lunch) was given over to  continued discussion of 
modalities, such as the frequency and level at which the 
committee should meet, and U.S.-Turkish encouragement for the 
Iraqi secretariat to conform with previous promises to 
circulate draft minutes of meeting s.  Echoing U.S. themes 
from earlier sessions, RDML Little emphasized that the U.S. 
del was there to support the Iraqi and Turkish participants 
in turning the committee into a practical venue for the 
exchange of information.  The Turks and Iraqis agreed 
information sharing would begin in earnest at the next 
meeting. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The only energetic exchange came when Ozturk stated 
Turkey's intention to roll ongoing intel liaison with the KDP 
QTurkey's intention to roll ongoing intel liaison with the KDP 
and PUK in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah into the trilat process, 
referring to an agreement made between Turkey's Interior 
Minister Besir Atalay and Iraqi Minister of State for 
National Security al-Waeli  at the initial ministerial 
session.  Baldawi seemed to have no knowledge of this 
agreement.  Offline, Iraqi officials (including Baldawi) and 
Turkish officials (Ozturk and MFA Director General Inan 
Ozyildiz) told U.S. participants that they were satisfied 
with the progress to date and willing to continue the 
process, aiming for weekly working-level sessions and a 
monthly meeting t the Subcommittee level. 
 
¶6. (C)  COMMENT:  Seen through American eyes, this session 
was an exercise in frustration.  Yet to our surprise, neither 
side seemed perturbed.  Notwithstanding the Turkish DCHOD,s 
understandable expression of disappointment about Iraqi 
unpreparedness (Ref E), our perception is that the Turks 
appear to have lowered their expectations of what can be 
accomplished through this forum and to have reconciled 
 
BAGHDAD 00000150  002 OF 002 
 
 
themselves to - at best - a slow path toward practicality. 
Their goal increasingly appears to be merely to maintain 
political cover for their separate contacts with the KRG. 
The Iraqi participants seem similarly content to go through 
the motions so they can assert that Turkey is cooperating 
with the GoI, not just the KRG, against the PKK.  We will 
continue to encourage the Turks and Iraqis to make more 
serious use of this channel, but we also find ourselves 
moderating our expectations.  END COMMENT. 
CROCKER