VZCZCXRO8785
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHAK #0003 0021616
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021616Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8364
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0006
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD PRIORITY
RUEAORC/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000003 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC, EUR/SE MARSH 
CBP/INA FOR BPICKETT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2019 
TAGS: ETTC KNNP KSTC MNUC PARM PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY SEIZES IRANIAN CONTAINERS WITH SUSPECTED 
BOMB-MAKING MATERIAL BOUND FOR VENEZUELA 
 
Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor A. Godfrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) On December 31, MFA DDG Ahmet Muhtar Gun confirmed for 
us media reporting the previous day that Turkish Customs 
seized 22 shipping containers originating from Iran bound for 
Venezuela, containing drums of nitrate and sulphite chemicals 
and dismantled laboratory instruments, which could possibly 
be used for making bombs.  Although he did not have 
additional details, Gun told us that the Turkish National 
Intelligence Organization "swarmed" the Port of Mersin when 
it learned of the seizure.  Mustafa Yurkakul, Gun's section 
chief, said the MFA is mindful of UNSC Resolution 1747's 
decision prohibiting Iran from transferring "arms and related 
materiel," and is awaiting a formal investigation report to 
make a determination whether the shipment is in violation of 
the resolution.  In a separate meeting on December 31, 
Turkish Customs Enforcement's Anti-Smuggling and Narcotics 
Department Head Mehmet Akilli provided us with the initial 
investigation's findings and showed us photographs of the 
shipping containers and drums of chemicals. 
 
¶2. (C) Akilli noted the following about the seizure: 
 
--  The containers originating from Iran were transported 
into Turkey via the Gurbulak Customs Port of Entry on the 
Iranian / Turkish Border.  The manifest claimed that the 
containers held tractor spare parts.  The trucks were allowed 
into Turkey for transshipment by ship via the Port of Mersin 
in southern Turkey. 
 
-- Once the truck entered the Port of Mersin, Customs 
performed a risk analysis and diverted the truck to an x-ray 
unit.  The x-ray image showed a number of crates containing 
drums and technical equipment, which were not consistent with 
the declared manifest.  The container was opened by a team of 
Custom Inspection officers and Custom Enforcement officers. 
 
-- In each container were wooden crates and metal drums.  The 
crates contained dismantled laboratory equipment (no further 
information was provided) and the drums appeared to be filled 
with sodium nitrate (labeled "Dualoble Nitro" on the drums) 
and sulfite. 
 
--  The crates were marked for delivery to the Ministry of 
Defense of Venezuela as the consignee and some were marked as 
military parts. 
 
--  The declared value for shipment was USD $5,500,000. 
 
--  The Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) was contacted. 
 TAEK officials inspected the shipment for possible 
radiological material, but none were found.  TAEK also 
checked the Turkish Export Control list for dual-use or other 
sensitive items and determined the chemicals and laboratory 
instruments were not on these lists. 
 
--  Since some crates were marked as military items, the 
Turkish Military is also investigating the items to ensure 
they do not fall under any military restrictions. 
 
--  Upon seizure of this shipment, Turkish Customs turned the 
investigation over to the prosecutors office for further 
investigation and determination. 
 
¶3. (C) Comment: The MFA has told us over the last two years 
that the GOT has stepped up monitoring of Iranian shipments 
transiting Turkey, including through random inspections at 
the Gurbulak border crossing.  This seizure is one tangible 
example of Turkey's heightened vigilance to prevent illicit 
shipments from Iran.  The willingness to share information 
with us so early on in a sensitive investigation is also an 
indication of the close cooperation we enjoy with the GOT on 
nonproliferation issues.  Post will continue to monitor the 
investigation and assist as appropriate, but we caution that 
now that the investigation has entered the stage where it is 
managed by the fiercely independent Prosecutor's Office, it 
may be difficult to track its progress.  End Comment. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
Jeffrey