VZCZCXRO0803
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVB #0834/01 3431251
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081251Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8828
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 000834 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CE AND EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL EUC HR SI
SUBJECT: CROATIA FEARS SLOVENIA WILL BLOCK EU ACCESSION 
PROGRESS UNTIL AGREEMENT ON BILATERAL BORDER ISSUES 
 
REF: A. LJUBLJANA 537 
     ¶B. LJUBLJANA 536 
     ¶C. LJUBLJANA 515 
     ¶D. ZAGREB 785 
     ¶E. ZAGREB 762 
     ¶F. ZAGREB 734 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, POL/ECON, Reason 1.4 B/D 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Croatian officials say they are 
increasingly concerned that Slovenia will be unwilling to 
compromise on a French-brokered statement clarifying that 
nothing in Croatia's EU accession negotiations could 
prejudice the outcome of Croatia and Slovenia's bilateral 
border disputes.  Croatia anxiously awaits the outcome of 
discussions in Brussels on December 4 and 5 to see if the 
French EU Presidency can craft language that would convince 
Ljubljana to lift its holds on several negotiating chapters 
prior to the next scheduled EU-Croatian negotiating session 
on December 19.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (C/NF) As reported reftels, Slovenia has placed a "hold" 
on the opening of several chapters in  Croatia's EU 
negotiations because of Croatia's alleged inclusion of 
material that was prejudicial to the ongoing border dispute. 
A French-brokered solution reportedly involves the EU and 
Croatia exchanging letters expressing that the material 
submitted by Croatia during its EU negotiations was in no way 
intended to be prejudicial vis-Q-vis the ongoing border 
dispute. However, in a December 4 meeting with the 
Ambassador, MFA State Secretary Davor Bozinovic expressed 
concern that this compromise would not persuade Ljubljana to 
lift its hold on the subject chapters.  MFA DG for Europe 
Neven Pelicaric raised similar concerns with POLCOUNS on the 
same day.  Bozinovic's version of developments mirrored 
closely that reported by Embassy Ljubljana in REF A:  the 
French had proposed a text, Slovenia had proposed amendments 
to that text, and the French had rejected the majority of 
those amendments.  According to Pelicaric, the French had 
told the GoC that the EU could not accept the Slovene 
proposals, much less Croatia, and had refused to even show 
Croatia the text of the Slovene changes. 
 
¶3. (C/NF) The Croatians said that they had received reports 
of a somewhat contentious COREPER meeting at the EU in 
Brussels on December 3, where the French had attempted to 
force Slovenia to accept an only slightly amended statement, 
but that the Slovene PermRep had refused.  The Croatians were 
told the negotiations continued in Brussels during December 
4, with a special COREPER meeting possible, with the Croatia 
text as the sole agenda item, on December 5. 
 
¶4. (C/NF) The GoC contends that there is no prejudicial 
material in its negotiating positions, and says it would 
happily accept the last version of the French language it has 
seen.  Croatian officials insist that their package includes 
no maps or references with any direct implication on border 
issues.  The Slovene objections, the Croatians say, are based 
on a scenario that includes checking every law or government 
decision that is referenced in a negotiating position, as 
well as any associated action plans or implementing 
provisions; finding provisions in those laws or decisions, or 
maps associated with them, that might be construed as 
implying a certain disposition of the border issue; and then 
insisting that those original laws or decisions had to be 
amended before the negotiating position would be acceptable. 
An Italian diplomat (protect) corroborates this, telling us 
that the Slovenes drilled down into every aspect of the 
negotiating package and had found some instances where such a 
connection could be made.  He added that, if Italy had wanted 
to, it could have performed a similar operation and found 
some concerns.  But, he said, Rome would never engage in such 
an exercise because of its support of the broader project of 
EU enlargement. 
 
¶5. (C/NF) Both Bozinovic and Pelicaric confirmed REF A report 
that the initial meeting between FM Jandrokovic and new 
Slovene FM Zbogar in Brussels on the margins of the NATO 
Ministerial earlier this week had gone well.  Pelicaric said 
they felt that Zbogar had been sincere when he said that the 
Slovene amendments to the French text would be 
non-controversial, and had been surprised when the French 
viewed them differently.  But given Slovenia's unreadiness to 
accept a compromise text, both Pelicaric and Bozinovic said 
they were beginning to wonder whether Slovenia would ever 
accept Croatia's EU membership pending concessions by Zagreb 
over the border issue.  These suspicions are shared by some 
others as well.  A UK diplomat (protect) has also suggested 
that it appears increasingly likely that Slovenia may indeed 
 
ZAGREB 00000834  002 OF 002 
 
 
be willing to keep keep Croatia out of the EU unless Zagreb 
gives in on the border dispute, particularly Piran Bay. 
 
¶6. (C) COMMENT: Last week's visit to Zagreb by Slovenian 
President Danilo Turk and Foreign Minister Samuel Zgobar had 
raised Croatian hopes that Croatian-Slovenian relations were 
to improve.  Croatian media largely characterized the visit 
as positive one that could diffuse tensions between the two 
neighbors.  This week's developments, therefore, come as an 
unwelcome setback.   Without a doubt, if Slovenia does indeed 
maintain the blockade on Croatia's EU negotiations later this 
month, then Croatia-Slovenia relations will suffer.  We agree 
with Embassy Ljubljana's view in REF A that a face-saving 
solution based on the French proposal is the most likely way 
out of the immediate impasse.  Over the longer term, the 
parties had agreed in 2007 to refer the border dispute to 
international arbitration, which would have the positive 
effect of removing this bilateral issue from the EU process 
entirely.  Unfortunately, that process also appears (REF F) 
to have stalled over the details.   END COMMENT 
BRADTKE