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Viewing cable 08USUNNEWYORK1198, UNGA 63: DEALING WITH WESTERN EUROPE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08USUNNEWYORK1198 2008-12-23 19:27 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL USUN New York
VZCZCXRO3894
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUCNDT #1198/01 3581927
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231927Z DEC 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5583
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3471
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001198 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018 
TAGS: PHUM PREL UNGA US XG XH XT ZB
SUBJECT: UNGA 63: DEALING WITH WESTERN EUROPE 
 
REF: 2007 USUN 1218 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS 
FOR REASON 1.4 (B&D) 
 
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
 
1.  (U)  This cable was prepared by Robert J. Smolik who 
served as Senior Area Advisor for Western European Affairs to 
the 63rd United Nations General Assembly. 
 
2.  (C)  During the fall session of the 63rd UNGA, EU and 
European Free Trade Association states generally aligned with 
U.S. objectives.  They put their weight behind human rights 
resolutions and buttressed us on most other first, second and 
third committee work.  Notably, the EU and allies quieted 
their call for the U.S. to engage at the UN Human Rights 
Council.  However, the EU moralistically and even 
provocatively countered U.S. preferences on death penalty and 
religious intolerance/freedom of expression, and sexual 
orientation issues. 
 
3.  (C)  One way to avoid needlessly exposing such 
transatlantic divisions (especially to the G-77) is to begin 
early, energetic, and detailed UNGA 64 consultations with the 
EU troika.  Pre-consultation on key issues (before the EU 
establishes its common position) would save hours of 
damage-limitation negotiation in New York.  More positively, 
it would allow us to work proactively with the EU to show 
transatlantic leadership at the UN. 
 
4.  (C)  In an effort to build bridges to the G-77, 
Switzerland played a successful, efficient role as floor 
manager for a U.S.-inspired resolution on "Legal Empowerment 
of the Poor".  Among the larger EU players, Spain most often 
contested U.S. interests.  For example, Spain prevented 
(probably for domestic political reasons) a stronger EU 
showing against the Kosovo ICJ referral, and complicated the 
UN's Interfaith Dialogue (which Spain sees as infringing on 
its Alliance of Civilizations).  Our relationship with Madrid 
on UN issues deserves sustained attention, not least because 
of Spain's mutliplier role in Latin America. 
 
5.  (SBU)  France's EU presidency during UNGA 63 assured a 
fully-staffed and efficient European team of interlocutors; 
Sweden will need to step up to play a similar role next year. 
 The Czech Republic's EU presidency in the first half of 2009 
gives us a strong ally on human rights issues. 
 
6.  (C)  This is another argument to engage the EU troika 
early to prepare as much of a common strategy as possible for 
UNGA 64.  In the end, the EU may be so attached to its role 
as "moderator in New York" between the U.S. and the G-77, 
that U.S.-EU common positions on all issues may not be 
possible before UNGA 64.  The bottom line is that the EU 
generally provides our core support within WEOG, as we often 
face overwhelming opposition from the G-77.  So for us to 
maintain and grow our influence during UNGA 64, one key is to 
engage the EU proactively and in detail.  END SUMMARY 
 
FRANCE'S STRONG EU PRESIDENCY COORDINATION; NEED TO INFLUENCE 
CZECH EU PRESIDENCY 
 
7.  (SBU)  As expected, throughout the fall UNGA 63, the 
French Mission was organized and energetic in representing 
common EU positions.  They worked with us to lobby African, 
Asian, Caribbean and Latin American delegations, effectively 
allocating tasks, sometimes in surprising extra-EU ways 
(Norway influenced Burundi's human rights votes).  But at 
times, France also allowed EU partners to work against our 
interests.  (EU PRs often turned this argument around, saying 
that U.S. positions of principle are on certain issues 
inimical to EU common positions). 
 
8.  (C)  For example, EU gave Sweden latitude to insert a 
capital punishment clause (unacceptable to us) into a UN/COE 
resolution.  This wasted hours of negotiation and generated 
pointless bad feeling, particularly since the clause was 
finally unceremoniously dropped.  France also allowed the EU 
resolution on religious intolerance to cross our known red 
lines on freedom of expression, giving Egypt and Pakistan 
among the G-77 the chance to spotlight transatlantic 
differences.  Determined negotiation allowed us to protect 
our constitutional freedom of speech requirements, and 
eventually to co-sponsor the resolution. Even though DRL had 
made our position clear to the EU several months before,  the 
positive outcome in third committee required many hours of 
work in New York and even last-minute intervention at 
political director level in capitals. 
 
9.  (SBU)  One way to save negotiation time and avoid bad 
perceptions is to engage the EU troika forcefully and early, 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001198  002 OF 003 
 
 
before the EU agrees on a common position.  Sweden will be in 
the EU presidency during the critical fall months of UNGA 64, 
Our best moment to influence the EU's UNGA 64 performance 
will be during the Czech presidency in the first half of 
2009.  The Czech PR is eager to coordinate with us, on third 
committee issues in particular, pointing out that the Czech 
Republic criticizes human rights abuses wherever they occur 
(including in Cuba.)  Ambassador Martin Palous has personal 
experience with human rights, as a dissident during the 
Soviet period. 
 
WORKING WITH EUROPEANS TO BUILD BRIDGES TO G-77 AND AVOID 
ISOLATION 
 
10.  (C)  In an effort to build bridges to the G-77, the U.S. 
Mission conceived a resolution based on the acclaimed work of 
Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto ("Legal Empowerment of 
the Poor and Eradication of Poverty").  His widely-praised 
proposals favor, inter alia, granting property rights to the 
poor so that they can borrow to build small businesses.  Our 
concept with this proposal was to get beyond instinctive G-77 
suspicion of U.S. proposals.  We asked Switzerland (and 
Guatemala) to floor manage the resolution, which they did 
brilliantly.  In achieving consensus, the resolution 
countered typical exchanges in second committee, where there 
is usually a deep divide between WEOG and the G-77. 
Switzerland intends to work with partners to pursue this 
resolution, implementing its provisions in a report that 
deals with practical problems of legal structures and 
economic development. 
 
11.  (SBU)  Switzerland, as a non-threatening good citizen of 
the UN, opened the way for similar initiatives, perhaps to be 
proposed in the future by an EU member state.  Along these 
same lines, USUN made a special effort this UNGA to avoid 
needless isolation on certain issues.  We worked successfully 
with France and the UK in the first committee to this effect. 
 On the series of Palestine resolutions, we were less 
successful, since several EU states who had moderated their 
positions on similar votes at the Human Rights Council in 
Geneva, reverted to an EU consensus abstention. 
 
12.  (SBU)  On the positive side, whereas during UNGA 62 
European PRs never failed to criticize us for disengaging 
from the HRC, at UNGA 63 they no longer mentioned Geneva, but 
worked effectively with us on human rights in the third 
committee.  As during UNGA 62, the EU worked closely with the 
U.S. and Canada to push through human rights resolutions 
condemning Burma, DPRK and Iran.  France/EU presidency 
effectively shouldered their responsibilities to share 
lobbying of G-77 members where they enjoy special influence. 
(They even asked Norway to use its predominant position in 
Burundi to lobby there.)  Along with France and the UK, who 
traditionally lobby francophone and Commonwealth nations, 
Spain at our request, tried to influence GRULAC Latins, with 
some success. 
 
INTERFAITH DIALOGUE AND RESOLUTIONS ON RELIGION - 
WORKING WITH SPAIN AND THE VATICAN 
 
13.  (C)  The Spanish Mission to the UN is extremely 
effective, both within the EU caucus (where they prevented a 
"free vote" on the ICJ Kosovo referral, achieving a 
disappointing block EU abstention) and working with Latin 
America (where we asked their PR to lobby for human rights 
votes against Burma, DPRK and Iran).  The current PR, Juan 
Antonio Yanez-Barnuevo, also served in the 1990s as Spain's 
Ambassador to the UN and was Legal Adviser at his Foreign 
Ministry; he is tenacious. 
 
14.  (SBU)  On the various UNGA 63 outcomes regarding 
religion, particularly during the Saudi-sponsored Interfaith 
Dialogue, Spain took a skeptical position, probably because 
they feared cross purposes with their own initiative, the 
Alliance of Civilizations.  The "preparatory" meeting in 
Madrid left both the Spanish Government and the Vatican 
displeased with the Saudi closing declaration.  However, 
thanks to hard work in Madrid and at the Holy See, the 
outcome document from the Interfaith Dialogue pleased all 
parties. 
 
15.  (C)  On the Kosovo ICJ referral, Spain was the major EU 
state most opposing our position.  Its intransigence 
prevented those EU members doubtful about the referral from 
voting a national position, and forced an EU abstention on 
the issue.   Also, on a wide variety of issues that matter to 
us and the EU, from human rights to various religious issues 
to reproductive rights, the Vatican UN Observer played a 
quiet but influential role.  The Holy See is worth 
cultivating on many issues likely to arise at UNGA 64. Others 
worth cultivating are tiny Europeans, like Liechtenstein and 
San Marino, whose long-serving and active Ambassadors at the 
 
USUN NEW Y 00001198  003 OF 003 
 
 
UN give them influence disproportionate to their populations. 
 Although they do not sit in EU coordinating meetings at the 
UN, they meet regularly with EU counterparts, both informally 
and in regularly scheduled format with the EU-27. 
 
16.  (SBU)  Another EU initiative, a statement on sexual 
orientation/gender identity, was also adopted.  The EU 
procedure in preparing their text was revealing.  France/EU 
presidency approached likely supporters and shared their 
draft; others, likely to oppose, such as the Vatican, were 
held at arms length.  We received the text fairly late in the 
process, after the French said some 55 co-signers were 
committed.  This experience highlights the need for early, 
preemptive consultations with the troika before future UNGAs. 
 Although a statement is not as formal a UN outcome as is a 
resolution, the text of the EU statement can and probably 
will be used as the basis for a future resolution. 
 
17.  (SBU)  UN budget and resource issues are also still 
under negotiation in fourth committee.  The EU representative 
is playing behind the scenes, not revealing his hand, but 
will reportedly argue for some budget stringency.  This would 
be an improvement over the EU's open-handed, even 
unprincipled approach on budget issues during UNGA 62. 
However, in the heat of negotiations, the EU has sometimes 
failed to acknowledge our points of principle on PBI (program 
of budget increase), thus straining relations.  The Hungarian 
PR chair of fourth committee is being even-handed. 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
18.  (C)  We need to work more proactively with the EU on our 
UNGA 64 agenda.  We should recognize that EU interests at 
UNGA 64 may diverge in specific areas from U.S. objectives, 
even if we engage in early and detailed consultations with 
the troika.  In substantive, strategic terms this will likely 
be the case for such issues as capital punishment and freedom 
of expression versus religious intolerance.  In tactical 
terms, even on issues that should unite us, including many 
arms limitation and economic development matters, the EU may 
still choose to play "go between" with the G-77.  The 
troika's consultations with the G-77 are institutionalized, 
which builds in a dynamic of accommodation.  This tactical 
challenge is still another argument for us to engage the EU 
troika early to prepare as much of a common strategy as 
possible for UNGA 64. 
 
19.  (C)  In the end, the EU may so relish its role as 
"moderator in New York" between the U.S. and the G-77, that 
pre-UNGA common transatlantic positions on all isues may not 
be possible.  In the category of "preempting an excuse," 
early consultations with the troika can at least minimize 
situations where the EU Presidency argues that its UN text 
was so exhaustively negotiated at 27 that they cannot reopen 
it.  The French Ambassador's remarks to hundreds of 
colleagues at France's end of presidency reception were 
provocative: "In the past at the UN, the EU was seen as 'the 
nice guy'. Now we want to be something more."  Several EU PRs 
interpret this to mean that in future the EU will more 
forcefully defend its red lines. 
 
20.  (C)  The bottom line is that the EU generally provides 
our core support within WEOG, as we often face overwhelming 
opposition from the G-77.  So better UN outcomes can result 
from engaging the troika early and in detail on UNGA 64.  The 
upcoming Czech presidency will give us that opportunity. 
 
Khalilzad