VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1159/01 3452346
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 102346Z DEC 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5501

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001159 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC AFIN KUNR ICTY ICTR UNGA
SUBJECT: FINANCING OF ITY AND ICTR 
 
¶1.   SUMMARY: The Fifth Committee will begin discussing the 
financing of International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ITY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) on Monday, December 15, 2008.  Member States will 
consider the First Performance Report for ITY (A/63/559) and 
ICTR (A/63/558), the revised estimates arising in respect to 
Security Council resolution 1800 (2008) on the appointment of 
additional ad litem judges at the ITY, and further discuss 
the issue of establishing a possible financial retention 
incentive for the Tribunals.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.   FIRST PERFORMANCE REPORTS FOR THE ITY (A/63/559) AND 
ICTR (A/63/558): These reports reflect the 
Secretary-General's (SYG) request for additional 
appropriations for the Tribunals.  The increased requirements 
reflect changes with respect to exchange rates, inflation, 
and standard salary costs.  For the ICTR, the SYG report 
requests the General Assembly (GA) to approve an additional 
amount of $7,831,700 gross ($6,948,00 net) to the ICTR 
Special Account for the biennium 2008-2009.  For the ITY, the 
GA is requested to approve an additional appropriation for 
the biennium 2008-2009 in the amount of $13,117,900 gross 
($11,404,700 net) to the ITY Special Account.  The Department 
may wish to take into account the observations and 
recommendations in the report of the ACABQ, which will be 
transmitted when available. 
 
¶3.   SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1800 (2008):  This SC 
resolution decided that the SYG may appoint, within existing 
resources, additional ad litem judges upon the request of the 
ITY President in order to conduct additional trials, 
notwithstanding the fact that the total number of ad litem 
judges appointed to the Chambers will from time to time 
temporarily exceed the maximum of 12 provided for in article 
12 (1) of the International Tribunal statute.  The SYG's 
report on the revised estimates arising in respect of SC 
resolution 1800 (2008) (A/62/809) estimates that the 
requirements for the appointment of up to four ad litem 
judges at any one time over the maximum of 12 would amount to 
$374,500.  However, the report claims that during this early 
stage, the Tribunal is not in a position to determine whether 
the additional costs can be met from within the approved 
appropriation.  The GA may wish to take note of the present 
report and request the SYG to submit a report on the 
implementation of SC resolution 1800 (2008) 
in the context of the second performance report for the 
biennium 2008-2009.  The ACABQ report on this matter 
(A/62/7/Add.38), however, expects the appointment of 
additional ad litem judges will indeed be implemented from 
within existing resources.  Unless otherwise instructed, USUN 
will endorse the conclusions of ACABQ on this item. 
 
¶4.   RETENTION INCENTIVE: In its resolution 61/274, the GA 
requested the SYG to submit a report on possible measures for 
staff retention no later than the first resumed session of 
the 62nd UNGA.  That report is contained in document A/62/681 
and up for discussion during the current 63rd UNGA.  The SYG 
recommends a combination of monetary and non-monetary 
incentives, of which the former is considered the most 
effective.  The SYG would like the GA to approve a financial 
incentive for staff who remain in their posts until their 
functions are no longer needed.  The SYG report analyzes 
three alternative approaches to the calculation of the amount 
of a retention incentive. 
 
--Option A: The incentive would apply to eligible staff 
having completed at least two years of service with the 
Tribunals at the time the incentive is due.  The incentive 
will be calculated in accordance with the recommended 
methodology in A/61/824, which recommended that authorization 
be granted to the SYG to apply the termination indemnities 
set out under the heading "Permanent appointments" in annex 
III to the Staff Regulations and Rules for the specific and 
sole purpose of approving payments related to the retention 
incentive package for the Tribunal staff.  The financial 
implications are estimated at $11.2 million for the ICTR and 
$12.1 million for the ITY. (paras. 30 to 35 of A/62/681) 
 
--Option B: The retention incentive would apply to eligible 
staff having completed at least five years of service with 
the Tribunals at the time the incentive is due, with all 
other conditions remaining unchanged as in Option A.  The 
financial implications are estimated at $6.9 million for the 
ICTR and $7.2 million for the ITY. (paras. 36 to 38 of 
A/62/681) 
 
--Option C: The retention incentive would apply to eligible 
staff having completed at least five years of service with 
the Tribunals and be capped at an amount to be set for the 
GA, either in terms of a fixed number of months of salary or 
a fixed incentive payment. The financial implications will 
depend on what limits are approved of in the GA. (paras. 39 
to 40 of A/62/681) 
 
¶5.   The SYG report recommends that this retention incentive 
apply to eligible staff who have completed at least five 
years of service with the Tribunals at the time the incentive 
is due as outlined in Option B.  Moreover, the SYG report 
claims that designating this incentive to a limited group of 
"key" staffers would be perceived as giving unequal treatment 
and could undermine staff morale.  The SYG recommends that 
the retention incentive be applicable on an as wide a post 
coverage basis as possible. 
 
¶6.   The ACABQ report as contained in document A/62/734, 
however, recommends a different scheme.  Noting that a 
retention incentive is not provided for in the existing Staff 
Regulations and Rules, the ACABQ recommends that the GA 
authorize, on an exceptional basis, the payment of a 
retention incentive to staff required to remain with the 
Tribunals until their services and posts are no longer 
needed, as set out in the drawdown plans of each Tribunal, 
targeting staff with a minimum of five years of service in 
the Tribunals as outlined in Option C in the SYG report.  The 
ACABQ also recommends the amount of the incentive be capped 
at five months' salary for all staff members, irrespective of 
the number of years of service at the Tribunals beyond five 
years.  This decision should be done on an ad hoc basis and 
not on an amendment to the Staff Rules. 
 
¶7.   The International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) 2007 
report as contained in A/62/30 advises that (a) special 
financial retention incentives for the ICTR and ITY are not 
considered appropriate because they are not provided for in 
the common system and as such would set a precedent, which 
should be avoided; (b) the existing contractual framework 
should be used to grant contracts that would remove the 
uncertainty with regard to future employment; (c) other 
non-monetary incentives should be made available; (d) those 
staff from the Tribunals who are offered appointments in 
another common system organization should have their 
reporting date for the new assignment to coincide with 
completion of their work with the Tribunal. 
 
¶8.   Unless otherwise instructed, USDel will continue to 
uphold the previously provided US position that the retention 
incentive as envisioned by the Tribunals is inappropriate. 
USUN would draw from the following points: 
 
--US is concerned with the Tribunals' inability to target the 
incentive to those who actually need to be retained through 
the completion of the Tribunals' work. 
 
--This retention incentive was not meant to be a universal 
bonus, which may perpetuate the problem of grade inflation, 
but rather it should be used to ensure that the most critical 
staff stay with the Tribunal as it works towards the 
completion strategy. 
 
--US notes the ICSC recommendations, which clearly state that 
providing a financial incentive is not necessary and such an 
incentive is not provided in the common system and would thus 
set a precedent. 
 
--US does not support the proposition that all or the 
majority of current staff are crucial and need to be given a 
retention bonus to retain their services. 
Khalilzad