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O 041513Z DEC 08
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TO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 1822
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RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI IMMEDIATE 0106
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0735
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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5463
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001131 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018 
TAGS: SO XW UNSC PGOV PRO ETTC
SUBJECT: UN/SOMALIA SANCTIONS: 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY POLITICAL COUNSELOR ELLEN GERMAIN, FOR REASONS 1. 
4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) This is an action request -- please see para 10. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary:  The UN Monitoring Group (MG) for Somalia 
has just released its latest confidential report on the 
implementation of the general arms embargo which includes a 
number of key findings likely to influence the policy debate 
on Somalia.  The MG concluded that nearly every armed force, 
group or militia in Somalia, as well their financiers, active 
supporters, and foreign donors, are guilty of arms embargo 
violations.  It alleged that the governments of Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, and commercial entities in Yemen, have provided 
political, financial and/or military support to armed Somali 
groups, which constitutes arms embargo violations.  The MG 
documented how external contributions to build TFG security 
forces, capacity have provided an important loophole through 
which arms, equipment and military skills are diverted to the 
open market or to armed opposition groups.  This report also 
includes detailed information about Somali armed groups that 
will help the Somalia Sanctions Committee find appropriate 
targets for designating individuals and entities under the 
new targeted sanctions regime.  The Sanctions Committee will 
meet with the MG in the coming weeks to discuss its findings 
further.  USUN requests guidance on how to respond to this 
report.  (END SUMMARY) 
 
¶3.  (C) The UN Monitoring Group (MG) for Somalia has just 
released its latest confidential report on the implementation 
of the general arms embargo which includes a number of key 
findings regarding the security situation in Somalia and the 
principal violators of the existing arms embargo.  (NOTE: The 
Monitoring Group is a team of UN contractors charged 
primarily with investigating and documenting violations of 
the comprehensive arms embargo that the Security Council 
first imposed in 1992.  END NOTE).  The MG reported that most 
serviceable weapons and ammunition have been diverted to 
Somalia since the 1992 implementation of the arms embargo, 
and therefore almost all of them represent embargo 
violations.  Every armed force, group, or militia in Somalia, 
their financiers, active supporters, and (in some cases) 
foreign donors, the MG asserted, are guilty of arms embargo 
violations.  The MG concluded that armed forces on all sides 
are characterized by weak command and control, informal 
hierarchies, situational loyalties, frequent schisms and 
shifting alliances.  Nevertheless, the report identified some 
key leaders who exercise sufficient authority to be held 
accountable for the actions of their forces. 
 
¶4.  (C) The MG reported that the pattern of arms embargo 
violations has remained constant over the mandate period, and 
appears broadly consistent with the previous report's 
findings.  It asserted that the relatively low volume of arms 
transfers to Somalia reflects a number of factors: that the 
conflict is of relatively low intensity; that it is 
characterized by irregular warfare waged with small infantry 
formations; and the already high density of weapons in 
circulation.  An important new feature of the security 
environment in Somalia, the MG noted, is the dramatic 
expansion of armed criminal groups, including maritime 
militias engaged in piracy and armed robbery at sea.  It 
assessed that genuine economic hardship and a sense of 
grievance against foreign exploitation of Somalia's maritime 
resources not only inspire many pirates, but also serve to 
legitimize their activities in the eyes of their communities. 
 The report proposed that some leading figures in piracy 
syndicates are responsible for arms embargo violations and 
should be considered for the new targeted sanctions measures 
imposed by UNSCR 1844, passed by the Security Council on 
November 20. The MG explained that UNSCR 1844 introduces the 
prospect of genuine accountability for violators, but the 
arms embargo exemptions also provide an opportunity for 
Somalia's international partners to demonstrate a norm of 
compliance through adherence to these procedures. 
 
¶5.  (C) The MG documented how external contributions to build 
the capacity of the TFG security forces have provided an 
important loophole through which arms, equipment and military 
skills are diverted to the open market or to armed opposition 
groups.  As much as 80 per cent of the international 
investment in building the TFG security forces has been 
diverted to purposes other than those for which it was 
intended, explained the MG.  Such facts, it argued, should be 
taken into account by governments planning training programs, 
 
and underscore the need for the Sanctions Committee to be 
notified in advance of any planned security sector support. 
The MG also explained that the practice of "self-exemption" 
from this requirement by providers of security sector support 
has been problematic. 
 
¶6.  (C) The MG asserted that the financing of embargo 
violations continues to reflect the absence of functioning 
government institutions or effective regulation of economic 
activity.  The report notes a steady decline in the fiscal 
oversight and capabilities of the TFG, whereas armed 
opposition groups have expanded the areas under their 
control, acquiring possession of strategic economic assets 
and access to substantial revenue flows.  As the TFG loses 
authority and cohesion, the MG observed, its leaders are 
squandering resources while its military assets are degraded 
and sold.  Armed opposition groups, on the other hand, 
continue to mobilize resources quite effectively, while 
augmenting their military capability ) often with arms and 
equipment acquired from the TFG. 
 
¶7.  (C) The MG's report concluded that the arms embargo has 
been violated principally by two types of actors: (1) actors 
who committed substantive violations for which no exemption 
could be obtained, and (2) non-abiding partners, who provided 
support to the Somali security sector, whose activities might 
have been eligible for an exemption if notified to the 
Sanctions Committee.  In the first group, the MG pointed a 
finger at Eritrea, which provides training, arms, and 
financial support to armed opposition groups in contravention 
of the arms embargo; Ethiopia, which has a military presence 
in Somalia and supplies weapons to Puntland authorities and 
other allied militias; and the Canadian-based Africa Oil 
Corp., which has not notified the Sanctions Committee of the 
recruitment of armed security guards or the hiring of foreign 
armed guards and trainers.  The second group includes 
Ethiopia, which has trained 17,000 Somali security personnel 
and provided arms to the TFG military and police without 
notifying the Sanctions Committee or receiving an exemption; 
Yemen, which demonstrated serious shortcomings in 
implementing measures to enforce the embargo; and the UNDP, 
which recruits and manages Somali armed security personnel 
and trains the Somali police. 
 
¶8.  (C) During the current mandate, the MG said it witnessed 
the continuing erosion of the TFG's cohesion, the 
fragmentation of armed opposition groups and a dramatic 
escalation in the activities of armed criminal groups, 
including terrorism and piracy.  Unless there is further 
progress toward a durable ceasefire, a credible political 
process and restoration of effective institution of 
governance, such trends are likely to continue.  However, 
failure to enforce the arms embargo will gravely undermine 
the prospects for progress on any and all of these fronts. 
 
¶9.  (C) The MG's recommendations focused on the developments 
of transparent systems for the registration, management, and 
disposal of weapons, ammunition and explosive stockpiles in 
accordance with international practices.  The MG also 
highlighted the importance of tracing arms in Somali 
territory, establishing more precise guidelines for the 
notification of support to Somali security sector 
institutions, and authorizing international naval forces in 
the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean to seize any weapons 
encountered in the course of their operations and to actively 
interdict arms trafficking. 
 
¶10.  (C) ACTION REQUEST -- The Somalia Sanctions Committee 
will meet on December 11 with members of the MG.  USUN 
requests guidance on how to respond to the MG's report.  This 
meeting will provide the Committee with an opportunity to 
request clarification and to make suggestions for issues the 
MG should focus on after its mandate is renewed. 
Wolff