VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0643/01 3401416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051416Z DEC 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8788
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000643 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018 
TAGS: AORC PREL PARM IAEA KNPP JA AR SF
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE:  MINTY,S CAMPAIGN PITCH TO WEOG 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
 Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) Meeting with Western European and Others Group (WEOG) 
Ambassadors, at his request, on December 1, South African 
Governor Abdul Minty fielded a wide range of pointed 
questions on Agency priorities as a prospective candidate for 
IAEA Director General.  Minty informed WEOG members that his 
Minister officially delivered his nomination on the margins 
of the November 27-28 Board of Governors meeting, and he was 
now consulting with regional groups on his candidacy.  He 
acknowledged that, in addition to managing the Agency, the 
Director General operated in a "political context" and that 
DG ElBaradei was leaving a "strong foundation" in this 
regard.  In response to WEOG member concerns, Minty stressed 
the importance of nuclear security and safeguards, though he 
was short on specifics as to the Agency's role in the former 
and hedged on the question of regular budget funding for 
nuclear security.  Minty presented himself as a consensus 
builder on Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF) who could 
bridge the North-South divide, though he admitted to having 
"no easy answers."  As to the "political" role of the DG, 
Minty envisioned a "good offices" function on issues such as 
Middle East safeguards and RANF, and recalled his 
constructive role as General Conference President in 2006. 
He expressed commitment to the "One-UN" approach and better 
coordination across IAEA departments and with other UN 
agencies on technical cooperation (TC).  Minty acknowledged 
the role of Member States in setting policy for TC but 
cautioned against second-guessing particular projects, when 
asked about the TACC debates on Iran and Syria.  He was 
similarly cautious in speaking about the Agency's role in 
assisting with disarmament tasks, and noted that the IAEA 
cannot be an advocate for disarmament. 
 
¶2. (C) Overall, Minty did better than expected in this 
90-minute job interview with WEOG, and offered well-reasoned 
and persuasive answers on Western priorities.  It is not 
clear that he won any converts, but he left the impression 
that he was not beholden to the G-77/NAM, in particular, on 
safeguards and security issues, and demonstrated an ability 
to think on his feet that other candidates will find hard to 
match.  Japanese Ambassador Amano will make himself available 
for a similar Q&A session with WEOG in January.  In our 
capacity as Co-Chairs of the Geneva Group, the U.S. and UK 
are also planning to invite Minty and Amano to meet with the 
group in the near future.  Mission welcomes Department input 
on management issues, including DG term limits, to raise with 
both DG candidates in the Geneva Group.  End Summary and 
Comment. 
 
Nuclear Security 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Schulte solicited Minty's views on 
integrating nuclear security in the Agency's core mission and 
budget, as well as promotion of UNSCR 1540 implementation and 
HEU minimization.  Germany and Norway also stressed the 
importance of regularizing funding for nuclear security. 
Minty did not offer a strategic vision for the Agency on 
nuclear security.  Although nuclear terrorism is a collective 
problem, he said, it was the role of member states to 
implement and enforce nuclear security guidelines.  He noted 
that the SAG had undertaken a program to downblend HEU, but 
added that HEU has legitimate uses for radioisotopes, and 
exclusive focus on HEU minimization overlooks the greater 
proliferation risk of plutonium.  The SAG saw safety and 
security as paramount, and explicitly disagreed with 
developing countries that predicate regular budget funding 
for nuclear security on "balance" with technical cooperation 
(TC).  Minty recommended greater coordination among DDGs to 
"mainstream" nuclear security in core functions; noted the 
unique capabilities of the Agency, e.g. to conduct 
inspections; and sought to make the IAEA's work on nuclear 
security better known. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Pressed further by Norway on regular budget funding 
for nuclear security, Minty opined that it was not healthy 
for an international body to rely on voluntary contributions 
for a core program, as was also the case for the Safeguards 
Analytical Lab (SAL).  He hedged on the question, claiming 
that the advisors to President-elect Obama acknowledged 
doubts, in light of the financial crisis, about being able to 
follow through on campaign pledges to double the IAEA budget. 
 He suggested cost savings through use of new technology, and 
proposed regional coordination on safety and security issues 
at the expert level.  This would not mean delegating national 
responsibility to the region, but such cooperation would be 
better than "purchasing" nuclear safety and security as, he 
noted, the UAE was doing. 
 
Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Germany raised the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle, 
and the difficulty of moving forward Reliable Access to 
Nuclear Fuel (RANF) given continued anxiety among the G-77 
about Article IV rights.  Minty acknowledged the increased 
risks brought by the nuclear renaissance, and attributed the 
polarization of the debate on RANF to an early proposal that 
would have required states to "forgo" enrichment, which still 
clouds perceptions.  South Africa had advised that rather 
than set such conditions, the focus should be on making 
enrichment the inefficient choice, and RANF proposals have 
since taken this on board.  Yet suspicion remains and last 
spring at a Berlin conference Minty heard concerns from 
developing world technical experts about whether there was "a 
plan" to disrupt commercial supply.  The lack of an effective 
dialogue between recipients and suppliers continues to 
frustrate the RANF debate.  In view of Minty's nomination, 
the SAG is taking more of a leadership role on this issue, 
and has proposed consultations among countries of the "South" 
and outreach to countries like Thailand and Argentina to try 
to get at "real concerns."  Erosion of Article IV rights 
remains a concern in the developing world, as evidenced in 
the NPT Prepcom.  Minty had "no easy answer" as to how to 
structure the RANF debate in Vienna but recommended the focus 
be on specific proposals.  He noted that there may not be 
unanimity of G-77 views on the specific proposals. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The UK noted the role of the DG and Secretariat with 
respect to a RANF mechanism was to serve as the supranational 
guarantor or custodian, and as such, the DG's focus in 
getting the message out should be forward-, not 
backward-looking.  Minty acknowledged the role of the Agency 
in promoting RANF but cautioned that no DG can get too far 
ahead of Member States.  Much of this was a matter of timing 
and political sense as well as interaction with capitals. 
Getting at "real concerns" would help forge consensus, he 
added.  This political role of the DG should be clearly 
separate, however, from the technical work of the Agency on 
RANF. 
 
¶7. (C) Advising that the EU was seriously considering a 
financial contribution to the proposed IAEA-administered 
International Fuel Bank (INFB), France asked about specific 
eligibility criteria for accessing this mechanism, and 
whether access should extend to non-NPT members.  Minty 
returned to his point that a fundamental consensus was needed 
on RANF before conditions about eligibility criteria can be 
set.  He noted that non-NPT members are IAEA members but also 
acknowledged the views of suppliers and their sovereign 
decisions, citing the Russian proposal.  We do not want to 
"perpetuate discrimination" but there were "real concerns" on 
both sides and "no easy answers," he repeated, as to how to 
break this logjam.  (Comment:  In short, he punted.  End 
Comment.) 
 
Strengthening Safeguards 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Finland expressed concern about the "politicized 
atmosphere" that threatened to undermine safeguards, citing 
the reluctance of some countries to accord the IAEA greater 
legal authority through universalization of the Additional 
Protocol (AP).  The deficiencies of SAL also put in question 
the credibility and integrity of Agency safeguards.  Minty 
deeply regretted the polarization of safeguards issues and 
underlined the SAG's commitment to strengthening the 
safeguards regime.  Safeguards need not be a logjam, he said, 
recalling the SAG's role in helping to secure indefinite 
extension of the NPT at the 1995 Prepcom.  Minty stressed the 
need for the 30 NPT members that have not done so to conclude 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) and South Africa's 
full support of the AP, though he noted it would be 
problematic to make the latter a condition of fuel supply. 
Interestingly, Minty argued that universalization of the AP 
was a symbolic and secondary goal, and that the main target 
should be the conclusion of APs by countries that have the 
capacity to proliferate.  Furthermore, he added in response 
to Australia, the AP may not be adequate and making it the 
end-all and be-all could be dangerous, noting that the SAG 
has proposed that Iran undertake additional transparency 
measures.  The objective was to increase the reach of the 
Agency in sovereign countries.  Rather than "pressure," Minty 
concluded, speaking in generalities, that the DG should use 
his "good offices" to ensure the credibility and authority of 
Agency safeguards. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Switzerland also asked about the perspective of 
bringing non-NPT countries under Agency safeguards in light 
of the India agreement.  Minty said the SAG thought of the 
India agreement more as a step forward for nuclear power, 
albeit one that had serious implications for the NPT, and 
noted that the NSG exception was not intended as a precedent, 
though we should "wait and see" what other countries do. 
 
DG "Good Offices" on Middle East 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Minty reminded WEOG Ambassadors of his handling of 
Middle East issues as President of the 2006 General 
Conference (GC).  He regretted the disproportionate focus in 
the GC on the Middle East at the expense of other Agency 
priorities.  Asked by the UK to elaborate on how he would 
deal with unproductive GC discussions on disarmament and the 
Middle East, Minty proposed that what may be needed is a 
clearly defined mechanism for the DG's "good offices" 
function, as in other international organizations.  Such a 
"good offices" role would provide more transparency than ad 
hoc mediation or intervention.  He noted that he had received 
positive feedback from several governments on this proposal. 
Minty envisioned that the DG could use his "good offices" on 
issues ranging from the Middle East to RANF, which would 
include direct interaction with capitals. 
 
¶11. (C) In the highly charged atmosphere of the 2006 GC, 
following the Israeli-Lebanese conflict, Minty recalled how 
he had sought to bring all the parties and groups together 
and came very close to agreement on a Presidential Statement, 
were it not for the fact that the Arab Group was constrained 
by Arab League Ministerial-level decisions.  He was not sure 
if the DG could in such a case contact the Arab League 
directly.  The GC President also need to be firm, as he had 
been during his tenure, in making clear to the parties that 
the discussion would not go beyond the last day of the 
Conference, so as to conclude in a "dignified manner."  He 
also recommended early high-level interaction among concerned 
parties.   Minty further recalled the SAG's reluctance to 
participate in the DG-sponsored Middle East Forum, counseling 
that a discussion of regional security should precede 
"frontal" engagement on nuclear weapons.  Such a frontal 
approach would not work, whether it was in the Middle East or 
with regard to India-Pakistan. (Comment: Minty was clearly 
playing to this audience of WEOG Ambassadors on Middle East 
issues.  End Comment.) 
 
Technical Cooperation: "One UN" and "One-IAEA" 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Norway asked about better integration of the IAEA 
in the UN family, for example, on implementation of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG).  Minty expressed the 
SAG's disappointment in this regard, and underlined the need 
for more synergy between the IAEA and other UN organizations, 
and not just on MDG goals.  This was particularly true in 
Technical Cooperation (TC), where he cited the IAEA-WHO and 
FAO Joint Divisions.  The IAEA has an important technical 
capacity but cannot become a development agency, he asserted, 
and suggested tapping into development funding through UNDP 
country programs and the like. 
 
¶13. (SBU) France observed that with regard to TC, there was 
hardly a "One-Agency" much less a "One-UN" approach, and 
noted the need for greater coordination among departments and 
guidelines on non-proliferation for TC projects.  Minty 
acknowledged the need to take account of technical capacity, 
safety and security in the implementation of TC projects.  He 
also saw the need for more coordination, and not just at the 
DDG level but also base-level interaction among departments. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Pressing the issue further, Finland noted TACC 
debates on TC projects in Iran and Syria and G-77 insistence 
on old understandings about TC not being touched.  "Should 
member states have more of say on the TC program, or is it a 
holy cow?," Finnish Ambassador Kauppi inquired.  Minty noted 
that the Agency Secretariat was the servant of Member States 
who set policy, citing the question of whether TC should fund 
projects in the EU.  However, Member State second-guessing on 
individual TC projects can be a "slippery slope," he 
cautioned obliquely, and can set the dangerous precedent of 
"questioning" Agency documents, including verification 
reports. 
 
Disarmament 
---------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Finland also raised the issue of the Agency's 
Statutory role and tasks with respect to disarmament.  Minty 
underscored South Africa's commitment to disarmament, and saw 
a role for Agency assistance with disarmament tasks, 
disputing those who claim the IAEA has no Statutory mandate 
or lacks expertise in this domain.  He was careful to note 
that the IAEA cannot be an advocate for disarmament, but it 
also cannot work in a vacuum as it fulfills its primary 
mission of "atoms only for peace."  Minty also took note of 
U.S. and UK efforts on disarmament and discussions in other 
fora. (Note: In a November 27 press conference on the margins 
of the Board of Governors meeting, Minty highlighted his work 
on disarmament and non-proliferation throughout his adult 
life. End Note.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16. (C) Speaking to a consciously skeptical audience, many of 
whom are publicly wary of Minty's past role as a NAM 
cheerleader, the South African Governor delivered a strong 
performance.  He came across as well-prepared and adept at 
thinking on his feet.  His Japanese competition will be 
challenged to meet the same bar. 
SCHULTE