VZCZCXRO7115
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #2495/01 3651456
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301456Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0642
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0160
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4753
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2233

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 002495 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SOUTH OSSETIA INCIDENTS: LESS FATAL, BUT 
BOLD 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 2176 
     ¶B. HTTP://WWW.EUMM.EU/EN/PRESS_AND_PUBLIC_INFORM ATIO- 
        N/PRESS_RELEASES/668/ 
     ¶C. TBILISI 2492 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary.  Although the area around South Ossetia has 
not seen any conflict-related fatalities since November 17, 
several recent incidents have caused injuries and shown a 
brazen attitude by the South Ossetian or Russian 
perpetrators.  Georgian Interior Ministry forces have been 
the targets of a December 5 guided missile, a December 10 
roadside bomb, a December 18 machine-gun attack, and a 
December 27 shooting; the roadside bomb was placed near 
Pkhvenisi, 8 kilometers outside the administrative boundary. 
International monitors have also been targeted; an EUMM 
patrol was threatened at gunpoint on December 6, and an OSCE 
vehicle was attacked on December 10.  Meanwhile both Perevi 
and Akhalgori remain problematic.  Reports of random shooting 
are already increasing as the New Year approaches, causing 
fears of further escalation; drunkenness could cause 
problems; and the likely departure of the OSCE military 
monitors on February 18 could cause further destabilization. 
An Interior Ministry official downplayed concerns in the 
immediate term, saying the cold weather will keep people 
indoors and make it harder to shoot them, but he also 
suggested that Russia wants to keep the situation along the 
boundary tense in order to maintain pressure on the Georgian 
government.  End summary. 
 
INTERIOR MINISTRY STILL UNDER FIRE 
 
¶2. (C) Since the November 17 killing of two and wounding of 
three Georgian Interior Ministry officials (ref A), post is 
unaware of any fatalities on either side of the South 
Ossetian administrative boundary.  Attacks have continued, 
however, with most originating inside South Ossetia and 
targeting Georgian Interior Ministry officials, usually 
within a short distance of the boundary.  On December 5, the 
OSCE reported a guided missile struck a stable next to the 
police station in Mereti, causing significant damage to the 
structure and injuring a cow; the EUMM reported the missile 
originated in Disevi, inside South Ossetia.  The OSCE 
reported an anti-tank missile landed in the town of Atotsi on 
December 21, doing no significant damage.  On December 18 the 
OSCE reported a police officer was slightly wounded in a 
machine-gun attack in Khurvaleti; another police officer was 
slighly wounded by gunfire near Ditsi on December 27. 
Director of the Interior Ministry Analytical Department Shota 
Utiashvili told EmbOff the bullet came from a "vintorez," 
which he described as a $60,000 specialized sniper rifle that 
Ossetians generally would not have, but that Russian special 
forces are often provided. 
 
¶3. (C) On December 10, however, the EUMM and OSCE reported 
the rear of an Interior Ministry vehicle was damaged by an 
improvised explosive device on the road near a bridge in 
Pkhvenisi, eight kilometers from the administrative boundary; 
one officer was slightly wounded.  The fact that the rear of 
the vehicle was damaged, not the front, indicated to both 
monitoring missions that the device did not detonate upon 
impact, but was remotely detonated, either by wire or radio. 
Although the perpetrators remain unknown, if they originated 
in South Ossetia, they had to travel well beyond the boundary 
Qin South Ossetia, they had to travel well beyond the boundary 
in order to set the device and then detonate it.  This 
incident could reflect a new willingness on the part of the 
attackers to reach farther outside of South Ossetia into 
areas that had generally been considered secure. 
 
¶4. (C) On December 20, the Interior Ministry told the EUMM 
that it would begin deploying COBRA armored vehicles in the 
area around South Ossetia, and both the EUMM and OSCE (and 
UNOMIG outside Abkhazia) have since observed them in the 
field.  The EUMM publicly criticized the deployment, 
suggesting that the use of such vehicles although not a 
violatin of the cease-fire agreement, would not enhance 
security on the ground.  The EUMM statement further noted 
that, although ten Georgian police officers have been killed 
since the end of the war, none of those incidents would have 
been prevented by armored vehicles (ref B).  In private, the 
EUMM expressed its concern that the Georgian use of the 
COBRAs endangers its own EUMM monitors, because some -- the 
Polish contingent in the Gori field office and the Italian 
contingent in the Zugdidi field office -- use similar 
vehicles.  It also noted that following more regular standard 
 
TBILISI 00002495  002 OF 003 
 
 
operating procedures would have done more to protect the 
Georgians, and furthermore suggested that the use of armored 
vehicles might actually encourage attackers to shoot.  (Post 
comment: The EUMM public arguments are not convincing to the 
Georgians and many diplomats, because the EUMM monitors 
themselves always use armored vehicles.  The real concern is 
what they expressed to us privately: that their own monitors 
not be confused with Georgian forces and attacked.  One could 
argue that the use of the COBRAs, which have a more military 
appearance than traditional police vehicles, increases the 
perception of militarization along the boundary (although 
some EUMM vehicles have a similar appearance), but it is hard 
to find fault with the Georgian side taking a step to protect 
its personnel -- the same step taken by all three 
international monitoring missions.  End comment.) 
 
MONITORS ALSO IN THE CROSSHAIRS 
 
¶5. (SBU) On December 6, the EUMM reported drunk Ossetian 
militia threatened an EUMM patrol with a pistol in Didi 
Gromi.  An OSCE monitor told EmbOff that an EUMM patrol was 
forced out of its vehicle and held for over an hour at 
gunpoint; this may have been the same December 6 incident. 
On December 10, outside the South Ossetian boundary near Zemo 
Khviti, an unidentified individual in partial uniform 
suddenly appeared before an OSCE patrol from behind some 
bushes, drew a weapon, and fired into the air.  As the 
vehicle began withdrawing, a second individual, also in 
partial uniform, appeared from behind some bushes and fired 
directly at the vehicle, hitting it several times.  The 
vehicle was armored, and no one was injured.  This was the 
first such direct attack on any monitors since the war. 
 
¶6. (C) The December 10 attackers appeared to the OSCE to be 
laying in wait for them.  Although the immediate 
circumstances are somewhat inconclusive -- the attackers may 
have been surprised by the patrol -- an OSCE monitor 
suggested to EmbOff it was most likely premeditated, offering 
the following explanation.  On December 1, an OSCE patrol 
witnessed an individual stop a white Lada across the 
administrative boundary from Zemo Khviti (the same location 
as the December 10 attack), remove an automatic weapon from 
the trunk, and fire a single shot toward the village (no one 
was injured).  The OSCE patrol then revealed itself, and the 
individual quickly drove off.  One week later, in the same 
location, an Ossetian soldier warned another OSCE monitor to 
stay away from the area.  Two days later, on December 10, an 
OSCE patrol returned to the spot to show it had not been 
intimidated -- and was attacked.  The OSCE monitor 
interpreted the attack as retaliation for what was perceived 
to be interference in the Ossetian militia's military 
activities. 
 
HAPPY NEW YEAR! 
 
¶7. (C) The OSCE has already received increasing reports of 
random shooting along the boundary, probably in connection 
with upcoming New Year's celebrations.  As the administrative 
boundary is so poorly defined and so interlocking, and 
because so many villages on either side of the boundary abut 
each other, any shooting -- even of a celebratory nature -- 
in an already tense atmosphere could easily escalate into 
something more malicious.  Holiday drunkenness -- frequently 
cited by the Georgian government, the EUMM and the OSCE as a 
problem among the Russians and Ossetians anyway -- could make 
Qproblem among the Russians and Ossetians anyway -- could make 
the situation even more unstable.  Analytical Department 
Director Utiashvili did not expect any major difficulties in 
the coming weeks, suggesting that the cold weather will keep 
people indoors, making them more difficult targets.  He 
acknowledged, however, that alcohol could lead to 
misunderstandings and therefore escalations. 
 
COMMENT: BEWARE WASHINGTON'S BIRTHDAY TOO 
 
¶8. (C) On February 18, the OSCE's military monitoring mission 
is scheduled to close, and post expects it will take some 
time for the EUMM to pick up the slack (ref C).  Utiashvili 
also downplayed this concern, suggesting that the OSCE's lack 
of access to South Ossetia makes the mission unable to have 
much impact now anyway.  He did add, however, that Russia 
probably wants to keep the situation along both the South 
Ossetian and Abkhaz boundaries tense, in order to maintain 
pressure on the Georgian government.  The apparently 
premeditated retaliation against the OSCE for interference in 
potentially attacks suggests to post that the unidentified 
troublemakers roaming the administrative boundary see the 
 
TBILISI 00002495  003 OF 003 
 
 
OSCE as a hindrance to their activities.  End comment. 
TEFFT