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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 134228 
 
 
GENEVA FOR JCIC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018 
TAGS: PARM KACT JCIC START INF RS US FR
 
SUBJECT: U.S. RESPONSE TO FRENCH GLOBAL INF PROPOSAL 
 
REF: A. P3 CONSULTATIONS ON NONPROLIFERATION AND 
        DISARMAMENT IN PARIS (PARIS 002134) 
     ¶B. RUSSIA PREVIEWS PROPOSED GLOBAL INF TREATY 
        (STATE 012526) 
 
Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI.  Reason 
1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an Action Cable for Embassy Paris, see 
paragraph 5. 
 
¶2.  (C) Background:  During a P-3 meeting in Paris on 
November 7, 2008 (Ref A), the French provided Acting 
Undersecretary for Arms Control and International 
Security, John Rood, a draft French proposal to globalize 
the INF Treaty entitled "Basic Elements of a Treaty 
Banning Short and Intermediate Range Ground-to-Ground 
Missiles" (Unofficial translation in paragraph 7).  The 
INF Treaty, formally known as the Treaty Between the 
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 
and Shorter-Range Missiles, entered into force on June 1, 
1988, and is of indefinite duration.  The INF Treaty 
obligates the United States and the USSR successor states 
to eliminate all their ground-launched ballistic or cruise 
missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers and 
not to produce, flight test or launch such missiles. 
 
¶3.  (C) On February 12, 2008, Russian Foreign Minister 
Lavrov presented a similar proposal to Globalize the INF 
Treaty to the Conference on Disarmament during a speech to 
the CD in Geneva (Ref B).  The French proposal has two 
options for expanding the scope of INF prohibited missiles 
to include those with a range in excess of 150 km or 300 
km (as opposed to INF minimum range of 500 km).  While the 
U.S. supported in principle the renunciation of 
ground-launched ballistic missiles and cruise missiles of 
INF ranges, the U.S. was not convinced that a global 
treaty was the best way to address the issue.  The points 
in paragraph 5, below, provide the U.S. analysis of the 
French INF proposal and are consistent with the U.S. 
response to the Russian proposal.  The points also note 
U.S. objections to the French proposal to include missiles 
with a range between 150/300-500 km. 
 
¶4.  (U) On December 5, 2008, French President Sarkozy, in 
his role as the President of the European Union (EU), 
provided to Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, a memorandum on the EU's views on 
disarmament.  Sarkozy's memo contained, inter alia, a 
recommendation to "start ... consultations on a treaty 
banning short and intermediate-range ground-to-ground 
missiles."  The memo did not provide any clarifying detail 
on the proposal. 
 
¶5.  (U) Action Request:  Embassy Paris should provide the 
points in paragraph 6 below, to an appropriate host 
government official.  Embassy is requested to confirm 
delivery of the points, the name and office of the 
official to whom they were delivered, the date of 
delivery, and any comment or reaction provided at that 
time. 
 
¶6.  (C/REL FRANCE) Begin points: 
 
- The United States has reviewed the French proposal to 
globalize the INF Treaty, entitled "Basic Elements of a 
Treaty Banning Short and Intermediate Range 
Ground-to-Ground Missiles" provided on November 7, 2008, 
in Paris. 
 
- The United States recognizes that France has made a 
serious proposal and is willing to meet bilaterally to 
discuss the proposal.  We note that your proposal expands 
upon a similar proposal made by the Russian Federation at 
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on February 
12, 2008, in that it would lead to the eventual 
elimination of entire classes of ground-launched ballistic 
and cruise missiles under the range of 5500 km. 
 
- The United States agrees that the growing proliferation 
of these missiles is a concern that should be recognized 
and dealt with by the international community and we 
welcome the fact that other countries share this concern. 
However, we have serious reservations about this, and 
similar proposals, well-intentioned though they may be, to 
negotiate a multilateral arms control treaty under the 
auspices of the CD. 
 
- We do not believe that a one-size-fits-all treaty is a 
practical response to this issue.  INF-range missiles are 
inextricably interwoven into complex regional situations. 
To successfully eliminate these missiles, the specifics of 
these regional dynamics must be understood and addressed 
within the context of those specific situations. 
 
- We are concerned that such a proposed treaty would 
inevitably become mired in CD politics, and thus risk 
replacing concerted and directed international 
non-proliferation efforts with political inaction and 
gridlock. 
 
- This has been the lesson of three United Nations missile 
panels, each of which has underscored the inability of the 
international community to reach consensus on developing a 
universal approach to the missile issue.  Moreover, we 
believe the three UN missile panels have shown that such 
approaches would divert attention and resources from 
successful and ongoing efforts to address missile 
proliferation that have yielded successes and produced 
results. 
 
- The United States is also concerned that France intends 
to lower the range of missiles subject to elimination to 
those with a range below 500 km.  The United States and 
many of its allies have missile systems of those ranges 
and their prohibition could raise U.S. national security 
concerns and those of our allies. 
 
- The United States recognizes the significant dangers 
posed to regional stability and international peace and 
security through missile proliferation and supports, in 
principle, the renunciation of ground-launched ballistic 
missiles and cruise missiles of INF ranges, i.e., with 
ranges between 500 and 5500 km; however, the United States 
is not convinced that a global treaty is the best way to 
address the issue.  We welcome the opportunity in that 
context to continue our work with the French Republic to 
address the threat posed by the proliferation of 
ground-launched missiles of INF-range. 
 
¶7.  (C) Begin text of the French proposal to globalize the 
INF Treaty, as received in English only. 
 
Basic Elements of a Treaty Banning Short and Intermediate 
Range Ground-to-Ground Missiles 
 
I - RATIONALE 
 
- The proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles with 
increasing range constitutes a growing threat to global 
and regional security.  Increasing missile tests over the 
last few years in the Middle East and Asia, together with 
missile development programs within a growing number of 
countries, point to the need for accelerated 
non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in this area, in 
the interests of promoting regional and international 
stability and reducing the availability of delivery 
systems capable of delivering WMD. 
 
- The aggravation of missile proliferation, in particular 
with short- and intermediate-range, requires from the 
international community to come up with a collective and 
normative response. 
 
- There is however a lack of a multilateral 
legally-binding regime to back up non-proliferation and 
disarmament efforts in the missile field. 
 
  -- The MTCR acts as a consultative and coordinating 
mechanism on export control policies and mechanisms; 
 
  -- The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation (HCOC), which promotes restraint in the 
development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles 
(including, where possible, reduction of national 
holdings) and introduces annual declarations and 
pre-launch notifications, serves essentially as a 
transparency- and confidence-building measure. 
 
  -- A few bilateral agreements do exist (the INF, START 
Treaties between the United States and Russia), but they 
do not provide an appropriate basis for multilateral 
action. 
 
- Therefore, we propose that a multilateral treaty on 
elimination of short- and intermediate-range 
ground-to-ground missiles be elaborated and concluded, 
with the double objective of strengthening the 
international non-proliferation regime, by addressing 
missile proliferation, and contributing to efforts in the 
field of disarmament. 
 
This Treaty would contribute to eliminating existing 
lacunas in international non-proliferation and disarmament 
regime regarding missiles, complementing efforts within 
existing international instruments in that field (HCOC, 
MTCR), and strengthening general and regional security. 
In particular, elimination of short- and 
intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles would 
represent a net increase in security at the regional 
level, as most of the missiles that the Treaty would 
address (in particular if it covers missiles with a range 
capability in excess of 150 km) are essentially regional 
in application. 
 
II - SCOPE OF THE TREATY 
 
- General obligations 
 
Such an international Treaty could comprise the following 
basic elements: 
 
  -- the obligation for the Parties, upon entry into force 
of the Treaty, not to manufacture, develop and deploy 
short- and intermediate-range missiles or their stages and 
launchers; 
 
  -- the obligation for the Parties to eliminate, under a 
phased time frame, all their short- and intermediate-range 
missiles, launchers thereof and associated supporting 
facilities and equipment. 
 
- Definitions of types of short- and intermediate-range 
ground-to-ground missiles 
 
  1) General definition 
 
  -- The Treaty would cover ballistic and cruise 
ground-to-ground (i.e. sea-launched missiles should be 
excluded) missiles, with any kind of payload.  For 
purposes of the Treaty, the terms "ballistic missile", " 
cruise missile" and "ground-to-ground" missiles should be 
defined. 
 
  -- Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) should be excluded 
from the scope of the Treaty; 
 
  -- Range capability: 
 
     --- For the long range: 5500 km would be coherent 
with NATO classification.  No strategic or technical 
reason justifying a different range has yet been 
identified. 
 
     --- For the short range, two options would be 
possible: 
 
         ---- 150 Km, consistent with NATO SRBM 
definition; it would allow to address missiles which are 
used in regional conflicts but not controlled under MTCR; 
 
         ---- 300 Km, consistent with MTCR definition. 
 
  2) Declaration mechanism 
 
To guaranty a certain flexibility of application, these 
general definitions could be associated with a declaration 
mechanism: 
 
  -- Each Party would, by ratifying the Treaty, designate 
its existing national types of short- and 
intermediate-range missiles covered by the Treaty. 
 
  -- An actualized declaration could then be submitted 
annually by each Party. 
 
- Elimination procedures 
 
A phased approach could apply to elimination procedures: 
each State Party to the Treaty should eliminate all its 
short- and intermediate-range missiles, launchers thereof 
and associated supporting facilities and equipment, in a 
specified time-period depending from the range, for ex: 
 
  -- IRBMs (3000 - 5500 Km) would be immediately 
eliminated; 
 
  -- MRBMs (1000 - 3000 Km) would be eliminated within a 
mid-term period (for ex 10 years); 
 
  -- SRBMs (150/300 - 1000 Km) would be eliminated within 
a specific time frame, defined by each State Party but not 
beyond an agreed deadline. 
 
- Compliance and exchange of information related to the 
obligations 
 
The Treaty would rely on a voluntary information and 
transparency basis (initial and annual declarations). 
 
- Other provisions 
 
  -- A permanent body could be established (an informal 
conference-based structure without fixed secretariat - as 
currently used by the NPT - a formal treaty-based 
international institution). 
 
  -- Duration of the Treaty and withdrawal: The Treaty 
would be of unlimited duration.  It could introduce 
provisions regarding withdrawal. 
 
  -- Entry into force: it would require the ratification 
of a determined number of countries most active in the 
field (all states which have claimed to have performed 
nuclear tests / only the P5 / other) 
 
III - METHOD 
 
- Consultations 
 
  -- circulation of the proposed Treaty for study by UK 
and then in P3; 
 
  -- consultations with the other members of the P5; 
 
  -- circulation within EU, in view of its possible 
endorsement; 
 
  -- presentation to the Member States of the Conference 
on Disarmament (possibly by the EU); 
 
  -- The EU could propose a resolution to the UNGA, in 
order to call for the launching of negotiations on the 
Treaty. 
 
- Fora to be negotiated 
 
The CD would be the most logical negotiating body, as it 
is the single multilateral forum the international 
community has at its disposal for global negotiations in 
the field of disarmament. 
 
There are UN bodies dealing with outer space but their 
mandates are not entirely pertinent.  The UN First 
Committee could be a useful vehicle but is not in itself a 
negotiating body.  Another option would be a special body 
set up to deal with the Treaty.  Existing bodies have 
however the advantage of established legitimacy and 
membership, so avoiding some of the procedural 
difficulties of establishing new bodies, and avoiding to 
weaken existing bodies such as CD. 
 
End text. 
RICE 
 
 
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