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FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG
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INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0036

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHENYANG 000189 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/K, INR, EAP/CM, IO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR ETRD KN KS CH
SUBJECT: PRC-DPRK: CHINA'S COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 1718 
LUXURY-GOODS PROVISIONS 
 
REF: A. (A) 07 SHENYANG 108 
     ¶B. (B) 07 SHENYANG 69 
     ¶C. (C) 06 SHENYANG 1201 
     ¶D. (D) SHENYANG 109 
     ¶E. (E) SHENYANG 67 
     ¶F. (F) SHENYANG 185 
 
Classified By: ACTING CONSUL GENERAL BRIAN M. GIBEL. 
REASONS: 1.4(b)/(d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Two years on, PRC compliance with the 
spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 1718's luxury- 
goods provisions appears limited at best.  Dandong and 
other border officials tell us privately that while they 
are implementing military-related provisions of UNSCR 1718, 
they are not enforcing a luxury-goods ban on North Korea 
because Beijing has not defined--or has chosen not to 
define--"luxury goods."  U.S.-defined luxury items like 
foreign liquor, consumer electronics and high-end vehicles 
are easily shipped across the PRC-DPRK border.  More 
generally, certain export-controlled items can be finessed 
across the border by enterprising individuals with the 
right connections, whether by way of smuggling, bribery, 
mislabeled manifests or other "informal" means.  Chinese 
scrutiny of outbound goods continues to be minimal.  By 
contrast, PRC restrictions on grain exports and certain 
renminbi-denominated banking transactions with North Korea 
continue to be more stringently enforced, though their 
practical impact ought not be overstated.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Beijing. 
 
¶3. (C) This report draws on private discussions with 
northeastern Chinese North Korea experts, 
trade/customs/port officials, businessmen and cross-border 
shippers in the two years since the passage of UNSCR 1718 
in October 2006.  It also draws on extensive site visits 
during the same period to the PRC-DPRK borderlands, 
including, most recently, to Dandong (December 29) and 
Jilin Province's Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture 
(December 15-18). 
 
PRC UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT: THE PARTY LINE VS. REALITY 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶4. (C) In official meetings since October 2006, a 
succession of northeastern Chinese political and trade 
officials claimed to be "strictly enforcing" UNSCR 1718, 
though they refused to disclose any details.  Liaoning and 
Jilin authorities have denied all of Post's formal requests 
to discuss enforcement of UNSCR 1718 in the PRC-DPRK border 
region. 
 
¶5. (C) Some officials have proven more forthcoming 
privately.  YANG Wenjia (PROTECT), Chief of the Foreign 
Trade Administration Section of the Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Bureau in the strategic PRC-DPRK trade 
thoroughfare of Dandong, told us informally December 29 
that the PRC maintains "strict" DPRK-specific export 
controls on arms, drugs and WMD precursors.  Yang said he 
was aware of UNSCR 1718's luxury-goods provisions (as well 
as U.S.-defined luxury items), but explained that Dandong 
is not enforcing a luxury-goods ban on North Korea because 
Beijing has not defined "luxury goods."  By this logic, 
asserted Yang, cross-border trade in Dandong has not been 
subject to UNSCR 1718 luxury-goods prohibitions.  This is 
why Yang and other border officials claim UNSCR 1718 has 
had minimal impact on PRC-DPRK trade levels since 2006 
(see, for instance, ref A). 
 
¶6. (C) Officials in Jilin Province--which, like Liaoning, 
also shares a long trading frontier with North Korea-- 
offered similar private explanations.  Well-placed 
officials in Yanji and Tumen told us last year that Beijing 
had not introduced new restrictions at PRC-DPRK ports in 
the province for the purpose of enforcing UNSCR 1718 (ref 
B).  Awareness of UNSCR 1718's luxury-goods provisions also 
seems to be poor in certain remote PRC-DPRK border areas. 
During a private dinner in Changbai last year, for 
instance, a senior administrator at the PRC land port 
opposite the DPRK's Hyesan expressed surprise that the U.S. 
had formulated a list of prohibited luxury goods (ref A). 
 
 
SHENYANG 00000189  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶7. (C) PRC-DPRK business contacts continue to report that 
North Koreans have little difficulty in procuring (U.S.- 
defined) luxury goods in northeast China.  LIU Chensheng 
(PROTECT), a Shenyang-based businessman who regularly hosts 
official North Korean delegations in northeast China, told 
us in late 2006 that many of his North Korean guests here 
were able to purchase and easily ship home laptops, 
clothing and MP3 players (ref C).  The same holds true 
today, Liu tells us in late 2008.  In Dandong on December 
29, ZHANG Zhaoliang (PROTECT), General Manager of the PRC- 
DPRK trade/shipping consultancy Tiger Eye, related that 
(U.S.-prohibited) items like MP3/DVD players and top-shelf 
foreign liquor can be shipped into North Korea via Dandong 
with ease.  The same appears to hold true for luxury 
vehicles, also proscribed by the U.S., European Union and 
others pursuant to UNSCR 1718.  During a visit to the 
bustling Dandong Land Port on the morning of December 29, 
Poloff and Pol/Econ Chief at approximately 1130 observed a 
late-model Lexus SUV with no license plates idling in the 
bonded warehouse within the port enclosure; the vehicle 
appeared to be readying to queue to cross into Sinuiju.  A 
few meters away behind the warehouse (but within the port 
enclosure) two men hurriedly poured gasoline into the tank 
of a used Mercedes Benz sedan, parked next to another late- 
model Lexus SUV--both without license plates and apparently 
imminently bound for Sinuiju. 
 
¶8. (C) Extensive site visits to most PRC-DPRK border ports 
since October 2006 reveal only minimal PRC scrutiny of 
inbound and outbound goods, particularly at the Dandong 
Land Port, through which over half of all official PRC-DPRK 
trade flows.  Last year, Dandong-based shippers claimed to 
be experiencing no major slowdowns 
stemming from reported PRC enforcement of UNSCR 1718. 
Tiger Eye's Zhang Zhaoliang reports the same holds true in 
late 2008.  Zhang noted that he and his contract shipping 
partners are able to clear DPRK-bound land, rail and sea 
shipments through customs, as well as commodity-inspections 
and quarantine (CIQ), in one day.  At the Dandong Land Port 
on December 29, Poloff between 1000 and 1050 observed PRC 
port officials briefly peer into the holds of most (and the 
cabs of some) incoming DPRK container trucks; between 1055 
and 1130, Sinuiju-bound PRC trucks--many of whose 
containers had been pre-cleared and sealed before arriving- 
-received little or no scrutiny.  We have found inspections 
in the smaller, lower-volume land ports of Jilin Province 
to be even less rigorous. 
 
¶9. (C) Post is unable to offer a firsthand assessment of 
PRC scrutiny of goods shipped via PRC-DPRK commercial air, 
sea and rail ports.  The Dandong Foreign Trade Bureau's 
Yang Wenjia noted that the majority of PRC-DPRK trade 
transiting Dandong this year continues to ship via truck, 
in part because of small shipment volumes and new PRC 
restrictions on railcars entering North Korea (see ref D). 
Tiger Eye's Zhang Zhaoliang noted that PRC inspections of 
his rail and sea shipments are minimal, usually take place 
at a bonded warehouse and involve customs agents quickly 
glancing at the loaded shipment and the CIQ  manifest. 
Zhang suggested scrutiny is more lax for maritime shipments 
(he loads his DPRK-bound maritime cargo directly onto 
Nampo-based North Korean ships docking at Dalian Port each 
week).  Farther north in Jilin Province's Yanbian 
Prefecture, Western contacts recently shipping goods to 
Rajin-Sonbong via China's busy Quanhe Land Port reported 
minimal PRC inspections there, too. 
 
¶10. (C) Regulations notwithstanding, most PRC goods--luxury 
or otherwise--are shippable across the PRC-DPRK border by 
any enterprising individual with the right connections, 
whether by way of smuggling, mislabeling manifests or other 
"informal" means.  Post over the past two years has 
documented ongoing cross-border smuggling in the Dandong 
area; much is small-scale, though some is larger in volume 
and involves the North Korean military.  Tiger Eye's Zhang 
Zhaoliang noted that while the PRC strongly controls the 
export of prohibited items like arms and drugs, less- 
sensitive "problematic" items (e.g., certain types of 
tobacco) can be finessed across the border.  Zhang 
typically provides prospective manifests to friends in 
Dandong/Dalian Customs and CIQ on an informal basis; he can 
then make alternative arrangements for problematic items he 
is tipped off to in advance.  Alternative procedures, Zhang 
 
SHENYANG 00000189  003 OF 003 
 
 
said, include smuggling; bribing port officials; 
mislabeling manifests (possible because of lax 
inspections); and tucking problematic items into separate 
shipments.  These "alternative" measures, however, can 
increase client costs by up to 100 percent, Zhao explained. 
 
 
¶11. (C) On U.S.-defined luxury goods like liquor, Zhang 
noted that much of the foreign alcohol entering North Korea 
of late is low-quality/counterfeit.  Real luxury foreign 
liquor--affordable only by "senior elites"--is being 
procured by "large" North Korean trading firms, often using 
PRC partners to affix fake labels in order to ease customs 
duties, he explained.  More generally, Zhang underscored 
that PRC export controls on a given item can usually be 
skirted; from a Chinese shipper's perspective, much more 
difficult is securing the necessary permits from the North 
Korean side, he said. 
 
PRC LUXURY-GOODS ENFORCEMENT IN PERSPECTIVE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) The PRC's grain-export restrictions this year offer 
a useful counterpoint to its enforcement of UNSCR 1718's 
luxury-goods provisions.  Unlike with luxury goods, the 
2008 PRC's grain-export restrictions have been clear, 
publicized and more stringently enforced, according to 
contacts (see, for instance, ref E).  Among others, 
Yanbian-based NGO contacts with food-aid operations across 
the border have been especially hard hit (see, for 
instance, ref F).  The Dandong Foreign Trade Bureau's Yang 
Wenjia noted December 29 that he had not received any 
indication from provincial authorities that any loosening 
on this front is in the offing for 2009.  Nevertheless, 
grain smuggling continues, though the scope is unclear. 
Tiger Eye's Zhang Zhaoliang, for instance, claimed 
smuggling up to "several hundred tons" of grain into North 
Korea is possible if shipped by sea and folded into a 
large, otherwise legitimate shipment. 
 
¶13. (C) Another counterpoint: PRC restrictions on 
remittances and other renminbi-denominated financial 
transactions with North Korea also remain in place, 
according to PRC-DPRK business contacts in Liaoning and 
Jilin provinces.  Despite new Chinese regulations 
sanctioning the use of the RMB for PRC-DPRK trade 
settlement, Chinese banks are still not authorized to 
process PRC-DPRK trade transactions.  Consequently, Chinese 
businessmen/traders and their cross-border contacts 
continue to use U.S. dollars and Euros--often in cash--to 
settle their transactions because Chinese banks will not 
process the transactions, said trade facilitator Liu 
Chensheng in Shenyang on December 11; ZHU Yilong (PROTECT), 
the Tumen-based General Manager of the Yanbian Haihua 
Import and Export Company, a major cross-border player in 
Jilin, on December 16; and Dandong trade official Yang 
Wenjia on December 29.  Contacts at Bank of China's 
Shenyang headquarters told our Pol FSN December 29 that the 
DPRK-specific restrictions remain in place for Bank of 
China branches nationwide.  Most PRC-DPRK trade 
transactions, however, are not handled in banking channels, 
so the practical import here ought not be overstated. 
GIBEL