VZCZCXRO2620
RR RUEHVK
DE RUEHUL #2289/01 3360523
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010523Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2461
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 7839
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5103
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4998
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 6130
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3719
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 3865
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 1559
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 2866

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SEOUL 002289 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR FOR WENDY CUTLER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV ETRD KS
SUBJECT:  Visit of San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank President 
Janet Yellen, November 17-19, 2008 
 
¶1. (U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified and is not/not 
intended for internet distribution. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary:  President of the San Francisco Federal Reserve 
Bank, Janet Yellen, met with a wide range of ROKG financial 
authorities, market actors, and economists during her November 17-19 
visit to Seoul.  Yellen led an open exchange of information and 
ideas regarding the impact of global financial turmoil on both 
countries.  Korean financial authorities and market actors praised 
the timing of the Federal Reserve's October 29 announcement of its 
USD 30 billion swap arrangement with Korea, crediting the move with 
ending panic and bringing stability to Korean financial markets. 
The global credit crunch and the continuing selling of Korean 
equities by foreign investors were cited as the two biggest factors 
in the continuing pressure on the Korean won.  Technical factors 
such as the gradual unwinding of currency-risk hedging positions 
were also cited as contributing to the won's weakness. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Summary continued:  All interlocutors agreed that the 
Korean economy has essentially absorbed the shockwave of global 
financial turmoil and concern has now shifted to the impacts of the 
global economic slowdown and continuing credit crunch on the broader 
economy.  Given Korea's large trade and financial exposure to the 
global economy, the Korean economy is expected to experience lower 
growth as exports slow and domestic demand remains weak.  All agreed 
that deterioration can be expected among weaker SMEs; the financial 
authorities noted that they had already begun to encourage 
restructuring within the construction and shipbuilding sectors. 
Officials pointed to the significant room Korea has for additional 
monetary and fiscal stimulation.  End Summary. 
 
¶4. (SBU) During her November 17-19 visit to Seoul, San Francisco 
Federal Reserve Bank President Janet Yellen met with a wide range of 
ROKG financial authorities, market actors, and economists to discuss 
developments in the impact on Korea of global financial turmoil. 
Yellen was accompanied by Federal Reserve Board of San Francisco 
Group Vice President for Banking Supervision and Regulation Teresa 
Curran and Federal Reserve Board of San Francisco Group Vice 
President for Economic Research Reuven Glick.  Yellen began the 
schedule with a call on the Ambassador. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The financial authority officials that Yellen met included: 
Bank of Korea Governor Lee Seong-tae; BOK Monetary Policy Committee 
Members Kim Dae-sik, Choi Do-soung, and Kang Myung-hun; Vice 
Chairman of the Financial Services Commission Rhee Chang-young; and, 
Financial Supervisory Service Governor Kim Jong Chang.  The leading 
economic and financial sector thinkers included former Prime 
Minister Han Duck-soo, Chairman of the National Strategy Institute 
Yang Soo-kil, President of the Seoul Financial Forum Kim Kihwan, 
Seoul National University professor Min Sang-kee, and Korea 
University professor Park Yung-chul.  Among the market actors were 
President of Kang and Company Kang (Thomas) Chan-soo, Vice President 
of Hana Financial Holding Kim Eunice, and JP Morgan Managing 
Director Lee Sung-hee.  Economists included Lim Jiwon of JP Morgan, 
President of the Korea Development Institute Hyun Jung Taik, Moon 
Ki-hoon of Good Morning Shinhan Securities, Kwon Goo-hoon of Goldman 
Sachs, and Yang Ho-chul of Margan Stanley. 
 
Banking Sector and Currency 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Korean interlocutors described the suddenness and strength 
of the dollar liquidity squeeze that hit Korean banks and the 
broader economy in September and October following the onset of the 
credit freeze in the United States after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers.  Most acknowledged that some ROKG and private sector 
financial decisions that seemed reasonable at the time actually 
exacerbated the vulnerability of Korea's economy to the global 
credit crunch.  Some of these decisions included the Korean end of 
the Japanese yen carry trade, ROKG encouragement of outbound 
investment, duration mismatches in currency hedging positions, and 
risky or excessive hedging positions.  Others factors included 
Korea's recent current account deficit and accumulation of 
short-term debt, both of which were driven by commodity price 
spikes.  Professor Min Sang-kee noted that foreign equity investors 
 
SEOUL 00002289  002 OF 004 
 
 
had begun leaving the market and repatriating their hard currencies 
two years ago.  This was obscured by credit inflows (short-term 
debt) that accelerated in the same timeframe. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Bankers and market actors uniformly stressed the decisive 
impact the October 29 Fed-BOK currency swap arrangement has had in 
stabilizing Korean financial markets by eliminating fear.  Bankers 
and officials described the overall health of the Korean banking 
sector as good.  While banks are engaged in corporate lending and a 
full range of other financial services, bankers pointed out that the 
banks' biggest assets are loans to households -- both mortgage and 
credit card debt.  They noted that even though real estate prices 
are declining, conservative loan-to-value ratio rules (40-60 
percent) would prevent the emergence of a Korean version of the U.S. 
sub-prime loan problem.  Short-term (3-year) housing loans are 
gradually being extended to longer durations and the ROKG is working 
to prevent variable interest rates from climbing too high. 
Nonetheless, there was broad agreement that banks will focus on 
strengthening capital as some assets on their balance sheets sour. 
 
¶8. (SBU) JP Morgan economist Jiwon Lim argued that relatively few 
banks are currently overexposed to bad loans.  Lim, who had been the 
first economist to call the won overvalued in 2008, said she does 
not see a second wave of currency crisis hitting the banking sector 
or the economy.  Dollar supply will remain tight and keep the won 
under pressure, but banks are seeing increases in deposits of both 
won and dollars (unlike the situation in many other markets).  The 
continuing unwinding of earlier hedging positions will keep dollar 
demand strong for many months.  Foreign banks have reduced dollar 
lending as home offices now strictly enforce stiffer collateral 
requirements.  Many banks have been hesitant to sign up for ROKG 
foreign debt guarantees because of the conditions in the 
government-required MOUs, e.g., reducing executive compensation. 
The won-dollar exchange rate should begin to reset with a 
strengthening of the won as the global credit crunch begins to ease, 
according to Lim.  Another factor in favor of a stronger won will be 
the movement of the current account balance into the black and 
growing net export revenues over the coming months. 
 
Impact on the Broader Economy 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Korean firms, particularly larger exporters and chaebols, 
had learned the lessons of the Asian Financial Crisis and are not 
overleveraged, according to financial authorities.  Corporate 
leverage routinely reached 400 percent in 1997 but was currently 
less than 100 percent on average.  Despite this careful positioning, 
many of these firms are being affected by the credit crunch by 
scarcity of dollar lending, falling equity values and a very thin 
bond market.  Market actors suggested that one problem is the 
mismatch between Korea's well developed export industries and its 
still developing financial markets. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Economists continue to worry that despite considerable 
diversification by region and product, Korean exports may be hit 
hard if global growth falls as much as some analysts have predicted. 
 Korea's economy is heavily exposed to international demand both 
through exports and imports.  The shipbuilding industry will be 
watched especially carefully because of its huge hard currency 
earnings in recent years.  Some interlocutors suggested that in the 
longer term the substantial depreciation of the Korean won will have 
a payoff in export earnings as Korean exports become more 
competitive vis-`-vis China, and particularly Japan.  One banker 
noted that the won was down by approximately 50 percent versus the 
yen in the last few months.  Others worried that this 
competitiveness could produce an increase in market share for Korean 
vehicles in the U.S. market at a time when U.S. deliberations on 
possible ratification of the KORUS Free Trade Agreement were most 
sensitive to such a development.  Still others argued that in the 
short term, trade adjustments will tend to come with respect to 
imports (through the price mechanism) rather than exports, which 
take longer to respond to new price and other market conditions. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Economists pointed to the Korean construction sector as a 
continuing source of weakness in a generally sluggish environment 
 
SEOUL 00002289  003 OF 004 
 
 
for domestic demand.  The earlier excess housing construction needs 
to be worked through -- one expert estimated total lending to 
construction firms at over USD 100 billion -- and there is unlikely 
to be significant new demand for construction domestically before 
the ROKG's stimulus package is implemented in 2009.  There was also 
broad agreement that many SMEs will need restructuring -- in 
construction and even in the lower tiers of the shipbuilding 
industry.  FSS Governor Kim Jong Chang noted that the delinquency 
rate on SME loans was still only 1.5 percent, but he acknowledged 
that the rate was still rising. 
 
Economic Policy/Regulatory Actions 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Former Prime Minister Han Duck-soo described the Federal 
Reserve's October 29 action to extend the USD 30 billion swap line 
to Korea as "very crucial" and noted that this action had eliminated 
the sense of panic that had pervaded Korean markets until that 
point.  He noted that the ROKG had faced a psychological barrier, a 
fear of actually using the considerable (USD 212 billion as of 
October 31) foreign exchange reserves to protect the financial 
system.  He ascribed this to the extreme nature of the current 
financial turmoil and the worry about how much foreign currency 
reserves were enough.  Korea's experience in the Asian Financial 
Crisis 11 years ago -- running out of foreign exchange reserves and 
requiring an IMF program to prevent sovereign default -- also made 
financial authorities cautious about using the foreign exchange 
reserves.  Professor Min pined that if the credit crunch continued 
over a sufficiently long term, Korea would not have sufficient 
foreign exchange reserves to weather the global financial storm. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Economists and strategists shared largely similar views 
regarding a slow start to the ROKG response to the crisis.  Many saw 
the government as responding strongly since mid-October (and 
implicitly not so strongly before) with a broad array of measures. 
They called for the government to take additional bold measures to 
encourage restructuring in weak industries.  While fiscal stimulus 
could buy time for this restructuring, it cannot put it off 
indefinitely.  Former PM Han noted that SMEs account for around 80 
percent of employment and that the government will need to expand 
the targeted lending that it has initiated through the state policy 
banks such as the Industrial Bank of Korea. 
 
Government Policy Perspectives 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (SBU) ROKG financial authorities were quick to explain that with 
Bank of Korea lending rates set at 4 percent, a budget surplus, and 
over USD 200 billion in foreign exchange reserves, the ROKG still 
has significant room for additional monetary and fiscal stimulation 
of the economy.  Most dismissed the possibility of negative 
repercussions for the current account balance from fiscal 
stimulation.  The choice to stimulate the construction sector 
generates a low marginal propensity to import.  The more-or-less 
universal choice by governments around the globe to undertake 
economic stimulation measures should neutralize to some extent 
effects on imports and exports. 
 
¶15. (SBU) FSC Vice Chairman Rhee described the now-familiar ROKG 
view of ways in which the foreign media got the situation in Korea 
wrong -- misunderstanding the actual status of short-term loans (a 
large proportion of which reflect borrowing by foreign banks), a 
sudden panic regarding exports (which are diversified by region and 
sector), and an unfair downgrading of Korean banks (which generally 
remain in good shape).  He also cited changes made by successive ROK 
governments had made changes that that strengthened government and 
financial institutions and left the country much better prepared for 
times of economic uncertainty.  That said, he acknowledged something 
of what he called the "stigma effect," in which people automatically 
tend to view the Korean economy through the prism of what happened 
in 1997/98. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Rhee continued that the government has reviewed the health 
of SMEs burdened with the especially pernicious Knock-in Knock-out 
(KIKO) currency hedging contracts and that fewer than 20 are in deep 
 
SEOUL 00002289  004 OF 004 
 
 
trouble.  He stressed that Korean banks are safe and are still 
receiving a strong deposit flow from Korean citizens who seek the 
safety of guaranteed deposits.  Rhee estimated that foreign 
investors had pulled USD 30-40 billion out of Korea but claimed the 
rate of withdrawal was decelerating.  He also noted that banks were 
beginning to issue subordinate debt to raise capital and ensure they 
remained within the 10 percent BIS end-of-year ratio.  Rhee closed 
by noting the utility of credit guarantee agencies during the 
recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis and the ROKG's current use 
of them. 
 
¶17. (SBU) FSS Governor Kim stated that banks did not currently have 
sufficient capital to absorb the expected souring of assets.  He too 
noted that the banks are working to issue subordinated debt but 
believed that more would be necessary.  He anticipated that ROKG 
financial authorities would develop a method to inject capital 
directly into banks.  A specific method had not yet been selected 
and would likely wait for an evaluation of banks' own efforts to 
raise capital.  Asked about the impact of government encouragement 
of bank lending to SMEs on the quality of bank assets, Governor Kim 
said the ROKG asks the banks to support only those SMEs that are 
sound with temporary liquidity problems and leaves the determination 
of soundness to the banks. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Several experts asked Yellen how financial prudential 
regulations for banks and other financial institutions could be 
expected to withstand the current extremes of the current global 
financial turmoil.  Yellen stressed that in modeling scenarios, U.S. 
financial authorities had never projected out conditions as bad 
those currently prevailing. 
 
Expectations for 2009 
--------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Most of the economists still anticipate Korean GDP growth 
in 2009 will be between 3 and 4 percent, reflecting the positive 
impact of the ROKG's substantial 2009 stimulus plan.  A few economic 
forecasts, however, have suggested growth could be one percent or 
even less.  Most non-ROKG interlocutors suggested that the 
government should work harder to lower expectations for future 
growth (and to formally abandon the campaign goal set a year ago by 
then Presidential candidate Lee Myung-bak of GDP growth of 7 
percent). 
 
¶20. (SBU) Regarding global steps to address the financial 
turbulence, most interlocutors agreed that the G20 was a good choice 
of forum - not least because of Korea's participation -- and that 
the gathering went as far as possible under the circumstances.  All 
agreed that global cooperation had been very strong so far and 
remains important in ensuring that countries maintain a positive 
policy response (and eschew unproductive or beggar-thy-neighbor 
approaches). 
 
STEPHENS