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O 191215Z DEC 08
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
TO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARTO 121901 
C O R R E C T E D   COPY  - SUBJECT LINE 
DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO ALNEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018 
TAGS: OVIP RICE CONDOLEEZZA PREL IR EUN XF XG
SUBJECT: (C) Secretary Rice's December 16, 2008 Meeting 
on Iran with the P5 plus Germany, EU High Rep Solana, 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, and 
 
partto 121901  001.4 OF 005 
 
 
Egypt. 
 
¶1.  (U)  Classified by:  Uzra Zeya, Deputy Executive 
Secretary, S/ES, Department of State. Reason 1.4.(d) 
 
¶2.       (U)  December 16, 2008, 0915-1050, UN Headquarters, 
New York City 
 
¶3. (U)  Participants: 
 
U.S. 
The Secretary 
NEA A/S Welch 
NEA PDAS Feltman 
NEA/ARP Office Director Steinfeld (notetaker) 
 
P5 plus Germany 
UK Foreign Secretary Miliband 
China Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei 
France Political Director Araud 
Russia Amb. to the U.S. Kislyak 
Germany UN PermRep Matussek 
EU High Rep Solana 
 
GCC plus 3 
Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal 
UAE FM Abdullah bin Zayed 
Bahrain FM Sheikh Khalid 
Kuwait UN PermRep Abdullah al-Murad 
Iraq FM Zebari 
Jordan FM Bashir 
Egypt UN PermRep Maged Abdelaziz 
(Oman and Qatar did not participate) 
 
¶4. (C) Summary:  Secretary Rice led a frank 90 minute 
exchange between the P5 plus one and the GCC plus 3 at 
UNHQ on December 16.  Seven foreign ministers and EU 
High Representative Solana attended; only Oman and Qatar 
were absent.  France and Germany expressed support for 
further strengthening of sanctions in 2009, while Russia 
and China were more nuanced in their approach, stressing 
the need for negotiations.  The Arab participants, 
nearly in unison, reiterated the threat they felt from 
Iran, pointing out that the Iranian drive for regional 
hegemony and its malevolent behavior in the region were 
as dangerous to them as the nuclear program.  Their 
message was that the price for resolution of the nuclear 
file could not be acceptance of Iran's hegemonic goals. 
Several of them decried any moves by the P5 plus one to 
grant Iran an explicit regional role, while 
acknowledging the reality that Iran already had one, 
albeit a malign one.  All agreed that the goal was to 
steer Iran -- through increased pressure, but with the 
door open to negotiations -- to a more positive role, 
one that did not seek hegemony over other states.  There 
also was acknowledgement that, while sanctions might be 
taking their toll on the Iranian economy, they had 
failed thus far in pushing Iran to suspend enrichment. 
The Saudi and Egyptian participants also referenced the 
Israeli nuclear program and issues regarding the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) more broadly.  There seemed 
to be consensus at the end that this forum was a useful 
one, and should be continued under the leadership of the 
new U.S. Administration.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Opening Comments of the P5 Plus One and EU 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The Secretary opened the meeting by reviewing the 
current international approach of two tracks:  increased 
pressure through five UN Security Council resolutions to 
 
partto 121901  002.4 OF 005 
 
 
convince Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment program 
coupled with an offer for negotiations and potential 
benefits should Iran comply.  She noted how important 
these matters were for the Arabs at the table and that 
both the nuclear file and Iran's malevolent behavior 
throughout the region needed to be addressed in tandem. 
 
¶6. (C) EU High Representative Solana offered brief 
comments, noting his intention to meet soon with Iranian 
nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, that Iranian 
cooperation with the IAEA was seen to be severely 
wanting, and that the number of centrifuges Iran was 
developing continued to grow.  He noted that his deputy, 
Robert Cooper, would travel to Iran that week, but he 
downplayed expectations.  The Iranians seemed to be 
playing for time, Solana said. 
 
¶7. (C) UK Foreign Secretary Miliband began by commenting 
on the increasing difficulties facing the Iranian 
economy:  inflation in Tehran of 50 percent, falling oil 
prices when Iran's budget was based on a price of 
$75/barrel, and the significant negative effects on the 
bazaaris.  That said, Miliband noted that sanctions were 
not having the desired effect on Iran's nuclear program. 
Hence, 2009 needed to be a year for increased 
international pressure on the Iranians, while continuing 
to make clear the potential benefits to them of halting 
enrichment.  Miliband added that the international 
community had to counter Iran's argument that it was the 
victim of UNSC actions; rather, it must be stressed that 
Iran is the victim of its own behavior.  The 
international community needed to change the 
cost/benefit calculus for Iran to avoid a nuclear arms 
race in the region, which is the last thing that was 
needed. 
 
¶8. (C) French MFA Political Director Araud conveyed 
President Sarkozy's strong interest and concern about 
the Iranian nuclear program.  He stressed that the 
Iranians had continuously spurned negotiations, and that 
they were buying time while they continued enrichment. 
As they have no nuclear power plants for this potential 
fuel, their intent is obvious -- enrichment of weapons 
grade material.  The international community is thus 
"obliged" to increase pressure on Iran; France and the 
EU are currently looking at new and more robust 
sanctions, as should the UNSC. 
 
¶9. (C) Chinese Vice FM He Yafei said the Iran file was 
an important and difficult issue, where the possibility 
of negotiations between the P5 plus one and Iran were 
still possible.  Iran needs to give a positive response 
to the P5 proposal, but all parties need to show 
patience -- dialogue and negotiations are still 
possible. 
 
¶10. (C) Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Kislyak said that 
the P5 wanted Iran to deal with the offer on the table, 
but that it was not the "Bible or the Quran" and could 
be modified.  Engagement by the P5 plus one with Iran 
was the key, but there were still no serious 
negotiations taking place.  UNSC resolutions were the 
outgrowth of issues related to IAEA non-compliance; the 
resolutions were not "inventions" of the P5 plus one. 
Kislyak said that whatever help the Arabs could provide 
to bring Iran to negotiations would be useful. 
 
¶11. (C) German UN PermRep Matussek said that 2009 would 
be a critical year.  While the P5 plus one had a firm 
commitment to the dual track approach, Iran was not 
interested in negotiations.  It was thus "wise" to think 
about additional measures from the UNSC, as well as to 
 
partto 121901  003.3 OF 005 
 
 
strengthen national implementation of existing 
sanctions.  It was important that Iran not be able to 
circumvent sanctions and "we at the table" need to 
remain united. 
 
-------------------------- 
GCC Plus 3 Opening Remarks 
-------------------------- 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
¶12. (C) Saudi FM Prince Saud quipped that any incentives 
offered to Iran should also be offered to the GCC.  He 
said that Iran would be an even larger threat than it 
already is were Tehran to secure nuclear arms.  He added 
that the balance of power in the region had been 
"shattered," even if for good causes; Iran has been able 
to broadly extend its power and influence throughout the 
region in the aftermath of the Iraq war.  The two key 
issues with regard to Iran are linked:  the nuclear 
program and regional activities; both sides of the 
equation needed to be solved.  Saud expressed hope that, 
while tackling the nuclear file, the situation regarding 
Iran's role in the region is not made worse.  The 
Iranians, he said, were obstinate and would go ahead 
with the nuclear program.  He continued that Iran was 
looking for a leadership role in the region -- 
politically, economically, and militarily. 
 
¶13. (C) Saud said that since WMD already was in the 
region, the Iranians would pursue them as well. 
Preventing this with the use of carrots and sticks would 
not work, he said.  The "original sin" was when Israel 
developed nuclear weapons, and there was a double 
standard at play.  Perhaps it would be necessary to 
demilitarize the whole region, as was done in South 
Africa.  This was the "only conceivable possible way" to 
solve the problem. 
 
¶14. (C) Saud also suggested that it might be useful to 
pursue a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN charter 
that guaranteed the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
and independence of Iraq as a way of increasing Iraq's 
sense of security vis-a-vis Iran. 
 
Jordan 
 
¶15. (C) Jordanian FM Bashir asked for more clarity from 
the P5 as to what was in the incentive package, in order 
to determine more fully whether we all see "eye to eye" 
on the issues.  He outlined a series of interlocking 
issues in the region:  WMD, Iranian hegemony, Israel- 
Palestine, and Iraq.  He stressed that the P5 plus one 
needed to insist that no one play outside the rules, 
whether with regard to WMD or interference in the 
internal affairs of others.  He asked what political 
incentives were actually being offered to Iran. 
 
Egypt 
 
¶16. (C) Egyptian UN PermRep Maged Abdelaziz said that 
sanctions had not proved effective.  He then spoke at 
length about the crisis in the NPT system, noting that 
some non-signatories' possession of nuclear weapons had 
gained legitimacy.  This in turn legitimized the Iranian 
program.  The right to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy must be preserved, he said.  Abdelaziz added that 
Egypt did not want to give Iran a "regional role."  The 
GCC plus 3 needed to be involved with the P5 plus one as 
policies were developed. 
 
UAE 
 
partto 121901  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶17. (C) UAE FM Sheikh Abdullah said that both the 
nuclear program and growing Iranian hegemony were of 
concern to the UAE.  He noted that it was difficult for 
the UAE to worry about Shahab 4, 5, and 6 missiles, when 
"I am already covered by Shahab 1."  Iran without the 
bomb, he asserted, is already "creating a big mess in my 
country;" with the bomb, it would be much worse.  He 
continued that "nothing" would stop Iran from attempting 
to get the bomb; this was partially out of revenge 
against the Arabs when they invaded Iran 1,400 years 
ago.  Nothing, he said, worried the UAE more than 
Iranian hegemony.  While it was not possible to declare 
war on Iran, "Iran needs to feel that time was running 
out."  2009 should be a year that is very serious for 
us. 
 
Iraq 
 
¶18. (C) Iraqi FM Zebari said that no country was more 
concerned about Iran than is his own.  Iraq had passed 
many messages to the Iranians, had been sincere with 
them, and told them to take note of Saddam's demise. 
Iraq, he continued, was for a peaceful solution to the 
issues, for dialogue.  Sanctions are, he stated, having 
an impact, but there is no appetite for bombing Iran. 
He argued that the way to deal with Iranian hegemony was 
to help strengthen Iraq, and he expressed appreciation 
to the Arabs who had normalized relations with his 
country.  He responded to Saud's idea of a UNSCR on 
Iraq's independence by quipping that he had been sent to 
New York to get out from under Chapter VII, not to have 
a new resolution under it.  He concluded by saying that 
patience was needed when dealing with Iraq. 
 
Bahrain 
 
¶19. (C) Bahraini FM Sheikh Khalid opened by saying that 
every once in a while an Iranian mullah or writer will 
still refer to Bahrain as Iran's 14th province.  The 
threat is real.  He queried as to what was actually in 
the P5 plus one package.  Why, he asked, should Iran be 
given a regional role?  They play such a role in any 
case, but need to do so responsibly.  He said any offers 
giving Iran a regional role "worries us."  He argued for 
continuing with these meetings in the future. 
 
Kuwait 
 
¶20. (C) Kuwaiti UN Perm Rep al-Murad suggested that 
another UNSC resolution would be a good idea.  He 
questioned why Iran's role in the Gulf would have to be 
specially enunciated. 
 
------------------ 
What Regional Role 
------------------ 
 
¶21. (C) The Secretary continued the discussion by asking 
for some clarity from the P5 plus one partners as to 
what actually was promised to Iran with regard to a 
regional role.  Amb. Kislyak said that the Russian 
understanding was not to give Iran a hegemonic role, but 
that the Iranians do want to be involved in the security 
of the region.  Foreign Secretary Miliband commented 
that Iran could have no rights without responsibilities. 
A regional role was "not for us to give."  Iran plays a 
malign role because of a lack of balance between rights 
and responsibilities; they want their rights but will 
not exercise responsibilities.  Miliband added, noting 
Abdelaziz's comments, that future issues around the NPT 
 
partto 121901  005.3 OF 005 
 
 
must not obscure the immediacy of the Iranian nuclear 
program.  He noted that Germany was right; 2009 will be 
an important year and acknowledged that UAE FM Abdullah 
had challenged us to act. 
 
¶22. (C) Prince Saud commented that a role was given to 
Iran when the British left the Gulf in the 1970s, and 
Iran "took" the UAE islands.  This could happen again, 
he said.  With regard to a regional role having been 
"given" to Iran, Araud said that was not part of the 
offer in June.  He noted that Sarkozy had sent him to 
consult in this forum with full transparency.  FM Sheikh 
Khalid then clarified that caution needed to be 
exercised during future negotiations with Iran because 
the Iranians could push the P5 plus one for 
acknowledgement of a regional role at that time, even if 
one had not yet been explicitly offered.  Germany added 
that Iran does in fact play a regional role, but the 
goal is to make it a positive one.  In emphasizing the 
need to consult regularly, the UAE FM urged that "we 
don't give ourselves false expectations regarding 
Iranian elections (in spring 2009)."  Whoever wins, 
Abdullah counseled, Supreme Leader Khamenei will still 
direct policy.  Ahmedinejad's behavior was perhaps the 
best incentive to build international unity in support 
of sanctions, but his potential departure in the spring 
should not be permitted to weaken international resolve. 
Saud added that if there are talks on Iran's regional 
role, they should be with the GCC. 
 
--------------------- 
Talks Should Continue 
--------------------- 
 
¶23. (C) Towards the end of the interventions, several 
delegations called for the need to continue the GCC plus 
three plus P5 plus one forum after Secretary Rice's 
departure from the State Department.  This message was 
most explicitly stated by Miliband, and seconded by 
France, the UAE, Bahrain, and Jordan.  Secretary Rice 
reiterated her strong support for the utility of the 
forum. 
 
------------------ 
Go Public, or Not? 
------------------ 
 
¶24. (C) Jordan began a discussion of how to publicize 
the meeting by asking what its outcomes would be.  The 
Secretary suggested that a short statement could be 
issued, or at least points agreed upon, as the meeting 
was already public knowledge.  Miliband argued for a 
robust text with explicit reference to Iran's nuclear 
and regional ambitions.  Kislyak countered that such a 
statement would take "years" to negotiate, and that 
something less "dramatic" was needed.  The UAE said that 
Iranians needed to know that these two groups were 
discussing Iran.  Saud wondered aloud whether leaving 
some mystery around the process might not enervate Iran 
even more. 
 
¶25. (C) In the end, the Secretary iterated some general 
points -- the importance of the forum; the concern over 
Iran's nuclear policies and regional ambitions; 
participants' support for the work of the UNSC, IAEA, 
and the P5 plus one; and agreement to continue these 
meetings on a regular basis.  She subsequently delivered 
these points to the press at the end of the meeting. 
 
¶26. (U) Minimize considered. 
RICE