VZCZCXRO8113
PP RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNK #0779/01 3661710
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311710Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7979
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0412
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0334
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0388
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1930
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0722
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0026
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0829
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0454

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000779 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: A PENSIVE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b and 
d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The President of the National Assembly 
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir is pleased with the results of his 
extensive round of African contacts leading to a tough policy 
line by the Peace and Security Council.  He praises the U.S. 
position while he worries about the Europeans.  Ould 
Boulkheir was pleasantly surprised by the decision of the 
High Constitutional Council that thwarted efforts to remove 
him from his position but is ill at ease with the current 
"cohabitation" with the members of his own chamber.   The 
Assembly President sees nothing useful coming from the 
National Dialogue on Democracy but voices frustration with 
President Abdallahi's lack of an alternative option.  End 
Summary 
 
¶2.  (C) Diplomatic Mission:  Charge met with President of the 
National Assembly Messaoud Ould Boulkheir on December 31 at 
Ould Boulkheir's Assembly office.  Charge congratulated Ould 
Boulkheir on the success of his extensive diplomatic mission 
on behalf of President Abdallahi.  Ould Boulkheir took the 
opportunity to thank the U.S. for its extensive support to 
his delegation during his trip highlighting particularly his 
meetings with Ambassador Simon at USAU and DCM LaLime in 
Pretoria..  Ould Boulkheir said he had found a consistent 
strong message of support throughout his mission and he had 
succeeded in getting the PSC to accept two of his main 
objectives -- getting the AU to invite President Abdallahi to 
appoint his own representative and getting AU support to pass 
the Mauritanian dossier to the UN Security Council.  Ould 
Boulkheir said he had noted the effectiveness of the U.S. 
position (as well as direct interventions) throughout his 
trip.  He worried that the French position remained "vague" 
but noted that AU Chairman Kikwete told him he had discussed 
Mauritania with President Sarkozy at the Doha Summit and had 
found the French Presidential position to be unwavering. 
Ould Boulkheir noted some confusion over the German position 
since the Germans had previously been strong supporters of 
Mauritania's democracy under President Abdallahi and now 
seemed the regime's most vocal supporters -- more so than the 
Spanish who Ould Boulkheir saw motivated by their own sense 
of security and commercial interests.  He was particularly 
concerned since the German Ambassador will now represent the 
European Union on behalf of the Czech EU Presidency. 
 
¶3.  (C) Constitutional Contortions:  Ould Boulkheir was 
surprised that the High Constitutional Council had rejected 
changes pushed through by General Aziz' "Parliamentary 
Battalion" in the Assembly that would have forced him out of 
his office.  That said, he said, "I'm not at all comfortable 
with this current arrangement of 'cohabitation'" noting he 
was sitting in his office at the Assembly while the combined 
Congress was being convened -- illegally so -- at the 
National Dialogue for Democracy.  Ould Boulkheir saw nothing 
useful coming from the Dialogue noting, first and foremost, 
that it had been convened and managed by an "illegitimate 
president" and his "illegal government."  The Dialogue itself 
had no standing to convene the Congress as a sub-set of the 
conference.  Recognizing that some political parties against 
the coup had decided to try to change things from within, 
Ould Boulkheir said they were already complaining that the 
participation in the Dialogue was so weighed in favor of 
traditional "notables" that the political parties were being 
pushed aside.  Ould Boulkheir asserted that, regardless of 
how open the debate might be, the results of the Dialogue 
will have no legal standing adding, "The military would have 
made life much easier for themselves by just launching a 
traditional coup.  This affair of trying to pretend that all 
other aspects of constitutional order remain in place doesn't 
work because the changes they are trying to force are 
inherently unconstitutional." 
 
¶4.  (C) Time For A Strategy:  Ould Boulkheir noted he had not 
gone to Lemden to brief President Abdallahi on his diplomatic 
mission because "I thought he would be back in town by now -- 
now I understand he won't come back until after the Dialogue 
is over."  He noted that bringing the President back to 
Nouakchott poses some very difficult administrative and 
security challenges for the FNDD but saw that it is difficult 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000779  002 OF 002 
 
 
to demonstrate that Abdallahi's liberation is not 
"unconditional" if it remains untested.  He is uncomfortable 
with the emerging long-term strategy of the FNDD and said, 
"it's time for the President to table some specific plan for 
a resolution to the problem" since the Aziz "National 
Dialogue" effort was the only thing out there for now.  Ould 
Boulkheir said the basic tenets of his earlier proposal -- 
for the President to announce he will schedule early 
elections as soon as the military leave and he is returned to 
office -- remains the most viable.  He allowed that short of 
actually giving up his mandate, the President had to at least 
put it at risk through a referendum or early parliamentary 
elections.  Ould Boulkheir said international pressure 
remains vital but saw that, eventually, something has to be 
done internally. 
 
¶5.  (C) Comment:  Ould Boulkheir continues to impress with 
his commitment to principle coupled with a sincere effort to 
find some negotiating room.  He is not without political 
ambition, of course.  Many Mauritanians see Ould Boulkheir's 
leadership of the FNDD African diplomatic mission as 
burnishing his own credentials as a future president -- 
building his credibility to, as some Mauritanians put it, "do 
an Obama" of having a black Mauritanian elected President. 
While still a crucial element of the FNDD coalition, Ould 
Boulkheir is the most outspoken in his willingness to have 
Abdallahi give up his position once he is returned to office 
and constitutional order is re-established.  End Comment. 
HANKINS