VZCZCXRO8597
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #3659/01 3521413
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171413Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1228
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003659 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AZ RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT NAGORNO-KARABAKH 
 
Classified By: Deputy Pol MinCouns David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4(b) 
 and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In a December 10 meeting, MFA Counselor 
Elena Kravchenko said the Minsk Group planned to organize 
another meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in 
the new year.  She said the major obstacles for a conflict 
resolution were the Lachin corridor and the unwillingness of 
the Azerbaijani and Armenian societies to accept any 
compromise.  Armenian president Sargsian's preparations for a 
referendum were a sign of progress, as was recent acceptance 
of the notion of a referendum in the Azerbaijani press. 
Denying Russia was conducting checkbook diplomacy by offering 
to buy Azerbaijani gas at high prices, Kravchenko insisted 
Russia's influence in the region was limited by the 
counterbalancing Armenian and Azerbaijani lobbies in Russia. 
Irina Zvyagelskaya from the International Center for 
Strategic and Policy Studies called for the inclusion of 
Nagorno-Karabakh as a third party in negotiations, and 
suggested Russia preferred a conflict resolution where 
Armenia and Azerbaijan committed to political neutrality. 
End Summary. 
 
------------------------- 
Recent events, next steps 
------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In a December 10 meeting, MFA Counselor for the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Elena Kravchenko described the 
recent activity on Nagorno-Karabakh as follow-through to the 
November 2 Moscow Summit statement, in which Azerbaijani and 
Armenian presidents Aliyev and Sargsian tasked their foreign 
ministers to work with the Minsk Group to activate the 
Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation process.  This included the 
mid-November co-chair visit to the region, the foreign 
ministers' meeting in Helsinki December 4, and plans for 
either a January meeting (possibly in Davos) between the 
foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, or for another 
co-chair trip to the region.  The January event would serve 
to set up a new meeting between Aliyev and Sargsian. 
 
¶3.  (C) Despite initially having voiced concerns about 
Aliyev's November 27 assertion to RAI International that 
Azerbaijan would "never rule out the military way as a way of 
restoring our territorial integrity," Kravchenko denied that 
this had in part caused the Minsk Group's foreign ministers 
to release a statement at the Helsinki OSCE Forum December 
4-5, rejecting any military solution of the conflict. 
Kravchenko said Aliyev had simply restated a well-known 
position in order to put pressure on Armenia. 
 
--------------------- 
Significant obstacles 
--------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Kravchenko warned that, despite press reports of a 
new dynamism in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
significant stumbling blocks remained.  The first was the 
question of the Lachin corridor, where, despite progress made 
in comparison with the situation years ago, the sides were 
still far from finding common agreement.  The other major 
problem according to Kravchenko was the internal political 
situation in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.  Given internal 
popular opposition to any solution that did not reflect 
hard-line domestic demands, both presidents needed to prepare 
and educate their respective countries' populations and 
governments to accept a compromise, without internally 
destabilizing the country. 
 
¶5.  (C) Kravchenko cautioned that the issues remaining to be 
resolved were becoming increasingly difficult, requiring 
presidential involvement by the conflict parties.  She also 
noted that agreements on individual Basic Principles often 
evaporated when considering the package as a whole, as then 
each side inevitably claimed the principles were weighted in 
favor of the other side. 
 
------------------------------ 
Russia "cautiously optimistic" 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) However, Kravchenko agreed there was progress, too. 
She noted that in an editorial published in Azerbaijan 
December 9, the author described the idea of a referendum on 
the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as "nothing terrible," and 
then proceeded to estimate result of such a vote based on the 
ethnicity of the population.  What was remarkable, according 
to Kravchenko, was that the author accepted the idea of a 
referendum, which she claimed had been heretofore impossible 
to present in Azerbaijani media.  Kravchenko pocketed this as 
the result of the continuous prodding, cajoling, and 
 
MOSCOW 00003659  002 OF 002 
 
 
advocating by the Minsk Group co-chairs and others. 
 
¶7.  (C) In Armenia, Sargsian had also started to take 
positive action, Kravchenko said.  Shortly after the November 
2 summit in Moscow, Sargsian had "bravely" launched cabinet 
deliberations to lay the groundwork for a referendum on the 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh.  As a result, Russia was 
"cautiously optimistic" about the possibility for progress on 
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
 
------------------------- 
Russian influence limited 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Kravchenko denied that the GOR had any special 
influence in the region it could exert in favor of resolving 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but then clarified to say that 
the GOR had no insight into the internal political processes 
Aliyev and Sargsian had to manage in order to sway the 
populaces in favor of a compromise solution.  She initially 
brushed off as "laughable" the suggestion Russia was 
conducting checkbook diplomacy by offering to buy Azeri gas 
in return for a conflict resolution in Azerbaijan's favor, 
claiming that notion was a "typical Azeri way of thinking," 
as evidenced by the GOAZ's "offer to buy Nagorno-Karabakh 
from Armenia."  Suggesting Azerbaijan had floated the 
gas-for-resolution idea to Russia, not vice versa, Kravchenko 
insisted that Russia had no intention of breaking the solid 
front of the three Minsk Group co-chairs by striking a 
separate deal with a conflict party.  Finally, the presence 
of significant diaspora populations from both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan prevented Russia from advocating any resolution 
that favored one side over the other.  However, Kravchenko 
allowed that she could imagine there might be "oscillations" 
in the GOR on how to handle the idea of buying gas in return 
for conflict resolution. 
 
--------------- 
Analyst's views 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Irina Zvyagelskaya from the International Center for 
Strategic and Policy Studies asserted that one key element in 
a lasting resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the 
inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh as a third and separate 
conflict party, as Armenia's and Nagorno-Karabakh's interests 
were not identical.  While giving the Minsk Group positive 
grades for its efforts, she also detected fault lines between 
the co-chair nations.  The presence of European or U.S. 
troops would exert a calming influence in the region, but 
Russia would never allow NATO country troops to be stationed 
there.  Russia's preferred resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
situation included the neutrality (for which read rejection 
of NATO membership) of the involved countries, according to 
Zvyagelskaya. 
BEYRLE