VZCZCXRO8698
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #1187/01 3391709
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 041709Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2450
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001187 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/I, AND S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KW
SUBJECT: (C) KUWAIT'S DEMOCRATIC JALOPY - STILL CHUGGING 
DESPITE BUMPS IN THE ROAD 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 1110 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 1144 
     ¶C. KUWAIT 1166 
     ¶D. KUWAIT 1175 
     ¶E. KUWAIT 1178 
     ¶F. KUWAIT 1183 
 
Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 14.b and d 
 
¶1. (S)  Summary:  Kuwait's developing democracy is undergoing 
yet another of the transitional wheezing attacks that seem to 
grip it every several years, but it is nowhere near death. 
Like the 70's)era Chevrolet Impalas that continue to ply 
Kuwait's choked freeways, alongside European sports cars and 
super-chromed, souped-up American SUV's, it is a beloved if 
increasingly decrepit and outdated model: a jalopy, as it 
were, held together by the political equivalent of baling 
wire and the occasional hard whack of a spanner, that somehow 
manages to keep going, albeit in fits and starts.  The Amir 
is unlikely to take decisive action any time soon, 
recognizing that alternatives to the current scenario will be 
difficult and divisive.   We will thus see neither a 
dictatorship - which would be unworkable - nor a failed 
democracy.  That said, growing fissures within Kuwaiti 
society have become increasingly visible with the current 
"crisis" and ultimately may force consideration of major 
adjustments, such as constitutional reform or a politically 
selected Deputy Prime Minister, hitherto considered off 
limits.  In the meantime, we assess minimal risk to US 
interests in the short term (5-10 years).  End summary. 
 
¶2. (S)  Over the past several months, this tiny 
constitutional emirate has been buffeted by viral panic 
associated with the global financial crisis (and resultant 
drop in the price of oil, its lifeblood) compounded by 
monumental government ineptitude, from the leadership on down 
through the cabinet and parliamentarians.  An oft-heard note 
in the midst of the political cacophony has been the call for 
the dissolution of parliament, for what would be the third 
time in as many years, with the concomitant desire that the 
Amir elect to rule by fiat, even unconstitutionally.  This, 
proponents argue, would stanch the growing tide of Salafist 
influence and enable the country to reclaim its earlier 
reputation as the progressive "Pearl of the Gulf," rather 
than continue to lag further behind in infrastructure and 
socioeconomic development as its more autocratic neighbors ) 
notably Qatar and the UAE -- speed ahead. 
 
¶3. (S)  Others argue with equal force that any effort to 
constrain or curtail Kuwait's deeply entrenched democratic 
dialogue - as embodied in its traditional diwaniyas (the 
equivalent of a salon for political discourse, frequented on 
a regular basis by tens of thousands of Kuwaiti males, 
generally) and its 17 daily newspapers would result in strong 
protests and perhaps even bloodshed as government security 
forces would be forced to contend with outraged students, 
political liberals, Shi'a and newly enfranchised tribals 
fearful of losing their claim to a larger piece of affluent 
Kuwait's social welfare pie. 
 
¶4. (S)  There are several realities here.  First and foremost 
is that the U.S. and our entrenched security presence enables 
- in the psychological sense - a relatively frivolous 
approach to politics.  As long as the oil flows out and the 
dollars flow in, Kuwaitis can afford to engage in these 
parlor games and the Amir can dither over tough decisions 
with impunity.  After all, what do most Kuwaitis lack for? 
Nothing.  Many believe the USG is calling the shots in any 
event.  The Russian Ambassador here asserted the other 
evening that "75 percent of Kuwaitis want dissolution, but 
they are afraid that you (i.e. the U.S. government) won't 
allow it." 
 
¶5. (S)  Our own conversations with a broad range of Kuwaitis 
suggests the split may be more along the lines of 50/50, with 
political liberals, secularists (if such a term can be used 
here) Islamist tribals and Shi'a intellectuals concerned the 
U.S. will turn a blind eye to unconstitutional dissolution in 
hopes of pushing through projects beneficial to our parochial 
interests (such as the Fourth Refinery or long-pending CT 
legislation), or in return for continued investment.  As this 
post has noted earlier (reftels), we bump up against the 
horns of a dilemma:  Certainly many of our specific interests 
would be better served with a more efficient, directive 
government, akin to the UAE or Saudi models, at least in 
theory and for awhile.  But that would undermine our 
political assertion that only democracy, in the long term, 
mitigates the potential for extremism. 
 
¶6. (S)  The Ambassador has been urged by some parties - 
 
KUWAIT 00001187  002 OF 003 
 
 
including at least one member of the ruling Al Sabah family - 
to intervene to prevent dissolution, and just as strongly by 
others - including the Amir's half-brother and confidant 
Shaykh Misha'al - to keep firmly out of the country's 
governmental knickers.  What has been communicated clearly to 
senior leadership by the Ambassador, discreetly, is a request 
that they not blindside us, as their most important ally; we 
will have a reaction to any unconstitutional dissolution and 
it would be best that we have a full context in which to 
craft any response.  To Shaykh Misha'al, whose influence goes 
well beyond his position in the GOK's organizational chart, 
the Ambassador has noted that handing our newly elected 
leadership an inaugural gift that certainly would be 
perceived by many as a huge step backward for an important 
regional ally would send a confusing signal, at least. 
 
¶7. (S)  The worst case scenario sketched out by one of the Al 
Sabah inner circle known for his occasionally Cassandra-esque 
predictions, posits a drawn out unconstitutional dissolution 
that "metastasizes" into something resembling a dictatorship, 
with an accompanying crackdown on the press and internet 
communications, and resultant violent reactions from various 
groups.  Our analysis is that the habit of democracy is 
simply too firmly entrenched for that to occur.  The Amir 
knows this, and thus the protracted political minuet of the 
past few weeks, designed to take the country into the Eid 
holiday, a parliamentary recess and ) without embarrassment 
- through the January 17-18 Arab Economic Summit here while 
he considers his options.  He is a wily politician, if not a 
decisive leader, and has been quietly and regularly checking 
the political pulse of his constituency even as his public 
remarks have made clear he will not tolerate an ongoing 
situation of rancorous political gridlock. 
 
¶8. (S)  The Prime Minister is universally liked as an 
individual and considered too weak to run a government.  The 
Amir has made clear he has no intention of removing him.  So 
the alternative, according to some, would be to assign "tough 
ministers," in the words of one interlocutor, who will take 
on the members of parliament themselves.  One individual 
cited with some frequency is Ahmad al-Fahd Al Sabah, the 
Amir's nephew, President of the National Security Bureau and 
an open rival to the PM, known for his influence amongst the 
tribals, as well as for his inherent corruptibility given his 
relatively impecunious (by Kuwaiti standards) financial 
circumstances. 
 
¶9. (S)  Whatever happens, one thing is clear:  no matter who 
holds the PM's office, the mechanics of Kuwait's democracy 
are increasingly incapable of addressing its changing 
demographics.  Old-style methods of governance, through 
consensus and the granting of favors, no longer work to 
address the growing demands of an increasingly diverse and 
conservative populace, resulting again and again in political 
gridlock.  Even now, and increasingly, many modalities are 
being discussed from reconfiguring the cabinet, to creating 
an elective Deputy PM position, to establishing political 
parties (not wished by the Al Sabah), to amending the 
constitution, to having an elected PM (not wished by most). 
There are persuasive pros and cons to be made in each case; 
thus we should avoid being prescriptive. 
 
¶10. (S)  When you press the Kuwaitis ) and particularly the 
urban, merchant elite ) they really don't want anything to 
change.  But change is unavoidable.  The largely urban 
merchant families that characterized Kuwait's demographic 30 
years ago have one wife and 2-3 children in whom they invest 
heavily in education; the tribal families have 2-3 wives and 
5-6 children per wife, with typically lower educational 
standards.  The pyramid has tipped.  Meanwhile, the basic 
structure of governance has not changed since 1963, with 50 
elected parliamentarians, no political parties, and an 
inviolate constitution. So the Amir, it could be argued, has 
no alternative but to dissolve parliament in order to set 
things straight. 
 
¶11. (S)  Even if the Amir were to take that step - the 
preferred route of many avowed cultural liberals - there is a 
sense he would still be forced to make concessions to an 
increasingly conservative Salafist demographic base, intent 
on reforming Kuwaiti society along its religious lines.  In 
the longer run such a trend could have consequences for our 
bilateral relationship, with or without a parliament.  No one 
believes for a moment that Kuwaitis, whether Salafist or 
secular, would ever urge the withdrawal of American troops; 
but they could certainly reduce the subsidies granted to us, 
or sharply curtail our access and operational flexibility. 
Similarly, major deals with American companies, or KIA 
investment in the U.S. could be directed elsewhere to appease 
elements unhappy with our policies in the Muslim world, and 
 
KUWAIT 00001187  003 OF 003 
 
 
Palestine. 
 
¶12. (S)  Although it is almost unimaginable to most analysts, 
there are incipient whispered suggestions that the 
politically decrepit Al Sabah, on whose goodwill we rely, may 
have outlived their usefulness and are now more concerned 
with controlling Kuwait's wealth than with ruling.  For its 
part, the ruling family hopes to discover a formula to 
invigorate its leadership and dispel the residual ill-will 
from the unseemly fashion in which the current Amir unseated 
his predecessor, the "non compos mentis" but nonetheless 
highly respected Shaykh Sa'ad Al Sabah. 
 
¶13. (S)  But all this is much further down the road.  For 
now, absent a "Boris Yeltsin" or other energetic reformer and 
visionary, this old Chevy will continue to smoke and clank 
down the highway.  It will be a drawn-out process with no 
immediate solution, but neither is it likely to be explosive. 
 Our role should be to continue to speak out publicly and 
clearly about the organic nature of democracies and the need 
for the machinery of the process to keep pace with societal 
dynamics, and the Kuwaitis' need to accommodate change while 
maintaining inherent respect for institutions, rule of law 
and the protection of their minorities.  Meanwhile we must 
sustain our efforts to strengthen those institutions through 
educational exchanges, IV programs, government to government 
exchanges, NGO's and corporate involvement.  There is no 
quick fix to societal transition. 
 
¶14. (C)  In the event of unconstitutional dissolution, which 
we assume would take place if at all sometime after the 
January 17-18 Arab Economic Summit, we believe the 
contingency press guidance submitted earlier remains relevant. 
 
Talking Points: 
 
- We have seen reports that the Amir of Kuwait has dissolved 
Kuwait's National Assembly for an undetermined period of time. 
 
- Kuwait is an important ally of the United States with a 
long and unique tradition of democratic governance.  We hope 
this will be a temporary measure. 
 
- We are aware that strained relations between the Government 
of Kuwait and the National Assembly and the resulting 
political paralysis have been a source of frustration for 
many Kuwaitis, some of whom have called for the Parliament's 
dissolution. 
 
- We strongly support Kuwait's democratic traditions and note 
that Parliament is only one part of that equation; democracy 
is also about respect for rule of law and institutions. 
Honest differences between the executive and legislative 
branches should not lead to governmental paralysis. 
 
- We would also hope that Kuwait's well-entrenched freedom of 
speech, as represented by its lively press and diwaniya 
tradition, will be respected during this period. 
 
 
 
 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
JONES