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P 021402Z DEC 08
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 000601 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2028 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PINS IR TU AZ
SUBJECT: IRAN/ETHNIC GROUPS:  AN ETHNIC RIGHTS ACTIVIST 
DESCRIBES THE "AZERI ETHNIC MOVEMENT" IN IRAN 
 
Classified By: Acting Pol/Econ section chief Geoff Odlum; Reason 1.5 (d 
). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  An Iranian-Azeri journalist told us 
November 29 that the June 2006 ethnic Azeri demonstrations 
against authorities in northwest Iran were "an awakening" for 
the Azeri ethnic movement and led the regime to conclude it 
was a threat to stability.  He described a diffuse ethnic 
movement, with different groups pursuing a spectrum of goals 
from simply enjoying more cultural and linguistic rights, to 
equal status for the Azeri language, to political autonomy, 
to independence.  Although "organically linked,", he said the 
groups sometimes work together and sometimes do not.  He said 
the general consensus is to focus on cultural and linguistic 
freedom, deferring political goals to the longer-term.  He 
claimed growing contacts between ethnic Azeri and Ahwaz Arab 
groups in Iran, and growing tensions with Iran's Kurds.  He 
described differing approaches to his movement from the IRGC 
and MOIS, believing the MOIS protected him from the IRGC 
while he was in jail.  He asked for USG views about the 
ethnic Azeri movement, warned the USG not to use the Azeri 
movement as a tool simply to raise pressure on Iran, and 
urged the USG to issue more careful statements of support for 
ethnic Iranian Azeri desires to enjoy freely their own 
language and culture.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) On the margins of an Iran human rights conference in 
Istanbul (septel), ConGen Istanbul's NEA "Iran Watcher" met 
discreetly with Ali Hamed Iman (strictly protect), an 
Iranian-Azeri journalist and activist.  Iman was only willing 
to meet off the premises of the conference, in the company of 
an intermediary.  He felt under constant scrutiny from 
Iranian security services, which he said were aware of his 
travel to Istanbul and possibly surveilling him.  Iman was 
formerly the editor of a leading Tabriz-based newspaper, 
"Tabrik Shams", which the GOI shut down in summer 2006 
following widespread protests in northwest Iran in reaction 
to the May 2006 publication in a Tehran daily of a derogatory 
cartoon of a cockroach representing an Iranian-Azeri.  Iman 
had written an editorial criticizing the GOI's slow reaction 
to condemning that caricature, which led security forces to 
arrest and jail him in June 2006.  He was freed after several 
months but his paper was permanently shut down and he 
received a lifetime ban against publishing in Iran.  He still 
lives in Tabriz, and now publishes "AzerTurk", a monthly 
magazine focusing on Iranian-Azeri literature and culture 
(www.azarturk.com), which is published in Canada.  He is 
trying to start up a tourism-oriented organization that will 
encourage Iranian-Azeri expatriates to travel back to 
northwest Iran for cultural and familial visits and raise 
international awareness of Iranian-Azeri culture.  Iman was 
nervous meeting with us, but he explained that the risk was 
worth the benefit of being able to convey to the USG the 
challenges the Iranian-Azeri "movement" is facing and of 
hearing USG views about ethnic Azeri activism inside Iran. 
 
 
The Iranian-Azeri "struggle" continues 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Iman characterized the Azeri population in northwest 
Iran as facing similar economic and political challenges as 
other Iranians, while additionally feeling a sense of 
suspended momentum in the population's efforts to highlight 
to the regime their particular cultural and linguistic 
grievances.  He characterized the May-June 2006 
demonstrations as "an awakening" for the Iranian-Azeri 
movement, which he said "surprised and even frightened both 
the regime and us" by showing just how widely and deeply in 
the region the sense of Azeri ethnicity was felt, and by 
showing regime leaders the power that Azeri ethnic identity 
has in bringing Iranians to the streets.  "It was good news 
and bad news for us, because it showed the world that we are 
a legitimate ethnic movement, but it also convinced the 
regime that it needed to treat us as a threat to stability." 
Following the demonstrations the regime jailed hundreds of 
ethnic Azeri leaders and activists, including Iman, and did 
so again in February 2007 following a second round of smaller 
but still widespread demonstrations.  As a "precaution,", the 
regime again detained known ethnic Azeri leaders in May 2007 
and May 2008, to prevent them from leading commemorative 
demonstrations. 
 
"The MOIS protected me from the IRGC" 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Iman described a GOI that reflexively sees any ethnic 
movement inside Iran as a threat against the system, a 
perspective shared even by regime leaders who themselves are 
 
ISTANBUL 00000601  002 OF 004 
 
 
of Azeri ethnicity like Supreme Leader Khamenei, IRGC 
Commander Safavi, and several other current GOI Ministers. 
The regime recognizes that Iranian Azeris generally were 
strong supporters of the Islamic Revolution and of Ayatollah 
Khomeini, and are well integrated into Iranian daily life. 
Some regime leaders, according to Iman, remain "quietly 
sympathetic" to the desire of Iranian-Azeris to enjoy freely 
their own language and culture, but "as long as Iran is under 
threat of a regime change" even sympathetic regime officials 
are afraid to allow any freedom.  Some are afraid that giving 
freedom of linguistic expression will lead down a slippery 
slope of further social or political demands.  Other regime 
officials do not want to open the door "even a crack" to 
allow Turkey any more influence in northwest Iran.  "The 
result is a policy of oppression, the easiest policy response 
for the regime to make." 
 
¶5.  (S) But even in pursuing oppressive tactics against the 
Iranian-Azeris, Iman acknowledged, there are nuanced 
differences in the way different regime elements operate.  He 
identified a half-dozen regime security organizations -- 
IRGC, MOIS, Ministry of Interior forces, Judiciary police, 
local and provincial police, and Basiji among them -- that 
are involved in monitoring, harassing, and arresting Iranian 
Azeri activists.  He said the IRGC is by far the toughest. 
Iman was arrested in June 2006 by local police who handed him 
over to the MOIS "because they didn't want the IRGC to get 
its hands on me and kill me."  He said the MOIS focused its 
questions on the Azeri ethnic movement's leadership and 
motives, and seemed most interested in confirming that the 
Azeri movement's aims were not regime overthrow or regional 
secession.  He believes (or was led by his MOIS interrogators 
to believe) that the MOIS was resisting intense pressure from 
above to turn him over to the IRGC.  Iman believes the MOIS 
protected him from certain IRGC torture.  The MOIS, however, 
has continued to make clear its redlines to Iman, the 
overstepping of which would lead to renewed detention. 
"Every time I return from travel abroad, they ask me to meet 
with them at a hotel in Tabriz and explain what I did on my 
trip.  As long as I have only been attending academic 
conferences or doing work with my magazine, they don't detain 
me.  So far." 
 
Our movement has a spectrum of goals 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Asked whether the ethnic Iranian Azeri movement was 
unified or diffuse, Iman said the overall movement "is not 
one voice or one leader at the moment."  He described a 
broad, "free-flowing" and flexible ethnic movement, rather 
than a rigid pyramid structure or formal political party.  He 
said most of the "30 million" ethnic Azeris in Iran (comment: 
 the 2008 CIA World Factbook indicates an Azeri population of 
around 16 million, i.e. 24% of the estimated 2008 Iranian 
population of 68.9 million inhabitants), simply want to 
exercise the right to use and enjoy the Azeri language and 
culture freely, including receiving a university-level 
education in Azeri.  Smaller groups are actively pushing for 
more formalized cultural and linguistic equality, for example 
by making Azeri an official language of Iran.  Some groups 
within the movement are more political, and seek degrees of 
political and legal autonomy through peaceful achievement of 
more federalist treatment by the regime of its ethnic 
provinces. The smallest of the groups, Iman explained, seek 
full "south Azerbaijan" independence from Iran.  These, 
however, are fringe groups, which he said are dangerous to 
the movement, as they invite the harshest regime crack-down. 
The main groups are "organically linked" but not 
systematically coordinated.  "Sometimes we work together, 
sometimes we don't." 
 
¶7.  (C) Iman said he is not involved in the Southern 
Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement (SANAM), a 
pro-independence or pro-autonomy group (observers differ over 
SANAM's ultimate goals) which reportedly has chapters in 
Azerbaijan, Turkey and the United States.  Asked if his 
movement received help from inside Turkey, he said no.  "We 
get no support from Turkish groups."  He suggested that 
Iranian-Azeris living in Turkey have "a different agenda," 
and admitted he is suspicious of them. 
 
¶8.  (C) Iman said there is a general consensus within the 
movement to focus for now on cultural issues.  "These are 
safer" and allow Iranian-Azeri activists more room to 
operate.  Since summer 2006, the real near-term goal is to 
keep the movement together, functioning, and re-building. 
The mid-term goal is to secure more cultural and social 
freedoms, focusing on Azeri language and culture.  Political 
goals should be postponed to the longer-term, he cautioned, 
 
ISTANBUL 00000601  003 OF 004 
 
 
and violence should never be used to secure such goals.  As 
long as the movement's goals are modest, moderate and 
peaceful, he added, the movement will be able to rely on 
quiet support from "friends" inside the GOI.  Meanwhile, his 
efforts to promote cultural events, disseminate cultural 
magazines, and start-up cultural websites, are helping create 
a grassroots organization and structure that eventually could 
become effective as a political movement. 
 
Helping the Ahwaz, but wary of the Kurds 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The Iranian Azeri movement, according to Iman, is the 
most successful ethnic rights movement in Iran, because of 
its flexible structure and measured aims.  "All other ethnic 
groups in Iran are rigid and ideological."  But some, such as 
the Ahwaz Arabs in southwest Iran, have started to make 
contact with the ethic Azeri movement, to learn how they are 
organized and perhaps follow their model. 
 
¶10.  (C) At the same time, there is growing friction between 
Iranian Azeris and Iranian Kurds, Iman warned.  He said the 
anti-Kurdish feeling in northwest Iran was "explosive", and 
that the situation was very sensitive.  "It is almost at a 
point of violence between us", though he did not identify the 
specific cause of the tensions.  Asked if the GOI might be 
manipulating those tensions to keep both ethnic groups 
off-balance and focused on each other rather than the regime, 
Iman thought probably not, characterizing the regime as 
"smart enough to stay out of it."  A regime effort to provoke 
Kurdish-Azeri tensions would only lead to anti-regime 
backlash by both groups, he felt. 
 
Inside vs. Outside 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Noting that this was the first trip he has ever 
taken to Turkey, Iman said he enjoys more regular travel to 
Canada and Europe.  An Iranian-American friend has promised 
to help him set up a visa interview this summer at the U.S. 
Embassy in Stockholm, on his next trip there.  (He said that 
posts in the region that issues visas to Iranians, including 
Embassy Ankara, ConGen Istanbul, and ConGen Dubai, have a 
reputation among many Iranians as being tougher on Iranian 
applicants than U.S. Embassies in Western Europe, so many are 
now looking to Stockholm, Paris, and elsewhere.) 
 
¶12.  (C) He acknowledged that he is in touch with several 
Iranian-Azeri groups in Europe, "but the real struggle is in 
Iran, and the real work is what we are doing in Iran."  He 
admitted there are some tensions between the "outside" groups 
and the "inside" groups.  Iman criticized most expatriate 
groups as doing very little.  "They raise some funds, but 
that's really it."  He said the most active fund-raising 
groups are in Germany and Sweden, though few of those 
activists ever try to return to Iran.  He said he proceeds 
cautiously with them, for fear that those groups, or "their 
foreign sponsors" will taint his own efforts and put him at 
greater risk. 
 
What does Washington want? 
------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Iman underscored that the risk of meeting with a US 
diplomat was outweighed by the benefit of using that contact 
to better understand USG views of the Azeri ethnic movement 
in Iran.  He warned that the USG must not try to manipulate 
the Iranian-Azeri movement or use it only as a tool to 
pressure the regime.  He said the movement has been betrayed 
in the past by Realpolitik realities, as when the Soviet 
Union turned in movement leaders to the Shah and even to 
Khomeini, after promising to support Iranian-Azeri autonomy. 
"Don't think of this movement as a bargaining chip." 
Moreover, he cautioned that "if the U.S. cuts a deal with the 
Iranian government, and it does not specifically protect 
ethnic groups' rights, the regime will think it has free rein 
to crush us."  Iman assessed that most Iranian-Azeris believe 
USG support for their ethnic and cultural rights is "thin and 
self-serving", not genuine. 
 
¶14.  (C) Iman continued his cautionary critique, complaining 
that the USG does not focus its attention enough on the 
plight of ethnic Azeris in Iran.  He claimed the Voice of 
America is "run by Monarchists" who only care about ethnic 
Persian issues and rarely report on ethnic minorities.  The 
USG should give more genuine attention to ethnic rights in 
Iran, he pleaded.  Statements of concerns from Washington or 
the UN, spotlighting the denial of Azeri rights to use their 
language and practice their culture, are helpful.  But they 
 
ISTANBUL 00000601  004 OF 004 
 
 
must be carefully worded.  "Such statements cannot be 
associated with regime change or the nuclear program.  They 
must be statements on ethnic rights that stand alone. 
Otherwise the regime will paint us as foreign agents."  He 
reiterated his primary concern -- that the real motive behind 
any new USG support for the ethnic Azeri movement would be to 
pressure the regime from within, not because of genuine human 
rights-related concerns for Azeris in Iran.  "We would 
welcome more statements of support, supporting our linguistic 
and cultural rights, and our cultural autonomy.  But nothing 
political, nothing too critical of Tehran." 
¶15.  (C) "Support for our goals from the USG is a very 
delicate and sensitive issue," Iman continued, "and it is 
very risky right now, but it is important to us and something 
we want to develop in the longer-run."  Iman also probed 
about how the USG's Iran Democracy funds work, and whether an 
ethnic association or NGO could be a recipient of such funds, 
working through a third party, for the purpose (in his case) 
of expanding his magazine's circulation, or building up his 
tourism website, or building his magazine and website staff's 
capacity for internet journalism. 
 
¶16.  (C) We responded to Iman's query about the USG's view of 
the Iranian Azeri movement by noting that it is long-standing 
USG policy to consider the free expression of cultural 
heritage as a fundamental human right; that the USG supports 
the aspirations of the Iranian people, regardless of 
ethnicity, to live in a society in which their fundamental 
freedoms and rights are respected; and that the USG had 
called in the past on the Iranian regime to release detained 
ethnic Azeris and other Iranian prisoners of conscience.  We 
underscored, however, that the USG does not support ethnic 
groups in Iran that use violence to pursue their goals, and 
welcomed Iman's commitment to pursuing peaceful change.  We 
promised to send Iman information about the Iran Democracy 
Fund, though the intermediary who had set up this meeting, 
rather than directly. 
 
Comment 
------ 
 
¶17.  (C) Iman, though physically nervous and agitated, came 
across as a moderate, thoughtful interlocutor, both in his 
words and tone.  While we cannot assess independently his 
credentials or standing within the Iranian-Azeri ethnic 
movement, and we are aware that many pan-Turkish/Azeri 
nationalists actively loiter on the regional 
human/womens/ethnic rights conference circuit, we assume that 
his past arrests at the hands of the GOI and his continuing 
efforts to publish pro-Azeri cultural materials afford him 
some degree of credibility as a movement activist.  His 
cautionary plaint that the USG must not treat that ethnic 
movement simply as a bargaining chip in any future USG 
engagement with, or as a tool for further pressure on, the 
Iranian regime tracks closely with similar advice we have 
received from other Iranians, i.e., that we not allow the 
Iranian population's grievances and aspirations to become 
lost in the USG's preeminent focus on the nuclear and 
terrorism issues.  We also found reasonable his judgment that 
focusing efforts for the near-term on raising awareness of 
Iranian-Azeri ethnic issues through cultural-focused media 
publications and building links with Iranian-Azeri expats 
through tourism are safer venues for activism for Iman 
personally and for this "movement" organizationally, than in 
pursuing a more aggressive political agenda. 
 
¶18.  (C) Unless instructed otherwise, we will forward 
background information on the 2008 Iran Democracy Fund and 
Iran "small grants" programs to Iman's 
intermediary/colleague, who is willing to forward it to him. 
WIENER