VZCZCXRO6546
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0883/01 3501358
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151358Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5683
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0493
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000883 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR WALLER, PARIS FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2018 
TAGS: PGOV KISC PTER SY
SUBJECT: SARG DISMISSES SHEIKHS FROM LEADERSHIP POSITIONS 
IN CHARITABLE ISLAMIC SOCIETIES ON SUSPICIONS OF TERRORIST 
FUNDING. 
 
REF: A. DAMASCUS 00677 
     ¶B. DAMASCUS 00814 
 
Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The SARG quietly ordered religious sheikhs 
who sit on the boards of non-governmental, charitable, 
Islamic "foundations" to resign their positions during the 
month of November.  One civil society activist, who first 
broke the news to us, claimed the SARG feared these 
organizations might have financial links with anti-regime 
terrorist cells in Syria.  Other interlocutors have said no 
such connection exists.  The SARG also attempted to deport 
all foreign students studying at private Islamic schools, but 
a coalition of sheikhs succeeded in reversing the decision. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
SARG Suspected Linkages to Fatah al-Islam 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In an orchestrated spectacle meant to galvanize public 
opinion around SARG policies and bolster the government's 
claim that Syria is a victim--not a sponsor--of terrorism, 
Syrian television aired confessional interviews on November 6 
of twelve Syrian members of Fatah al-Islam who allegedly 
provided operational assistance in the September 27 car-bomb 
attack in Damascus (refs A & B).  Soon after the confessions 
aired, the SARG began investigating the finances of 
independent Islamic foundations around the country, according 
to civil society activist Fawaz Tello (strictly protect), on 
grounds that two of the terrorists had studied at one of the 
Islamic charity's schools and another stated he had accepted 
money from one of the charities. 
 
¶3. (C) Tello told us that the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs (MLSA) instructed the foundations to channel all 
future financial contributions through the government's 
Ministry of Religious Endowments for the purposes of 
monitoring and disbursement.  At the same time, the MLSA 
summoned to their offices religious sheikhs serving as board 
members.  All were "asked" to resign.  According to Tello, 
some of the sheikhs, many of whom had strong connections with 
SARG officials, initially balked at the request only later to 
find themselves being instructed to do so by Syrian 
intelligence officers.  Tello added the SARG had taken 
similar actions in Aleppo and other cities throughout the 
country.  Following these incidents, Tello stated, many of 
the sheikhs "were angry and bad mouthing the regime" in 
public.  Within a week Asad himself called them to the palace 
to quell their dissent, informing them that "this is my 
policy." 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Sheikhs Circumspect in Their Descriptions of SARG Actions 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Sheikh Salah Kuftaro (strictly protect), a moderate 
Islamist with the Abu Nour/Kuftaro Foundation, confirmed to 
us that the MLSA had asked him and other religious sheikhs to 
resign and to appoint "civilian" replacements from the 
foundations' general memberships to assume the vacant 
positions.  He added that the SARG's actions had no 
connection to the Fatah al-Islam arrests in October.  He did 
not give any other justification for the dismissals, however. 
 
¶5. (C) In a move that seemed to belie Kuftaro's claim that 
the forced resignations were unrelated to Fatah al-Islam 
terrorism, SARG security forces also attempted to deport all 
new and first-year foreign students studying at private 
foundation-sponsored institutes--namely, Kuftaro, al-Fatah, 
and Bader Edin al-Hasani.  In an effort to reverse the 
policy, Sheikhs Salah Kuftaro, Osama al-Rifai, Rateb Nabulsi, 
Hussam Farfour, and Said Ramadan al-Bouti appealed directly 
to President Asad in a meeting that also included the Grand 
Mufti, Sheikh Ahmed Bader Hassoun, and the Minister of 
Endowments, Dr. Mohammed Abdul-Sattar. 
 
¶6. (C) During the meeting, Kuftaro claimed, he and the other 
sheikhs successfully persuaded Asad to change course on the 
deportations.  He said Asad ultimately agreed with the 
sheikhs' argument that these students were "ambassadors for 
 
DAMASCUS 00000883  002 OF 002 
 
 
Syria and represent safety valves in their communities," and 
by allowing them to remain in their schools, they avoided the 
risk of these students becoming "fundamentalists and 
Wahhabis."  In the course of the meeting, the president also 
reportedly assured Sheikh Farfour that the SARG was not 
targeting the al-Fatah Institute per se.  Asad implied that 
the SARG had "edited" the televised confessions to spare the 
institute any embarrassment or loss of credibility with the 
public, Kuftaro told us. 
 
-------------------------------- 
SARG Aims for Ultimate Oversight 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Sunni Islamic leaders are at loggerheads with the 
Ministry of Religious Endowments (MORE) and the Grand Mufti, 
according to Kuftaro.  He reasoned MORE and the Grand Mufti 
would like to take these charitable foundations "under their 
cloaks," thereby stripping away their independence and 
folding them into the SARG's bureaucracy.  Tello told us that 
these charities provide significant financial assistance to 
the local poor and should government interference impede the 
normal distribution of funds to the needy, "this will create 
extremism." 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT: The SARG's move to sideline several of 
Syria's most prominent moderate Sunni Imams reflects 
longstanding reservations among the security services about 
the autonomy of these organizations.  SARG concerns about 
Saudi penetration and financing of these foundations is also 
another probable factor behind the move.  Though Kuftaro and 
others have consistently championed moderate and 
regime-friendly messages and programs, the September 27 
attack may have provided rival factions within the SARG an 
irresistable pretext to take over their popular, well-funded, 
and wide-ranging charity foundations.  Asad's willingness to 
permit foreign students to remain, and to be swayed by the 
Sheikhs' arguments, shows he may not have lost all faith in 
the moderate philosophy of these foundations.  At the very 
least, he appears to recognize singling out Sunni 
organizations with too heavy a hand would invite more dissent 
from the Sunni majority. END COMMENT. 
CONNELLY