O 120732Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0681
INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T CANBERRA 001271 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/PDAS FELTMAN, S/I SATTERFIELD, AND 
EAP/PDAS DAVIES 
NSC FOR DNSA JEFFREY AND DWILDER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN REQUIRES IMMEDIATE HELP WITH IRAQ SOFA 
 
REF: A) STATE 128040 B) CANBERRA 1258 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert D. McCallum for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Smith has told Ambassador 
McCallum that Australia needs immediate help from the United 
States in order to keep its remaining troops in Iraq.  The FM 
noted that GOA was requested by the US to defer its 
negotiation with the GOI so as not to complicate US 
negotiations on a US/GOI SOFA.  The GOA had done so and kept 
its forces there all year while the U.S. negotiated its own 
SOFA, Smith said, because it understood their importance. Now 
GOA forces will have no basis to remain in Iraq and no legal 
protection even if they are invited to stay by the GOI.  The 
GOA needs immediate help from the U.S. to obtain an 
invitation from Iraq to remain after December 31 and adequate 
legal protection for its forces.  Smith added that the GOA 
needed some action by December 20-21 at the latest.  Without 
an invitation, the GOA would likely have no alternative but 
to withdraw its forces by December 31.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (S/NF) Foreign Minister Stephen Smith called in the 
Ambassador on December 12.  He said he had just come from a 
meeting of the National Security Committee and he needed to 
discuss Australia's lack of a status of forces agreement 
(SOFA) with Iraq.  He said he and the Prime Minister did not 
appreciate being demarched by its closest ally, particularly 
on a subject matter where the GOA had been asked by the US to 
defer interaction with the GOI.  He and PM Rudd also objected 
to a deadline by the U.S to respond to the demarche.  The GOA 
needed help, Smith declared.  They had kept their forces and 
imbeds in Iraq all year because they understood their 
importance to the US and now they were facing a situation 
where they would have no invitation from the host country to 
remain and no legal protection if they remained.  If there 
was no invitation from the Government of Iraq to remain, 
Australia would likely have to remove its troops by January 
1, the Foreign Minister stated.  Australia needed two things, 
he continued, an invitation from the Iraq Government to stay, 
and adequate legal protection.  In addition, Smith said, the 
GOA needed help in the next few days not the next few weeks. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Smith said the GOA currently had a team in Iraq 
discussing with the Iraqis a small piece of legislation 
backed up by a letter from the Iraq Government.  He stated 
that he was very skeptical, however, that anything could be 
accomplished by the end of the year.  The Ambassador then 
asked what the GOA would do if either an invitation to remain 
or some legal protection is not obtained from the GOI, to 
which Smith replied that the GOA would "cross that bridge 
when we came to it." 
 
¶4. (S/NF) The Foreign Minister said the GOA did not want to 
withdraw its forces from Iraq but it needed an invitation 
to stay from the Government of Iraq and adequate legal 
protection, and it needed immediate U.S. assistance to obtain 
both.  He said the GOA's deadline for some action by the GOI 
was December 20-21 and Australian forces would likely have to 
withdraw from Iraq if no formal invitation was received from 
the Government by December 31, 
 
¶5. (S/NF) COMMENT: The Foreign Minister's tone during this 
brief meeting was cordial but sharp.  The unmistakable 
Qbrief meeting was cordial but sharp.  The unmistakable 
message from him, and the Prime Minister, was that Australia 
had done what the U.S. had asked it to do and now it was 
stuck.  Since the U.S. had put Australia there, Australia 
expected the U.S. to help it find a solution.  The demarche 
to which the Foreign Minister referred is ref A, dated 
December 4, which asked Post to encourage the GOA to accept 
an exchange of notes or letters as a SOFA in lieu of the 
agreement the GOA was currently insisting on, since an 
agreement would need ratification by the Iraqi Council of 
Representatives.  Ref B, sent December 11, is the current 
thinking from the Australian Department of Defence about how 
their forces could remain in the region in the absence of a 
SOFA. 
 
MCCALLUM