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RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #2503/01 3501425
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 151425Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1049
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 CAIRO 002503 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR FO; S/P FOR JAIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL EFIN SY LE SU IR IS IZ EG XF
SUBJECT: QUINT POLICY PLANNING TALKS FOCUS ON REGIONAL 
ISSUES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey 
Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The November 18 "Quint" consultations with 
policy planners from Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt (host) 
and the U.S. yielded a comprehensive dialogue on a range of 
regional issues, including Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, piracy off 
the Horn of Africa, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The Iraqi delegation indicated its desire to align itself 
with moderates in the region and expressed broad agreement 
with the other participants on key issues, including the 
importance of reaching a peace agreement between Israel and 
the Palestinians and continuing support for President Abbas. 
Iraq,s presentation on internal progress and pleas for 
political and economic assistance were generally 
well-received, though the Saudis said nothing during this 
part of the discussion.  The Egyptians argued strongly that 
the Annapolis Process be maintained for the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and were especially forthcoming 
in highlighting concerns regarding Iran; the other 
delegations largely concurred.  All participants expressed 
enthusiasm for continuing to meet in this format, and the 
Jordanians offered to host the next session sometime this 
spring.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Delegations 
------------------ 
 
Egypt: MFA Chief of Cabinet Wafa Bassim; Assistant Minister 
for Arab Affairs Abdel Rahman Salah; MFA director for Policy 
Planning Mohammad Zorqani; Senior Advisor and Spokesman 
Hossam Zaki; Deputy Assistant Minister for Arab Affairs 
Abdelhameed Marzouk; MFA Cabinet Staff 
 
Iraq: MFA Director of Policy Planning Mohammad Hakim; Advisor 
to Vice President Mahdi Fareed Yassin; Charge d'Affaires Saad 
Ali 
 
Jordan: MFA Director of Policy Planning Omar Nahar; Embassy 
staff 
 
Saudi Arabia: MFA Director of Policy Planning Prince Ahmed 
bin Saud bin Khaled; Embassy Staff 
 
United States:  Director of Policy Planning Dr. David Gordon; 
Ambassador Margaret Scobey; Principal Deputy for Near East 
Affairs Jeffrey Feltman; Director for Egypt and Levant 
Affairs Nicole Shampaine; Policy Planning Staff Member Ash 
Jain; Embassy First Secretary Greg LoGerfo (notetaker; 
Embassy Second Secretary Todd Watkins (notetaker) 
 
¶3. (C) Overall Regional Perspectives 
------------------------------------ 
 
Director of Policy Planning Dr. David Gordon described key 
trends and challenges as outlined by the National 
Intelligence Council,s "Global Trends 2025" report (which 
has since been made public).  He described a world trending 
toward multi-polarity, with rising economic powers gaining 
relative influence, but where the U.S. will likely retain 
primacy, especially in terms of military power.  Dr. Gordon 
outlined the growing competition for resources, where 
securing access to reliable sources of energy, water, and 
food will gain increasing prominence.  In addition, while the 
appeal of terror will likely decline in the coming years, for 
active terror groups the challenge of weapons and technology 
proliferation will become even more acute. 
 
¶4. (C) Middle East challenges: Dr. Gordon described three key 
challenges likely to face the Middle East in the years ahead: 
(i) economic integration, and whether the Middle East will 
use its status as a financial "pole of power" to promote 
higher economic growth, diversification, and integration into 
the global economy; (ii) Iran,s quest for a nuclear weapons 
capability, which would have immense regional political 
consequences and impact regional power projection, and (iii) 
continued stability in Iraq.  A successful Iraq could have 
dramatic consequences as a hedge against extremism and a 
force for moderation, tolerance and democratic governance. 
If the Arab world and others (e.g. Turkey) continue to 
integrate Iraq we could drastically enhance prospects for 
success.  However, if Iraq fails, the negative impact will be 
as dramatic, with major spillover effects on regional states. 

¶5. (C) USG transition: Asked to comment on the U.S. 
presidential transition, Dr. Gordon said that there will 
likely be changes in our approach to the region, but key U.S. 
interests will likely remain unchanged.  The U.S. will remain 
committed to the President's two-state solution for the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict; our goal is to pass to the next 
administration the Annapolis Process intact and with positive 
momentum.  The November 8-9 meetings in Sharm el-Sheikh 
(which included the Israelis, Palestinians and Quartet) were 
geared toward that end.  Dr. Gordon noted that the Arab Peace 
Initiative (API) will likely remain an important element in 
the process.  On Iran, the new administration may approach 
Tehran in a different manner, but opposition to Iran's intent 
to develop a nuclear weapons capacity will likely remain 
firm.  On Iraq, Dr. Gordon assessed that the next 
administration will maintain the focus on building a stable 
Iraq, in the context of a mutually-agreeable withdrawal of 
USG forces based on the reality on the ground. 
 
¶6. (C) Egypt,s regional assessment: Assistant Foreign 
Minister for Arab Affairs Abdul-Rahman Salah characterized 
the regional situation as one of "imminent threats."  He 
stated that the world may be gravitating toward 
"multi-polarity," but the U.S. will continue to play a 
special role in the region on the major issues.  Salah said 
that all participants in the discussion ("not just Israel") 
have a special relationship with the U.S., and seek greater 
policy consultation with the U.S. (adding that Egypt's 
recommendations in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
were ignored).  Salah assessed that moderates in the region 
have been on the defensive over the past several years, due 
to the Israeli-Palestinian and Iraq issues. Settlement of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains critical. He said that 
the GOE agrees on the need for economic development and 
democratic reforms, but regional crises abound.  He argued 
that the U.S. will need to step up its pace of regional 
involvement.  In addition, he said that Egypt hopes the new 
administration will be more active in "educating Congress and 
the American public" on Egypt's role as a moderate regional 
actor. 
 
¶7. (C) Jordan: MFA Director of Policy Planning Omar Nahar 
urged the new administration to "listen to its friends" in 
the region, and work with its allies to deliver something 
"tangible" to the people of the Arab world.  He stressed that 
the USG maintain "continuity" on key regional issues, 
especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  "We cannot 
afford to wait one year, or even six months.  Everyone knows 
the issues.  We need quick engagement."  Nahar agreed that 
the world is trending towards multi-polarity but noted the 
rise of non-state actors, especially in the Middle East.  The 
U.S. has a special role to confront this trend, Nahar argued. 
 
¶8. (C) Saudi Arabia,s regional outlook: MFA Director for 
Policy Planning Prince Ahmed bin Saud bin Khaled agreed on 
the need for the USG to support moderates against extremists, 
noting the rise of Hizballah in Lebanon as a primary example, 
as well as Hamas.  Saudi Arabia will continue to take the 
initiative on intra-Arab and intra-Muslim conflicts when 
possible, such as the Mecca Agreement (Palestinians), and 
similar efforts with Somalia and Afghanistan.  He agreed that 
the USG should remain actively engaged on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Dr. Gordon commented that 
Saudi Arabia's intra-faith dialogues have been an important 
part of efforts to counter extremism. 
 
¶9. (C) Iraq,s perspective: MFA Director of Policy Planning 
Mohammad Al Hakim stressed the centrality of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  He argued that economic issues 
will become paramount in the region; the Arab world has 
fallen behind on job creation, education and development. 
Leaders need to focus on what is best for their people, or 
terrorists will remain empowered.  Political issues on a 
local, personal level, need to be resolved.  Iraq seeks to 
move toward moderation, Hakim said.  Iraqi delegation member 
Farid Yassin commented that economic solutions need be to be 
internal decisions; he noted the severe problem of 
underemployment in the Arab world. 
 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Egypt,s assessment: MFA Senior Cabinet Advisor and 
Spokesman Hossam Zaki emphatically urged the incoming 
administration to maintain the Annapolis Process.  "It is 
important to bear in mind that peace is more important than 
process.  In the 1990s the focus was on process.  Meetings 
became an end in themselves.  It was a strenuous effort with 
no real results.  The failure of Camp David in 2000 was a 
prime example," Zaki said. 
 
¶11. (C) In addition to maintaining Annapolis, the new 
administration should move to alleviate the humanitarian 
situation in Gaza and the West Bank, and confront Israeli 
settlement activity, which if unchecked would threaten the 
implementation of a two-state solution.  The system of 
roadblocks and checkpoints also remains a serious problem, 
said Zaki. 
 
¶12. (C) Responding to Zaki,s comment that more attention 
needs to be paid to the UNSCRs on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 
PDAS Feltman responded that the "land for peace" formula, 
articulated at the Madrid talks in 1991, has guided our 
approach.  The situation is challenging but not impossible. 
Feltman noted we have supported Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations and efforts of both sides to confront terror, 
and we have supported efforts for improved conditions on the 
ground, with mixed results.  He also reminded the group the 
USG has also worked with Arab states to improve the regional 
atmosphere, noting that the two-state solution is now the 
regional political consensus. 
 
¶13. (C) Zaki argued that if the humanitarian situation for 
the Palestinians were "bearable," it would allow for a 
Palestinian constituency that supports negotiations with 
Israel.  If, on the other hand, it becomes "unbearable," and 
on a downward trajectory, support for peace talks will 
dwindle, and Hamas, and eventually Al Qaeda, will ascend.  In 
this context, Zaki said that the issue of Palestinian 
prisoners (which he estimated to be 11,000) has affected tens 
of thousands of their family members for the last 20 years. 
This mitigates strongly against Palestinian public support 
for negotiations, he said. 
 
¶14. (C) Zaki said that if Israeli FM Livni is elected, he 
expects Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will continue.  But 
he expressed deep concern about election of a different 
Israeli prime minister, and suggested that meeting 
participants consider how to deal with this "contingency." 
Dr. Gordon noted that the Arab Peace Initiative (API) has 
been cited twice by Israeli President Peres, and said that he 
expects the API will remain an important element in any 
future discussions.  Zaki agreed that the API is "gaining 
momentum" but said the USG must understand that the API is 
"not to be altered," and is a clearly delineated bargain of 
Arab recognition of Israel in return for Palestinian 
statehood. 
 
¶15. (C) Jordanian view: Delegation head Nahar agreed that the 
focus should be on facilitating peace rather than on 
establishment of a new, complex process.  Arab states should 
support Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and insist that any 
agreement be consistent with UNSCRs 247 and 338.  Nahar, 
Zaki, Saudi Prince Khaled and Iraqi delegation leader Hakim 
all stressed the need to support PA President Abbas, both in 
the context of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the 
ongoing intra-Palestinian political impasse. 
 
¶16. (C) Iraqi view: The Iraqi delegation reiterated the 
importance of continuing peace talks and extending support 
for President Abbas.  Hakim added that Iraq knows first-hand 
the damage inflicted by suicide bombers, and suggested that 
Arabs need to be more sensitive to Israeli concerns on this 
issue.  At the same time, there is not enough attention paid 
to quality of life issues for the Palestinians and 
consequences stemming from "denial of their rights under 
Israeli occupation." 
 
INTRA-PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) Zaki said that the Egyptians remain committed to 
Palestinian unity, but that the situation is "very 
complicated."  It has been three months of difficult work. 
If the Palestinians remain divided, Zaki assessed, it will 
not be conducive to Israeli-Palestinian peace.  He said that 
the Egyptian approach is designed for conciliation; "we don't 
want mere quiet between belligerents.  So it is designed to 
support, or at least not obstruct, (Israeli-Palestinian) 
peace efforts." 
 
ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ 
------------------ 
 
¶18. (C) Iraqi outlook: Hakim said that the GOI was developing 
security forces, as well as judges and police.  The GOI has 
taken action to assert itself successfully in areas such as 
Mosul, Diyalah, and Basrah.  Internal provincial elections 
will be held at the end of January; these will be critical in 
identifying the strength of various political parties. 
Kirkuk, due to its multi-ethnicity, remains an issue, Hakim 
said.  U.N. envoy di Mastura has presented a proposal, of 
which the Iraqi Parliament approved a modified version. 
 
¶19. (C) Economic reconstruction: The GOI has drastically 
reduced the percentage of GDP spent on the military, from a 
high of approximately 65 percent in 2003.  Iraq is focusing 
on rebuilding its infrastructure, but needs help from Arab 
states, especially on oil production and electricity 
infrastructure.  Iraq still imports oil products as well as 
food, but Hakim said the GOI expects to be self-sufficient in 
these areas, and economically independent, in a few years. 
 
¶20. (C) Hakim said that the growing size of the Iraqi 
government and bureaucracy is problematic.  The private 
sector remains weak; as a result Iraqis seek employment in 
the public sector.  With 22 universities graduating thousands 
of students a year, demand exceeds the supply of good jobs. 
The GOI is focusing on developing provinces and 
decentralizing some decision-making; "Baghdad is not always 
right," Hakim acknowledged. 
 
¶21. (C) Hakim said that Iraq is multiethnic and diverse, but 
has an abundance of human and natural resources; the GOI is 
trying to take the country in a new direction.  "We are now 
walking, but not yet able to run," he said.  The friendship 
of the United States is critical for Iraq and other regional 
states; Hakim said that Iran's role in the region is also 
"very important."  Iraq has borders with six neighbors and 
has "positive and negative" aspects of its relations with all 
of them. 
 
¶22. (C) Farid Yassin commented that the GOI, Coalition 
Provincial Authority, U.S. and U.N. had all made mistakes 
over the past five years.  He contended that the United 
Nation's electoral framework for Iraq was flawed, and had 
resulted in Iraqis voting based on ethnic identities, as 
opposed to issues.  The GOI is working to repair this 
problem, Yasin said.  Egyptian delegation leader Bassim 
agreed that Iraqi electoral politics seemed to be moving away 
from sectarianism, and said that Egypt "will do what Iraq 
asks" to help on this issue. 
 
¶23. (C) Plea for Arab engagement: Explaining that Iraqi 
special forces had made real progress in countering terrorist 
groups, Yassin implored Iraq,s Arab neighbors to do more to 
help Iraq.  "Please engage with Iraq, we really need you," he 
said.  Yassin specified that Saudi assistance on agriculture 
would be welcomed, although the Saudis did not respond. 
Given the importance of greater Sunni political 
representation, Yassin also suggested the need for Arab 
states to encourage active Sunni participation in the 
upcoming provincial elections. 
 
¶24. (C) Hakim said that he was optimistic that the U.S.-Iraqi 
Status of Forces (SOFA) agreement would be approved by the 
Iraqi Parliament on the basis of a "yes or no" vote.  Dr. 
Gordon said that the SOFA was a critical document that 
represented the healthy assertion of Iraqi sovereignty and a 
repudiation of negative Iranian influence in Iraq, given that 
Tehran had made defeat of the SOFA a major strategic goal. 
It is very important that Arab states support Iraq's 
ratification and implementation of the agreement, said 
Gordon.  Suggesting that he agreed, Hakim thanked the U.S. 
for its explanation of why the SOFA was so important to both 
parties. 
 
¶25. (C) The Egyptian and Jordanian delegations expressed 
support for the GOI. The Egyptians pointed to increasing 
GOI-GOE cooperation, ongoing consultations on debt relief, 
and the plan to return an ambassador to Baghdad.  Bassim said 
she would lead the Egyptian delegation to the upcoming 
GOE-GOI strategic discussions.  She said Iraq can constitute 
"a promise or a threat" to Egypt and the region, and the GOE 
remains concerned about the potential for division.  It is 
very important that regional partners and the U.S. stay 
focused and coordinated, noted Bassim.  Jordan,s Nahar 
welcomed "such candid talk" from the Iraqi delegation.  All 
delegations agreed that cross-border movement of extremists 
into Iraq is a problem, but equally concerning is the 
potential for an increase of outbound extremists as the Iraqi 
security situation improves. 
 
¶26. (C) Note: The Saudi delegation declined to comment during 
the Iraq portion of the discussions, ignoring two direct 
opportunities to do so.  End note. 
 
LEBANON 
------- 
 
¶27. (C) Egyptian MFA Deputy Assistant Minister for Arab 
Affairs Ayman Zeineldeen assessed the situation as markedly 
improved since the May crisis.  However, given Lebanon's 
connection to other regional dynamics, the chance of a 
flare-up remains.  The Egyptians do not believe there will be 
a clear winner in the 2009 parliamentary elections. 
Christians will likely comprise the swing vote.  Hizballah 
will retain its supply lines but appears to be politically 
constrained from using force internally.  Zeineldeen also 
opined that Syrian behavior had improved, but that a 
fundamental change in Syria's approach to Lebanon will take 
more time. 
 
¶28. (C) PDAS Feltman said that the USG goal is full 
implementation of UNSC 1701.  Since the Doha agreement we 
have seen reinvigoration of state institutions.  This is a 
positive development, as moderates can better compete through 
the institution of the state, where they are strong.  By 
contrast, Hizbollah proved in May that it can control the 
street through force.  The USG will increase total assistance 
to 1.3 billion dollars.  We believe a normal Lebanon-Syria 
diplomatic relationship is possible, but we remain concerned 
about Syria's intentions.  The Qusayeh military base in the 
Beqaa Valley is an arms smuggling transit point and is linked 
to Damascus, for example.  The USG agrees that the Christians 
will likely be the swing voters in the parliamentary 
elections.  Feltman and Zeineldeen agreed that Hizballah will 
likely remain quiet in the run-up to the elections, but it is 
unclear how they would react to a significant electoral 
defeat or if they would foresee a probable electoral defeat. 
 
¶29. (C) Egyptian MFA Senior Advisor Zaki said that supporting 
the Lebanese military is critical.  "We need to know that the 
army can function," he emphasized.  Zaki claimed the 
Egyptians are "constantly" urging the Israelis not to 
interfere in the internal Lebanese political situation.  He 
strongly urged that the Taif Accord of 1989 remain in place 
to ensure 50-50 Christian-Muslim representation.  Zaki said 
he has heard that ideas for modification of Taif have been 
floated, based on different proportions for the three groups 
(but that would increase Shia power), but that Egypt does not 
favor this change. 
 
¶30. (C) Feltman responded that the USG view is that the 
Lebanese themselves can choose to modify Taif, but that we 
are not pushing this option.  The USG is fully committed to 
supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces, and we appreciate 
Egypt's help on this.  Perhaps resolution of Shebaa Farms 
would politically weaken Hizballah, but how would the 
Lebanese state move to consolidate its power following such 
an agreement?  The Lebanese should explain how they would 
capitalize on this, and first seek assurances from Syria that 
it would demarcate its border with Lebanon.  Zeineldeen 
commented that Syria has stated publicly that Shebaa is 
Lebanese territory and this should be used as a basis to push 
for border demarcation.  Even if Shebaa was resolved, Feltman 
predicted that Hizballah would no doubt find an alternative 
grievance related to Israel as a pretext to maintaining its 
arms; in fact Hizballah recently raised the issue of seven 
Lebanese villages currently located in Israel that apparently 
had been Lebanese prior to 1923. 
 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶31. (C) Bassim began by noting that Iran was the key to 
future stability or instability in the region.  Iran,s 
"capability to penetrate into the neighborhood" posed real 
concerns.  Egyptian MFA Director of Policy Planning Zorqani 
gave an overview of Iran and regional implications.  He 
argued that Iran has the full right for peaceful use of a 
civilian nuclear program, but that Iran's lack of 
transparency has led to a general lack of trust in the 
region.  He raised Israel's nuclear program and the well-worn 
"double-standard" argument.  Zorqani said that all diplomatic 
levers, including sanctions, should be used with Tehran, but 
warned that a military strike on Iran would have "grave 
consequences" for an already volatile region.  Pointing to 
Iran,s "destabilizing and subversive" activities, he 
suggested the need for a coordinated approach to deal with 
Iran.  He reiterated Egypt,s interest in pursuing a joint 
P5 1/GCC 3 meeting and also called for regional security 
arrangements that include all parties. 
 
¶32. (C) Egyptian MFA Deputy Assistant Minister for Iran 
Affairs Yousef Sharkawy said economic sanctions have put 
Tehran into a constant "crisis mode."  That said, he did not 
foresee any threat to the position of Supreme Leader Ali 
Khamenei, but rather to the contrary.  He said President 
Ahmadinejad had aggregated power to some extent, but Sharkawy 
argued that no important decision can be made without 
Khamenei's consent.  Ahmadinejad appears to have the support 
of Khamenei, the Revolutionary Guard, and conservatives, and 
as such is in a good position to remain president.  Other 
contenders include former President Mohammed Khatemi.  Dr. 
Gordon noted that the upcoming elections in Iran could 
consolidate power at the top. 
 
¶33. (C) Dr. Gordon agreed that Iran has legitimate 
aspirations, but obtaining a nuclear weapon capability and 
regional domination were not among them.  The incoming 
administration will not likely deviate from this, but may 
engage with Tehran in a different manner.  Tehran continues 
to support Hizballah and Hamas, and is intent on derailing 
Israeli-Syria talks (facilitated by Turkey).  The Iranians 
provide lethal support to resistance groups in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  However, Tehran has had difficulties in Iraq 
and with declining oil revenues, is facing serious economic 
challenges.  We believe that now is the time for the U.N. 
coalition to increase the pressure, said Gordon. 
 
¶34. (C) The Iraqi delegation stated that Iraq too has 
concerns with Iran, particularly its support for militias and 
"cross-border interventions."  But Hakim said that the 
reality is that Iran is a neighbor that the GCC states and 
Iraq have lived with "for centuries."  A nuclear-armed Iran 
would be a regional threat, and Iraq does not want to see 
this happen.  Hakim argued that Iran will be deliberate and 
patient, and seek to outlast the political will of the U.N. 
sanctions regime. He suggested that bullying Iran is not a 
solution; we should pursue dialogue instead.  He disagreed 
that Ahmadinejad was secure as president, and suggested that 
Ali Larijani and former president Akbar Rafsanjani -- both 
pragmatists in his view -- are legitimate contenders for the 
presidency. 
 
¶35. (C) The Saudi Arabian delegation agreed that a nuclear 
free zone in the Middle East was an important goal, and 
concurred with the Egyptian objection of a "double standard" 
for Israel.  However, Prince Khaled was emphatic that Saudi 
Arabia "does not want a problem on its eastern border."  He 
agreed that the international community should seek out all 
diplomatic options to address Tehran's nuclear ambitions, but 
the burden is on Iran to signal it is serious about changing 
its posture.  "Time is ticking.  We do not see a new Iranian 
president or political players anytime soon."  Rafsanjani is 
a "good man" but is not a decision maker.  "We cannot play 
games.  This is very serious for us in the gulf and we are 
considering contingency plans in case the oil market is 
disrupted (by Iran)."  The Jordanian delegation observed that 
the U.S. and European "good-cop/bad-cop" approach is 
appropriate, and that both roles are necessary. 
 
PIRACY 
------ 
 
¶36. (C) Egyptian Deputy Assistant Minster for South and East 
Africa Abdelhameed Marzouk said that the GOE was concerned 
about two inter-related issues, piracy near the Red Sea and 
the situation on the ground in Somalia.  Egypt was backing 
all efforts for a comprehensive peace agreement between the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the opposition, 
without exclusion, to achieve security and peace on land. 
Egypt supports coordinated efforts to combat and face piracy 
on the seas.  Bassim said "a state of chaos" in Somalia led 
to the "return of the phenomena of piracy."  That said, 
piracy is currently limited to the Indian Ocean, Gulf of 
Aden, and the Somali coast, and had not yet entered the Red 
Sea.  Bassim noted the Red Sea riparian states, together with 
the TFG and the Arab League, would meet on November 20 to 
study the piracy issue; its roots, beneficiaries, and the 
political, economic, and security impact (septel). 
 
¶37. (C) Dr. Gordon agreed on the link between conditions in 
Somalia and the rise in piracy.  He said that the TFG 's 
"limited ability" was "diminishing" and encouraged other 
states to work with UN Special Envoy Ould-Abdallah to 
encourage elements in Somalia, including the Islamists, to 
join the political process, though Shebaab,s "extensive ties 
to Al Qaeda" may warrant its exclusion. On the piracy angle, 
Dr. Gordon said that the U.S. is interested in exploring 
enhanced naval cooperation to resolve the problem.  The 
stakes for Egypt are particularly high because piracy could 
affect the "credibility of the Suez Canal as a transport 
route."  Dr. Gordon asked if Egypt would be willing to take 
custody of the pirates for trial.  He said that it is not 
clear whether the U.S. would have a legal basis on which to 
try the pirates, unless they attacked U.S. persons, or a U.S. 
vessel. 
 
¶38. (SBU) Saudi Prince Khaled said that the KSA, after the 
Arab League ministerial, had offered to host a meeting of 
Somali parties in Jeddah.  He agreed that the Shebaab have 
the same philosophy as Al Qaeda and should not be invited to 
Jeddah.  Saudi Arabia would take the U.S. offer to deepen 
cooperation under consideration. 
 
NEXT MEETING IN JORDAN 
---------------------- 
 
¶39. (SBU) All participants expressed enthusiasm for the Quint 
dialogue, praising Bassim and her Egyptian colleagues for 
organizing a successful meeting and indicated their desire to 
continue to meet in this format in the future.  Dr. Gordon 
commented that the meeting "exceeded expectations." 
Suggesting that it provided a useful mechanism for 
consultation and an opportunity to discuss sensitive topics 
in an informal setting, Jordanian delegation leader Nahar 
offered to host the next meeting sometime this spring. 
SCOBEY