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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2739
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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0589
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C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001604 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL MARR GM NO SW FI IT AF
SUBJECT: GERMANY/AFGHANISTAN: NOVEMBER 26-27 MEETING OF 
ISAF RC-NORTH CHIEFS OF DEFENSE IN BERLIN 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JEFF RATHKE. REASONS: 1.4 ( 
B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  At a November 26-27 conference in Berlin, 
ISAF RC-North Chiefs of Defense and representatives from 
SHAPE and JFC Brunssum discussed a wide range of issues, 
including the insurgent threat along the border with RC-West, 
the requirements for a larger RC-North QRF and support for 
next year's presidential election in Afghanistan.  They also 
discussed the possible establishment of an ANA Engineer 
School in Mazar-e-Sharif, the filling of the remaining OMLT 
requirements in RC-North, and Germany's ideas for 
"Afghanizing" OMLTs.  Germany continued to promote its 
Provincial Advisory Team concept, while everyone agreed on 
the need for PRTs to have robust civilian components to carry 
out the comprehensive approach.  Finally, the CHODs discussed 
the conditions for transferring lead security responsibility 
to the Afghan national security forces and the decision on 
counternarcotics taken by NATO defense ministers at their 
October meeting in Budapest.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE 
 
¶2. (SBU) The German Ministry of Defense hosted its second 
annual ISAF Regional Command North (RC-North) Chiefs of 
Defense (CHODs) conference November 26-27 in Berlin, led by 
German CHOD Gen. Wolfgang Schneiderhan.  Most of the Allies 
and Partners who contribute forces to the north were 
represented by their CHODs or other senior military leaders. 
Attending from SHAPE was Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Operations (and former RC-North commander) Brigadier Gen. 
Dieter Dammjacob (Germany).  Joint Force Command (JFC) 
Brunssum was represented on the first day by Assistant Chief 
of Staff (ACOS) for Operations Air Commodore Graham Stacey 
(UK) and on the second day by Deputy Commander Air Marshall 
Chris Moran (UK).  OSD Foreign Affairs Specialist James Lowen 
as well as Embassy Defense Attache and Pol-Mil/External 
Affairs Chief attended as observers. 
 
THREAT SITUATION IN RC-NORTH 
 
¶3. (C) In its opening threat briefing, the German MOD 
conceded that despite the marked increase in security 
incidents in RC-North so far this year (170 compared to 130 
during the same period last year), the region was relatively 
peaceful compared to RC-South and RC-East, which have 
suffered 3,800 and 3,500 incidents respectively.  All total, 
less than 2% of all security incidents nationwide this year 
occurred in RC-North.  The increase in violence in RC-North 
has been concentrated in just three provinces (Kunduz, 
Baghlan and Faryab), while the six other northern provinces 
(Balkh, Badakhshan, Jowzjan, Takhar, Sar-e-Pol and Samangan) 
have seen violence this year remain at the same level or 
decrease. 
 
INCORPORATING GORMACH DISTRICT INTO RC-NORTH 
 
¶4. (C) To help address the deteriorating security situation 
in Faryab province, where Norway leads PRT Maimana, Norwegian 
CHOD Gen. Sverre Diesen pressed for a permanent ISAF presence 
in neighboring Gormach District in the RC-West province of 
Badghis.  Diesen noted that insurgents are obviously aware of 
the boundary line between RC-West and RC-North and are using 
Gormach as a safe haven from which to launch attacks into 
Faryab.  He called for greater flexibility in allowing 
Norwegian and other RC-North forces to conduct operations as 
needed in Gormach.  He noted that Kandaks of the ANA 209th 
Corps, based in Mazar-e-Sharif, were already active in 
Gormach, so it only made sense for RC-North to be as well. 
 
¶5. (C) JFC Brunssum Deputy Commander Air Marshall Moran 
strongly supported the Norwegian position, noting that 
terrain and distance made it difficult for RC-West to provide 
the required forces.  He pointed out that the Spanish-led PRT 
in the Badghis capital of Qala-i-Naw was some 180 kilometers 
away from Gormach and that it took upwards of 18 hours to 
reach the district by vehicle during the winter.  Moran also 
noted that the Afghans were already moving on a separate 
political track to incorporate Gormach into Faryab, therefore 
reinforcing the need for RC-North to consider this district 
as part of its area of operations. 
 
¶6. (C) Italian Lt. Gen. Giuseppe Valotto, speaking for 
 
RC-West, reacted somewhat defensively, noting that until 
recently, the center of gravity for RC-West operations was in 
the southern part of the region, but that now, RC-West had 
more capability to reinforce the Spanish in Badghis province. 
 Gen. Schneiderhan was very cautious.  While expressing 
understanding for the Norwegian position, he expressed 
concern about trying to expand the RC-North area of 
responsibility to include Gormach, which he claimed would 
have to be approved by the German Bundestag.  He said he was 
"not confident" that this could be achieved, noting that the 
Bundestag had just renewed the ISAF parliamentary mandate in 
October and would be reluctant to take up this controversial 
issue again during the run-up to parliamentary elections in 
September 2009.  He also made the point that it would not be 
enough to send just ISAF forces into Gormach ) the ANA, 
UNAMA and the NGOs had to go in as well or none of the 
security improvements would be sustainable. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Since the CHODs conference, this issue has hit the 
German press, with some unnamed parliamentarians reportedly 
expressing outrage over the "creeping" expansion of the 
German area of responsibility in Afghanistan.  In response to 
media inquiries, German Defense Minister Jung has not ruled 
out the possibility of expanding RC-North to encompass 
Gormach District, but rather has simply committed to consult 
the Bundestag before agreeing to any changes. 
 
FILLING THE REQUIREMENT FOR A LARGER QRF 
 
¶8. (C) Germany used the conference to seek help in filling 
the requirement for a larger quick reaction force (QRF), as 
called for in the revised ISAF Combined Joint Statement of 
Requirements (CJSOR).  The previous requirement was for a 
company-sized unit of approximately 200, which Germany has 
been filling alone since July, when it took over 
responsibility from Norway.  The new requirement is for a 
battalion-size unit of approximately 600.  The German MOD 
argued that given the large area to cover, it would be better 
to have a decentralized deployment of the QRF at two or three 
locations rather than basing the entire battalion at 
Mazar-e-Sharif.  Toward that end, Schneiderhan said Germany 
could provide two QRF companies at Mazar and one at Kunduz, 
and asked that Norway provide a fourth company out of its PRT 
in Maimana. 
 
¶9. (C) Norwegian CHOD Gen. Diesen tentatively agreed, saying 
that it would work with its Latvian partners on meeting the 
requirement.  He argued, however, that if the QRF were 
deployed in a decentralized manner, it should be controlled 
by local commanders rather than by RC-North.  While not 
challenging the plans for decentralized deployment, JFC 
Brunssum Deputy Commander Moran reminded the group that 
according to the CJSOR, the QRF battalion was supposed to be 
capable of being deployed "AOR wide" (i.e., throughout 
Afghanistan) as an integrated unit.  There was no comment or 
discussion of Moran,s intervention. 
 
PROVIDING FORCES FOR ELECTION SUPPORT 
 
¶10. (C) Germany highlighted the CJSOR requirement for 
RC-North,s support of the upcoming presidential election, 
which calls for three infantry companies, rotary-wing 
transport (four helicopters), psychological and information 
operations teams, civil military teams (CIMIC) and medical 
support.  Schneiderhan pressed the SHAPE and JFC Brunssum 
representatives to explain exactly what the ISAF mission 
would be in supporting the election so that RC-North could 
properly configure these additional forces. 
 
¶11. (C) JFC Brunssum Deputy Commander Moran explained that 
ISAF forces would mostly likely be asked to provide outer 
perimeter security and in extremis support, but conceded that 
the date of the election was still up in the air and that 
there had still been no formal request for support from the 
Afghan government.  He noted that while COMISAF favored the 
election in September/October after Ramadan, as previously 
arranged, Afghan political considerations could dictate that 
it take place as early as May.  He also expressed a 
preference for having the election conducted over a period of 
several days in different regions, arguing that ISAF probably 
did not have enough forces to provide security throughout the 
country for a one-day election. 
 
¶12. (C) There was general agreement to meet the requirement 
for additional combat forces in a decentralized fashion, with 
each lead nation taking responsibility for reinforcing its 
own PRT with a few additional platoons of infantry. 
Schneiderhan confirmed that Germany was prepared to provide 
the required psyops, information and CIMIC teams, as well as 
a deployable Role 2 medical facility.  He also confirmed that 
Germany was hoping to deploy two additional CH-53 helicopters 
in time to support the elections, but that this depended on 
how quickly they could be up-armored.  Separately, Director 
of the German Joint Commitment Staff Maj. Gen. Erhard Buehler 
indicated that the two additional helicopters would probably 
not be withdrawn after the elections, but remain deployed in 
Afghanistan indefinitely.  (Comment:  Deployment of these two 
additional helicopters would increase the number of uparmored 
German CH-53s in Afghanistan to 9.  Germany has some 80 
CH-53s in its inventory, but only 20 are currently up-armored 
and combat-deployable.  Germany is currently having 8 
additional CH-53s up-armored, from which the MOD will draw in 
supporting the election support deployment.  End Comment.) 
 
GIVING OMLTS AN AFGHAN FACE? 
 
¶13. (C) Schneiderhan announced that Germany planned to do a 
food-for-thought paper on evolution of the OMLT concept, 
proposing, among other things, to give it more of an "Afghan 
face."  Germany thought it was time to think about how to 
integrate Afghan trainers into the OMLTs, with the goal of 
having them gradually take over the training and mentoring of 
Kandaks, thereby reducing the need for international forces 
to do this work.  Schneiderhan argued that this would become 
especially important as the ANA was expanded to meet the new 
end-state goal of 122,000 and the demand for OMLTs increased. 
 
¶14. (C) While expressing themselves open to any new ideas 
Germany might want to bring forward, both SHAPE and JFC 
Brunssum were clearly skeptical about the Afghanization of 
OMLTs.  JFC Brunssum ACOS for Operations Air Commodore Stacey 
pointed out that OMLTs not only provide training, but also 
provide liaison with ISAF and are responsible for calling in 
close air support and medical evacuation.  For legal and 
other reasons, this was not a function that could be turned 
over solely to the Afghans.  He and SHAPE ACOS Brigadier Gen. 
Dammjacob also pointed out that experienced and highly 
qualified ANA officers were in short supply and using them as 
trainers/mentors would mean that they would not be available 
to lead ANA Kandaks, thus diminishing the combat capability 
that the training programs were designed to engender.  Both 
expressed doubt that this would be a good trade-off. 
 
FILLING OMLT REQUIREMENTS IN RC-NORTH 
 
¶15. (C) Germany announced at the start of the conference that 
only two U.S. ETTs in the ANA 209th Corps in RC-North still 
had no identified NATO OMLT replacements: 1) the Combat 
Service Support (CSS) Kandak for the 1st Brigade and 2) the 
Garrison Kandak for the forthcoming 2nd Brigade.  When Sweden 
announced at the conference that it was willing to provide an 
OMLT for an infantry Kandak, Germany agreed to let Sweden 
take over the infantry battalion it is currently mentoring 
(2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade) and to assume responsibility for 
the 1st Brigade CSS Kandak instead.  Finland announced it was 
willing to team up with Germans in mentoring this unit. 
Germany also agreed to assume responsibility for the 2nd 
Brigade Garrison Kandak.  Croatia confirmed that it was 
taking over the Combat Support (CS) Battalion of the 1st 
Brigade from a U.S. ETT in March 2009, but said it would be 
doing so in partnership with the U.S. Minnesota National 
Guard. 
 
¶16. (C) The Germans understand that the U.S. wants to retain 
its ETT in the 209th Corps Commando Kandak based in 
Mazar-e-Sharif.  By Germany,s reckoning, then, there are no 
more U.S. ETTs to be replaced in RC-North at the current 
time, although the MOD is aware that the stand-up of the 3rd 
Brigade in 2010 and beyond, as part of the ANA expansion, 
will create additional OMLT requirements.  As result of the 
agreements reached at the conference, the OMLT picture in 
RC-North is as follows: 
 
209th Corps:  Germany/Norway/Sweden/Croatia Finland 
 
1st Brigade:  Norway/Germany/Sweden/Croatia/Finland/Macedon ia 
 
-- 1st Kandak (Battalion): U.S., transfer to Norway in 
January 2009 
-- 2nd:  Germany, transfer to Sweden in 2009 
-- 3rd:  Croatia 
-- CS:  U.S., transfer to Croatia/U.S. in March 2009 
-- CSS: U.S., transfer to Germany/Finland in 2009 
-- Garrison:  Croatia in February 2009 
 
2nd Brigade:  Germany/Hungary/Macedonia 
-- 1st: Germany (entered initial training October 2008) 
-- 2nd: Belgium (start January 2009) 
-- 3rd:  Hungary (start February 2009) 
-- CS: Germany (start March 2009) 
-- CSS: Germany (start January 2009) 
-- Garrison: U.S., transfer to Germany in 2009 
 
PROPOSED ANA ENGINEER SCHOOL 
 
¶17. (C) Germany briefed its proposal to establish an ANA 
Engineer School in Mazar-e-Sharif consisting of some 30 
mentors and costing some 18 million Euros over five years. 
Germany originally had intended to set up an ANA Infantry 
School in Mazar, but had given up that idea after learning 
that such a school was already planned to be established in 
Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province.  While nations generally 
supported the idea of an Engineer School and volunteered to 
provide trainers and equipment, no one stepped forward to 
help with funding.  Schneiderhan said flatly that Germany 
could not afford to cover all the costs of the school itself 
and that without other financial contributions, the proposal 
was "a non-flier."   He suggested that RC-North nations take 
up this issue again in the new year.  (Comment: The MOD,s 
balking at spending 18 million Euros over five years for the 
Engineer School does not bode well for our pending request 
that Germany spend an additional 100 million Euros per year 
beginning in 2010 to support ANA expansion.  End Comment.) 
 
PROVINCIAL ADVISORY TEAMS AND FUTURE OF THE PRT CONCEPT 
 
¶18. (C) Germany continued to promote its idea of setting up a 
Provincial Advisory Team (PAT) in every province that does 
not yet have a PRT.  It also continued to advocate in favor 
 
of eventually establishing a PRT in all 34 provinces of the 
country.  Germany noted that it was considerably expanding 
its PAT in Takhar Province to some 45 soldiers and civilians, 
up from the original team of 25, which was military only. 
While Swedish CHOD Gen. Syren Hakan remained reluctant to 
accept the PAT moniker for Sweden's three provincial offices 
in Jawzjan, Sar-e-Pol and Samangan, he noted that Sweden and 
its partners were following Germany,s line and adding a 
full-time civilian capacity to each. 
 
¶19. (C) Norwegian CHOD Gen. Diesen noted that because of the 
lack of coherence at the strategic level in Afghanistan, PRTs 
must be the primary instruments of the comprehensive 
approach, which requires more civilian capability.  He 
conceded that this view ran at variance to Norway's 
long-standing ideological preference to funnel all 
development and civilian assistance through the national 
government and through NGOs at the national level.  He also 
regretted the fact that most civilian agencies in the 
governments of ISAF contributing nations did not have much 
expeditionary capability. 
 
¶20. (C) Finnish Chief of Defense Command Lt. Gen. Ari 
Puheloinen took a similar line, raising the idea of 
eventually transforming its military observation teams (MOTs) 
at PRT Maimana into CIMIC teams that can more readily carry 
out a comprehensive approach.  JFC Brunssum Deputy Commander 
Moran revealed that Brunssum was just about to release a 
paper on the "PRT life cycle," which would propose a possible 
evolution of PRTs in accordance with the five-year Afghan 
National Development Strategy (ANDS) and PRT end-state. 
 
 
TRANSFER OF LEAD SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY 
 
¶21. (C) The German MOD raised concerns that ISAF had been too 
passive up to now on the issue of transferring lead security 
responsibility (TLSR) to the Afghan National Security Forces. 
 It proposed ISAF taking a more "directive approach" in 
setting criteria and pre-conditions to ensure that the TLSR 
process unfolded in a transparent and predictable fashion 
 
that respected the equities of ISAF contributing nations. 
Swedish CHOD Gen. Hakan agreed, noting that there were many 
rumors that Balkh province, the location of PRT 
Mazar-e-Sharif and RC-North HQ, was a leading TLSR candidate 
after Kabul.  It was important to understand what the 
criteria and timelines would be for this process and what the 
role of ISAF would be after it was over.  Referring to 
President Karzai,s announcement on TLSR for Kabul, SHAPE 
DCOS for Operations Brigadier Gen. Dammjacob agreed that if 
ISAF did not "lean forward" on TLSR, the Afghans would make 
decisions on their own, which might not necessarily accord 
with ISAF,s point of view. 
 
¶22. (C) JFC Brunssum Deputy Commander Moran conceded that 
there was a need to have greater transparency and 
understanding of what TLSR was all about.  He clarified that 
Phase 4 (transition) of the ISAF operation would only be 
declared after a number of provinces had been successfully 
transferred to the ANSF and a "tipping point" had been 
reached.  In conclusion, Schneiderhan wondered if the paper 
currently before the NATO Military Committee on the TLSR 
issue was really ripe for consideration.  He noted that once 
it was delivered to the political level, the military would 
lose control of it.  He suggested postponing any action on it 
until after new CENTCOM Commander General Patreus completed 
his Joint Strategic Review of CENTCOM's area of operation in 
February 2009. 
 
FOLLOW-UP TO BUDAPEST DECISION ON CN 
 
¶23. (C) German Joint Commitment Staff Director Maj. Gen. 
Buehler noted that although NATO Defense Ministers had been 
pressed to take an urgent decision at their informal Budapest 
meeting in October to authorize COMISAF to conduct CN 
interdiction operations against drug laboratories and 
traffickers linked to the insurgency, no such operations had 
yet been conducted.  He wondered why this was the case and 
what ISAF would be able to report to Defense Ministers at 
their next week in Krakow in February. 
 
¶24. (C) JFC Brunssum Deputy Commander Moran confirmed that, 
in fact, no operations under COMISAF,s enhanced CN authority 
had been conducted, largely because of the need for countries 
who plan to participate in such operations, such as the U.S., 
to settle remaining outstanding legal and procedural issues 
and to refine the rules of engagement.  He acknowledged that 
because of the delay, ISAF had probably missed the 
opportunity to interdict the initial production and 
processing of this past season,s poppy crop.  As a result, 
he said it would be important to "manage expectations" about 
what can be achieved by the time of the Krakow meeting. 
TIMKEN JR