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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 001136 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DRL- DAVID KRAMER AND WENDY SILVERMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM AJ
SUBJECT: DRL A/S KRAMER, PRESIDENT ALIYEV DEBATE PACE OF 
POLITICAL REFORM 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse, reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: On November 18 DRL A/S David 
Kramer and the Ambassador met with President Ilham Aliyev for 
a two-hour discussion of democracy and human rights issues. 
Most of the discussion centered on the deteriorating state of 
media freedom in Azerbaijan, including the jailed journalists 
and the announcement that foreign broadcasters may be removed 
from Azerbaijan's airwaves.  A/S Kramer also raised issues of 
freedom of assembly and religion.  The overall tone of the 
discussion was friendly, but Aliyev did not make any promises 
to remedy any of the issues raised, sticking to the line that 
Azerbaijan is the most democratic country in the region. The 
discussion strongly suggested a struggle in the government 
over the issue of these broadcasting closures, with 
hard-liners and those actively seeking to promote a public 
break with Washington arguing hard that the GOAJ should not 
let the USG push it around on "an issue of Azerbaijani law." 
 End Summary and Comment. 
 
¶2. (C) On November 18 Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor David Kramer and the 
Ambassador met with President Ilham Aliyev.  Aliyev's 
International Relations Advisor Novruz Mammedov joined the 
meeting. 
 
Poor press freedom major obstacle in U.S.-AJ Relations 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶3. (C) A/S Kramer explained that the United States is looking 
to deepen its relations with Azerbaijan, through an 
intensified security dialogue, more support on 
Nagorno-Karabakh, and discussing changes to section 907 of 
the Freedom Support Act.  However, issues like the possible 
ban on Radio Liberty and Voice of America from Azerbaijan's 
airwaves and the continued detention of journalists will make 
it harder to seek these changes.  Corruption and judicial 
reform are also important, albeit long-term reform 
priorities.  Freedom of the press remains front and center on 
the U.S. democratization agenda. 
 
¶4. (C) President Aliyev agreed that there are good signs of 
the deepening of relations between the U.S. and Azerbaijan, 
including the recent visits of Vice President Cheney, Deputy 
Secretary of State Negroponte, and Secretary of Energy 
Bodman, and President Bush's recent letters.   In discussions 
with these visitors Aliyev saw no difference of opinion.  In 
general Aliyev believes freedom of the press in Azerbaijan is 
improving, and is not worse than in neighboring countries. 
The GOAJ did not shut down any television stations, as 
Georgia did, nor did it have poor elections as did Armenia. 
(Note:  The GOAJ did shut down ANS TV in 2006 and since then 
there is no television station that takes an entirely 
independent editorial line.  End Note.)  President Aliyev 
personally would not like to see any journalists in jail, but 
they are in jail due to their crimes, and that should not 
affect the general positive picture of the media.  &There is 
freedom of the press in Azerbaijan,8 he claimed. 
 
¶5. (C) On foreign broadcasters, Aliyev believes that it is 
important not to politicize the issue, as they are simply 
bringing the situation into conformity with Azerbaijani law. 
The GOAJ has already removed Russian television from 
Azerbaijani frequencies, because Azerbaijan is an independent 
country.  Aliyev believes such foreign broadcasts damage 
Azerbaijan's sovereignty, and are not found in Europe or even 
in Azerbaijan's neighborhood. 
 
¶6. (C) Aliyev then explained that the GOAJ has monitored 
Radio Liberty and that 90 percent of its coverage is against 
him.  While he has the highest respect for the Executive 
branch of the USG, he believes listening to Radio Liberty is 
the same as listening to Radio Iran, which spreads propaganda 
into the south of Azerbaijan.  Furthermore, when Azerbaijan 
removed Russian television stations from the country, it did 
not ruin relations with Russia. 
 
¶7. (C) A/S Kramer then asked why, if the law were passed in 
2002, was the GOAJ only deciding to implement it now 
vis-a-vis RFE/RL, VOA and BBC.  Aliyev responded that the 
GOAJ had previously acted against Russian and Turkish 
 
broadcasters.  In addition, he did not want to take this step 
before the presidential election, as it would have been 
interpreted as an attack on free speech.  He continued that 
the GOAJ will do many other things in the coming months and 
years to "bring Azerbaijan in accordance with international 
standards."  He then said he was flexible on how to fix the 
problem, and that the GOAJ would not shut the broadcasts down 
entirely.  This would be impossible anyway, he stated, as 
they always listened to these stations under the Soviet Union. 
 
¶8. (C) A/S Kramer further explained that the announcement by 
the National Radio and Television Center on ending the 
broadcasts was viewed very poorly in Washington, and not just 
by DRL, and asked for negotiations in good faith on how to 
resolve it, without a looming deadline.  Aliyev responded 
that this was not a signal after his election; the real 
"signal" was the November 13-14 Baku Energy Summit.  A/S 
Kramer asked if Aliyev would be shutting these stations if 
their coverage was 90 percent positive towards him.  After 
hesitating, Aliyev replied that he would shut them down, as 
it is a rule of law issue. 
 
¶9. (C) A/s Kramer said it is not just the West that is 
worried about this issue: during his meeting with civil 
society members (septel), all of the activists raised this 
issue as the most important one on their agenda.  Aliyev 
replied that he could guess who those civil society activists 
were, and that the reason they say they want Radio Liberty is 
because they want grants from the West.  Aliyev said he wants 
to change many things that happened during the early years of 
Azerbaijan's independence that were wrong, and wants respect 
for Azerbaijan's statehood. 
 
¶10. (C) In a final push, A/S Kramer again asked for no 
deadline for negotiations, stating that if GOAJ closed these 
radio stations at the end of the year, it would be the first 
thing the new U.S. administration would learn about 
Azerbaijan.  Aliyev pushed back, asking why it is proper for 
foreign countries to make propaganda against him.  He stated 
there were "two Americas," one consisting of the President 
and Vice President and the other which is financing NGOs. 
A/S Kramer responded that Radio Liberty is not producing 
propaganda, it produces information, and that the President 
and the Vice President are the same people who are funding 
NGOs. Any issues of content should be raised with RFE/RL 
management, which enforces a policy of objective, 
independent, unbiased reporting.  A/S Kramer also asked 
Aliyev to issue a strong statement condemning violence 
against journalists which would send a clear message that 
these actions are not to be tolerated.  Aliyev replied that 
he did so several years ago, and the situation is not any 
better in Georgia or Armenia.  A/S Kramer said that attacks 
have increased, arguing for a need to issue a new statement 
(a plea A/S Kramer made during his June visit as well). 
 
Election Monitoring Center 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Aliyev then brought up the recent presidential 
elections as a clear sign of democracy in Azerbaijan, stating 
that even the Election Monitoring Center (EMC) confirmed the 
results.  A/S Kramer and the Ambassador then explained to 
Aliyev that the threats made by Ramiz Mehdiyev against EMC on 
the evening before the election were unacceptable, and the 
manner in which he relayed  them to the Ambassador was 
offensive to a friendly country.  Aliyev seemed surprised by 
this news, but replied that he knew that EMC was specially 
created to attack him publicly, and was made up of opposition 
leaders, including (EMC Director) Anar Mammadli.  Aliyev 
asked why the U.S. chose opposition people to conduct an exit 
poll (NOTE:  EMC did not conduct an exit poll, but a PVT, 
during this election.  End Note.)  Aliyev also stated that 
the National Democratic Institute, which funds EMC, has 
always been against the GOAJ. 
 
Aliyev's view of U.S.-AJ Relations 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Aliyev stated that he does not have this type of 
conversation with other partners, only with the US. 
Azerbaijan's domestic situation is not worse than other 
 
countries of the former Soviet Union.  Aliyev believes that 
the situation in Azerbaijan is not a threat to the U.S., but 
the threats come from the possibility of a weak government, 
religious extremism, and Azerbaijan's neighbors.  The jailed 
journalists "are not worth the United States' time."  He 
wondered what to expect from the Obama administration. 
 
¶13. (C) Aliyev then explained that Radio Liberty publishes 
stories against not only him, but against national symbols. 
He had read an article in which Radio Liberty disapproved of 
Aliyev's plan to build an enormous flagpole in the Baku 
harbor complex, a project which would require moving "a few 
military installations."  (NOTE: The project resulted in 
displacing the Navy from its headquarters.  End Note.) 
Aliyev said that Radio Liberty suggested he plant the 
flagpole in Karabakh instead.  Aliyev asked rhetorically what 
members of Azerbaijan's parliament think when they hear 
stories like this. 
 
Middle East and Democratization 
------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) In response to A/S Kramer's explanation that the best 
partners to the U.S. are those that are moving in a 
democratic direction, Aliyev asked why one of the closest U.S 
allies is Saudi Arabia, and why the U.S. did not recognize 
the election of Hamas in the Palestinian territories.  The 
U.S. has lost position in the Arab world because of "attempts 
to democratize kings" and "democracy is not possible in that 
part of the world."  Aliyev stated that Iraq is in a worse 
position now than it was under Saddam Hussein, because it is 
divided and hundreds of thousands of people have died; A/S 
Kramer strongly challenged Aliyev's views. 
 
¶15. (C) Aliyev stated that the average citizen of Azerbaijan, 
by comparison, supports him and all of his policies because 
they live in peace and have jobs.  Aliyev believes the 
average Azerbaijani doesn't feel the war in Georgia nor the 
world financial crisis.  Therefore the U.S. cannot tell the 
GOAJ what to do, as they do not want a strong Azerbaijan as 
much as he does.  If that were the case, Aliyev believes he 
would not have won 89 percent of the vote.  The level of 
democracy now in Azerbaijan is the maximum that can be 
achieved. 
 
Freedom of Assembly 
------------------- 
 
¶16.  (C) In response to the Ambassador's question on freedom 
of assembly, Aliyev stated there was no problem with this, as 
people can assemble in any of the specially designated areas. 
 In addition, he stated that people have no reason to rally. 
Aliyev says the old opposition is disorganized and the new 
opposition is weak.  Moreover, the opposition leaders have a 
good life, as they get to meet foreign representatives and go 
to receptions, but they have never worked a day in their 
lives. 
 
Freedom of Religion 
------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) In response to A/S Kramer's question on forced beard 
shavings, Aliyev replied that the number of beards in 
Azerbaijan is growing and it is a very dangerous situation, 
but noted it is not the GOAJ's policy to forcibly shave 
beards.   Regarding the Abu Bakr mosque, which was the site 
of a grenade attack on August 18, Aliyev said the authorities 
had arrested a couple dozen people, and while this may have 
been excessive, it is better to save time, and those that 
want to harm Azerbaijan will be punished.  The mosque will 
probably be re-opened but we have to wait and see, as threats 
on the Imam's life continue and neighbors complain about the 
mosque. 
 
Three Requests 
-------------- 
 
¶18. (C) A/S Kramer concluded the meeting by repeating his 
three main requests of Aliyev: freeing the three journalists; 
a presidential statement condemning violence against 
journalists; and continuing foreign broadcasts.  Aliyev said 
 
that if negotiations of the foreign broadcasters are in good 
faith, there would be no need to take them off the air 
immediately.  He said there might be a compromise solution of 
reducing the current number of four broadcasters (Radio 
Liberty, Voice of America radio, Voice of American TV, and 
BBC) to a smaller number, starting with VOA TV. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶19. (C) The fact that Aliyev engaged in a lively and often 
difficult discussion of democracy and human rights issues for 
two hours was a welcome sign in an otherwise bleak picture on 
these issues since his re-election.  While the message from 
A/S Kramer was clear, Aliyev did not make any promises to 
resolve the issues raised.  It was also clear from the 
discussion that Aliyev has very poor information on a number 
of issues, including the content and audience of Radio 
Liberty and the activities of NGOs including EMC.  He seemed 
stunned when A/S Kramer told him that back in August 
Presidential advisor Ali Hasanov during a visit in Washington 
promised the release of the detained journalists immediately 
after the election.  &He had no business or authority to 
promise such a thing,8 Aliyev responded angrily.  The 
discussion strongly  suggested there is a struggle in the 
government over the issue of these broadcasting cosures, 
with hard-liners and those actively seekig to promote a 
public rift with Washington arguing hard that the GOAJ should 
not let the USG push it around on "an issue of Azerbaijani 
law." 
 
¶20. (C) The USG should continue to take every opportunity to 
hammer home in blunt terms the message of USG redlines on 
keeping the foreign broadcasts on the air in all bilateral 
channels and all meetings with the relevant GOAJ 
interlocutors, but hold off on further condemnatory public 
reactions as the BBG, expected in Baku in early December, 
addresses the legal issues (FonMin Mammadyarov reiterated to 
the Ambassador on November 27 that he is working internally 
to resolve the radio issue, and asks again that the USG not 
take the matter to the press, but have the BBG talk to the 
NRTC.)  END COMMENT. 
 
¶21.  (U) Assistant Secretary Kramer has cleared this cable. 
 
DERSE