VZCZCXRO7316
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4068 3651745
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301745Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1068
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 004068 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/WCI, NEA/I, NEA/PM, NEA-I/PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PHUM PINR KDRG IZ US
SUBJECT: IRAQ APPROVES ACCEPTANCE OF GUANTANAMO DETAINEES; 
AWAITING WRITTEN ASSURANCES 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 3512 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 3272 
     ¶C. STATE 100598 
 
Classified By: Acting Political-Military Counselor Philip S. 
Kosnett for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY.  Prime Minister (PM) Nuri al-Maliki has 
approved the transfer of four Iraqi detainees from USG 
custody at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO; REF C) to the control and 
custody of the Government of Iraq.  The PM has authorized the 
Director of the Prime Minister's National Operation Center 
(PMNOC), Mr. Hussain Al-Asady, to coordinate the transfer 
framework with Embassy Baghdad.  Mr. Hussain has agreed in 
principle to security and humane treatment assurances and 
will provide written confirmation of those assurances.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (S) Embassy Baghdad discussed the transfer of four Iraqi 
detainees from GTMO to Iraq with Minister of Interior Jawad 
al-Bulani October 6 (REF B).  As requested by al-Bulani, 
biometric data and releasable case files were provided (REF 
C).  EmbOffs continued to press for movement on the transfer 
with other contacts at the MoI and Office of the Prime 
Minister. On December 30, Hussain Al-Asady of the PM's staff 
notified PolMilOff that the PM had signed off on the transfer 
(after some earlier expressions of reluctance) and asked to 
consult on next steps.  (NOTE:  Although the PM had stated on 
more than one occasion that he did not want Iraqi GTMO 
detainees repatriated, the realization that they cannot stay 
at GTMO forever and that their release in the U.S. or another 
third country could cause embarrassment to the Government, 
especially should any of them should engage in subversive 
activities, evidently caused him to reconsider.  Owing to 
this, Al-Asadi stated that he would like to execute the 
process "before (the PM) changes his mind."  END NOTE.) 
 
¶3. (S) PolMilOff reiterated that written assurances like the 
draft copy previously provided are would be required to move 
forward.  PolMilOff emphasized the following points: 
 
-- The USG is not requiring or requesting that the detainees 
be further detained after repatriation.  Al-Asady noted that 
their activities would be investigated upon their return, but 
they would only be detained in accordance with Iraqi law. 
(NOTE:  According to Al-Asady, a person may be detained for 
up to seven days with a court order, and the court order 
could be renewed twice for a total of 21 days for 
investigative purposes.  END COMMENT) 
 
-- The GOI would take all necessary and legal steps to ensure 
that the detainees do not participate in terrorism 
activities.  Al-Asady said that their families and tribes 
would assist in monitoring their activities. 
 
-- Travel restrictions outside of Iraq should be imposed. 
Al-Asady said that according to Iraqi law, their passports 
could be confiscated for up to five years. 
 
-- The transferred persons must be treated humanely in 
accordance with Iraqi law and international standards and 
that a U.S. representative be allowed access to them upon 
request.  Al-Asady agreed. 
 
-- The USG requests that the GOI share any information it may 
learn from the transferred persons that could assist the USG 
in preventing, countering, investigating, or prosecuting acts 
of terror.  Al-Asady agreed. 
 
¶4. (S) Al-Asady asked whether the USG would "if possible" 
share interrogation files from the detainees so Iraqi 
investigators would "not have to start from the beginning." 
Pol-MilOff promised to pass on the request. (COMMENT:  The 
tone used by Al-Asady indicated that the transfers would not 
Qtone used by Al-Asady indicated that the transfers would not 
be tied to receiving the detainees' case files, and we do not 
believe the GOI will insist on this.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶5. (S) Al-Asady told Pol-MilOff that he would go over the 
draft written assurances and while he did not believe there 
would be any problems, he would contact the Embassy should he 
need any clarification.  He emphasized that the GOI would 
like to move forward quickly on the transfer.  Embassy will 
continue to follow-up with Mr. Al-Asady and will forward 
written assurances once received. 
CROCKER