VZCZCXRO7119
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4064/01 3651455
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301455Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1059
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS KCRS IZ
SUBJECT: PRT SALAH AD DIN: APPREHENSION OVER COMING SOI 
TRANSITION 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 4057 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 3922 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor John Fox for Reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) This is a PRT Salah ad Din reporting cable. 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: Provincial leaders are concerned that the 
upcoming transition of responsibility for Sons of Iraq (SOI) 
contracts from Coalition Forces (CF) to the Government of 
Iraq (GOI) could undermine security improvements in Salah ad 
Din (SaD).  While SOI transition in SaD is not scheduled to 
take place until April 2009, local leaders are already 
carefully tracking progress in other regions.  Many SOI 
sheikhs in SaD are reluctant to see the CF or GOI implement 
any transition arrangement that removes operational control 
of the SOI program from the Sheikhs' direct supervision.  SOI 
members themselves, however, appear primarily concerned with 
having a steady salary.  Rank and file members of the SOI in 
SaD are largely unskilled workers with few alternative 
sources of income.  The PRT and CF in SaD have been seeking 
opportunities to shift SOI members into long-term civilian 
employment, but the lack of comprehensive jobs or training 
programs will limit the reach of these efforts.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
SaD LEADERS TRACKING SOI TRANSITION ELSEWHERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) In SaD, SOI registration is scheduled to begin in 
March, and transition to GOI responsibility will begin in 
April.  (NOTE: As of December 28, SaD province had 124 SOI 
contracts incorporating 8,521 individuals.  END NOTE). 
Leaders at all levels of the provincial government, however, 
have already begun to express concern that a poorly managed 
transition to GOI control would lead to a rapid decrease in 
security. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Provincial and local officials are tracking the 
progress of the SOI transition in Baghdad.  They have so far 
commented favorably on CF and GOI management of the process, 
which they view as predictive of how events will unfold in 
SaD.  On December 27, PRT officers spoke with one Sheikh who 
controls a security contract for 65 men along Route Tampa 
outside Tikrit.  He said that the SOI transition was going 
smoothly in Baghdad, which would bode well for the SoI 
transition in his area. 
 
------------------ 
SOI ADMIRED IN SAD 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Provincial leaders and many citizens in SaD credit the 
SOI with the rapid improvements in security over the last 
year and a half.  Bayji Oil Refinery Director General Ali 
Obeidi commented in a September meeting with PRT officers 
that "there should be some sort of monument to them (the 
SOI)."  Deputy Governor Abdullah Jebara has often credited 
the SOI with "defeating al-Qaida" during conversations with 
the PRT.  The achievements of the SOI are all the more 
politically significant for SaD residents, since they are the 
local, Iraqi face of the counterinsurgency. 
 
¶6. (U) Many SOI sheikhs and members derive great satisfaction 
from their service, which has enabled them to provide income 
to their families and linked them with a force that is 
praised for improving security.  On market walks and 
community engagements, PRT officers are often approached by 
young men introducing themselves as SOI members with evident 
pride.  Likewise, many SOI sheikhs have used the income and 
status they derive from SOI contracts to expand their role in 
politics and business (refs). 
 
--------------- 
BUT ALSO FEARED 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (C) At the same time, many local observers speak fearfully 
of the SOIs' brutality and general lack of discipline.  PRT 
Qof the SOIs' brutality and general lack of discipline.  PRT 
officers have received unconfirmed reports from local 
contacts of the involvement of off-duty SOI members in crimes 
ranging from extorting fuel trucks to sexual assault.  During 
engagements with local leaders, PRT officers have often noted 
the youthfulness of the SOI members and their poor discipline 
(e.g., their tendency to accidentally discharge their 
weapons).  On a few occasions, PRT locally hired staff has 
related fearful, late-night encounters with SOI members at 
checkpoints around the province.  On one occasion, a PRT 
contact from the banking sector insisted that CF warn SOI 
sheikhs not to display their guns in his office or "make a 
lot of noise about their relationship with the Americans" 
 
BAGHDAD 00004064  002 OF 002 
 
 
before he would agree to collaborate on a project involving 
several powerful local SOI sheikhs. 
 
¶8. (C) PRT contacts frequently accuse SOI members of 
maintaining contact with both the CF and insurgent groups, 
and thus should not be fully trusted.  As a local business 
contact commented to the PRT in November, "al-Qaida used to 
pay them (the SOI) to place IEDs, now you (CF) are paying 
them to fight al-Qaida." Some in SaD fear that, without CF 
control, some SOI will revert to insurgents.  Asked if the 
men under his control would do this, one Bayji-based Sheikh 
denied that this would be a problem with his men, but that 
SOI members from "other groups" could fall under al-Qaida 
influence again if they were left off the payroll. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
SOI SHEIKHS LOOKING TO MAINTAIN STATUS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Many SOI sheikhs that the PRT has spoken to are 
reluctant to see any arrangement that would remove 
operational control of the SOI, or payment of SOI salaries, 
from them.  Asked what jobs his men would seek after the SOI 
contracts expire, one Bayji area Sheikh told us that his men 
would only accept jobs that allowed them to "carry our own 
guns and protect our own villages;" i.e. preserve the status 
quo.  Nonetheless, most of the SOI "soldiers" that we have 
met said they would eagerly accept any well-paying job of 
equal status. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
SOI SALARIES SUPPORTING POOREST FAMILIES 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) SOI salaries are a major source of income for some of 
the most economically vulnerable workers in SaD and their 
extended families.  A Human Terrain Team study by CF in SaD 
found that over half the SOI in SaD (63.6 percent) have no 
marketable skills or training.  Few of them that we have 
interviewed have completed secondary school. (NOTE: SOI 
members in SaD are paid $250 U.S./month, which is considered 
a good salary for unskilled workers.  END NOTE). Furthermore, 
the 8,581 SOI members on contract in SaD as of December 28 
support a median family size of ten people.  This will 
magnify the effect of any loss of income. 
 
¶11. (SBU) During conversations with the PRT, very few SOI 
members said they had any good prospects for new employment. 
Many of them have told us they wish to join the Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF).  This may reflect SOI members' 
favorable perception of ISF jobs as well as a lack of 
confidence in their ability to obtain any other desirable 
employment.  In Samarra, approximately 600 former SOI members 
are expected to complete police training and be sworn into 
the force by the end of December. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS LIMITED 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) In coordination with CF in SaD, the PRT is working 
to develop employment opportunities for former SOI.  The PRT 
has persuaded one contractor linked with our hoop house 
agricultural initiative (building plastic greenhouses) to 
hire 24 SOI members for a short-term construction project. 
(NOTE: We expect the number of former SOI employed in this 
project to quadruple as the hoop house project moves forward. 
 END NOTE). Iraqi Business and Industrial Zone (IBIZ) Skills 
Enhancement training programs have helped more than 92 former 
SOI members to get jobs at COB Speicher. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Finding stable employment for the 8,500-strong 
force of experienced fighters will be one of the primary 
challenges in SaD for the PRT, CF, and GOI in the coming 
year.  Current funding ceilings for programs such as Quick 
Qyear.  Current funding ceilings for programs such as Quick 
Response Funds and Iraqi Rapid Assistance Projects are 
insufficient to address this challenge in a comprehensive 
manner.  Tapping into appropriate funding sources--whether 
from the GOI or the U.S.--will enable us to increase the 
number of former SOI members that are prepared for civilian 
employment.  END COMMENT. 
CROCKER