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INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 001635 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018 
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD GR PGOV PREL CH
SUBJECT: GREECE/CHINA: GREEKS SEE PRC AS MORE "AGGRESSIVE" 
DURING PRESIDENT HU'S VISIT 
 
Classified By: DCM DEBORAH MCCARTHY.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Chinese Embassy and Greek MFA readouts 
painted very different pictures of Chinese President Hu's 
recent visit to Athens.  The Chinese saw the visit as 
fulfilling three goals: repaying Greece for President 
Papoulias' visit during the Olympics; cementing the 
Chinese-Greece "comprehensive strategic partnership"; and 
expanding economic cooperation, including the signing of an 
agreement for a 35-year concession for the Chinese company 
COSCO to run the container terminal at the Piraeus port.  The 
Greek MFA took a less benign view of the visit, which the GOG 
believed had been "imposed" on them by the increasingly 
"aggressive" Chinese, who insisted on Greek support for 
China's positions on key issues but did not reciprocate with 
support for the Greek position on such issues as the 
Macedonia name dispute.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) People's Republic of China President Hu Jintao paid a 
state visit to Greece November 24-26.  This was the first 
visit to Greece by a PRC Head of State since 2000.  Greek 
President Papoulias had visited China in June; PM Karamanlis 
last visited China in 2006.  During the Athens visit, Hu met 
with Papoulias, Karamanlis, and the heads of the main 
opposition PASOK party and the Communist Party of Greece 
(KKE). 
 
THE CHINESE VIEW 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In a readout for us of the visit, Chinese Embassy 
Political Counselor Liu Wei said the Chinese had three goals. 
 The first was to repay Greece for the visit of President 
Papoulias to China and the support Greece had shown to China 
with the Olympics.  Wei said it was important to the "Chinese 
mentality" to show gratitude.  On this score, he also 
mentioned China's gratitude to President Bush for his support 
of the Olympics. 
 
¶4. (C) The second goal was renewal of Greek-Chinese 
friendship.  Wei said Greece and China were not allies, as 
Greece and the U.S. were -- China did not make such alliances 
with foreign governments.  But Greece and China were 
"comprehensive strategic partners," as established in their 
2006 agreement.  Wei defined precisely what that meant: 
"comprehensive" referred to the fact that China and Greece 
would agree on issues across the board and not cherry pick 
when it was convenient.  Their partnership at the same time 
was "strategic" because it focused on the global context and 
was long-term, not simply a marriage of convenience for the 
present.  Wei said Greece was the "most adamant" supporter of 
the one-China policy in the EU, and China was a strong 
supporter of the reunification of Cyprus.  Such a convergence 
of views, he argued, made Greece and China "natural 
partners."  Greece was one of China's strongest advocates in 
the EU, and the Chinese President promised during the visit 
that China would never do anything to harm Greece. 
 
¶5. (C) Expanding "pragmatic cooperation," that is, economic 
and business interaction, was the third Chinese goal.  Wei 
indicated China wanted to "go global" but had had problems in 
securing a foothold in Western countries due to mistrust. 
Such mistrust did not exist in Greece, according to Wei, and 
increasing economic ties between China and Greece was an 
important step for China.  Wei said that half of Chinese 
exports were carried on Greek-owned vessels, while 60 percent 
of China's oil imports arrived on Greek ships. 
 
¶6. (C) During the visit, PM Karamanlis signed an agreement 
granting the Chinese firm COSCO Pacific Ltd a 35-year 
concession on the container terminal at the port of Piraeus. 
Under the agreement, which China was awarded in June and 
which represented the largest-ever such deal with a foreign 
power to control such an important aspect of the Greek 
economy, COSCO would pay 4.3 billion euro over 35 years and 
would renovate one pier and build another.  Wei admitted that 
the Chinese saw some difficulties in managing the Piraeus 
operation, due both to the global economic downturn and to 
Greek labor unrest.  Greek dock workers continued to strike 
at the prospect of job or salary cuts under Chinese 
management, though Wei said China intended to have only one 
Chinese national running the container operation with an 
otherwise entirely Greek staff.  Additionally, four other 
minor agreements were signed, including two removing 
obstacles to Greek agricultural imports to China (Wei said 
Greek agricultural imports were quite expensive compared to 
domestic Chinese products but were nevertheless necessary in 
the production of high-quality goods for export.)  Other 
agreements covered cooperation between the Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organization (OTE) and the Chinese 
microchip supplier HUAWEI, and the sharing of programming 
 
ATHENS 00001635  002 OF 003 
 
 
between Chinese television CCTV and the Greek State-owned 
television ERT. 
 
¶7. (C) Finally, when asked about potential military sales, 
Wei said there had been no such discussion during the visit. 
(NOTE: Greece has often helped cement deals or agreements in 
other areas through military equipment purchases.  For 
example, at the same time that Greece was sealing the 
Southstream gas pipeline deal with Russia, it also agreed to 
purchase more than a billion dollars worth of Russian armored 
personnel carriers (BMPs).  END NOTE.)  China was "very 
prudent" in arms sales and did not want to upset the balance 
between Greece and Turkey.  "Do no harm" was China's first 
rule in arms sales. 
 
THE GREEK VIEW 
-------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Greek readout, provided by MFA A10 Directorate for 
Asia and Oceania deputy head Adam Adamidis, while covering 
the same basic territory as Wei's readout, was less positive 
and more cynical.  Adamidis said the Chinese had "imposed" 
the visit on Greece, providing only a month's notice, which 
forced Greece to cancel or delay some other high-level 
meetings, such as the visit of the Cypriot President.  This 
was in contrast to Papoulias' visit to China in June, for 
which the Chinese had required a year's preparation.  It was 
not clear why the Chinese had forced their President on the 
Greeks at short notice, though apparently they wanted to 
conclude the COSCO port concession agreement as quickly as 
possible.  Adamidis said the COSCO agreement had been stuck 
in the Greek bureaucracy for some time, but the visit had 
forced it out. 
 
¶9. (C) During the visit, President Papoulias discussed most 
of the political topics, while PM Karamanlis confined himself 
to economic matters.  The COSCO concession, Adamidis said, 
had been Karamanlis' idea.  (NOTE: Press reports early on 
indicated that the Piraeus port concession was to be done by 
an open and fair competition, though as it developed politics 
may have played an increasingly significant role.  END NOTE.) 
 Adamidis took exception to the Chinese interpretation of the 
"comprehensive strategic partnership," saying that while 
Greece and China agreed on many things now, that certainly 
did not mean they would agree forever or on everything.  At 
the same time, however, he conceded that Greece was in a 
"subordinate position," due to its very large trade deficit 
with China: 12 billion euro, plus Chinese shipyards were 
building 20 billion euro worth of Greek ships.  Greece 
accordingly generally supported positions of importance to 
the Chinese.  Adamidis noted Greek support for China's 
receiving Market Economy Status in the world of trade and for 
lifting the EU arms embargo.  Also, unlike most other EU 
countries, Greece did not have an office in Taiwan, and 
Greece kept a low profile on human rights issues in China, 
for which the PRC was grateful. 
 
¶10. (C) The Greeks clearly did not believe this show of 
support for China was reciprocated.  Adamidis noted President 
Papoulias' discussion with Hu on the Macedonia name issue. 
He said Papoulias had told President Hu, "We support you on 
Taiwan, Tibet, and Market Economy Status, but we need your 
support on FYROM."  Papoulias went on to note that Greece had 
been "furious" at China for being the first member of the UN 
Security Council to recognize "FYROM" by its constitutional 
name (1993).  The Chinese reply was "We are going to accept 
any decision by the two parties for a mutually acceptable 
solution."  The Chinese President had also warned Papoulias 
that if the Dalai Lama were permitted to visit Greece, it 
would have a "severe impact" on bilateral relations.  Adding 
to this list, Adamidis mentioned with some disfavor as well 
that in the runup to the Olympics in China, the Chinese had 
agreed to have Greece help with security at the games but as 
the event approach, "they dumped us." 
 
¶11. (C) Summing up, Adamidis said the Chinese had become much 
more "aggressive" of late.  A few years ago, they treated 
Greece with more respect, but now they sought to impose their 
wishes on Greece. 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT: Due to its subordinate economic position 
stemming from its trade deficit and outstanding ship-building 
contracts with the Chinese, Greece apparently feels compelled 
to support Chinese positions on a range of international 
issues.  But Greece evidently is not getting what it thinks 
it deserves in return, and the Greeks do not appear happy 
with the relationship.  PM Karamanlis may be trying to turn 
this situation around with the concession to COSCO on the 
Piraeus container port -- assuming that the MFA report is 
true that he and not a competitive bidding process was 
ultimately responsible for the Chinese getting the 
 
ATHENS 00001635  003 OF 003 
 
 
concession.  As is the case with Russia, the GOG appears 
willing to make concessions on current business deals to 
secure a better position later.  But whether such a strategy 
will work -- either with China or with Russia -- may not be 
clear for some time. 
 
SPECKHARD